EXITING WAR
POST CONFLICT MILITARY OPERATIONS
6th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
Military History Working Group

Bratislava 3–7 April 2006

Bratislava 3 - 7 April 2006

EXITING WAR

POST CONFLICT MILITARY OPERATIONS

6th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
Military History Working Group

Editors

Miloslav Čaplovič
Mária Stanová
André Rakoto

Bratislava – Château de Vincennes
2007

Contents

OBSAH

Vystúpenie
ministra obrany Slovenskej republiky
k účastníkom 6. medzinárodnej vedeckej
konferencie Pracovnej skupiny vojenskej histórie

Vážení delegáti konferencie, milí hostia,
dámy a páni,

je pre mňa veľkou cťou byť prítomný a otvárať túto medzinárodnú vedeckú konferenciu Pracovnej skupiny vojenskej histórie programu Partnerstva za mier Konzorcia obranných akadémií a Inštitútov obranných štúdií, ktorej obsahom sú vážne a náročné otázky, týkajúce sa postkonfliktných vojenských operácií po skončení vojny.

Každoročné konferencie vojenských historikov členských štátov združených v Konzorciu programu Partnerstva za mier sa stávajú už takmer zabehnutou tradíciou. Preto mi dovoľte, aby som Vás čo najsrdečnejšie privítal v poradí už na 6. konferencii. Všestranný význam týchto podujatí potvrdzuje, že Vy, vojenskí historici, sa stretávate na takýchto medzinárodných fórach, vymieňate si názory na rôzne témy histórie bezpečnostnej a vojenskej politiky predovšetkým v 20. storočí, najmä však s dôrazom na jeho druhú polovicu. Ich nezastupiteľnosť vidím aj v tom, že v každodennej praxi Ministerstva obrany Slovenskej republiky sa stále naliehavejšie potvrdzuje nevyhnutnosť zapájania historického poznania do súčasných procesov bezpečnostnej a vojenskej politiky.

Myšlienka organizovania dnešnej konferencie vychádza zo základného poslania Konzorcia pre vojenskú históriu programu Partnerstva za mier. Chce sa stať takým fórom, ktoré poskytne možnosť na medzinárodnú výmenu informácií medzi Vami odborníkmi o jednej zo základných otázok historického kontextu súčasných medzinárodných a regionálnych vzťahov. Cieľ, ktorý ste si postavili na dnešnú konferenciu spočíva v analýze charakteru vojenských postkonfliktných operácií a aktivít v sledovanom období, teda 20. storočia. Priblíženie tejto témy z pohľadov rôznych štátov nepochybne rozšíri poznatky či už o vojenskej okupácii, o protipovstaleckých operáciách, o demobilizácii, o operáciách na udržanie mieru a stability alebo o vojenských aspektoch povojnovej rekonštrukcie a obnovy. O všetkých týchto okruhoch problémov aj z nedávnej minulosti.

Téma dnešnej konferencia má pre nás všetkých nielen historický, ale aj praktický význam, pretože v problematike postkonfliktných operácií sa história spája so súčasnosťou. Skutočnosť, že na svete existujú dodnes bezpečnostné riziká, medzinárodný teroriz-

mus, nestabilita, nám pripomína dôležitosť objektívneho historického hodnotenia a zaväzuje nás k uplatňovaniu a rešpektovaniu jeho výsledkov v politike.

Po roku 1993 Ozbrojené sily Slovenskej republiky sa aktívne zapájajú do rôznych mierových misií, významne prispievajú k stabilizácii viacerých regionálnych konfliktov a kríz. Operujú v rôznych kútoch sveta, slúžia v záujme mieru, bezpečnosti a ďalšieho rozvoja medzinárodnej spolupráce. Od roku 1993, sa v počte asi 10 000 slovenských vojakov, postupne zúčastnili vyše dvadsiatich misií pod zástavou OSN, NATO, Európskej únie alebo OBSE.

Celá táto činnosť, na ktorej sa aktívne podieľa aj Slovenská republika v úzkej spolupráci s európskymi a transatlantickými štruktúrami medzinárodných vojensko-politických organizácií, smeruje do budúcnosti. V tejto súvislosti mi dovoľte odcitovať Európana Otto von Habsburga: „Nemáme právo odpočívať na skutočných alebo zdanlivých vavrínoch. Koniec histórie nenastane, aj keď naivní duchovia o tom snívajú.“

Ani naša súčasná vojenská a bezpečnostná politika, ktorá smeruje do budúcnosti, nemôže byť bez znalosti dejín a aj tí, ktorí sa zdanlivo zaoberajú so súčasnosťou, nemôžu nerešpektovať historickú skúsenosť. Konkrétne historické poznatky z tejto problematiky nám môžu pomôcť aj v súčasnosti.

Vážené dámy a páni, Vašej konferencii želám plodné rokovania, úspešný priebeh, inšpirujúce nové poznatky a teším sa na ich výsledok.

Ďakujem za pozornosť.

Martin Fedor

Bratislava, 4. apríl 2006

Speech of the Minister of Defence of the Slovak Republic

to the Participants of the 6th MHWG International Conference

Dear Delegates of the Conference, Dear Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

it is a great honour to me to be present here and to open this International Scientific Conference of the Working Group of Military History of the Partnership for Peace Program of the Consortium of Defence Academies and Defence Studies Institutes which deals with serious and challenging issues related to post-conflict military operations after ending the war.

Annual conferences of military historians of member states associated in the Consortium of the Partnership for Peace program are becoming almost a tradition. That's why I would like to welcome you most cordially to the 6th Conference. Multilateral importance of these events is evidence that you, military historians, meet each other in such international forums, exchange your opinions on various topics of history of security and military policy first of all in the 20th century, but mainly with focus on its second half. I see their insubstitutability in the fact that daily practice of the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic all the time more urgently shows the necessity of involvement of historical cognition into present processes of security and military policy.

The idea of arranging today's conference results from the basic mission of the Consortium for Military History of the Partnership for Peace program. It wants to become such a forum that will provide an opportunity for international exchange of information among you, experts, on one of basic issues of historic context of present international and regional relations. A goal that you put for today's conference consists in the analysis of character of military post-conflict operations and activities in the watched period, particularly in the 20th century. Description of this topic from views of various states will undoubtedly extend knowledge on military occupation, on operations against rebellions, on demobilisation, on peace-keeping operations or on military aspects of the post-war reconstruction and renewal. On all these problems also from recent past.

The topic of today's conference has for us all not only historic, but also a practical importance, because in the issue of post-conflict operations the past is joined with the

present. The fact that in the world there exist all the time till now security risks, international terrorism and instability remind us of the importance of objective historic evaluation and undertakes us to implement and respect its results in the policy.

After 1993 the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic have been actively involved in various peace missions, they significantly contributed to stabilisation of several regional conflicts and crises. They operate in various parts of the world; they serve in the interest of peace, security and further development of international cooperation. Since 1993, they, in strength about 10 000 Slovak troops, gradually took part in more than twenty missions under the flags of UN, NATO, European Union or OSCE.

Whole this activity, in which also the Slovak Republic has been actively involved in close cooperation with European and Transatlantic structures of international military and political organisations, is directed at the future. In this connection I would like to quote European Otto von Habsburg: „We do not have right to rest on real or ostensible laurels. End of history will not come although naive spirits dream about it.“

Our present military and security policy that is directed at the future cannot be without knowing the history and those who seemingly deal with the present, cannot disrespect historic experience. The concrete historic knowledge of this topic may help us also at present.

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to your conference fruitful discussions, successful course and inspiring new knowledge and I am looking forward to their result.

Thank you for your attention.

Martin Fedor

Bratislava, 4th April 2006

Discours du ministre de la défense de la République Slovaque
devant les participants du 6ᵉ colloque scientifique international du GTHM

Chers délégués du colloque, Chers hôtes,
Mesdames, Messieurs,

C'est un grand honneur pour moi d'être présent parmi vous et d'ouvrir ce colloque scientifique international du Groupe de travail d'histoire militaire du programme Partenariat pour la paix du Consortium des Académies de défense et des Instituts des études de défense dont le contenu sont des questions sérieuses et exigeantes concernant des opérations après les sorties des guerres.

Les colloques annuels des historiens militaires des pays membres associés dans le Consortium du programme Partenariat pour la paix deviennent une tradition bien rodée. Permettez moi de vous accueillir très sincèrement à ce 6ᵉ colloque.

L'importance universelle de ces événements prouve que vous, les historiens militaires, venus à ces forums internationaux, vous échangez des vues sur divers sujets de l'histoire de la politique militaire et de sécurité avant tout au 20ᵉ siècle, en mettant accent sur sa deuxième moitié. Je vois leur place irremplaçable dans le travail quotidien du Ministère de la défense de la République slovaque où la nécessité d'intégrer la connaissance historique dans les processus actuels de la politique militaire et de défense se montre de façon sans cesse plus urgente.

L'idée de l'organisation de ce colloque part de la mission de base du Consortium de l'histoire militaire du programme Partenariat pour la paix. Le colloque a l'ambition de devenir un tel forum qui offrira la possibilité des échanges internationaux d'informations entre vous, les spécialistes, sur l'une des questions fondamentales du contexte historique des relations contemporaines internationales et régionales. L'objectif que vous vous êtes fixé pour le colloque d'aujourd'hui repose dans l'analyse du caractère des opérations militaires après les conflits et des actions de la période suivie, donc du 20ᵉ siècle. Le rapprochement de ce thème, du point de vue de différents pays, élargira sans doute des connaissances sur l'occupation militaire, sur des opérations anti-insurrectionnelles, sur la démobilisation, les opérations de maintien de la paix et de la stabilité ou sur les aspects mi-

litaires de la reconstruction et de la restauration d'après-guerre, sur tous ces domaines même du passé récent.

Le sujet de votre colloque a pour nous tous une importance non seulement historique mais aussi pratique parce que dans la problématique des opérations des sorties des guerres, l'histoire se joint à la contemporanéité. Le fait, que dans le monde existent jusqu'à présent des risques sécuritaires, le terrorisme international et l'instabilité, nous rappelle l'importance de l'évaluation historique objective et nous engage à l'application et au respect de ses résultats dans la politique.

Après l'année 1993, les Forces armées de la République slovaque rejoignent activement des missions de maintien de la paix, participent considérablement à la stabilisation de plusieurs crises et conflits régionaux. Elles opèrent dans diverses régions du monde, servent les intérêts de la paix, de la sécurité et du développement de la coopération internationale. Depuis 1993, environ 10 000 militaires slovaques participaient à tour de rôles dans plus de 20 missions sous les drapeaux de l'ONU, de l'OTAN, de l'Union européenne ou de l'OSCE.

Toute cette activité, à laquelle la République slovaque participe activement en coopération étroite avec les structures européennes et transatlantiques des organisations politico-militaires internationales, est orientée vers l'avenir. Dans cet ordre, permettez-moi de citer un Européen, Otto von Habsburg: „Nous n'avons pas le droit de reposer sur les lauriers, réels ou fictifs. La fin de l'histoire n'aura pas lieu même si des esprits naïfs en songent.“

Même notre politique militaire et de sécurité contemporaine, qui tend vers l'avenir, ne peut pas être non plus sans connaissance de l'histoire et même ceux qui s'occupent apparemment de l'époque contemporaine ne peuvent pas se permettre de ne pas respecter l'expérience historique. Les acquis historiques concrets de cette problématique peuvent nous aider même à l'époque contemporaine.

Chères Mesdames et Messieurs, je souhaite à votre colloque une session fructueuse, un déroulement réussi, de nouveaux acquis inspirateurs et je me réjouis à leurs résultats.

Merci de votre attention.

Martin Fedor

Bratislava, le 4 avril 2006

panel 1:

The Evolution of Peace-keeping, a Historical Perspective

Chair:
Major-general (ret.) Svetozár Naďovič,
Slovakia

Tradition of the Italian Carabinieri Corps in Peace-keeping Reconstruction Missions from Crete to Sarajevo and Nassyria.
Future Task: Afghanistan, Area of Herat Region?

Prof. Maria Gabriella Pasqualini[1]

It is even too easy to speak about the tradition of the Italian Arma dei Carabinieri, a police with a military status – since the year 2000 the fourth Armed Force of Italy, before part of the Army, considered as its first speciality -, in peace-keeping reconstruction missions in countries completely or partially collapsed. In this essay of course we will not speak about one of the institutional task of the Carabinieri which is to be Military Police and we will obviously skim details about international organizations' authorizations (UN, NATO; EU) to develop the military interventions, combat and reconstruction. And we cannot speak also about all the missions deployed by Carabinieri, but we will remember only some of them, underlining the many tasks they have fulfilled in the past and they do in the present situation.

It is important just to recall here the important fact – for those who are not acquainted with the special characteristic of this Institution – that this Corps has a double soul, a double identity, the one of an Armed Force and the second one of a Police with a military asset (status), as above remembered. With this double professions the Carabinieri have always participated in Italian military missions abroad, both as a combat unit, as MP and/or guarantees of public order, also taking care to support social and humanitarian aims; missions caring for humanitarian values and the global threat to world peace and security. The history of Carabinieri involved in this kind of missions is strictly connected with the Italian history all along two centuries.

For a long time Carabinieri have been doing an important role in abroad missions,

---

1   Opinions expressed in this paper are totally personal and do not reflect the ones of any institution.

since the XIX century, when the UN were not on the horizon but when the *Concert of the Great Powers* decided where and when peace should have been maintained.

If in the second part of the XIXth century and in the first half of the XX, missions abroad for Carabinieri have been numerous, in the second part of the XX°, their international involvement and projection has increased terribly.

Since 1989 the doctrine relating to *peace keeping* has changed a lot, involving more and more civil components together with the military ones; nowadays, with the new European Security Strategy (ESS) policy, again at a European level, and of course with influence on a global level, the new doctrine sees a *comprenhensive crisis management*, with multidisciplinary strategies, which will explain also the new tasks that – may be – will be given to the Carabinieri in Herat – Afghanistan, always in the path of the long tradition of this Corps since its foundation in 1814.

As we know the terminology *peace-keeping* operations or *peace support* operations in recent times has been substituted with *Crisis Response Operations*, may be to better define all the possible interventions like for example what it is happening in Afghanistan with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams[2]. There is an intimate interconnection between security and development at all levels because in a frame of security, legal economic development increases and this increase has as a consequence an increased stability, opening a virtuous circle.

CRO: this has been recently the way in NATO, nowadays, to call missions and it contains many concepts in it, like preventive diplomacy, peace making, and peace building, even if many times also peace enforcing is to be considered, in order to achieve and support a framework of stability and security.

SOME HISTORICAL REMARKS

I think that the collective memory sometimes is very short because it does not remember old multinational and interforces missions that have some of the characteristic of the contemporary missions under the authority of UN and NATO, and recently of the EU.

In the past century (XX°) the Kingdom of Italy used the military instrument not only to conquer new territories, but also to assert itself among the Great Powers, also participating to special missions to maintain the international security, under the authorization of the dominating powers of period. We have to say of course that the historical situations were different, but the purpose and the deployment for those missions was exactly that one of maintaining in a territory a situation of stability.

In those times the important voices in the international context were few, four or five, in comparison with the almost 200 voices of our times in the UN, but the important leaders of the world, sitting in the Security Council, are still now very few....the Great

---

2   It would be too long to give all the details of the missions in which the Carabinieri Corps of Italy participated. In this essay only few of them will be given, because the accent is on the particular tasks performed during their presence abroad. All the Carabinieri missions have been studied in details in 2 books written by the author of this essay: *Le missioni all'estero dei Carabinieri 1855-1935* (vol. I) and *Le missioni all'estero dei carabinieri 1936-2001* (vol. II), Roma, 2000-2001. For the time being no other volumes have been published covering all the Carabinieri missions up to June 2001.

Powers of the contemporary period; they can be easily related to the famous *Concert of Great Powers*, who decided the international politics in the XIX and XX century.

If once upon a time it was the *concert* of the European powers to call for missions of this kind, now the UN do the same job, but in particular these problems are discussed within the Security Council, where only the real Powers of the world seat at present.

Of course in order to analyse missions of this kind in the past, it is important to put them in the right historical context and period in which they were thought and implemented, to consider the operational aspects at the time of their realisation and the economic ones also, correlated to national interests of the countries involved...more or less, as it is now: stability and security of a territory mean global peace but they mean also opening of new potential markets and in the past, also new colonies or territories of prominent 'influence'.

This is one of the main differences with military missions in the past times: before there was an enemy to destroy in the Napoleonic or Clausewitz's view of the world; now the international community has to comply with the coexistence principles and in sensible areas it has to impose respect of human rights, order, security, conditions for economic development connected with the development of the population's lowerest classes. Some of these tasks may justify sometimes the use of force, for the major benefit of the international community. At least this what sometimes the international community thinks it is a right thing to go for.

May be the first mission at international level that was also multinational and for Italy also inter-Forces has been the one in Crete in 1897-1906[3]: this is also the first one in which the Carabinieri showed for the first time abroad their particular skills as a military status Police regarding the maintaining of the public order.

Crete represented for Italy, in its role of maintaining the Mediterranean equilibrium in the *concert* of the Great Powers recently joined as a united country, one of the priorities of the Italian foreign policy in that historical period. The Mediterranean Sea was the more interesting strategic sector for the young Kingdom of Italy, also because at the very end of the XIX century the scramble for partition of the former powerful Ottoman Empire was at its zenith: in this period riots of a certain importance started in Crete – christians against muslims – while Athens and Constantinople wanted to get the absolute power on the island.

An international force was sent by the Great Powers in order to sedate the riots, and above all to keep a situation of security in the island and the equilibrium in the Mediterranean, which was so sought for by all the European powers, not only by Italy. Little by little the internal administrative and political structures collapsed completely. And in this collapsed situation, they were necessary also substitutive missions of a strong police intervention in order to impose the respect of laws and public order.

In this context the Italian intervention was not of a colonial type, but as a demonstration of its power in the international community.

---

3   Documents related to this mission can be seen in Archivio del Museo Storico dell'Arma, Rome, and in AUSSME (Archivio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito E 3 – R 21-22. See also Bagnaia A., *L'Anatolia. 1919-1923*, in "Studi Storico-Militari 1992", Ufficio Storico SME, Roma, 1994, pp. 255-350.

As it is known it was decided at an international level – besides allowing the military heavy intervention which was done by troops of many European countries -, to form a regiment of International '*Gendarmerie*' to replace the local one, Turkish, which was composed in the majority by muslims elements; it was highly corrupted and above all unable to secure public order. The abuses and the corruption of these gendarmes had been also one of the reasons for the heavy riots leading to the instability of the island, to the insurrection of May 1896. Members of the new *Gendarmerie* regiment should have been military people, coming from all the powers involved in the affair, that is, Russia, Great Britain, Austria –Hungary, France and Italy. Italy sent for this purpose the Carabinieri Reali: they reached Crete in February 1897.

Waiting to perform their institutional tasks, they were employed by the Admirals' Council, governing Crete, in observation and investigation missions also inside the island, while waiting for the international *Gendarmerie* to be formed with mixed companies and to start their job within it.

Italy was the *leader* country in this international intervention because the Italian Admiral Canevaro was the President of the Admirals' Council, who had taken in their hands the crisis and would not allow Greece to take power if the island, waiting to occupy it completely at the end of the Ottoman Empire, event thought to be very very near in time. But the Powers had to wait for another 20 years to reach their objective.

While the studies and projects were laid down for the international *Gendarmerie*, it was also considered that it was necessary also in the meantime to reorganize the local one, that is the Ottoman one, even if on different bases and above all on a different training. Notwithstanding the good proposals, 10 of March 1897 the international *Gendarmerie* was disbanded, because it had not been quite successful.

Following a decision taken by the Admirals' Council on August 14, 1897, since September of the same year, the Ottoman *Gendarmerie*, reorganized in the meantime with the purpose of substituting the *International* one, was under the orders of an Italian captain of the Carabinieri, Federico Craveri, waiting to organise a new local one, formed by all the representatives of the communities existing on the island. Captain Craveri and his colleagues were charged to form and train the new Crete *Gendarmerie* under constitution.

Not giving many details about this international mission, because they can be easily found in every history book, we have to underline that since 1899, the year in which all soldiers of other countries had left the island, because the military administration had come to an end, due to the improved internal situation, the Italian Carabinieri stayed and started their task to reorganize the local *Gendarmerie*, a task performed for the first of many other times in the future: a contribution to garantee the stability and security in the island through a local police, trained in what was for that time a 'modern' way.

In Crete up to 1906, when their mission ended, the Italians had an interesting success in re-establishing the order and the internal security and in maintaining it, controlling the two different parties, muslims and christians, acting as an interposition force, performing also a kind of economic and social reconstruction of the civil society, establishing good and normal relations with the local population and the clergy, trying to win a popular consent and enhance the authority of the local Institutions. Within the tasks

performed, there was also a 'harvest of weapons and ammunitions', in a place where there was the habit for men to consider weapons as a part of their male personality. This task presents lot of difficulties and is quite dangerous to be performed.

The Crete mission is particularly interesting if we want to compare it with contemporary missions, of course taking into account the right historical moment and context: the mission was multinational; the area of the island was divided into AOR for the countries participating in it.; the mission wanted to have the consent of the two armed parties; the military command was unified in order to reach the political and diplomatic strategies sought for by the Powers involved; involvment of the military components of the mission in activities not strictly military like the administration of justice, local disarmament, building and reorganizing the local police, this task particularly given to the Italians, to the Carabinieri.

In this strategy for stabilization, it was also done an effort to relocate 1300 muslims fled from their houses in La Canea, during the Greek-turkish conflict in that city.

Also in China, after the Boxers rebellion and the international intervention to save the Legations'Quarter, the Carabinieri present in the Italian contingent in Tientsin, the Italian area obtained from the Chinese Empress[4], established a nucleus of 20 Chinese men as a local police, under the order of an Italian non-commissioned officer (maresciallo), and trained by him, to guarantee the internal order of the Italian Concession, together with twelve Italians. Not only the Chinese were trained in professional skills, but their Commander established also rules for a civil life, including sink drainage, collection of the waste material...

The reputation for the Italians, especially for the Carabinieri, to be professional reorganizer of local police forces started to be quite well known.

We must also remember that at the beginning of the century even the Persian Shah Kadjar asked for the Italian Carabinieri to reorganize his police forces: but the international powers, namely Great Britain and the Zarist Empire, forbade the presence of the Italians because they did not want the influence of a new power on the Persian territory they were going to split into two spheres of influence in 1907 and were afraid of a possible interference of Italy and its Armed Forces that had started to be appreciated on an international context.

Between 1904 and 1911 the Italians were called to re-organize the Macedonia (still part of the Ottoman Empire) local *Gendarmerie*: the Diwan asked directly the Ruman government for it and a mission was sent: a high officer of the Italian Army, division general Emilio de Giorgis, and later on, at his death in 1908, general Mario Nicolis di Robilant, was the *Lieutenant Général Réorganisateur* of the Macedonian police.

Among the officers who took part in this mission, there was a very special Carabinieri officer, Colonel Balduino Caprini, who had already proved his knowledge in this kind of job in Crete for some years. Most of the members of the mission were taken from the Carabinieri. It is also interesting to remember that at the court of the Sultan there was a military counsellor, from the Italian Army, captain Giovanni Romei and as aid-de-

---

4   Italy had the Tientsin Concession up to 1938, when the Japanese occupied the Chinese territory. From the legal international point of view, the *Concessione* was dissolved only at the end of the Second World War.

camp to the Sultan, a Carabinieri officer, captain Tomassi[5]. Both of them were members of the Sultanial Commission of the War Ministry settled for the reorganization of the Macedonian *Gendarmerie*. Of course with the Libian war (1911), the Italian mission had to leave Macedonia, without ending the project[6].

For 2 years, 1909-1911, Carabinieri went also to Chile as instructors for the *Cuerpo de Carabineros de Chile*, training them also in the operational systems of the Corps.

In the meantime also the sovereign nation of Greece had asked the Italian Armed Forces to help in re-organizing its military police, besides the local one. So the Carabinieri were active in that country for some years (1911-1923): the interesting thing in this mission is that it was not in a collapsed or anarchic country, but in a sovereign state asking the international help for its military organization (France and Great Britain were involved in training the Army and the Navy)[7].

Jumping to the end of the First World War, we arrive to the occupation of Constantinople in 1919, when the Golden Horn saw 55 warships at its shores[8].

The Chief Commander of the Allied Forces had to nominate an international committee with the task of controlling the Ottoman Police that was not able to maintain the internal order in the city, neither to provide the security in the same area. In this particular sector – police training or monitoring – once again the *leader* nation was Italy, with its experts, the majority of which were members of the Carabinieri Corps.

The capital city of the still unbelievable alive Ottoman Empire was divided into what we call with a modern name AOR (Area of Responsibility) and the Italians had to guarantee the area of Scutari, where the Headquarters of the Allied Forces had settled.

How we can consider this mission to Constantinople? A supporting mission of the local police with monitoring, guiding, training and recruiting the agents; it was also a supporting mission in the investigations for any kind of crimes, in the sense that the Italians did not substitute the local Police, but helped with the tasks to be performed and collaborated. It seems quite a contemporary mission to support a local police. The presence in Constantinople ended in 1923, when the Allied Powers signed a peace treaty with the laic Republic of Turkey led by the powerful and winning Mustafa Kemal, the new middle-eastern power, heir to the Ottoman Empire, definitely buried.

In this period Italy participated in some other external missions in difficult areas always with the presence of the Carabinieri, as Military Police or performing special local tasks.

In order to analyse successive historical missions, we have to remember that at the end of the First World War a new organization substituted in a way the *concert* of the Great Powers in 1920: the League of Nations, with many more voices, than five ones, and a dif-

---

5   See Pasqualini M.G., *Il Levante, il Vicino e il Medio Oriente. 1860-1939, i Documenti storici dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito*, ed. Stato Maggiore Esercito, Roma, 1999.

6   To study in a more detailed way this historical period see Renouvin P, *Histoire des Relations internationales*, vol. III, De 1871 à 1945, Parigi, ed. Hachette, 1994, p. 200 e ss.

7   For details about this mission, Pasqualini M.G., *I Carabinieri Reali in Grecia (1912- 1923)*, in "Missioni militari italiane all'estero in tempo di pace. (1861- 1939)", in "Atti del convegno di studi tenuto a Milano presso la Scuola Militare dell'Esercito nei giorni 25-26 ottobre 2000", Roma, 2001, pp. 321- 341.

8   For this period see among many books, Davison R., *Turkish diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne*, in "The diplomats 1919-1939, a cura di Craig G. e Gilbert F., University Press, Princeton, 1953, pp. 172-209.

ferent impact on the international community and a different philosophy regarding the world stability and security, even if again national interests of the major Powers were more considered and important than the ones of others.

One of the missions that seems more similar to the present ones is undoubtedly the one connected with the referendum to annex to France or to Germany the very wealthy region of SAAR or to maintain the *status quo*: the League of Nations wanted the referendum to be implemented in a secure way, above all at the polling stations, monitoring them, and asked some of its members to send a contingent, because the situation was not one of the most calm, and the two countries involved (France and Nazi Germany) used a heavy propaganda. Among the international (Holland, Sweden, Great Britain, Italy) military contingent that at end of 1934 reached the Saar region, the Italians sent a *framework* regiment with a core of Carabinieri whose main task was, besides monitoring the referendum, to guarantee the internal order and to escort, once the referendum done, the ballots cards to the collecting centre, without any gerrymandering. Germany, having done the heaviest propaganda and above all an inside strong individually pressing, was the winner of the referendum.

Italy sent, with other troupes, a batallion of Carabinieri; together with the other elements of the Italian military presence, they organised an efficient info-investigation system, in order to calibrate the service to the internal situation and guarantee the public order: so was it done. In March 1935 all the foreign military people left the region after performing a kind of a mission that can be called a true peace-keeping mission in a modern way, an observing and monitoring referendum mission.

As a matter of fact there has been a precedent in this kind of referendum, in High Silesia, 1920, where an international contingent (Italy, France and Great Britain) had been sent, always with the purpose of monitoring the referendum that was to be held and secure internal order. This one was a peace-keeping mission that evolved in a *peace enforcing* mission: the Italians who had the task to control the borders, faced problems of internal security, because of continuous riots between Germans and Polish, conflicts really dangerous also because of the very depressed social and economic situation. Inhabitants went to the polling stations in February 1920, but the result was not accepted by either parts. Cosel presidium, in charge of the Italians, was attacked by the Polish people: the Italians guaranteed the opening of the bridges on the Oder river. The order was reestablished; the Italian Commander became the Civil and Military Governor of the small city. The Italian military force, at the very beginning just a monitoring Force, was compelled to act as an *interposition* Force to maintain the public order and the small core of Carabinieri were very useful in this special task.

These are some examples of what the Italian Armed Forces and especially the Carabinieri Corps did before the second world war, already showing what will be one of its main features in missions abroad: to know how to maintain public order and how to reorganize and train local police forces.

After the Second World War, a new era of international missions started. United Nations, founded in 1944 while the conflict was still going on, in 1949 decided to give Italy the trusteeship of Somalia: in 10 years Rome should have guided the new country to

its complete international maturity. A *Corpo di Sicurezza*[9] was sent by the Italian government to secure the necessary framework of stability, to accompany the country to the full sovereignty and again the Carabinieri Corps was called to perform its institutional duties and to organize and train the Somali local police, inherited from the British organized Somali Police. It was not an easy task in those years to form this kind of police also because nine years of British occupation in the territory had heavily changed the previous organization given by Italy during colonial times, always applying the operations' system of the Corps. So the Commander of the Carabinieri first of all had to absorb all the Somali Police Force agents, created by the British and start again a reorganization, following the peculiar operational methods of the Carabinieri, but not forgetting of course the special traditions, cultural, social, ethnics of Somalia: the danger was to be again in a colonialist atmosphere. But a great effort was done to avoid it. A Police School was founded in Muqdishu with courses for officers and non-commissioned officers and also the training for simple agents was started. Another problem to solve was the one of the 'somalization' of the Police: but little by little, local agents started to substitute the Italians, so that by 1957 all the members of the Local Somali Police forces had been trained enough to take over the task of maintaining the internal order of the country. The Command of the Force was then transferred to a Somali colonel. In 1958 an agreement for collaboration was signed between the Italian Government and the Somali one: for this it was possible for the Corps to continue to give to the new Somali Police Force a support in recruiting and training. In 1960, as it was established by the UN, after 10 years, Somalia became fully independent.

The Carabinieri had to intervene later another time in Somalia, during the UN mission, in 1992.

In Lebanon, in 1982, the Carabinieri were part of the Italian military presence, within the international contingent. The parachutist Regiment 'Tuscania' had the task to patrol Beirut east on pre-established itineraries, acting as a force of interposition and prevention, not substituting, in this case as in others, the Lebanese Armed Forces. In this particular mission, the armed-force identity of the Carabinieri was particularly useful, together with their profession in facing also civil population, when it was the case to maintain public order and security in the AOR[10].

Not saying anything about the mission in Albania in 1991-1993, in Salvador in 1991-995, in Cambogia 1992-1993, where the Corps expressed its profession also in training local police forces, we go directly to the mission *Restore Hope* in Somalia in 1992-1995, a very difficult one for the international forces there operating. UN had decided that in parallel with military operations it was necessary to reconstruct, once again, the Somali administration. One of the major tools, among the others, to have it done was to reorganize the Judiciary system and a civil police, that could support the Judiciary. If you do not have a sound judiciary system in a country, supported by efficient police forces, it is not possible to start reconstructing a collapsed country.

---

9   Documents related to the Italian AFIS (Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana in Somalia), Corpo di Sicurezza, can be seen at Archivio del Museo Storico dell'Arma dei Carabinieri (Rome) and at AUSSME (Rome).

10 For details of this mission, see Pasqualini M.G., *Le missioni…..*vol.II, p.16.

The Italian Carabinieri acted in two different institutional and juridical frames. The first one was within the Italian military contingent ITALFOR: in our AOR, besides acting as an armed force, I should say as a Special Force, with the parachutist Regiment 'Tuscania', and doing the duty of the Military Police, as usual, Carabinieri had also to rebuild and organize a local police force (the previous one, still the one trained by the Italians during the trusteeship period, had been disbanded in its majority when President Siad Barre had been overthrown and officialy dissolved in December 1992) for the particular area, waiting that a special general Judiciary Program for Somalia could take place in this field.

Apart from these tasks, Kofi Annan, at that time Deputy Secretary General of the UN and Chief of the Department of Peace Keeping (DPK), asked the Italians to charge one officer of the Carabinieri to study a plan to reorganize a neutral Civil Police Force in Somalia, together with a Dutch and a German colleague.

The team reported to the Deputy Secretary General in short time. An advanced party was sent on the field for a better study and planning of the reorganization project. A general program considering also the reorganization for the judicial administration, was written and it became known as Somali Justice Program (SJP), approved by Italy, Great Britain, Holland, Egypt Germany and Norway. The program stated in a clear way, may be for the first time, that for the stability and security in Somalia, it was highly necessary a new system of civil and penal law able to act in an efficient bureaucratic situation, with the support of a very well organized and efficient Police.

Activities in favour of the Somali police started at the beginning of 1994, also with the help of the Italians: training, logistic support, and everything was important to put up a sound and efficient Police, of course based on western schemes, mainly Italians and Germans, who were strictly collaborating in this task.

Situation in that part of Africa quickly deteriorated; there was no more security for the trainers to do their job and the Italian component, as the others, had to leave.

Remembering another mission, in 1994 and 1997 the Carabinieri, without weapons as the others observers, were again in Palestina with the *Temporary International Presence in Hebron* (TIPH), with tasks of Police monitoring, patrolling in multinational teams. The organization scheme of the TIPH has been an interesting comparison and pattern for some other missions, *support* or *peace-keeping* ones, above all as an example of a multinational activity completely integrated in the Command chain and operational systems.

And nowadays Carabinieri are, always in a multinational team of which they have the Command, at the Palestinian border with Egypt, monitoring the situation and controlling the right application of agreements concerning a normal use of movements rights to pass the border, guarantees for the security of it.

In March 1995, some Carabinieri were part of the PM Multinational Company of the Multinational Division East and of the Civil Police of the UEO; in the same period some others reached Sarajevo to act as Military Police, but they did also patrolling in the city in order to guarantee the security in the city. It is exactly in Sarajevo in this period that we can appreciate the important flexibility of the Corps whose members acted as a PM, supported the rest of the personnel and the Special Forces of the Italian contingent, with

a vast network of military intelligence; another task of the Carabinieri has been to monitor the polling stations and the preparatory activities for popular elections.

In the same period in Mostar within the frame of the EUAM (*European Union Administration of Mostar*), it was felt the urgence for a civil Police, efficient and representative of all the ethnic components of the territory. In particular it had been decided that the core of the reconstruction of the city would have been a nucleus of European police with a double task: to build and train a Croato-bosniac-muslim police (UPFM, *Unified Police Force in Mostar*), and in the same time to maintain public order. In March 1995 a group of Carabinieri WEUPOL (*Western European Union Police*) was sent to Mostar: they had mainly to organize, instruct, monitor the activity of the local police, besides training them to reach a highly efficient level.

As in Mostar, also in Albania (where the Carabinieri were present in MAPE-UEO (*Multinational Advisors Police Element*) administrative and social reconstruction passed also through the path of eliminating the illegal criminal organizations, imposing the respect for law and human rights.

Unify the two different civil police forces present in Mostar has been a very difficult job. May be one of the winning method was to organize patrolling group with a Carabiniere in command and composed by a muslim from Mostar east, a Croat from Mostar west, a Croat from the Croatia republic and an interpreter. In October 1996 WEUPOL was dissolved because the problems had been solved by 90%.

Before the creation and deployment of the first MSU, new international military tool, we have also to remember the presence of the Carabinieri in the IPTF (*International Police Task Force*) in Sarajevo within the UNMIBH (*United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina*), starting in May 1997, integrated in the structure of the UNCIVPOL.

MSU – MULTINATIONAL SPECIALISED UNIT

It has been especially in the Balcans, not to mention Iraq, that the secular tradition of the Carabinieri in reorganizing and training local police forces, and of course in restoring public order and security, beside normal combat activities, had its most important professional point: it showed not only its professionalism, but also the high capacity in proposing and establishing normative and doctrinal contributions, later implemented with success. It is in the Balcans that what is an original contribution to the solution of present security problems in some countries was first time experienced, the MSU, *Multinational Specialised Unit*.

In 1998 with the formation of this new regiment a very important change was introduced in the employment of a multinational police force. The Carabinieri Corps has been protagonist in elaborating the relevant doctrine and in implementing it[11].

In few words, for the ones who did not have any experience with this regiment, the MSU, Multinational Specialized Unit, is an extremely flexible military tool, thought to

---

11 For details on the creation and the doctrine of MSU, see Paris A., *Aspect of military doctrine on the MSU*, in 'Proceedings of the Seminar on the MSU', held in Rome, March 30-31 2004, p.151-158; Libertini D, *International environmental and juridical aspects*, in the same 'Proceedings...', p. 133- 138; see also Paris A., *Lo strumento militare italiano in operazioni di polizia*, in 'Rivista Italiana di Difesa', n.10/2004, p. 70-74.

fill a gap; a security gap, in a grey area when the phase *combat* has not yet finished but the *reconstruction* one has started already and it is compulsory, not only to fight rebels or still resisting rebellion movements, but also to be able to face security civil problems, maintain public order and impose the respect for the existing laws.

So in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 1997, for the first time, in order to implement the 1995 Daytona Peace Agreements, where SFOR (*Stabilization Force*) and IPTF could not fill their tasks as needed, it was felt the necessity for a new kind of unit, that could perform both the tasks, *combat* and *crowd control*. Local Police was not able or did not want to intervene in public order operations for many reasons, mainly for ethnical ones, not to forget the political ones and, may be also, for a lack of the right profession to cope with this kind of delicate situations, still in a fighting time.

The experience gained by a Corps with a military asset, like Carabinieri, all along through more than a century, led to the idea of this multinational unit, the role of which is absolutely different from the one of a normal traditional or military police force and the Alliance asked the Carabinieri to form a MSU.

It was so authorized the constitution of a MSU regiment within SFOR, at the direct Command of the Operations of FOF (*Follow on Force*- a reduced Force intended to substitute SFOR as it did though maintaining the name of SFOR). MSU was intended to give SFOR a special contribution in the professional field of a military asset police force specialized also in crowd control and public security. MSU mandate in BH was quite complex, but it had a) mobility and flexibility of deployment due to its framework and its operational systems; b) professionalism in providing *intelligence*, with official powers and authorizations, bearing in mind the efficient info-investigative system of Carabinieri, always able to interact in a mutual exchange with the system or structure of the operation intelligence on the spot, created by military Commands in theatres; c) right equipment to face civil population if needed.

In fact it was not easy to secure public order, a progressive stability and a legal environment without being possible to *harvest* information, investigations on illegal activities and without performing *special operations*. At that time it was also important to reconstruct the social network of BH, stimulating the coming back of the refugees, giving a frame of security for local political elections and the formation of a local government. The regiment was at the orders of an Italian Carabinieri Officer, as it has been established also in other similar experiences. Italy will always be, according the present international agreements, the *leading nation* for a MSU regiment.

In synthesis, in BH, the MSU had the task to promote and assist public security; to assist the refugees in their going back to their original lands; to give the necessary support to the re-building of local institutions, according to the instructions received by the international community; to maintain public order, with a prevention policy, and managing crisis situations and controlling crowd and riots of any kind; to perform on the territory all the activities indicated by the Chain of Command and of course to implement the indications of the High Commisioner of the United Nations, having them respected locally.

A MSU regiment acted and is acting in Bosnia, Albania, in Kosovo and in Iraq, for the

time being. The Kosovo experience was in a way quite similar, with the more or less the same mandate.

MSU IN IRAQ

The last experience in time for a MSU is at present in Iraq; an experience being rather different from the others because of a different chain of Command, but always led by Italy, and with a Carabinieri full colonel as the Commander.

The special experience gained by the MSU deployed in Iraq will be surely, if I may say, a leading one, not only for the doctrine in progress, but also as far as operational procedures will be definitely settled, keeping in mind that flexibility of this instrument will always be required, because operational theatres have all their own particular characteristics and above all because professionalism in the field of police with military status and flexibility are among the winning assets of a Multinational Specialised Unit: these assets are indeed in the MSU at present deployed in Iraq, the lesson learned of, is to be taken into account for future deployments in this area or similar ones, in this *Arab* sector, which proves to be much more difficult than thought before.

In order to better understand which has been and which is the role and the tasks performed by the MSU, at Regiment level, in Nassiriya- Iraq, lead by the Italian CC, within an Italian military contingent – ITALFOR – we have first of all to remember the very difficult historical and geo-political situation in the country after the fall of Baghdad and the nearly total, if not <u>total</u> collapse, of every Iraqi governmental and bureaucratic institutions, army and local, traffic or whatever other kind of police was, included. On the top, as everyone knows, Iraq is not an homogenous country, with many ethnic and religious conflicts that have complicated, and still are doing it, the necessary transfer of power to Iraqi authorities.

This transfer of power has not improved the situation, in my opinion, though the international community may hope or think the contrary. Law enforcement and the fight against terrorism are indeed the very first actions to be taken there, if really there is a will to reinstate stability and security in this strategic sector of Middle East, an exceptionally difficult and ambitious program.

We can also say that the combat period is in a way still going on there; though the international community has started to try to stabilize and secure the country, the area of transition to the time of a combat replacement, is still very wide, that 'grey area', in which a MSU can perform the best and for which it has been conceived, since its first deployment years ago in the Balcans.

The operational AOR of the Italians and of course of the MSU there deployed, integrated in the IT-JTF is the small, in comparison with all the Iraqi territory, but sensitive region of Dhi Khar, all Shi'ite area, not only the city of Nassyiria. The region is also characterised by the presence of many powerful tribes, whose sheiks are also political leaders, and by the muslim shi'ite clergy, as powerful as the tribes chiefs; to complicate the landscape, some of the powerful sheiks are also religious leaders; the consequence being that the task of collecting sensitive reliable information is quite hard. This is one of the tasks performed by some of the components of the MSU in the Dhi Khar region and we can

say that especially in the present days the political situation of this territory is quite well known to the Italian authorities over there, thanks to these investigations. You cannot do anything at all, especially in an Arab country, if you do not know the environment, in a situation which is so far away from our way of thinking and behaving.

We must add that the region is also very poor, deprived of the basic conditions of life, including water, drinkable or not, or a city sewer system; electricity was a problem in the past when Saddam Hussein used to convey it, produced in the south, to the north, exactly the same as he did with water. Now the problem seems to be solved unless, for some reasons, again the electricity will be conveyed in large quantities to the North.

A SYNTHETIC CHRONOLOGY

The Italian Advanced Party for this Unit reached Nassyria around middle of June 2003, while the Main Body reached the operational theatre middle of July, same year, finding nearly total destruction in this city and all the possible turmoil in this Southern zone of Iraq, the almost total population of which follows the Shi'ia confession.

The first turn-over of people took place between October 20 and November 14; February-March 2004, the second turn over; every four to six months personnel changes.

As everyone knows, the Iraq MSU has been integrated by a contingent of Rumanian army and Portuguese National Republican 'Guardia', the last one reaching the Unit, after November 12, as it was scheduled much time before the Event, the terrorist attack to Base Maestrale, one of the two bases of MSU.

The total components of the Unit are, average number, almost 600 men (among them there were very few women), the Italian personnel being around 350 Carabinieri in the different operational situations, chosen for their professional special skills required for the mission to be performed in that area, belonging, to the Paratroopers Regiment 'Tuscania', to the 7° Regiment 'Trentino A.A.' and to the 13° Regiment 'Friuli V.G.', to the G.I.S.- this for the 'combat' component, the strong military component, so much necessary in this particular case – and to some other specialisations in the Corps, like experts in environment (NOE), cultural heritage protection (TPC), the Iraqi one being constantly looted; anti-sophistication (NAS), to take care of other 'civil' tasks, added values to the work already performed and in progress.

LOCAL CLIMATIC CONDITIONS

We have also to stress the fact that the mission performed by this Unit has undergone very particular difficulties connected also with the Iraqi climate, reaching more than 50° C. from July to September-October, which made the logistic settlement of the bases quite hard. After those months, mud and cold weather have been also a noticeable difficulty. Not to forget the frequent desert storms that sometimes hinder the normal duties or make them very difficult to be performed – personal experience – and can heavily damage, with a kind of talcum powder sand, mechanical engines and sophisticated electronic tools. Which means that a complete analysis of the climatic conditions must always be done beforehand, in order to send over right equipments and outfits.

Therefore this is also a new experience to be taken into account for this kind of Unit.

As I had the chance to stay there, in the MSU HQ in Nassyria, November 2003, I had the opportunity to watch daily how the different tasks were performed, leaving the HQ on many different occasions during the patrolling activities or the humanitarian ones, like to escort the Italian Red Cross releasing humanitarian help in villages or to Hospitals and medical consulting places.

There have been some positive results that shows the different tasks performed by a MSU regiment.

As you know, one of the most important tasks to be carried out in Iraq has been the control of the sensitive areas, performed by patrolling critical spots, also to gather information in order to prevent crimes of every kind (above all, arms and explosives smuggling or illegal digging or drugs' traffic, and of course terrorism), a night and day job.

Just a few figures will give you the idea of what has been done in few months, in this regard, before and after that 12 November 2003[12] by the Unit:

July 20- 2003/November 12 – 2003

External duties	2.800
Arrested/detained persons	0
Weapons sequestrated	265
Ammunition sequestrated	15.063
Explosives sequestrated	1.047

November 13- 2003/ March 11 – 2004

External duties	3.803
Arrested/detained persons handed oner to local police	102
Weapons sequestrated	665
Ammunition sequestrated	33.299
Explosives sequestrated	1.737

Source: Carabinieri General Headquarters

This is to show not only the amount of work performed in a relative short time – eight months –, but also the strong *reaction* and *the cohesion* shown by all the components of the MSU regiment after the attack at 'Maestrale Quarters'.

These outstanding operational results are important for one of the primary objectives of Carabinieri presence there: the executive mission for law enforcement and the re-es-

---

12 This is the day when the Italians were attacked at one of their base in Nassyria (Base Maestrale) and lost 17 men, plus two civil omes.

tablishment of public order and security. During the period I was there, every single day and most of the nights the presence of the various components of the Unit was necessary or required even by local authorities in order to control the crowd, for example: every kind of queueing up, be it policemen to be enrolled, salary to be received or the changing of the old paper money with the new currency has been an occasion of a possible turmoil and the Unit has always been able to control the crowd, without the use of fire. Many times the Unit acted as an interposition force, like for example, among the many more occured, one action; it took place March 9, 2004, in the evening, when there had been a very harsh problem between some militia men of political parties and local policemen: four of these policemen were killed and four injured. Members of the Unit intervened, controlled the crowd (almost 150 policemen gathered to counteract against militia people) recuperating also the bodies of the dead ones, put under arrest 9 persons, seized quite a number of weapons and ammunition, escorted the arrested people to the local prison in the HQ of the Local Police, after identifying them: all without firing a single bullet. I want to underline the fact that the control of the crowd in an Arab country is particularly delicate for the very special way of behaving of those people, easy to be enflamed and easy to use weapons, even when not needed, but very weak in front of the right show of force, anyway very dangerous.

The criminal investigation and intelligence carried out is always necessary in order to isolate violent persons or cripto- agents of disrupting groups, in view of securing the area, also with counter terrorism objective: and this has been and is done constantly, also getting into contact and obtaining the local society's confidence, to a better understanding of the real situation over there: humint helps a lot also in decisions concerning in which areas or spots, not only to enforce peace, but also to give a humanitarian help, where it is most needed or even asked for, as I saw it was done there, by those Carabinieri assigned to this kind of delicate investigation.

ORGANIZING AND TRAINING OF LOCAL POLICE FORCES

Always in the field of the preparatory activity for the transfer of power and police responsibility to the various kinds of local Police, which have already been settled or will be in the future, much work has been done by some of the Italian components of the Unit. In Nassiriya, Local Police and Traffic Police have been re-organized and trained by the Italian Carabinieri personnel, according to a Program outlined by the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority), sometimes starting even from re-building the premises and handing over new uniforms. Following the training by the MSU, Traffic Police in Nassiriya started to be respected by the population and the numerous traffic jams, in a possible way, started to be directed by the Iraqi Traffic policemen. As far as the Local Police is concerned, in this case the Italian help (at the Academy in Al-Zubayr, organized by the UK, 10 Carabinieri together with 34 British elements, 10 from Czechoslovakia and 4 from Denmark) had taken care of training, mentoring the new and old recruited policemen, with control of duties performed by them during normal police service and a kind of 'on the job training', patrolling with them, to show practically the way it is to be done.

People under arrest for different crimes are handed over to the Local Police, who is

charged to keep them in custody, until a local Court of law decides the case, but frequent checks are done by the Unit on how these prisoners are treated as far as the Human Rights are concerned: I should say that frequent controls at these latitudes are compulsory to obtain some results. Part of the program of re-organizing and training had included also to supply them with new tools, like for example it has been done with the 12 pick-up Mitsubishi given by the CPA, through the Italian Force – MSU, November 2003 at the HQ of the Local Police.

CIMIC ACTIVITIES

The Unit worked and works in collaboration with the CIMIC Center of the Italian Brigade in order to put into action, for example, also what have been called *quick impact projects*, concerning the restructuring or rebuilding of Police stations or the maintenance of city streets, roads and side walks, normally in very poor conditions: in fact it is compulsory to try to start again also small local enterprises, besides the greater important reconstruction projects (difficult to 'take off') and to circulate money trying to produce legal profits in such a depressed area, where the flux of financial means depends quite only on smuggling weapons, explosives and archaeological relics and articrafts.

One of the winning ideas of the MSU has been also to offer medical assistance to local population, besides giving great help in the city hospitals, also going into small villages around Nassyria: the medical situation is very poor in those places, where it lacks many basic medicines, above all for children, who must be constantly treated for even simple pediatric pathologies. This has been done in the past also by means of a vehicle acting as a moving medical consulting room, intended also for a tele-medicine.

The idea was winningm but the vehicle was too high, too big and in a way too sophisticated for that climate and those difficult roads around Nassyria, where most of the streets do not have tarmac laid on. The need would have been for a special car, equipped with medical instrument, but easier to use in those sometimes extreme conditions.

As I mentioned before, one added value is the *TPC*. In fact, one of the special tasks performed by this particular MSU is related to the protection of the Iraqi Cultural Heritage in Sumerian Dhi Khar area, a very rich one.

Just, as above, a few figures, because words are not so effective, for a very interesting period:

July 2003-November 2003

Registered archaeological sites:	25
Air reconnaissance (with the support of the IT-JTF):	7
Preventive and repressive motorised patrols:	15
Sequestrated archaeological sites:	101
Identified persons:	61
Arrested persons:	19

July 2003- March, 10, 2004

Registered archaeological sites:	60
Air reconnaissance (with the support of the IT-JTF):	16
Preventive and repressive motorised patrols:	65
Sequestrated archaeological sites:	302
Identified persons:	94
Individuals under arrest:	46
Weapons sequestrated:	1

Source: Comando Tutela Patrimonio Culturale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri

The work of this special team, integrated also by a specialist in problems related to the environment and biology, identifies and monitors the archaeological sites, surveying them. An accurate archaeological map of the region has been drawn.

The team had also watch-towers and fences built, radio-connections established. Besides this, they instruct, also at the use of weapons, a sort of 'archaeological guards', to whom the Iraqi Police can extend a Temporary Weapon Card (TWC).

An incredible amount of work has been done also to prevent illegal digging, forbidden during Saddam Hussein period, and the subsequent looting, normally performed by a nearby living tribe, whose members specialised in this kind of survival, knowing the places where to dig by oral tradition and a thorough familiarity with those sites.

In my visit over there, I saw a good amount of illegal pits, left over in the middle of the action of digging, most of the time, because of the intense surveillance of the Carabinieri team. In this field also investigations have been done to cut the illegal traffic of archaeological Sumerian valuable pieces.

We have to note also that a complete list of all seized pieces has always been written down, photographs were taken, before sending them to Baghdad, where they had been handed over to the competent Iraqi authorities at the Archaeological Museum.

This is a positive help for a country to be reconstructed and is well accepted by the Iraqi society; the area is very wide and it is necessary or to have more experts there or to increase and speed up the training of the archeological guards.

Synthesis:

A: The tasks performed by the Iraqi MSU are the ones needed in such a situation and in this kind of area, up to now not very much known from the operational point of view and from a psychological one; if I may add, also from the historical point of view – recent history -, which is also fundamental to understand what is going on in these days. Of course, the fact that the area has a wave of 'combat' still in act, means that the 'combat' component of this MSU is to be studied, as it has been, with care, in order to see if it fits to the present moment, but also previewing possible abrupt changes of the situation; may be it is necessary to deepen the knowledge of the country, at the light of the experiences made and the information

gathered, so as to ameliorate the already effective composition of the Unit. Surely there is a need for more people knowing Arabic language, or, at least, a good English, because, by the way, locally interpreters speak a very poor English, which means that sometimes communication is not very easy;

B: The activities of training and monitoring local civil police and the ones carried on by CIMIC should be enhanced, since they are the most effective on the local population, and of course they must be done with the consent of the local authorities, state or religious ones, in order not to alter local balances of every kind. This kind of activities will help really to stabilize and secure the country, and consequently also that strategic sector, up to now, as anyone knows, far from being stabilized and secured, notwithstanding the efforts done and the toll of victims.

Altogether the Regiment MSU there had been and is developing a very good, though very difficult job, showing also to the Coalition Forces and to the local authorities and population, the way in which the Italians perform their activities – be it military or humanitarian help – with a strong sense of discipline and duty. In the case Iraqi had MSU the entire Command and control of the region it could have performed even much better its functions, already well known in the area to the Higher Commands of the Coalition Forces.

THE FUTURE

For the future, there are discussions for Afghanistan, in the Herat region, AOR of Italy for PRT (Provincial reconstruction Teams). In this area training of local police forces had been performed by the Germans, who apparently decided to retire by the end of the year; but in the re-organization of the area responsibilities, there are consistent rumours that this task will be assigned to the Italian Carabinieri, internationally known in this respect for expectional results obtained in various countries where they had been called to act.

The success has been built mission after mission, with a very careful response to the international crisis response to the necessities of different countries, be them collapsed or semi collapsed. Many are the officers of the Carabinieri who have important Staff responsibilities in the international organization connected with the crisis response operations. Secular tradition, also of collaboration with other military police forces, especially now that a European Police Force is on the way to be constituted, trained and put to action.

Exiting war is much more difficult than starting a conflict, especially in our present time, when an 'exit strategy' doctrine has not yet been defined.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

(Since the international bibliography about this kind of missions can be easily found even in internet, only Italian authors will be recorded in this list of books or articles and essays in proceedings of symposiums held and published in Italy)

Abhot C. S., *La cooperazione marittima quale fattore di capacità operative comuni: Peace-keeping*, Atti della Prima Sessione Regionale dell'International Seapower Simposium fra le Marine dei Paesi del Mediterraneo-Mar Nero, Venezia 5–8 novembre 1996, Supplemento alla Rivista Marittima N.° 2, 1997.

Antoniotto A., *Antropologia e peace-keeping: per un approccio a culture diverse nelle operazioni militari di pace.* [Pubblicazione a cura del] Centro militare di studi strategici. Milano, 1999.

Bagnaia A., *L'Anatolia (191–1923). Il Corpo di spedizione italiano nel Mediterraneo orientale e la missione Caprini*, dalla Rivista "Studi Storico-Militari 1992", Roma, 1994, p.255–350.

Barravecchia G., *Le operazioni di tutela della pace*, in Ginsborg P., *Stato dell'Italia*, Saggiatore, Milano, 1994.

Id – *Le operazioni di Peacekeeping delle forze russe nel territorio nell'ex Unione Sovietica*, ISPI, Milano 1995.

Id.- *I limiti e le contraddizioni delle operazioni di Peacekeeping,* ISPI, Milano, 1995.

Id. – *Le forze armate italiane e gli interventi al di fuori del territorio*, ISPI, Milano 1996.

Biagini A., *Momenti di Storia Balcanica (1878–1914), Aspetti Militari*, USSME, Roma, 1981.

Biagini A., Nuti L., *Note sulla Partecipazione Italiana a Corpi di Spedizione Internazionali*, in 'Studi Storico-Militari' 1994, USSME, Roma, 1996.

Bianco G., Graziano C., Risi M., *Soldati Blu, i giorni e le opere degli alpini italiani in Mozambico*, in 2 parti, B.go S. Dalmazzo (CN), Edizioni Martini, 1993–1995.

Benedetti G., *L'uso della forza dopo la guerra fredda: strumenti, obiettivi e limiti*. Roma, 1998.

Blais G., *Vigilare sulla pace. Missione di monitoraggio nella ex Repubblica iugoslava di Macedonia*, Rivista Militare, N.° 2, 1994.

Cellamare G., *Le operazioni di "peace-keeping" multifunzionali*. Torino, 1999.

Chiggio, R., *Ufficiali e sottufficiali dell'Esercito Italiano con la European Community Monitor Mission nella ex Iugoslavia*, Rivista Militare, N.° 4, 1993.

Donini A., *The Policies of mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda*, T. J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Occasional Paper N.° 22, Brown University, Providence RI, 1996.

Fiocca M.T., *Il ruolo delle istituzioni finanziarie internazionali nei processi di peace- building.* [Pubblicazione del] Centro militare di studi strategici. Gaeta, 2002.

Giacomello G., Magnani E., *Italian Peacekeeping Operations, a Brief History,* Peace Research, The Canadian Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 25, N.° 4, nov. 1993.

Guttry (de) A., *Le missioni delle Forze Armate italiane fuori area: profili giuridici della partecipazione nazionale alle "peace support operations".* [Pubblicazione a cura del] Centro militare studi strategici. Milano, 1997.

Ilari V., *Storia militare della prima repubblica 1943–1993*, Ancona, 1994.

Libertini D, *International environmental and juridical aspects*, in 'Proceedings of the Seminar on the MSU', held in Rome, March 30–31 2004, p. 133–138.

Magliano G., *Le Forze di Pace delle Nazioni Unite: Modalità Operative, Riflessi Politi-*

ci e Prospettive, XVI Corso Superiore Informazione Professionale per Consiglieri di Legazione, Ministero Affari Esteri, Istituto Diplomatico, 1989, Roma.

Loi B., *Peace-keeping, pace o guerra*? Prefazione di Sergio Rumano. Firenze, 2004.

Magnani E., *Peacekeeping,* Difesa Oggi, N. 7, 8, 9, 10, 1990.

Id. – *UN: The other way of using force*, Defence Today, agosto – settembre 1990.

Id. – *UN: Where its troops are to be found*, Defense Today, oct. – dec.1990.

Id. (a cura di) – *Oltremare, le missioni all'estero dell'Esercito Italiano*, Ia ed.,
Roma SME, 1992.

Id. – *Operazioni di pace di organismi internazionali e regionali*, Archivio Disarmo, Sistema informativo a schede, N.° 7, sett. 1994.

Id. (a cura di) – *Oltremare, le missioni all'estero dell'Esercito Italiano*, 2ª ed.,
Roma SME, 1994.

Id. – *Evoluzione del concetto di Peacekeeping,* in Fiore C., Zoldan B. (cur.) – *Esercito e Società*, Roma, SME/Una edizioni. 1994.

Id., *Peace-keeping, una rivisitazione*, Affari Esteri, N.° 106, apr. 1995.

Marchisio, S., *La cornice giuridica-istituzionale dell'intervento in compiti di pace*, Archivio Disarmo, Sistema informativo a schede, N.° 1, gen. 1994.

Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *European Commission MonitorMission*, (documento ufficioso), DGAP, Roma, 1993.

Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *La Conferenza sull'Andamento del Processo di pace in Bosnia -Erzegovina*: *I Principali Documenti* (Firenze 13–14 giugno 1996), Servizio Stampa e Informazione, Roma, 1997.

Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Istituto Affari Internazionali, *Il ruolo dell'Italia nella Cooperazione Politica ed Economica con l'Europa Danubiano-Balcanica* (Roma 13 giugno 1997), Servizio Stampa e Informazione, Roma, 1997.

Ministero della Difesa, Gabinetto del Ministro, *Forze Armate italiane, principali operazioni in Italia ed internazionali in corso e concluse*, Roma, ottobre 1997.

Ministero della Difesa, Gabinetto del Ministro, *I-FOR – S-FOR, storia e punto della situazione*, Roma, ottobre 1997, con allegati.

Paris A., *Aspect of military doctrine on the MSU*, in 'Proceedings of the Seminar on the MSU', held in Rome, March 30–31 2004, p.151–158;

Id., *Lo strumento militare italiano in operazioni di polizia*, in 'Rivista Italiana di Difesa', n.10/2004, p. 70–74.

Pasqualini M.G., *Le missioni all'estero dei Carabinieri 1855–2001*, 2 voll., Roma 2000– 2001

Pineschi L., *Le operazioni delle Nazioni Unite per il mantenimento della pace*, Padova, 1998.

Pirocchi A. L., *I problemi attuali del Peacekeeping e l'approccio italiano*, Quaderni su 'Armi e Disarmo', N.° 39, Centro Studi di Economia Applicata – Gruppo di Studio su Armi e Disarmo, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, 1995.

Prizzi L., *Le operazioni di sostegno della pace (1892–1997)*, Rivista Militare, Roma, 2000.

Prodi R., *Un anno di politica estera* (Roma 16 luglio 1997), Centro Italiano di Studi per la Riconciliazione Internazionale/Banca di Roma, Roma, 1997.

Rivista Militare – *Mantenimento della pace e interventi umanit*ari, Pubblicazione N.° 903 della serie dottrinale, Rivista Militare, N.° 3, 1995.

Ronzitti N. (a cura di) *Comando e controllo nelle forze di pace e nelle coalizioni militari. Contributo alla riforma delle Nazioni Unite*, Milano, 1999.

Santoro C.M.(a cura di) – *Ľelmo di Scipio. Studi sul modello di difesa italiano*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1992. SENATO della Repubblica. Servizio Studi. Ufficio ricerche nei settori della politica estera e di difesa, *Iraq: la missione italiana*. Roma, 2004.

RESUMÉ

Maria Gabriella Pasqualinni: Tradícia talianskeho zboru karabinierov v mierových rekonštrukčných misiách od Kréty po Sarajevo a Nasýriu. Budúca úloha: Afganistan, oblasť regiónu Herat?

Taliansky karabiniersky zbor má dvojitú dušu, dvojitú identitu, jednu v ozbrojených silách a druhú ukotvenú v polícii s vojenskými aktívami (status). Karabinieri disponujúc znalosťami dvoch profesií sa vždy zúčastňovali na histórii talianskych vojenských misií v zahraničí. Jednak ako bojová jednotka, ako vojenská polícia a/alebo ako záruka verejného poriadku, pričom zabezpečovali aj sociálne a humanitárne ciele; na misiách starajúcich sa o humanitárne hodnoty a globálne ohrozenie svetového mieru a bezpečnosť.

Prvá mierová misia na medzinárodnej úrovni bola určite na Kréte v rokoch 1897 – 1906: bola to misia, v ktorej karabinieri po prvý raz v zahraničí ukázali svoje špecifické schopnosti ako vojenská polícia pri udržiavaní verejného poriadku, pozorovaní a prieskume na ostrove, vytváraní novej miestnej polície a jej výcviku. Takisto v Číne po boxerskej vzbure a počas medzinárodnej intervencie na záchranu veľvyslaneckej štvrte boli karabinieri v talianskej jednotke v Tientsine zárukou vnútorného poriadku v talianskej koncesii, kde cvičili aj čínsku políciu.

Reputácia Talianov, najmä karabinierov, ako profesionálnych reorganizátorov miestnych policajných síl, sa začala v tom čase zviditeľňovať.

V rokoch 1904 až 1911 boli Taliani pozvaní, aby prebudovali macedónske (stále súčasť Osmanskej ríše) miestne *žandárstvo*: medzi dôstojníkmi, ktorí sa zúčastnili na tejto misii, bol veľmi zvláštny karabinier – dôstojník, plukovník Balduino Caprini, ktorý už predtým potvrdil znalosti takejto práce počas niekoľkoročného pôsobenia na Kréte.

V spomínanom čase aj suverénna krajina Grécko požiadala talianske ozbrojené sily o pomoc pri reorganizácii svojej vojenskej, ale aj miestnej polície. Karabinieri boli aktívni v tejto krajine niekoľko rokov (1911 – 1923).

Počas okupácie Konštantinopolu v roku 1919, keď Zlatý roh videl pri svojich brehoch 55 vojnových lodí, hlavný veliteľ spojeneckých síl musel menovať medzinárodný výbor s úlohou riadiť osmanskú políciu. V tomto konkrétnom sektore – policajný výcvik alebo pozorovanie – bolo opäť vedúcou krajinou Taliansko so svojimi expertmi, ktorých väčšina boli príslušníci zboru karabinierov.

V tomto období sa Taliansko zúčastnilo aj na niektorých iných externých misiách v problematických oblastiach vždy prostredníctvom karabinierov – ako vojenská polícia – alebo plnením špeciálnych miestnych úloh. Karabinieri sa zúčastnili na medzinárodných misiách schválených Ligou národov, ako napríklad na misii spojenej s referendom v Hornom Sliezsku, 1920, alebo v rokoch 1935 – 1936 v inom referende o pripojení veľmi bohatého regiónu Sárska k Francúzsku alebo k Nemecku alebo zachovaní *status quo*.

Po druhej svetovej vojne karabinieri boli v Somálsku pod talianskym správcovstvom a organizovali somálsku políciu. Karabinieri museli neskôr ešte raz zasiahnuť v Somálsku, počas misie OSN *Restore Hope*, v roku 1992, a pri reorganizácii miestnej polície od roku 1994.

V Libanone, v roku 1982, boli karabinieri v rámci medzinárodného kontingentu súčasťou talianskej vojenskej jednotky. Výsadkársky pluk 'Tuscania' mal za úlohu hliadkovať v Bejrúte, východne od vopred stanoveného plánu, kde pôsobil ako sila zabezpečujúca sprostredkovanie a prevenciu, pričom na rozdiel od iných prípadov tu nenahrádzal libanonské ozbrojené sily. V tejto konkrétnej misii bola identita karabinierov v rámci ozbrojených síl zvlášť užitočná, spolu s ich profesionálnym prístupom k civilnému obyvateľstvu, pretože tu išlo o udržiavanie verejného poriadku a bezpečnosť v oblasti pôsobenia (AOR).

Boli aj misie v Albánsku v rokoch 1991 – 1993, v Salvadore v rokoch 1991 –1995, v Kambodži v rokoch 1992 – 1993, kde zbor prejavil svoju profesionalitu aj pri výcviku miestnych policajných síl. Na Balkáne zbor pôsobil a pôsobí aj teraz, pričom sa stará o verejný poriadok, vnútornú bezpečnosť a výcvik miestnych bezpečnostných síl.

Bolo to najmä na Balkáne, ak nespomíname Irak, kde svetská tradícia karabinierov pri reorganizácii a výcviku miestnych policajných síl, a samozrejme, pri obnovovaní verejného poriadku a bezpečnosti, popri bežných bojových činností, dospela do svojho najvýznamnejšieho profesionálneho bodu: prejavili nielen svoju profesionalitu, ale aj veľké možnosti pri navrhovaní a určovaní normatívnych a doktrinálnych príspevkov, neskôr s úspechom implementovaných. Práve na Balkáne sa po prvý raz stretli s tým, čo je originálny príspevok k riešeniu súčasných bezpečnostných problémov v niektorých krajinách – MSU – mnohonárodnou špecializovanou jednotkou (*Multinational Specialised Unit*). Je to mimoriadne flexibilný nástroj armády, určený na vyplnenie rezerv v bezpečnosti, v oblasti, kde ešte neskončila fáza *boja*, ale už začala *rekonštrukcia,* a je nevyhnutné nielen bojovať so vzbúrencami alebo stále odporujúcim povstaleckým hnutím, ale aj byť schopný čeliť problémom civilnej bezpečnosti, udržiavať verejný poriadok a nastoliť rešpekt voči existujúcim zákonom.

Posledná misia, ktorou boli poverení: karabinieri sú vždy v mnohonárodnom družstve, v ktorom majú velenie, na palestínskej hranici s Egyptom, monitorovanie situácie a kontrola správnej aplikácie dohôd týkajúcich sa obvyklého používania práv pri prechode hraníc a bezpečnostných záruk.

Polish Armed Forces in the International Peacekeeping Operations 1953–2006

Col. Janusz Zuziak

It has been more than half a century since the Polish Armed Forces became involved in the international peacekeeping operations. Our participation in the peace missions dates back to 1953, when the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in Korea was established.

In over 50-year-long history of contribution of the Polish Armed Forces to the international peacekeeping missions, the Polish soldiers have performed logistic, operational duties, they were observers and arbitrators.

The Polish Armed Forces have taken part in the peacekeeping operations organized mainly by the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union and NATO. Moreover, several times Poland has participated in the missions mandated by UN, organized and conducted by the temporary coalitions of the member states and led by the US (e.g. in the Persian Gulf in 1991, in Haiti in 1994 or at present in Iraq).

The Polish soldiers also participated in the peacekeeping missions organized outside the UN system: the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea mentioned earlier, also participation in the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) in South Vietnam.

In the history of the Polish involvement in the peacekeeping operations and missions several characteristic moments should be pointed:

- ► 1953 – beginning of participation of the Polish soldiers as observers in the operations organized outside the UN system (the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea);
- ► 1973 – beginning of participation of the regular military contingents (logistic units) in the peacekeeping operations organized by the UN (*the Second United Nations Emergency Forces in Egypt – UNEF II*);
- ► 1992 – beginning of participation of the operational units of the Polish Armed

Forces in the international peacekeeping operations (infantry battalion in *United Nations Protection Forces – UNPROFOR* – in Yugoslavia);

► 1992 – beginning of Polish involvement in the peacekeeping missions organized by OSCE and European Union;

► 1995 – beginning of participation of the operational units of the Polish Armed Forces in the peace enforcement operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina organized and mandated by EU and led by NATO – *Implementation Forces – IFOR*;

► 2003 –participation of the Polish Armed Forces units in the operation "Iraqi Freedom" and in the Multinational Stabilization Forces in the Republic of Iraq.

These moments involved quantity and quality changes in our participation in the peacekeeping operations and missions.

To present contribution of the Polish soldiers to the most important international peacekeeping missions and operations in the chronological order, one should start with the work in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea, established by the armistice agreement that ended a three-year Korean war, signed on 27 July 1953 in Panmunjon. Apart from the Polish representatives, the NNSC comprised also delegates from Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and Sweden.

The task of the Commission was to supervise compliance with the conditions of the armistice agreement. According to Article 40, Commission set up 20 Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, 10 fixed and 10 mobile, including not less than 4 officers each. These teams were stationed at the ports, airports and railway stations of both parties and patrolled the demilitarized zones along the demarcation line.

At the end of June 1953 a reconnaissance team made up of approximately 30 personnel was sent, the first shift numbering 301 personnel (259 soldiers and 42 civilian personnel) followed. The second Polish shift in NNSC comprised 300 personnel, but this number in the third shift in 1955/1956 was reduced to 88, including 64 soldiers. That change was a result of the limited range of work of the Commission. From the beginning of the 60's the Polish military personnel in NNSC did not exceed 10 persons.

The Polish mission in NNSC lasted by February 1995, when the authorities of Democratic People's Republic of Korea withdrew the consent for our further stay on their territory. Although formally Poland is still a member of NNSC, in fact our participation in the works of the Commission is very limited.

The delegates of the Polish Armed Forces were also involved in the works of International Commissions for Control and Supervision in Indochina, established by Geneva agreements, including the armistice agreement in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, signed on 20 and 21 July 1954. A separate commission, which had however similar tasks, was International Commission for Supervision and Control set up in January 1973 in South Vietnam under the Paris Agreement. Polish representatives also took part in its works.

The principal task of ICCS in Indochina was: supervision of movement of troops of parties engaged in the conflict, supervision of demarcation lines and demilitarized zones, supervision of return of prisoners of war, control of ports, airfields and borders and supervision of conduct of elections.

Overall, 1948 Poles took part in the in the works of the international commissions in Indochina, 1,391 soldiers and 557 civilian personnel.

In 1968 – 1970 4 Polish officers were involved in the International Observers Team Nigeria (OTN). The team was to control the conduct of Nigerian federal army towards the prisoners of war, civilian population and refugees from the Ibo tribe. The Polish military observers cooperated with the Canadians, the Swiss, and the British there.

Poland detached the first military contingent for the international peacekeeping mission in autumn 1973 and sent Polish Military Special Unit to the United Nations Emergency Forces II (UNEF II).

Both the Polish and the Canadian units were responsible for logistics of the operational units of the international peacekeeping forces in the buffer zone.

Main duties of the Polish soldiers on this mission were:

► transport of people, food, water, petroleum oil and lubricants and other supplies;
► mining and purifying water;
► maintaining the technical efficiency of all the access roads in the buffer area, building and maintenance of roads in the area of operations of the peacekeeping forces;
► mine clearance of objects, roads and terrains in the area of responsibility;
► running field hospital, health and sanitary care of all the peacekeeping forces contingents.

In 1973 – 1979 11,699 personnel served in UNEF, including 11,117 soldiers and 582 civilian personnel, mainly medical personnel.

The next peacekeeping operation involving the Polish soldiers is the operation in the Golan Heights carried out from 1974 in Syria by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). By December 1993 the Polish contingent conducted here logistic, mainly transport, supply and engineering duties. It numbered 130–150 soldiers on the average. Due to organizational changes in UNDOF the Polish contingent terminated its service in December 1993, and the Canadian contingent took over its duties.

In 1994 the Polish soldiers resumed their mission in the Golan Heights. However, the character of the mission changed, as after withdrawal of the Finnish operational battalion the Polish soldiers took over its tasks. From 1994 up to now the Polish soldiers (POLBATT) have then, fulfilled typical operational duties, mainly:

► monitoring of the separation zones between Syrian and Israeli forces in the assigned area of responsibility
► observation and reporting on the air activity of the opposing sides in the airspace in the Polish area of responsibility.

From 1974 several thousand Polish soldiers have served in the Golan Heights in UNDOF forces. At present 344 people serve there.

In 1989 – 1990 the Polish soldiers also participated in the peace operation in Namibia conducted by the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAC), established by the UN Security Council Resolution 632 of 16 February 1989.

The principal tasks of the peacekeeping forces in Namibia were:

► supervision of ceasefire agreement between the South African forces and guerilla forces of South West African People Organization – SWAPO;
► supervision of reduction and withdrawal of South African forces from the territory of Namibia;

► securing the repatriation of refugees and the process of preparation and holding free elections.

In Namibia, just like earlier in Egypt and Syria, the Polish contingent fulfilled mainly logistic duties. The soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces provided functioning of the central supplies storehouses and supplied the operational battalions deployed in the northern Namibia. The 89th Canadian Logistic Unit was responsible for supplying the peacekeeping forces in the southern part of this country. Medical support was provided by the Swiss unit, and maintenance by the German Maintenance Team.

The Polish unit, apart from the logistic troops, comprised also 20 military observers. Overall, 393 soldiers served in the Polish contingent in Namibia.

The next peacekeeping mission in which the Polish soldiers participated was the mission in Cambodia in 1992 – 1993. By the UN Security Council Resolution 745 of 2 February 1992, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established to ensure implementation of agreement on settlement of the Cambodian conflict.

In July 1992 Poland sent a logistic and engineering unit consisting of 700 personnel to Cambodia. Together with the Canadian contingent it was responsible for logistics of approx. 10,000 operational troops. The main tasks of the Polish soldiers were following:

► delivery of water, food and fuel to the operational contingents;
► securing of functioning of the central supplies storehouses of the peacekeeping forces;
► maintenance of roads and bridges.

Moreover, the Polish contingent comprised 16 military observers and personnel in the UNTAC Headquarters.

Overall 1,270 soldiers and civilians served in two rotations of the Polish contingent in UNTAC in Cambodia.

One of the biggest and the longest peacekeeping mission in which the Polish soldiers participated is the mission of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon – UNIFIL, established by UN Security Council Resolution 425 of 19 March 1978. This resolution called for abiding by the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon in its borders and for ceasing military actions and withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory.

UNIFIL tasks were following:

► supervision of withdrawal of the Israeli forces;
► restoring peace and security;
► assisting the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of authority in the areas occupied earlier by the Israeli forces.

The service of the Polish military contingent began in Lebanon in June 1992 and it has lasted till today. By April 1994 Poland had provided the field hospital with over 60 personnel. Then the logistic battalion and the engineering detachment numbering over 500 personnel were sent to the mission area. In June 1996 the maintenance units joined the Polish contingent. Thereby, the Polish soldiers took over all the logistic duties in UNIFIL forces that had 4,500 personnel in strength.

Duties of the Polish soldiers:

► transport of personnel and different kinds of materials for the operational contingents;

► providing functioning of the central storehouses of the peacekeeping forces;

► maintenance of the motor vehicles and other equipment of the peacekeeping forces;

► mine clearance, building and fortification works in the UNIFIL deployment areas;

► providing all the peacekeeping forces in Lebanon with medical care;

► providing local population with humanitarian aid.

So far approx. 9,000 soldiers and civilian personnel have participated in the Polish Military Contingent in the peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. At present 233 Poles serve there.

In 1992 Poland detached a battalion (in strength approx. 9,000 soldiers) to the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, established by the UN Security Council Resolution 743 of 21 February 1992.

The structure of this battalion, the first Polish operational unit in the history of our involvement in the peacekeeping missions and operations consisted of: command, five infantry companies, supply company and maintenance company.

In March 1992 the Polish battalion was deployed in Kraijna to execute the following duties:

► monitoring of assigned areas of responsibility;

► protection of important installations;

► protection of convoys with humanitarian aid;

► control of withdrawal of the federal Yugoslavian forces and irregular Serb forces from the territory of Croatia;

► control of movement of vehicles and people on the assigned road sections in the assigned area of responsibility.

Due to a greater number of duties, the number of personnel in the Polish battalion increased. At the beginning of 1995 it amounted to 1,298 soldiers and civilian personnel. Apart from the operational battalion, the Polish contingent was composed of the officers fulfilling various functions in the command of the sector, the Polish personnel in the UNPROFOR HQ, military observers and 30 policemen. Overall, 4,600 Polish soldiers, policemen and civilian personnel served in UNPROFOR.

Polish soldiers continued their involvement in the international peacekeeping operation in the Balkans in the Implementation Forces (IFOR) established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1031 of 15 December 1995. The Polish battalion together with the battalions of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden comprised the Nordic-Polish Brigade within the Multinational Division North.

The principal duties of the Polish battalion in IFOR were:

► control of movement through the points on the demarcation line;

► patrol of the zones of separation between the forces;

► providing possibility of movement of the peacekeeping forces;

► monitoring of withdrawal of forces and armament of the opposing sides beyond the agreed lines;

► supervision of freedom and safety of movement of civilians (refugees and displaced people);
► support of humanitarian actions.

The IFOR forces had a mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina only for 12 months. When it terminated, Security Council – by Resolution 1088 of 12 December 1996 – established Stabilization Forces (SFOR). Poland took part in this effort that was the continuation of the operation of the implementation forces (IFOR). The Polish tasks remained the same.

Since 2 December 2004 the Polish Military Contingent in Bosnia and Herzegovina has continued the tasks within the European Forces (EUFOR). At present 257 soldiers and civilian personnel serve there.

Since 1 July 1999 up till today the Polish soldiers have been involved in the service in the stabilization forces in Kosovo (Kosovo Forces – KFOR) that were established by the UN General Assembly Resolution 1244. At present the Polish Military Contingent in Kosovo numbers 304 military and civilian personnel.

The most important duties of the Polish soldiers are:
► patrol of the area of responsibility;
► supervision of the demilitarization process and compliance with the peace agreements;
► mine clearance and ordnance disposal;
► protection and security of civilian population;
► providing freedom of movement using main communication lines;
► support of international organizations;
► securing humanitarian actions.

Following the tragic events of 11 September 2001, Poland joined actively the anti-terrorist coalition. It resulted in the presence – since 16 March 2002 up till today – of the Polish Military Contingent in the international operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan. At present 97 Polish soldiers serve there.

The biggest current peacekeeping operation of the Polish Armed Forces is the operation in Iraq. By decision of President of the Republic of Poland of 17 March 2003, made on motion of the Council of Ministers and pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002, Poland sent the military contingent to Iraq that consisted of 200 personnel.

In September 2003 Polish Military Contingent in Iraq was increased to approx. 2, 400 soldiers. Due to the change of character of the mission of the multinational forces in Iraq from the beginning of 2006, the Polish Military Contingent is reduced to approx. 900 soldiers who are to carry out only training and advisory tasks.

Earlier, the Polish soldiers assisted Iraqis to restore stabilization, rebuild and develop civil infrastructure, they protected cultural goods, carried out and supported humanitarian actions, took part in rebuilding numerous hospitals, schools and kindergartens, supported the local administration.

So far approx. 11, 000 Polish soldiers have served in Iraq.

History of involvement of the Polish Armed Forces in the peacekeeping missions and operations comprises today about 70 such initiatives, organized by UN, OSCE, Europe-

an Union or NATO. Just a few the most important and the biggest missions have been discussed here.

So far in the peacekeeping missions and operations approximately 50,000 soldiers, policemen and civilian personnel have taken part, "... they risked their lives to bring others hope for freedom, peace and normal life".

RESUMÉ

Janusz Zuziak: Poľské ozbrojené sily v medzinárodných mierových operáciách
1953 – 2006

Prešlo viac ako polstoročie, odkedy sa Poľské ozbrojené sily zapojili do medzinárodných mierových operácií. Poľská účasť v mierových misiách sa datuje od roku 1953, kedy bola zriadená Kontrolná komisia neutrálnych krajín (NNSC) v Kórei.

Za viac ako 50-ročnú históriu prispievania poľských ozbrojených síl do medzinárodných mierových misií plnili poľskí vojaci logistické a operačné povinnosti, pôsobili ako pozorovatelia a sudcovia.

Poľské ozbrojené sily sa zúčastňovali na mierových operáciách organizovaných hlavne Organizáciou spojených národov, Organizáciou pre bezpečnosť a spoluprácu v Európe, Európskou úniou a NATO. Okrem toho sa Poľsko niekoľkokrát zúčastnilo na misiách pod mandátom OSN, organizovaných a uskutočňovaných dočasnými koalíciami členských štátov a vedených USA (napr. v Perzskom zálive v roku 1991, na Haiti v roku 1994 alebo v súčasnosti v Iraku).

Poľskí vojaci sa zúčastňovali aj na mierových misiách organizovaných mimo systému OSN: predtým spomenutá Kontrolná komisia neutrálnych krajín v Kórei a tiež účasť v medzinárodnej Komisii pre kontrolu a dohľad (ICCS) v Južnom Vietname.

V histórii poľského zapojenia do mierových operácií a misií by sa mali zdôrazniť niektoré charakteristické momenty:

► 1953 – začiatok účasti poľských vojakov ako pozorovateľov v operáciách organizovaných mimo systému OSN (Kontrolná komisia neutrálnych krajín v Kórei);

► 1973 – začiatok účasti pravidelných vojenských kontingentov (logistických jednotiek) v mierových operáciách organizovaných OSN (*the Second United Nations Emergency Forces in Egypt – UNEF II*);

► 1992 – začiatok účasti operačných jednotiek poľských ozbrojených síl v medzinárodných mierových operáciách (pechotný prápor v *Ochranných silách Organizácie spojených národov – UNPROFOR – v* Juhoslávii);

► 1992 – začiatok poľskej účasti v mierových misiách organizovaných OBSE a Európskou úniou;

► 1995 – začiatok účasti operačných jednotiek poľských ozbrojených síl v operáciách na presadenie mieru v Bosne a Hercegovine organizovaných pod mandátom EÚ a vedených NATO – *Implementačné sily – IFOR*;

► 2003 – účasť jednotiek poľských ozbrojených síl v operácii "Iracká sloboda" a v mnohonárodných stabilizačných silách v Irackej republike.

Históriu zapojenia poľských ozbrojených síl do mierových misií a operácií tvorí dnes asi 70 takýchto iniciatív, organizovaných OSN, OBSE, Európskou úniou alebo NATO. Spomenuli sme iba najdôležitejšie a najväčšie misie.

Doteraz sa na mierových misiách a operáciách zúčastnilo približne 50 000 vojakov, policajtov a civilných osôb, "… riskovali svoje životy, aby priniesli iným nádej na slobodu, mier a normálny život".

Sweden's Participation in Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement Operations 1956 – 2006

Prof. Kent Zetterberg

Swedish foreign policy has long been based on the premise that national security is best served by staying free of alliances in peacetime in order to remain neutral in the event of war. However, in 2002, Sweden revised its security doctrine. The security doctrine now states that "*Sweden ursues a policy of non-participation in military alliances,*" but permits cooperation in response to threats against peace and security. The government also seeks to maintain Sweden's high standard of living. These two objectives require heavy expenditures for social welfare, defence spending at rates considered high by west European standards (currently around 2.2% of GNP), and close attention to foreign trade opportunities and world economic cooperation.

Sweden participates actively in the United Nations, as a member of the Security Council in 1997–98, and in other multilateral organizations. The strong interest of the Swedish Government and people in international cooperation and peacemaking is a long tradition. It has been supplemented by renewed attention to Nordic and European security questions. In January 1995, Sweden became a full member of the European Union after a referendum in late 1994 indicated that 52.3% of participants wanted to join. Sweden became a member in part due to its increasing isolation outside the economic framework of the Maastricht Treaty. It sits as an observer in the Western European Union and is an active member of NATO's Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

Swedish foreign policy has been the result of a wide consensus. Sweden cooperates closely with its Nordic neighbours, formally in economic and social matters through the Nordic Council of Ministers and informally in political matters through direct consultation.

Swedish governments have not defined nonalignment as precluding outspoken positions in international affairs. Government leaders have favoured national liberation movements that enjoy broad support among developing world countries, with notable

attention to Africa. During the Cold War, Sweden was suspicious of the superpowers, which it saw as making decisions affecting small countries without always consulting those countries. With the end of the Cold War, that suspicion has lessened somewhat, although Sweden still chooses to remain nonaligned. Sweden has devoted particular attention to issues of disarmament, arms control, and nuclear nonproliferation and has contributed importantly to UN and other international peacekeeping efforts, including the NATO-led peacekeeping forces in the Balkans. Sweden also contributes to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and will assume leadership of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Mazar e-Sharif in 2006. [1]

Sweden joined the United Nations in 1946 and from the start the basis for Swedish participation in different forms of United Nations work was promising. The attitude in Sweden towards international activities was positive since long. After the disastrous Second World War Sweden wanted to take part in building a new peaceful international order and give humanitarian aid and in every way try to rebuild the destroyed and warridden nations in Europe.

In the League of Nations Sweden had played an active role, especially in the 1920's, to foster cooperation between the great powers, to support the democratic Germany (The Weimar Republic)to find a new peaceful role, and in order to form a new international order of collective security. In 1923 Swedish diplomats and armed forces participated in the League of Nations observation role in Vilna. The same procedure was repeated in the Saar election in 1935 when Saarland became a part of Germany after the election. Sweden had a dispute with the new independent state Finland in the years 1919–21in the League of Nations about *the Aaland islands* (Ålandsöarna). The Swedish-speaking inhabitants of the Aaland islands very strongly wanted to be a part of Sweden but Finland considered the islands as a part of Finland since the peace in 1809 when Russia gained Finland as a grand Duchy within its empire. (Sweden in 1814 gained a Union with Norway as a compensation). The League of Nations wanted to support the rights of national minorities and the principle of national sovereignty. Sweden made attempts in the League of Nations to bring about the transfer of the Aalands islands to Sweden, but gave in and acknowledged the right of Finland in this matter. However it all ended peacefully in a an international convention in 1921 in which the Aalands islands were declared a neutralized and demilitarised zone and the population of the islands got rights of self-determination in all domestic affairs. (Finland was responsible for the foreign policy and defence.)

As in 1905, when the Union between Sweden and Norway ended peacefully, Sweden in 1921 wanted a peaceful solution with Finland on the question of the Aalands islands. This gave two fine peaceful examples for Europe by Sweden. However, both in 1905 and 1919–21 there were nationalist groups in Sweden opposing the deals, even wanting to go to war with Norway and Finland to defend "The Swedish national pride and rights of Sweden." (The old dream of Sweden as a dominant power among the Nordic Countries, a semi-great power in Northern Europe, looking back on its own history as a European Great power in 1621–1721.) However, after the promising 1920's, the new aggres-

---

1   http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2880.htm

sive dictatorships of Hitlers Germany, Mussolinis Italy and the USSR under Stalin, made the hope for a lasting peace and the coming of a democratic Europe, diminishing. The Western powers tried to get a deal with Hitler in 1938 by the Munich Agreement, but all in vain. In august 1939 Hitler and Stalin formed a pact leading to the outbreak of a new Great War in Europe when Hitler attacked Poland on the 1 September 1939. Sweden managed to stay neutral and outside the war in the years 1939–45, however surrounded by Germany and the USSR in "the pact years" 1939–45 and encircled and surrounded by German troops in the years 1941–44. Sweden lost its trade overseas and with the western powers 1940–45 and was depending on the expanding German trade, including the controversial iron ore export to Germany. Sweden imported military arms and goods from Germany as well as coal, industry products etc. In the final war years 1943–45 Sweden gave humanitarian aid and support for many countries in Europe and for around 300 000 refugees, mostly from Norway, Denmark, Finland and the Baltic states.

Count Folke Bernadotte af Wisborg (1895–1948) during the final months of the War in 1945, as vice chairman of the Swedish Red Cross, led the "white buses" expedition to Germany saving some 30000 concentration camp prisoners. In May 1947, Folke Bernadotte, was appointed UN mediator in Palestine. He succeeded in achieving a truce in the first Israeli-Arab war and laid the groundwork for UNTSO (The UN Truce Supervision Organization) and UNWRA (UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees). On 17 September 1948, he was assassinated by Jewish extremists in Jerusalem a few days before his plan for a political solution was to be presented to the United Nations.

After the end of the Second World War in 1945 Dag Hammarskjöld was secretary general of the United Nations 1953–1961; he died in a plane crash while trying to negotiate a settlement in the Congo Crisis. Swedish peacekeeping troops got involved from 1956 (Gaza) and onwards wherever there was demand for a neutral force to separate enemies. Sweden sent a military hospital to the Korean battleground, but did not otherwise get involved. After the armistice was signed in 1953, Swedes were selected as members of the NNSC (Neutral Nations Supervisory Council) created to supervise that both sides keep the armistice. They still are serving at this mission.

There have been about 800,000 peacekeepers in 50 years since they were started in 1956 under Dag Hammarskjöld, the Swedish Secretary-General, and Ralph Bunche. Out of 800,000 Sweden has provided about 10 percent, which shows a strong commitment for such a small country. Sweden, indeed was a pioneer in peacekeeping and Dag Hammarskjöld managed to launch the UN peacekeeping missions as a new task for the UN in the early days of the Cold War. After that Sweden was a stubborn contributor to the UN peacekeeping missions to the end of the Cold War and regularly sent peacekeeping forces (battalions and companies) to Gaza, Cyprus, Lebanon etc.

The Swedish Ambassador Peter Osvald, President of the Security Council, and Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations, gave this Statement on 22 June 1997 honouring the great efforts of all nations, men and women, in the UN peacekeeping missions:

For nearly half a century, the lives, security and future of countless individuals across the globe have depended on United Nations peacekeeping efforts, and on the peacekeepers participating in them. Today, we express our gratitude to all those who have served

the United Nations in the cause of peace. Over 750 000 men and women have served in UN peacekeeping operations. More than 1500 have lost their lives; many more have been wounded. This solemn meeting of the Security Council is held in tribute to their service and sacrifice.

Today, the Council is establishing the Dag Hammarskjöld Medal in recognition and commemoration of those who have lost their life as a result of service in peacekeeping operations under the operational control and authority of the United Nations. The medal is named after Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-General of this organisation, who greatly contributed to the development of the concept of peacekeeping operations, whose own commitment to the cause of peacekeeping was unwavering, and who lost his life while on mission to one of the many countries in which the United Nations has tried to build peace. As we honour those who have died in United Nations peacekeeping operations, we must never forget our responsibility as members of the Security Council towards those participating in the operations whose mandates we establish. The Security Council must continue to ensure the proper discharge of its mandates and take every possible measure to enhance the safety and security of all those serving the United Nations in conflict situations. This we owe those men and women who are prepared to risk their lives for peace.

Dag Hammarskjöld once wrote that "no life was more satisfying than one of selfless service to your country – or humanity. This service required a sacrifice of all personal interests, but likewise the courage to stand up unflinchingly for your convictions." His life and death are perhaps a fitting symbol of what we honour today: commitment, service and sacrifice.[2]

SWEDEN AS A STAUNCH SUPPORTER OF UN PEACE-KEEPING MISSIONS

In the Clinton-Era in USA and in the World, Ambassador Bill Richardson at a Press Conference in Stockholm, Sweden on January 30, 1998, made this Statement in honour of the Swedish long leading role in peacekeeping operations under the UN flag:

"Sweden is a very active and positive member of the U.N. Security Council. It's contributions in the Security Council this year have been outstanding, as they were last year. Sweden's role in peacekeeping, Sweden's role in Bosnia, in Africa, on human rights issues has been noteworthy and outstanding. The United States and Sweden have a very good strong relationship and my objective here in Sweden is to talk to Swedish officials on a joint strategy on Iraq."[3]

After the Cold War Sweden has been engaged in more mixed peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions at the Balkans in cooperation with NATO and the European Union, but always under the Mandate of the United Nations. That goes for Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, Liberia and Kosovo in the period of 1995– 2006. A new role of EU in peace-support operations outside Europe has begun in the late years and Sweden has been participating in the peacekeeping missions in Liberia and the Congo/Kinshasa and

---

2   http://www.un.int/sweden/pages/nationalstatemen/0970622.htm
3   http://www.un.int/usa/98_11.htm

in Afghanistan. European countries and industrial countries first seemed not to be so willing to go in so much in Africa where the main peacekeeping operations are. However, EU after a while found a new role for its peace-support operations in Africa from 2002–2003 and Sweden strongly supported this new policy. (USA and NATO seems to concentrate on missions and operations in other continents).

Thus, peacekeeping operations has been a tradition in Swedish Foreign Policy since 1956 and a duty and tradition for the Swedish Armed Forces, often with support of NGO's and Civil Emergency Authorities from the Swedish State.

Sweden strongly believed in the international role of the UN and it became a cornerstone in the Swedish foreign and security policy from the 1950's and onwards. The social democrats long stressed under the governments of Tage Erlander 1946–1969, Olof Palme 1969–1976, 1982–1986, Ingvar Carlsson 1986–1991 and Göran Persson 1994–2006, the need for collective action and collective solutions for collective problems. He non-socialist parties supported this policy mainly but sometimes made objections to parts of the very active the social democratic foreign policy, especially during the Cold War. Also the non-socialist governments 1976–1982 (Thorbjörn Fälldin, Ola Ullsten) and 1991–1994 (Carl Bildt) strongly supported the UN and its peacekeeping operations in these years. The Nordic countries contributed a lot to UN programs; together, as much as the U.S. They are major donors to all the different programs, because The Nordic countries strongly believe in the UN and its role for peace and development in the world.

A RADICAL REFORM OF UN?

However, Pierre Schori, Sweden's Ambassador at the UN, in 2004 in a interview said that UN needed radical reform to be able to better perform its international roles. He made this statement:

"Sweden has always made a contribution to the peacekeeping forces, either in the form of boots on the ground or in terms of expertise. We also know that the UN needs reform now, just like the EU expanding its membership now needs to deepen and change the structures. The UN needs radical reform. There's a lot of internal inertia, while there's a lot of external energy at the UN with all the peacekeeping operations and so on. But it's the only organization where you have legitimacy, sustainability, impartiality, and universality."[4]

In an interview in Berkeley at the Institute of International Studies, Pierre Schori elaborated his view on the role of Sweden in the following words[5]:

Sweden's Leadership Role

Tell us a little about how Sweden's foreign policy and the kinds of commitments you had talked about earlier, coming out of your party, related to that millennium agenda. Because when one looks at the record, Sweden, across the board, takes a leadership role in many of these areas, and for a small state it's surprising. One always thinks that it's only the major powers who can contribute.

---

4   http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people4/Schori/schori-con0.html the Institute's "Conversations with History"

5   http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people4/Schori/schori-con0.html

In 1962, already, we set up the 0.7 goal of GNP for foreign assistance, because we saw that as part of our national security policy, that as long as you're having injustices and poverty and conflicts out there, we can never in the long run develop our own society behind walls, or under a glass. This was in '62, and there was Olof Palme, he was secretary of that group. It was the same time when the War on Poverty started in this country, or was announced by Lyndon Johnson and Michael Harrington, which inspired us – we knew Michael Harrington, Palme met him, too, and that inspired us, too.

But there were two wars on poverty. Ours, in '62, was against world poverty, because we had already gotten started on our own society. Lyndon's was the [domestic] War on Poverty, which was obvious, then. Again, there was a war that disturbed that – Vietnam, of course. So over the years, we have set aside a lot of money for development and cooperation, and I think that we made a difference in many fields where other countries held back. The anti-apartheid struggle, for instance, we were early on involved in humanitarian support and legal support to the ANC, and also for liberation movements. That was very important.

Why has your country been an important leader at the UN? It really has been. Is it this link between domestic and foreign policy, and Sweden's own internal values? Yes. There have been about 800,000 peacekeepers since they were started under Dag Hammarskjöld, the Swedish Secretary-General, and Ralph Bunche. Out of 800,000, we have [provided] about 10 percent, which shows a lot about our commitment. That [figure] was down some years ago, but now we are coming back with a vengeance, I would say. We are right now in all the peacekeeping operation in Africa, in one or another form. But, yes, it has been a tradition.

The problem for peacekeeping now is that it's mainly Third World countries who are contributing, and you see European countries and industrial countries not wanting to go in so much in Africa, for instance, where all the main peacekeeping operations are. We have to rectify that to show that we are not Europeanized, so to say, or [that we] just take care of the Balkans and do not want to engage in Africa. I think that is changing now. It needs to change. International activities are increasing in importance, at the same time as improved forms of international co-operation are being developed. The commitment of the Swedish Armed Forces to international causes is nothing new. Since the creation of the United Nations following the conclusion of World War II, Sweden has been sending individuals and units on UN peace support operations in trouble spots around the globe.

Sweden is a member of Partnership for Peace (PfP), which is a practical co-operation programme between NATO and interested members of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). One cornerstone for the PfP programme is that each country decides in which areas and in which manner it wishes to co-operate. The aims of PfP co-operation include increasing the ability of Sweden to take part in international peace support operations. Sweden also participates in major exercises involving co-operation between many countries to solve fictitious conflicts. Apart from gaining experience in the practical aspects of co-operation and conflict resolution, the participants gain valuable experience through contact with other nations and cultures.

Since Sweden joined the EU in 1995, this too has become an important platform for international co-operation in the field of security. Member States now work together on crisis management issues, which allows Sweden to fully participate in, and gain insight into, EU decision-making. It also places considerable demands on Sweden's commitment to European co-operation."[6]

NOW IN AFGHANISTAN AND KOSOVO

In February 2006 Sweden sent some 400 troops to Afghanistan, to form the core of a PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team). Although Sweden has been militarily neutral for nearly two centuries, it has been active in contributing troops to peacekeeping missions. During the 1950–53 Korean war, it even sent a military hospital to Korea, and later in the 1950s, began providing military observers and peacekeepers in the Middle East. Sweden, like Switzerland, has a small professional armed force, augmented by a huge reserve, containing all males of military age fit for military service. The peacekeepers are a combination of professionals, and reservists who volunteer for the duty.[7]

Brigadier-General Anders Brännström is the Swedish Brigadier General commanding Multinational Brigade (MNB) Centre in Kosovo within the NATO-led KFOR mission. MNB Centre is deployed in central and northeastern Kosovo and headquartered in Pristina. The area has a population of about 700,000, including Albanians, Gorans and Serbs. Brigadier-General Brännström has spent much of his career in Sweden's Arctic Infantry, where he has had a variety of appointments from platoon leader to brigade commander. In 1982 and 1983, he served as a platoon leader in the Swedish UN Battalion in Cyprus. And in summer 2000, he commanded the Swedish battalion (SWEBAT) in Kosovo. He is the only Partner officer currently commanding a sector in a NATO-led operation. He was interviewed by NATO about the cooperation between Sweden and NATO in these countries:[8] Here some excerpts:

How difficult is it for soldiers from Partner nations to work together with their NATO peers in complex peace support operations?

It's actually quite easy to work together. This is the result of ten years of cooperating with NATO in the framework of the Partnership for Peace, as well as our experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina where Sweden deployed 12 battalions in the 1990s. Moreover, in Kosovo we have already been working together for five years. Critically, all soldiers – whether NATO or non-NATO – are, above all, soldiers with similar training and similar values. This makes the overall experience extremely positive.

What has been your greatest challenge as an officer for a Partner country running a key sector of a NATO-led operation?

My greatest challenge is the same as that which any commanding officer, whether from a Partner country or a NATO member state, would face. It is to get the very best out of

---

6   http://www.mil.se/article.php
7   http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htun/articles/20060218.aspx
8   http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue1/english/interview.html

the eight nations that make up MNB Centre. It is to make multinationality a strength and not a weakness.

Based on your experience in Kosovo, do you have any suggestions for improving the way soldiers from Partner nations work together with their NATO peers?

Harmonising staff procedures and communication systems is extremely important. Otherwise, when it comes to training and preparing young soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers for multinational operations, the most important basic skill is that of language. It is absolutely critical for everyone involved to be able to communicate effectively in English.

In addition to language, what other key skills do soldiers require to be effective peacekeepers?

Peacekeepers need to be fair, firm and friendly. That goes for all levels in a peacekeeping operation. Locals have to see that a peacekeeper is friendly to those people who cooperate with him but that he can be tough with those who do not. In this way, peacekeepers will earn the respect of both local people and of other international organisations operating on the ground, which is essential to the success of a mission. The key skills are in fact simply those of a good soldier. And a good soldier will command respect from all parties.

Do you perceive any difference in the attitudes of Kosovars, whether ethnic Albanian or Serb to peacekeepers from Partner nations?

Differences are not ethnically based. Overall, the local population – both Albanian and Serb – has as much respect for soldiers from Partner nations as from the NATO countries. I should, however, highlight the exception to this rule. While ordinary, honest people from all ethnic backgrounds have a very positive attitude towards the peacekeepers, the criminal element and people with a destructive political agenda are hostile towards us. This may be a good sign, since it suggests that we are doing a good job.

The sector for which you are responsible, Multinational Brigade Centre, covers some of the most emotionally charged territory in Kosovo including Kosovo Polje the site of the celebrated battle of 1389. What impact if any has this had on your mission both in your preparations and in its day to day operations?

It is extremely important for all peacekeepers and especially for anyone in a leadership position to study the background to the conflict and the history of the area and its peoples. In this respect, I have a great advantage since I was the commanding officer of the Swedish battalion here in the summer of 2000 and I am able to draw on that experience. The job of Battle Group Commander is not, of course, the same as that of Brigade Commander, but my earlier six-month tour stands me in good stead for my current assignment. Otherwise, it is critical to have good advisers. Before I came back to Kosovo I made sure that I had extremely good people around me.

How much of your time and effort is devoted to protecting ethnic Serb communities and what are the prospects for further sustainable Serb returns?

My task is to protect all ethnicities, people and organisations, as well as anyone and anything else that is threatened. I don't have any statistics concerning how much time we devote to one community as opposed to another. In any case, we work on these issues together with the police forces. I think that security is an important factor that potential

returnees take into consideration when deciding whether or not to return. But it is not the only factor. The prospects for returns, therefore, depend on a combination of several factors. The state of the economy is, for example, also extremely important. We support anybody who wishes to return and to this end are trying to make the environment as safe and secure as possible.

KFOR has been in Kosovo for close to five years and generally remains popular. However, a final political solution for the province remains some years away. What impact has the lack of certainty over Kosovo's future had on the peace process and have you detected any change in popular attitudes to KFOR between your time in Kosovo in 2000 and now?

If I compare the situation today with that of three years ago, I don't see any change in KFOR's popularity and I don't foresee any change as long as we continue to perform well. A final political solution for Kosovo would probably make my job easier. But we all have to respect the fact that this is a process that will inevitably take time, since it is extremely difficult to resolve the multitude of problems related to Kosovo. I tell my men that our task is to work to create a safe and secure environment and hope that this will help bring about a political solution.

Which particular skills and expertise have the Swedish Armed Forces brought to KFOR?

I would like to highlight two factors. The first is the long history that we have of peacekeeping. Sweden has been involved in peacekeeping missions since the 1940s and Swedish peacekeepers have experience from the Middle East, Cyprus and Congo as well as from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. We are proud of our peacekeeping tradition and of the experience that we bring with us to KFOR. The second factor is the conscript system we have in Sweden. We base all our overseas deployments on people who have been trained as conscripts and who have volunteered to serve in a specific mission. In this way, every single Swedish soldier brings civilian skills to operations such as KFOR and there are teachers, plumbers, policemen and many other professions represented among us. These non-military skills can be extremely useful in peace-support and peacekeeping operations, especially when it comes to working with civilians.

How have you benefited from working together with NATO and how do Swedish soldiers in general benefit from this relationship?

Before coming to Kosovo we had to prepare meticulously for this mission. By working together with NATO forces on the ground we have been able to learn the Alliance's working methods and practical procedures, as well as the way NATO goes about operational planning. At the same time, by working within a NATO framework or indeed any other multinational framework, we are able to make a daily comparison between ourselves and soldiers from other militaries. This is not a competition. Rather it is a constructive exchange of information and opinion, which is positive. As a Swedish officer, both as a professional and as an individual, I have found the experience extremely good. I have received good support from NATO, from my commander, Lieutenant-General Holger Kammerhoff, and from all eight troop-contributing nations within MNB Centre.

How do most Swedes view NATO and might Sweden one day join the Alliance?

According to various studies of Swedish public opinion carried out by pollsters like Gallup, the majority of Swedes do not wish to join NATO. However, a question that is

never asked in these polls is what Swedes think about Sweden working together with NATO. Here, I'm sure that most Swedes are very happy to be working with NATO in the PfP framework and in peacekeeping missions here in Kosovo, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and possibly in other places in the future. I feel that we're learning a lot from working with many different militaries, people and organisations within the NATO structure. And I'm sure that we can continue contributing to the common international effort here. As to whether we may one day join the Alliance, that's a political question and you have to ask a politician who is more competent to answer it.

CELEBRATION IN 2006

In 2006 Sweden is celebrating the 50 years Jubilee since the beginning of UN peace-keeping missions with UN troops in Gaza in 1956. At the same time it was 100 years since Dag Hammarskjöld, the founder of the UN- missions in Gaza and Congo, was born.

Dag Hammarskjöld and the long row of Swedish UN peace-keeping missions in different continents is a legacy for the future.[9]

RESUMÉ

Kent Zetterberg: Švédska účasť v operáciách na udržanie a presadenie mieru 1956 – 2006

Švédska zahraničná politika bola dlho založená na premise, že pre národnú bezpečnosť bude najlepšie, ak zostane mimo aliancií v čase mieru, aby zostala neutrálna v prípade vojny. Avšak, v roku 2002 Švédsko revidovalo svoju bezpečnostnú doktrínu. V bezpečnostnej doktríne je teraz uvedené, že *"Švédsko presadzuje politiku neúčasti vo vojenských alianciách,"* ale dovoľuje spoluprácu v reakcii na hrozby proti mieru a bezpečnosti.

Intenzívny záujem švédskej vlády a ľudí o medzinárodnú spoluprácu a udržiavanie mieru má dlhodobú tradíciu. Dopĺňa ju obnovená pozornosť venovaná severským a európskym bezpečnostným otázkam.

Hlavne v 20. rokoch 19. storočia Švédsko hralo aktívnu úlohu v Lige národov. Švédsku sa podarilo zostať neutrálnym a mimo vojnových udalostí počas druhej svetovej vojny, bolo však obklopené Nemeckom a ZSSR v "rokoch podpisovania paktu" 1939 – 1941 a obkľúčené a ohraničené nemeckými vojskami v rokoch 1941 – 1944. V rokoch 1940 – 1945 Švédsko stratilo svoje obchody v zámorí, ako aj mnohé kontakty so západnými veľmocami a stalo sa závislým od expandujúceho nemeckého obchodu, vrátane kontroverzného exportu železnej rudy do Nemecka. V záverečných rokoch vojny 1943 – 1945 Švédsko poskytovalo humanitárnu pomoc a podporu mnohým krajinám v Európe a asi 300 000 utečencom, hlavne z Nórska, Dánska, Fínska a pobaltských štátov.

Dag Hammarskjöld bol generálnym tajomníkom Organizácie spojených národov v rokoch 1953 – 1961; zomrel pri havárii lietadla, keď sa snažil o prerokovanie riešenia krízy v Kongu. Švédske mierové jednotky sa začali zapájať v roku 1956 (Gaza) a potom vždy, keď boli potrebné neutrálne sily na oddelenie nepriateľov. Švédsko poslalo vojenskú nemocnicu na kórejské bojisko, inak sa však nezapojilo.

---

9   About Sweden and the UN and peace-keeping missions see Report of the Dag Hammarskjöld Symposium on Respecting International Law and International Institutions / [edited by Peter Wallensteen and Olle Nordberg], Uppsala 2005, The U.N. in Cyprus: the Swedish peace-keeping operations 1964–1993 / Gustaf Welin, Christer Ekelund; translated from the Swedish by Johan von Horn,London 2004, Sweden at the UN: eight profiles / Gunnar Fredriksson, Stockholm: Swedish Institute (Svenska institutet), 2001.

V máji 1947 bol Folke Bernadotte menovaný za sprostredkovateľa OSN v Palestíne. Podarilo sa mu dosiahnuť prímerie v prvej izraelsko-arabskej vojne, ale 17. septembra 1948 ho zavraždili židovskí extrémisti v Jeruzaleme, niekoľko dní predtým, ako mal byť jeho plán na politické riešenie predložený Organizáciii spojených národov.

V 50. rokoch 20. storočia bolo zorganizovaných okolo 800 000 mierotvorcov ešte predtým, ako začali aktivitu v roku 1956 pod vedením Daga Hammarskjölda, švédskeho generálneho tajomníka a Ralpha Buncha. Z týchto 800 000 ľudí Švédsko poskytlo asi 10 percent, čo je veľký záväzok na takú malú krajinu. Švédsko bolo priekopníkom v udržiavaní mieru a Dagovi Hammarskjöldovi sa podarilo spustiť mierové misie OSN ako novú úlohu OSN v prvých dňoch studenej vojny. Potom bolo Švédsko rozhodným prispievateľom do mierových misií OSN až do konca studenej vojny a pravidelne posielalo mierové sily (hlavne prápory) do Gazy, na Cyprus, do Libanonu atď.

Po studenej vojne sa Švédsko zapojilo do viacerých zmiešaných misií na udržanie a presadzovanie mieru na Balkáne v spolupráci s NATO a Európskou úniou, ale vždy pod mandátom Organizácie spojených národov. To platí pre Bosnu a Hercegovinu, Macedónsko, Libériu a Kosovo v období rokov 1995 – 2006. Nová úloha EÚ v operáciách na podporu mieru mimo Európy sa začala v neskorších rokoch a Švédsko sa zúčastnilo na mierových misiách v Libérii a Kongu/Kinšase a v Afganistane.

Police Forces in Peace Operations
With Special Reference to Police Forces of Military Nature

Capt. Miguel López Corral

While peace operations have always been construed according to the interpretation of the United Nations, it was not until the Fall of the Berlin Wall that a new dimension of its importance within the context of the international conflicts could be perceived. Undoubtedly, the reason for this change was a qualitative and quantitative modification of the geostrategic conception awoken after the Cold War. As a consequence, both the United Nations and the NATO are playing a more prominent role in the new world order, as has been confirmed by the Golf War, the situation in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, and other regional conflicts in which a large number of both military and police 'blue helmets' have participated and are still participating.

In this context, the importance of the so called *'Peace Building'* phase has increased. This phase corresponds to the actions carried out once the peace agreements have been adopted by the belligerents, in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities and ensure peaceful coexistence. Apart from being a very sensitive phase, difficult to address and with common features, it also requires the intervention of military forces, together with other different participants, such as election observers, human rights monitors, NGO members or police units. Each of them performs specific tasks, depending on their training.

THE POLICE COMPONENT

Among these forces, the role of the police component has shown to be especially significant. As has been clearly proven by the experience gained in the conflicts of the last three decades, as peace operations are developed, one of the common features is that the cessation of hostilities between the belligerents is followed by the lack of confidence by

some of them in the performance of the local police force due to its links with the opposing belligerents. This situation should be corrected.

Together with this tense situation, there exist other elements that Peace building requires to be addressed with professionalism and police effectiveness. We are referring to the protection of election processes, the respect for human rights, the guarantee of public security and the normal functioning of the judicial system and of the laws in general, when the local police forces that are in charge of it cannot carry them out as neutrally as appropriate. Therefore, this implies the need to provide support and training to the local police forces, so that they can take the responsibility for these guarantees in the mid term and, consequently, create an atmosphere of trust among the parties involved.

As a consequence thereof, we are in a position to assert that the police component plays a crucial and fundamental role in peace operations. In fact, since 1964 we have observed a gradual rise in the number of participants and tasks of the police component, what has led to their achieving the same influence as the military component. One example of this is the case of the IPTF (*International Police Task Force*), consisting of more than 2.000 officers in Bosnia and more than 3.000 in Kosovo. As regards the latter, we could highlight the importance attached by CIVPOL to police tasks in a document it distributed in 2004 through the DPKO (*Department of Peace Keeping Operations*) where they established certain guidelines on the activities to be carried out by the police component depending on the type of operation. (Cf. ANNEX 1).

THE POLICE COMPONENT OF MILITARY NATURE

The influence gained, and the variety and importance of its missions have prompted an evolution of the role played by the police component in their international missions. The turning point were the special circumstances in the Balkans and afterwards in Timor.

In relation to the situation in the Balkans, we could verify that at the outset of highly unstable conflicts implying serious civilian confrontations, it was necessary to ensure security in that territory by means of forces with the required operational capacity regarding deterrents, logistics and a good organisation. Military units are the only ones comprising these features, especially when such units belong to organisations like the NATO that have common procedures and doctrine, together with similar resources, and that are used to intervene at an international level. These units are responsible for providing security and keeping public order and legality, until responsibilities are gradually transferred to the international civilian presence through their International Police Force. Nonetheless, once the military phase has finished an intermediate phase begins, before reaching the civilian one. This intermediate stage involves democratic normalisation, where the Armed Forces and the police forces are not the most appropriate to ensure this normalisation process. Regarding the Army, and more specifically the tasks performed by the SFOR in Bosnia or in Kosovo, forecasts were exceeded when they had to combine the missions aimed at arresting the war criminals and bringing them to the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, with the efforts aimed at keeping public order in non-armed conflicts. Besides, the civilian police forces were not able to manage a situation of latent violence that apart from requiring deterrents, armament and heavy vehicles they

did not possess, also implied the impossibility to combine police procedures with an operational deployment that, due to the origin and development of the conflict, gave rise to a scenario subjected to the military scope and law.

Another drawback joined the previous one. In order to organise the transfers, several liaison mechanisms were established with members of the International Police Force (police component), so that they could give advice and assistance to the military forces in their mission to ensure security and public order. In spite of that, this situation created tension that hindered coordination, and consequently reduced the missions effectiveness.

In this context, it was convenient to separate the military component from the civilian one while maintaining the necessary cooperation between them. The solution that gained strength consisted in providing the peace forces with units belonging to police forces of military nature such as the French National Gendarmerie, the Italian Carabinieri or the Spanish Guardia Civil. Due to their military nature, discipline and training, these forces were able to carry out both police and military tasks, without prejudice to the respect for human rights, while ensuring the coordination mechanisms between the military forces and the civilian police component.

Apart from this advantage, we could mention that the function of advising and assisting the military forces that are participating in activities related to keeping law and order, can be performed in a more coordinated way by the police forces of military nature, since they share ideas and have closer links than police forces of civilian nature.

EU PHILOSOPHY

The expertise obtained from the Balkans, the 11-S terrorist attacks –together with the 11-M terrorist attacks in Madrid- the strategic context and the multidimensional nature of crisis have made the EU aware of the real importance of the police component in peace operations. Besides, the ESDP (*European Security and Defence Policy*) has set the objective of providing the EU with a police force whose mission shall consist in contributing directly to the re-establishment of public security in the areas requiring an international action.

The crucial steps in this direction were taken at the summits held in Feira, Nice and Nordwijk (we will not take into account the Helsinki Conference, held in December 1999). During the Feira Convention, held in June 2000, the EU decided to prioritise the police capacity and established the following objectives:

► Establishing a 5.000-police-officer force to come into operation before 2003, of whom 1.000 officers should be deployable in less than 30 days (rapid deployment capacity).

► Assigning this contingent to international missions including crisis prevention and management operations.

► When deploying the 1.000 first officers, the units to be used should be integrated, flexible, interoperable and adapted to the transitional period from an initial military command to a civilian one.

The objectives of the force being deployed would be: strengthening the Rule of Law, the Administration and the Civil Protection.

As regards the of the Nice Summit of December 2000, it not only ratified the Feira Convention approach, but also intensified the priority given to the police capacity. Moreover, special attention was paid to strengthening the rule of law, defining specific objectives according to the experience acquired from two specific scenarios:

A: First, one based on situations similar to those in Guatemala, Croatia, Albany, Mostar and El Salvador aiming at reinforcing local police capacities through training, assistance, control and advisory missions.

B: The second, corresponding to complex crisis similar to those in Kosovo, Western Timor and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the European Police Force was established in order to replace local police forces weakened when carrying out missions aiming at restoring public security and reactivating the judicial organs and prisons.

Both scenarios required these widespread crisis to be managed through a process consisting of three stages:

▶ Initial phase: essentially military, in order to control the area;

▶ Transitional phase: focused on the establishment of public security as prior condition to recovering normal life;

▶ End of crisis and progressive reestablishment of a correct functioning of local institutions.

In the same summit, it was also decided the number of officers some states should provide. In this sense, Germany, a country especially involved in civil crisis management, was on the point of reaching an agreement between the BUND (central federal level) and the LAENDER (local level) authorising a contribution of 800–1,000 police officers to the European Police Force.

On the part of France, it would contribute 805 officers of the French National Gendarmerie, that would take part all through the crisis management operation, from the coercive phase to reconstruction. France would also be able to accomplish all the police missions described in Nice (from local police force reinforcement through assistance missions, advice, training, etc, to substitution of local police forces weakened in missions aimed at keeping order and protecting persons and property). The French contribution (Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior) has been stated by the General Director of the French National Gendarmerie.

But the French contribution is much wider. When necessary, it shall contribute 550 officers more to the 950-staff Rapid Deployment Force of the European Police Force. Spain shall contribute 300 civil guards and Italy 250 carabinieris.

The ESDP was aware that these scenarios required great complementarity between the military and police components, both during the planning stage and during the operational action. To that end, it was considered convenient that the participating police forces had as their main feature being a military force combined with a police one (Cf. Annex 2).

We could mention several reasons for this. First of all, the fact that the defence of in-

dividual freedoms and dignities has become an universal justification for intervention –armed when necessary- in national affairs of a third country. Secondly, because when the need for an armed intervention arises, the ESDP understands that military interposition forces cannot manage the global mediation in a peace process, but some other intervention forces that can perform a wide range of tasks are necessary. One example of these intervention forces are the 'blue helmets' currently deployed in Haiti, that include multinational police forces and other military forces. All things considered, we are referring to tasks (traffic control, police investigations, arms control, financial control, etc) the Armed Forces cannot totally guarantee, and in some cases, not even the civilian police forces.

In the case of the European Union, the aforementioned reasons agreed with the new doctrine on international cooperation and collaboration among the Member States in freedom, justice and security matters, embodied in the preamble to the Constitutional Treaty. In the light of this text, the idea of strengthening the creation of a common security space and establishing operational cooperation in police matters among customs services and some other specialised services aimed at preventing criminal offences developed. Likewise, as laid down in Article 42 of the Treaty(Clause of solidarity), it could also be created to provide assistance to any Member State in order to prevent terrorist attacks or natural catastrophes "mobilizing all the available instruments, including the military resources put at its disposal by the Member States …"

This new doctrine does not only agree with everything that has been analysed regarding the contributions of the Armed Forces when facing real threats against national security, borders control and interventions on the high seas, but it also agrees with the role the police forces of military nature can perform due to their broad experience in the fight against terrorism and natural catastrophes; as regards the latter, we could say that it does justice to the humanitarian commitment shown by institutions such as the Spanish Guardia Civil in this kind of missions.

At the same time, this new doctrine reveals the awareness of the EU common problems, and promotes the *'acquis communautaire'* in the context of the so called European cooperation principle in order to consolidate a common space of freedom, security and justice. Consequently, the military security forces in other EU Member States should play an extraordinary role in the strategies and policies to be implemented.

Up to the 11-S terrorist attacks, the police cooperation among Member States had focused especially on crime prevention, detection and investigation, on developing databases, on implementing different training and exchange programmes, or on setting up networks aimed at giving protection to personalities, summits and sports events. It was an institutional and regulatory approach, focused on the establishment of procedures and organs such as EUROPOL, CEPOL or the Task Force of Chiefs of Police, that were necessary for cooperation, but insufficient for preventing serious crimes that reflect the *modus operandi* of the criminal organizations involved in illegal immigration, trafficking in firearms, drug traffic or fundamentalist terrorism. This reality has forced the creation of multinational shared efforts bi-directionally oriented towards the external borders control and towards a police solution proportional to the seriousness of each terrorist threat or to the dimensions of a specific humanitarian catastrophe.

In the case of terrorist threats or catastrophes, the EU has understood that the security of its Member States requires adding one more principle to the previous three principles on which the EU police cooperation efforts had been focusing up to now. As a result, apart from the collection and exchange of documents, the staff training and exchange programmes, and the sharing of investigations techniques (including the compliance of the EUROPOL legal system with European Law), the Constitutional Treaty lays the foundations for using police units when fighting terrorism and in major catastrophes. This approach will make necessary the participation of military intelligence services for supporting internal security and, on a basis of reciprocity, of criminal police officers supporting external security.

In this sense, most police forces of military nature have the structure required by the new European strategy in intelligence services, that must be well prepared, experienced and interconnected with the Armed Forces. Likewise, their knowledge of the problems posed to public security, the high specialisation of their units, the dual training of their members and their organisational analogy with other European police forces, confer them certain advantages to be used when drawing up new policies.

In order to carry out the project, the ESDP started taking the appropriate steps in relation to the states that have institutions of military nature among their police forces. Two of these steps should be highlighted because of their importance. First, according to the chronological order, the FIEP Agreement (Association of the European and Mediterranean Police Forces and Gendarmeries with Military Status) adopted in Madrid in May 1994 by the major representatives of the Italian Carabinieri, the French National Gendarmerie and the Spanish Guardia Civil, with the aim of combining efforts and actions within the framework of their responsibilities. It would also include the Portuguese National Republican Guard, the Turkish Gendarmerie, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussé, the Moroccan Royal Gendarmerie and the Rumanian National Gendarmerie, all of them with military status.

The positive experience of FIEP and the contact among their working commissions have paved the way for the second step mentioned above: the creation of a joint police force consisting of the institutions with military status of the EU Member States that have this type of police force. Nonetheless, the awareness raising in the EU caused by the 11-S terrorist attacks was the key element that pushed the project forward. Other important elements were the need of the EU to strengthen its own security and to have a joint police force of military nature for international peace operations that, under the auspices of the EU, cooperates with the military forces deployed in that area and replaces them in those tasks the Armed Forces are not designed or prepared for.

The result of this synergy was the Noordwijk Agreement (2004) adopted by the Ministers of Defence of Spain, France, the Netherlands, Italy and Portugal. This agreement would give response to the achievements the Constitutional Treaty expects from the police forces with military status as regards the strengthening of the security within the EU, and more specifically, it would allow them to be used in peace-keeping or crisis management missions, whenever required by the NATO, OSCE or UN. Undoubtedly, this is a decisive qualitative step towards the future conception of security, not only at the EU level, but also in the regions where conflicts require the presence of blue helmets or the

creation of police forces (Bosnia will be the first scenario where this police force intervenes).

As we have previously mentioned, the police forces of military nature with dual tasks, half way between criminal police and Armed Forces both in the field of intelligence and prevention, constitute a guarantee that cannot be ignored by the European leaders; on the contrary, it should be reinforced. The French government understood it this way, and came up with this idea that was welcomed by the other countries that signed the Nordwijk Agreement. As was to be expected, the Paris initiative had immediate effects in other Member States like Poland, Belgium, Great Britain, Greece and Germany that showed their interest in joining it.

The Spanish contribution to Nordwijk shall be the Guardia Civil. The agreement provides for the creation of a 800-officer permanent force for the beginning of 2005 that could travel to the areas of crisis in one month. According to forecasts, the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) would have its permanent Headquarters at Vicenza (Italy), with a multinational, modular and projectable headquarters. It shall be under the authority of the EGF Commander and the key positions shall rotate among the different members (the Guardia Civil will contribute a permanent team of experts and a reserve force in Spanish territory of 1,000 – 1,500 officers). This force has been designed to cover all aspects within a crisis response operation, and its tasks will consist in controlling public order once the military forces have finished the initial phase of stabilisation in the area of crisis. Likewise, they will be able to participate in recovering normality in a region and, in the final phase of the crisis, provide training to local personnel aimed at keeping public order, since tasks would be progressively transferred to them. More specifically, the tasks to be performed by them shall be:

- ► rendering security and public order services,
- ► monitoring and advising local police forces,
- ► public surveillance, traffic regulations, border control and general intelligence,
- ► police forces training,
- ► protection of property and persons, and keeping public order,
- ► investigation of crimes.

In order to face this challenge, the EU has decided to develop its crisis management civilian and military capacities, among which police forces constitute one of the key instruments. In order to achieve this objective, by the end of 2004 the civilian-military cooperation shall be in force thanks to the fact that a Military Civilian Cell will come into operation under the Council authority, according to Mr. Javier Solana's intervention in the meeting of Police Directors held on 25 October 2004 in Warnsfeld (Holland).

To end with, we could say that, according to the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. Javier Solana, this police contribution to international missions constitutes "a pragmatic and organised response to the evolution of the international relations system in a new millennium".

ANNEX 1:
MISSIONS TO BE PERFORMED BY THE POLICE COMPONENT

Control, advice and protection: monitoring the performance of the local police force so that they meet international standards and respect human rights, and when necessary, give advice to the local police component when carrying out their tasks and investigations. If regulations are contravened and there is no cooperation with the members of the police component or the civilian population makes formal complaints to the police, the corresponding reports shall be drawn up according to the situation.

Training: appropriate training shall be provided to the local police force so that they can better perform their tasks. Training may be addressed to three different types of trainees: new staff, refresher courses for already existing staff, or training for trainers that will train in turn other members of the local police force they belong to.

Reform and restructuring: in certain cases, peace agreements imply the need for restructuring the already existing police force in order to meet international standards. In some cases it requires the establishment of a new regulatory framework (code of conduct, disciplinary code, staff conditions, training programmes, etc), a new organic structure, operational use procedures and police conduct doctrine, infrastructure and equipment programmes.

Creation of new police forces: this last measure could be necessary in some conflicts. In this particular case the tasks to be performed should be similar to those previously mentioned, without applying them to an already existing police force, but creating a totally new one.

ANNEX 2:
MISSIONS TO BE PERFORMED BY THE POLICE COMPONENT OF MILITARY NATURE

A) Re-establishment of public security, including keeping public order, protecting people and property, criminal police and gathering general information. These missions are inseparable from one another, since police action implies operational and legal coherence.

B) Re-establishment of public security, a bi-dimensional objective:
   ▶ Rapid response to the security basic needs of population. They will also try to put a stop, as soon as possible, both to the most serious terrorist attacks against persons or properties, and to riots.
   ▶ Crucial stage, depending on the procedures and instruments used, when trying to achieve the ultimate objective previously set: reconstruct civil society in conformity with the principles and values of democracy.

C) Re-establishment of public security: first phase towards democratic normalization within a demilitarization process.

While encouraging population, it is vitally important to make society to adhere to the principles favouring the establishment of social links and the development of a democratic society.

If due to cultural reasons a mediation initiative is developed, based on proximity and on the gradual use of force, the police officers deployed, both with civilian and military status, shall contribute to solve conflicts at all levels. This effective and normalised presence of police at the core of society is fundamental, and allows strengthening and accepting a new perception of police forces.

Conflict solving and reduction shall especially profit from criminal police actions, that ensures the reactivation of penal response. More specifically, it implies reactivating, in compliance with the common democratic rights, the mechanisms suppressing the desire for revenge in a person or a community, allowing reconciliation by means of jurisdictional organs. In this case, it is imperative to carry it out as quickly as possible.

Keeping public order, an essentially civil and police task that has urged some societies to create police units specialised in this filed, is a key step and its being under control determines progress towards normalization.

Faced with masses of people on the street, the police officers with civilian or military status apply their experience in the field of keeping public order, since they are facing circumstantial opponents, not enemies. As a result, and always within the framework of common laws, they apply proportional measures, in order to prevent an escalation of the conflict and to make possible conflicts to be solved through political negotiation.

Keeping order should be competence of the highest authority on the ground. The following points could be included within this process:

- ► Gathering information and getting to know the gravitation centres, institutional or others, of the different parts, especially by means of the proximity police.
- ► Performing police tasks under different forms of prevention.
- ► Deployment of operational forces, if necessary, aimed at providing gradual and proportional responses within a general framework that should ensure the widest scope for action for the relevant political authority.
- ► Use of force, when necessary, with the aim of entering actions against criminals and people responsible for riots, as well as keeping in touch on a regular basis with the people organizing demonstrations.

In this context the Guardia Civil appears, together with other police forces of military nature, as an ideal solution to be deployed in international peace missions. Both the United Nations and the European Union have agreed on this point.

As for the United Nations, there were two main reasons that led to incorporate Guardia Civil units into the military forces deployed. First, the need to have experts in fields that require special qualifications. Secondly, the need to control public order and support the distribution of humanitarian aid, that requires certain police experience and training the Armed Forces lack. Consequently, it was not accidental that the governments of several countries in which civil wars had just come to an end resorted to the Guardia Civil, whose prestige and organization are very well know, with a view to having them in charge of training and organising their police forces. This was the case for Mozambique, Guatemala, Timor and El Salvador, where the Guardia Civil has been training their police forces, either at the request of their governments or of international organs.

RESUMÉ

Miguel López Corral: Policajné sily v mierových operáciách so zvláštnym zreteľom na sily vojenského charakteru

Policajné sily vojenského charakteru zohrávajú nezastupiteľnú úlohu v mierových operáciách. Hlavne vo fáze známej ako "budovanie mieru". Táto fáza zodpovedá akciám uskutočňovaným po prijatí mierových dohôd bojujúcimi stranami, aby sa zabránilo obnoveniu nepriateľstva a aby sa zabezpečilo mierové spolužitie. Okrem toho, že ide o veľmi citlivú fázu, ktorá sa ťažko rieši a ktorá má spoločné črty, vyžaduje si aj intervenciu vojenských síl, spolu s ostatnými ďalšími účastníkmi, ako sú pozorovatelia pri voľbách, pracovníci sledujúci dodržiavanie ľudských práv, členovia NVO alebo policajné jednotky.

V tomto procese je vojenská zložka dôležitá na ochranu a zabezpečenie volebného práva, dodržiavanie ľudských práv, zabezpečenie verejnej bezpečnosti a normálne fungovanie súdneho systému a práva ako takého.

V skutočnosti sme od roku 1964 pozorovali postupný nárast počtu účastníkov a úloh policajnej zložky, čo viedlo k tomu, že dosiahli rovnaký vplyv ako vojenská zložka. Jedným z príkladom je prípad IPTF (Medzinárodná policajná operačná skupina), zloženej z viac ako 2 000 dôstojníkov v Bosne a viac ako 3 000 v Kosove.

V takomto stave je doplnenie mierových síl o jednotky patriace k policajným silám vojenského charakteru, ako je francúzske národné žandárstvo, talianski karabinieri alebo španielska civilná garda, veľmi užitočné pre ich vojenský charakter, disciplínu, výcvik a schopnosť vykonávať jednak policajné, ale aj vojenské úlohy. Mohli by sme spomenúť aj to, že úlohu poradcov a asistencie vojenským silám, ktoré sa zúčastňujú na činnostiach pri udržiavaní práva a poriadku, môžu koordinovanejším spôsobom vykonávať sily vojenského charakteru, pretože majú rovnaké myslenie a ešte bližšie vzťahy ako policajné sily civilného charakteru.

Z expertízy získanej na Balkáne vyplýva, že teroristické útoky z 11. septembra 2001 – spolu s útokmi v Madride z 11. marca 2004 – ich strategický kontext a viacrozmerný charakter krízy donútil EÚ, aby si uvedomila skutočný význam policajnej zložky v mierových operáciách. Okrem toho, ESDP (Európska bezpečnostná a obranná politika) stanovila cieľ poskytnúť EÚ policajné sily, ktorých poslanie bude prispieť k znovunastoleniu verejnej bezpečnosti v oblastiach vyžadujúcich medzinárodný zásah.

Pre uskutočnenie projektu ESDP bola vypracovaná dohoda FIEP (Asociácia európskych a stredozemných policajných síl a žandárstva s vojenským štatútom) prijatá v Madride v máji 1994 hlavnými predstaviteľmi talianskych karabinierov, francúzskeho národného žandárstva a španielskej civilnej gardy za účelom spojenia úsilia a akcií v rámci ich zodpovednosti. Zahŕňa aj portugalskú národnú republikánsku gardu, turecké žandárstvo, kráľovskú cestnú políciu, marocké kráľovské žandárstvo a rumunské národné žandárstvo, všetky s vojenským štatútom.

Pozitívne skúsenosti FIEP a kontakty medzi ich pracovnými komisiami vydláždili cestu pre druhý krok: vytvorenie spoločných policajných síl členských štátov EÚ zložených z inštitúcií s vojenským štatútom, ktoré majú tento typ policajných síl.

Výsledkom tejto synergie bola dohoda z Nordwijku (2004) prijatá ministrami obrany Španielska, Francúzska, Holandska, Talianska a Portugalska. Toto je rozhodujúci kvalitatívny krok smerom k budúcej koncepcii bezpečnosti, nielen na úrovni EÚ, ale aj regiónoch, kde konflikty vyžadujú prítomnosť modrých prílb alebo vytvorenie policajných síl (Bosna bude mať prvý scenár, kde budú zasahovať tieto policajné sily.).

Španielskym príspevkom k Nordwijku bude civilná garda. Dohoda zabezpečila vytvorenie stálej sily 800 dôstojníkov začiatkom roka 2005, ktorí mohli pricestovať do krízových oblastí v priebehu jedného mesiaca. Podľa prognóz by európske žandárske sily (EGF) mali svoje stále veliteľstvo vo Vincenze (Taliansko), s mnohonárodným, štandardným a plánovaným veliteľstvom. Budú patriť pod právomoc veliteľa

EGF a kľúčové pozície budú rotovať medzi jednotlivými členmi (civilná garda prispeje stálym tímom expertov a záložnými silami na území Španielska v počte 1 000 – 1 500 dôstojníkov). Tieto sily boli určené na zabezpečenie všetkých aspektov v operáciách reagujúcich na krízy a ich úlohy budú spočívať v kontrolovaní verejného poriadku potom, keď vojenské sily ukončia úvodnú fázu stabilizácie v krízovej oblasti. Podobne sa budú môcť zúčastňovať na obnovení normálneho poriadku v regióne v záverečnej fáze krízy, poskytovať výcvik pre miestny personál zameraný na udržiavanie verejného poriadku, pretože úlohy sa budú na nich postupne presúvať.

panel 2:

Peace-keeping in Recent History

Chair:
Lieutenant-general Nicholas Mastrandonis, Greece

Global Geopolitics and Greek Peace-keeping Operations During the Second Half of the 20th Century

CDR. Andreas Tousas

INTRODUCTION

As an introduction, I call upon the words of Plato, the philosopher, from the 'Laws': 'What most people name as peace exists only in name, because in reality there is always an undeclared war among the states due to a natural need' (Plato, Laws A, 626E).

If this sentence was an ascertainment for the city-states of the antiquity, for the modern states of mankind it is a permanent phenomenon. Going back to the war conflicts of the previous century proves beyond any shadow of doubt the truth of these words.

During the 20th century, mankind went through all the forms of war: conventional, nuclear, defensive, offensive, liberating, conquest, civil, cold, ideological, financial, the 'balance of powers' and the 'peace of dread'. Because of these wars, a specific alternating global geopolitical situation was formed and vice versa, and the occasionally formed geopolitical situation became the cause of war.

Geopolitics is the 'power' geography and methodologically studies the impact of the territory, in the context of geographical environment, on man, economy, politics, strategy and in general, international relations. In the same way, the structural element of geopolitics is universality. In general the 20th century manifests the following geopolitical elements:

- The violent (armed) breaking up of all the big European empires – Colonial and National Empires.
- The USA, which were absent in the previous century, emerged at that time as the 'first global power'.
- The appearance of systematic collective efforts for the 'institutionalizing of the inter-state cooperation'.
- The independence of the financial powers.

- The independence of technology.
- The war conflicts, with two world wars, the forty years of the cold war and a 'new order' in the last 10 years.
- a/ The breaking up of the USSR;
- b/ The breaking-up of the Federal "Yugoslavia of Tito";
- c/ The breaking up of Czechoslovakia;
- d/ The unification of East and West Germany.

The global charting of the States was subject to change. States were wiped out or changed borders and new ones were formed because of the conflicting interests and the spheres of influence of the occasional regulating powers or the more powerful ones according to the circumstances. In the end, the war conflicts caused only suffering to winners and losers. Therefore, the only war that is justified is the war against war. When this becomes common belief and consciousness, aim and target of the 'small' and 'big', the powerful and the 'weak', mankind will see better days.

THE AMPHICTYONY – THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (LN) – THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION (UNO)

The Greek spirit had captured the idea of solving the differences among the cities of ancient Greece with the establishment of Amphictyony, which was originally a religious institution. Representatives of the neighbouring cities were gathered in a central city to solve the arisen differences so that war could be avoided. Important Amphictyonies were the ones of Delphi and Thermopiles from the 7th century AD, the ones of Delos, Kalavria (Poros) etc.

It was impossible for Greece, which inspired and played a leading role in the idea of solving the differences among the peoples with peaceful means, to stay out of the cosmogonical changes of the 20th century. Greece was a member of the League of Nations and now is a member of the United Nations Organization, of the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe, of the European Union and other organizations, which promote peace and the well being of mankind.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS OF GREECE

Since 1950, Greece, despite its restricted capabilities in terms of human potential as well as in terms of financial means, has participated in the Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations Organization with Expeditionary Corps, Formations, Units, sub-units, Troops, Staff officers in Headquarters and with military observers. The most important peacekeeping operations during the second half of the 20th century are the following:

Korea

Greece is one of the 22 States that participated in the Korean War of 1950–1955. After the Second World War Korea was divided along the length of the 38th parallel of latitude in North Korea, with an Eastern Orientation and South Korea, with a Western one. The attempts of the United Nations Organization for unification by means of elec-

tions failed. 22 countries then put their power under the flag of the UN according to the decision of the Security Council of June 29, 1950. Greece was among these countries with forces of the Army and the Air Force. As a total, in the Korean operation (1950–1955), 10,255 men took part.

Congo

In 1960 Hellenic Air Force after a decision taken by the government sent a group of aircraft of a Transport Squadron, with the goal to transport fellow Greeks from the areas under rebellion to other secure areas.

The following year Hellenic Air Force also contributed to the UN effort to establish order to the newly independent area of Congo.

Somalia

Greece, with a decision of the Security Council of the UN, participated in the peace-keeping mission in Somalia from February 1993, up to May 1994, with the Greek force of Somalia comprising of 106 men.

South Africa

Following a decision of the European Union, an observatory force for the elections of April 27, 1994 was assembled and Greece participated with 16 officers.

Ethiopia

Moreover, by decision of the European Union, an observatory force for the elections of July, 1994 was assembled and Greece participated with 3 officers.

Kuwait

By decision of the Security Council of the UN, a demilitarized zone was defined along the Iraq- Kuwait line of 15 km width and a mission of observers was set up for its control. Greece participated in it with 6 officers on April, 1991.

North Iraq

In July 1991, the 'Guard Force of North Iraq' was created with the mission of providing humanitarian aid to its population. Greece participated in it from the July 1991, with 30 officers and noncommissioned officers of the three Branches of the Armed Forces. From June 1993 up to November 1997 it participated with 10 officers. From November 1997 up to February 1999, with 8 officers.

Western Sahara

Following a petition of the UN, on September, 1991 Greece contributed an officer of the Army Forces to the peacekeeping mission in order to conduct a ballot concerning the incorporation of the country into Morocco.

Abhazia- Georgia

In August 1993, the UN in Georgia assembled an observatory mission in order to su-

pervise the truce, which was agreed on July, 1993. After a relevant petition of the UN, Greece participated in the mission from September, 1994, with 5 military observers.

Nagorno- Carabach

In the context of the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe, a staff has been created with headquarters in Vienna with the aim of studying ways of de-escalation of the tension between the fighting parties (Armenia- Azerbaijan) outside and around the area of Nagorno Carabach, as well as cases of intervention for the pacification in the area. Greece participates with one staff officer in the operation department.

Ex Yugoslavia

With the decision of the European Union for a peaceful solution to the problem in former Yugoslavia, Greece participated in the Community Control Committee for keeping the Brioni agreement in Yugoslavia with 9 officers of the Army Forces in July 1991, with 92 officers of the Armed Forces from January 1994, with 26 officers from August 1998 and with 3 officers from August 2003 up to the present day.

Bosnia

Greece participated with Units of the Navy in the operations of the Adriatic for the implementation of the sanctions (embargo) against former Yugoslavia. Moreover, since January 1996 it has participated in conjunction with the Greek Force of Bosnia in the Multinational Military Force with the name IFOR (Implementation Force).

Albania

In March 1997 after the outbreak of the crisis in Albania attributable to collapse of its bank system, the Security Council of the UN decided on the assembly of the Temporary Multinational Protection Force (FMP = Forze Multinationale Protezione) and its deployment in Albania according to the provisions of the article VII of the Chart of the United Nations.

Greece participated in the Multinational Protection Force with the Greek Force in Albania the deployment of which started on April 1997 at Tirana- Isberis- Avlona and Elbasan, with 803 men and 224 vehicles within the framework of operation ALBA under an Italian Commandant and a Greek Deputy commander.

Today, the Greek Force of Albania-3 infantry company (-) and an Engineers Platoon with the corresponding NSE (National Support Elements) with a total power of 87 men participates under the Communication Zone (West) (COMMZ(W)) in the context of KFOR.

Kossovo

Greece has participated in the Allied Force of Kossovo (KFOR) since June 1999 with the Greek Force of Kossovo, consisting of the 34 Mechanized Infantry Brigade.

Scopia

Greece takes part as an essential member in the "Essential Harvest" operation, an op-

eration for harvesting and destroying the arms of Albania's UCK that started in August 2001, with a force of a 400-man strong Battalion based at Krivolak of FYROM. Additionally, other military personnel has been made available for peace operations as well as four staff officers at the Scopia NATO headquarters (NHQSK).

Afghanistan

Greece with a decision of the UN participated in the peacekeeping mission providing Humanitarian aid in Afghanistan from July 2001.

The current participation of Greek forces in the mission is:

▶ A Special Composition Transfer Unit,
▶ One Mobile Surgical Hospital,
▶ Two Officers in the Headquarters of Kabul and the ISAF,
▶ A 39 men force of the Air Force for the Command of the airport of Kabul.

Greece, within the framework of the System of Readiness of the Peacekeeping Operations of the UN which was inaugurated by the General Secretariat of the United Nations in 1994, has compiled and trained the Greek Unit of Peacekeeping Missions (EMEL) in order to respond immediately to the demands of the International Organizations for the formation of Peace Forces of Rapid Intervention (Response Peace Forces).

Moreover, Greece participates in the Multinational Peace Force of South Eastern Europe (MPFSEE), which aims at the prevention of conflicts and the undertaking of peace operations. The recent peace operations, as well, have shown that the military personnel needs to possess several skills in order to execute a multitude of requirements and play a wide range of stressful roles ranging from the one of the fighter to the one of the diplomat, the policeman, the nurse, the manager, the sociologist and, consequently, special training is required.

For this reason, the Multinational Peace Support Operations Center (MPSO, TC) has been operating in Greece since November 23, 1998 (Kristoni, Kilkis) providing theoretical and practical training in all issues pertinent to the peace support operations according to international requirements and offering intensive training for units and sub-units before they deploy in order to implement peace missions with the optimal results. (Emblem 1).

The Hellenic Navy took part with its ships in the inspection/control of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Gulf.

Also, in the framework of the Peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, Greece played the role of the Host Nation Support providing access to the ports of Thessaloniki and Volos for passage and accommodation of the allied forces. Additionally, the base of Souda became Forward Logistics Site for the Gulf operations.

CONCLUSION

Greece continues from 1950 to participate actively with military forces and means to a big number of operations not just for peacekeeping, always however, showing loyalty to its duties in the framework of the military agreements it has signed and the Organisations it belongs.

The historic evidence about the suffering caused by the war remains irrefutable and the

results of the war conflicts of the 20th century, among other things, are still alive in our memories. Therefore we are bound to unanimously agree with Benjamin Franklin who said: 'War -was never good and Peace was never bad'. Let this be the guide in the 21st century so that mankind can see better days.

RESUMÉ

Andreas Tousas: Globálne geopolitické a grécke mierové operácie počas druhej polovice 20. storočia

Tento príspevok sa zaoberá myšlienkou mierovej existencie ľudstva, potrebou udržiavania mieru prostredníctvom OSN a Bezpečnostnej rady, globálnou geopolitickou situáciou a účasťou helénskych ozbrojených síl v mierových operáciách počas druhej polovice 20. storočia.

Ľudstvo sa často rôznymi formami vojny pokúšalo o "rovnováhu síl" a "upokojenie obáv". Tieto vojny znamenali vznik špecifickej meniacej sa globálnej geopolitickej situácie a naopak. Občas sa takto vytvorená geopolitická situácia stala príčinou vojny.

Nakoniec vojnové konflikty spôsobili víťazom aj porazeným iba utrpenie. Grécky duch riešil myšlienku úcty medzi mestami starovekého Grécka zriadením amfiktyónie.

Pre Grécko, ktoré inšpirovalo a zohrávalo vedúcu úlohu, bolo nemožné zostať mimo kozmogonických zmien 20. storočia pri riešení rozdielov medzi ľuďmi mierovými prostriedkami. Grécko bolo členom Ligy národov a teraz je členom OSN, Organizácie pre bezpečnosť a spoluprácu v Európe, Európskej únie a iných organizácií, ktoré podporujú mier a blahobyt ľudstva.

Od roku 1950 sa Grécko napriek svojim obmedzeným spôsobilostiam z hľadiska ľudského potenciálu, ako aj finančných prostriedkov, zúčastňuje na mierových operáciách OSN.

Medzi najdôležitejšie mierové operácie počas druhej polovice 20. storočia patria:
- ► Kórea – Kongo – Somálsko – Južná Afrika,
- ► Etiópia – Kuvajt – Severný Irak – Západná Sahara,
- ► Abcházsko – Gruzínsko – Náhorný Karabach,
- ► Bývalá Juhoslávia – Bosna – Albánsko – Kosovo – Scopia – Afganistan.

Aj v rámci mierových operácií na Balkáne a operácií v Zálive zohralo Grécko úlohu podpory hostiteľskej krajiny poskytnutím prístupu do prístavov.

Od roku 1950 sa Grécko so svojimi ozbrojenými silami a prostriedkami aktívne zúčastňuje na veľkom počte operácií, nie vždy iba mierových. Prejavuje však lojalitu voči svojim povinnostiam v zmysle vojenských dohôd, ktoré podpísalo, ako aj voči organizáciám, do ktorých patrí.

The Participation of the Hungarian Armed Forces in Peace Support and Crisis Management Operations

Ltc. János Jakus

Taking into consideration the new challenges of the era, the countries achieving success in Euroatlantic integration need to prepare not only for the defence of a particular country but also for participation in peace support and crisis management operations beyond the boundaries of the nation states. Peace support and crisis management military operations may take place in close co-operation with the defence forces of other nations on the periphery of the Alliance or in areas further away. According to the Hungarian approach, peace support operations can be defined as political and/or military activities that are aimed at the complementation of the political process of conflict management and at the restoration and maintenance of peace, in order to alleviate and eliminate hostilities between states or within a certain state by the intervention of the military (or civilian) force of an international organization.

The summary of the peace support and crisis management operations initiated and performed by international organizations in recent years supports the well-known fact that the soldiers have to prepare not only for fighting but also for a number of activities that do not actually belong to the category of armed combat. These may be diplomatic, police, administrative and humanitarian tasks.

It has to be recognized that peace support and crisis management operations always carry the threat of the crisis or conflict deepening, which increases the chance of armed intervention, and of force demonstration, that is, of using the original capabilities of the armed force.

In fact, the peace support and crisis management operations cannot be called new military tasks. In the late 19th century and in the early 20th century the armed force of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (AHM), especially some of its navy units, were involved in a number of crisis prevention, crisis management or, as these were called, fire extinguishing missions. (Crete 1897–1898, China 1900–1914, the Balkans 1903–1909, Skutar 1912–1913.)[1]

---

1   Die K. und K. Streitkrefte auf und vor Kreta 1897/1898 Wien 1901.

THE APPLICATION OF THE ARMED FORCE OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY IN PEACE SUPPORT AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT OR FIRE EXTINGUISHING OPERATIONS

In the above mentioned operations only European powers participated – with the exception of the operation in China. The reason on one hand was that the conflicts took place on the European continent, and, on the other hand, that they wanted to form their own region of interest in the security vacuum evolving with the loss of ground of the Turkish Empire in the Balkans.

In the eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea, the Greek – Turkish belligerence offered the first opportunity for upsetting the power balance in the region. The island of **Crete** was under the rule of the Turkish Empire but 90% of the population were of Greek nationality. Since the middle of the 19th century, independent Greece kept arousing anti-Turkish feeling either by provoking minor clashes or by political means.

In January 1897 an uprising broke out against the rule of the Turkish Court on Crete and it ended up with a massacre. In Constantinople the ambassadors of the great powers started talks about the solution to the conflict and decided for military intervention. Following the decision, Great Britain sent 21, France 8, Italy 13, Russia 5 and the AHM 6 warships into the region. From the Navy of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy it was the K.u.K. Marie Therese and the Sebenico warships that first arrived to the region with the task to provide protection to the Austro-Hungarian and to the German subjects and, if necessary, to rescue them as well as to guarantee that the rules of the marine blocade were kept.

In an ultimatum the Council of Admirals, the highest decision-making body of the international force demanded the withdrawal of the Greek force from the island. In order to create security, the Turkish population was concentrated into reinforced, protected seaside towns. On 1st March the representatives of the great powers introduced temporary international administration on the island and Gyula Pintér of Hungarian birth was assigned to control it. After the 2nd battalion of the 87th infantry regiment of the joint army had finished landing, it was this unit that separated the opposing parties and that maintained order. At the same time and in accordance with the long-term settlement plan, the uprisers were disarmed and compliance with the regulations of the arms embargo was verified. (Of all the sectors, the Monarchy checked the most dangerous one: close control of the western sector was particularly important because it was the closest to Greece.)

Following the normalization of the situation, on April 12, 1888, the military forces of the great powers left the island, so Gyula Pintér handed over the leadership of administration to the newly appointed Turkish governor.

China. By the late 19th century the movement of the opponents to foreign economic and political influence had strengthened. They managed to convince the Chinese sol-

---

- August Urbanski von Ostrymiecz: Die Österrechisch-Ungarische officers-mission in Makedonien 1903–1909.
Wien 1910 Verlag von F. Tempsky.

diers in service with foreign embassies and bureaus, the so called Boxers, to support their cause. In June 1900 the Chinese Empress Mother declared a war on the great powers and the Boxers' Insurgency broke out. The Boxers started to siege the diplomatic quarter and it was a pretext for the intervention of the great powers. The AHM, Germany, France, Russia, Italy, the Netherlands, The USA, Belgium, Great Britain and Japan participated in the military operation. The international forces liberated the diplomatic quarter and occupied Beijing and Tienchin. The cities were divided into sectors in each of which the contingent of a participant state maintained order. The Austro-Hungarian servicemen were assigned not onl the task of maintaining order but also controlled the activity of 80 Chinese policemen and performed administrative tasks as well.

In the liberation siege of 55 days 12 Austro-Hungarian servicemen died and they were buried in Beijing. The servicemen taking part in the mission were replaced every two years. When World War I broke out, the former comrades became enemies on more than one occasion: for example, the Austro-Hungarian servicemen participating in the operations could get into Germany escaping in civilian clothes, and could return into their native countries only in 1920.

The Balkan Peninsula. In autumn 1902 ethnic and religious hostilities started. The clashes beginning in Macedonia soon escalated onto the neighbouring provinces: Montenegro and Kosovo. In February 1903 the Ambassadors of Russia, France, Great Britain and of the OHM to Constantinople developed a plan to eliminate the conflict. In January 1904 Italy, Germany, France and Great Britain joined the military operations. However, the attempts to settle the conflict failed.

In October 1904 Russia and the AHM developed another settlement plan, which was accepted by the Turkish Court. In accordance with the plan the two powers reorganized local administration and the police and, meanwhile, disarmed the uprisers. Then the Turkish troops were withdrawn. As realization of a further settlement plan, the two great powers appointed their own officials to control administration and the police, who performed their tasks in close co-operation.

For the interest of reorganizing the police the appointed officers of the great powers entered Turkish service temporarily, so six Austro-Hungarian officers were sent into Kosovo, where they commanded 277 Turkish policemen. In autumn 1905 the Turkish government made an attempt to cancel the agreement but the fleet demonstration of the great powers compelled the Turkish Court to withdraw. In spite of this, the flood of refugees from the South Balkan region occupied by the Turkish Empire towards the areas controlled by the great powers kept increasing, consequently, the police were assigned the task to set up and operate refugee camps and health centres. In 1908 the war renewed because a so called Young Turk had shot Pasha Semsi and it caused a Turkish – Turkish conflict in addition to the existing crisis. On 5th October, 1908, Bulgarian Tsar Ferdinand declared the independence of Bulgaria and it meant a new turn in the conflict: a civil war burst out, which could be characterized as 'all against all'. In March 1909 the AHM troops were assigned back into their original positions and their mission was over. During their activity they had investigated 25 major armed conflicts and a number of minor ambushes.

It can be said that this operation took place with the agreement of the parties involved.

The international force transformed the Turkish police and controlled it and also re-organized and controlled the administration. The supervision of the withdrawal of the Turkish force as well as the disarmament of the uprisers enhanced the realization of the long-term settlement plan and refugee camps were established and operated in order to manage the ethnic conflicts.

Skutari. In November 1912, in the First Balkan War the troops of Serbia and Montenegro surrounded the town of Skutari inhabited by Albanians, which was under Turkish occupation. At the London Conference of December, 1912, the great powers decided to establish independent Albania, then, with their decision of March 1913, they placed Skutari under Albanian authority. At the same time the Turks handed over the town to the army of Montenegro and that was why the Council of Admirals, formed from the commanders of the German, Italian, French, Austro-Hungarian and British forces, resolved to occupy the town in April. Russia and Greece also joined the resolution and assigned ships to the international fleet on the Adriatic Sea. The navy of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy landed 300 sailors so as to ensure the occupation of the town and with this the dual monarchy participated in the operation with the greatest strength. In July the sailors were replaced by the 4th battalion of the 87th infantry regiment. Beside continuing the control of the town, the international force also participated in the establishment and organization of the Albanian police from September on. In October the Council of Admirals of the great powers transformed into a Supervisory Board and, at the same time, the head of the board was appointed the governor of the town and the commander of the peace support force.

For the purpose of settling the ethnic conflict the international force performed administrative tasks and later trained and commanded as well as controlled the activity of the local police.

THE PARTICIPATION OF HUNGARY IN THE SOUTH VIETNAM INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORY AND SUPERVISORY BOARD[2]

Following the two world wars the armed forces were required to take part in peace support operations in the late 20th century, too. Then the representatives of the Polish, Indonesian and Canadian armed forces had to supervise the closing down of the war in South Vietnam as well as the peaceful transition. This mission was performed by the participant forces on the basis of a mandate.

SOUTH VIETNAM

The envoys of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, of the South Vietnam Transitory Revolutionary Government, of the government of the United States and of the government of the Republic of Vietnam signed the *Treaty on the End of the War and the Restoration of Peace in Vietnam* in Paris on 27th January, 1973.

Apart from Hungarian diplomats and persons of diplomatic status 525 professional

---

2   Gyugyik Béla: Naplók, Dél-Vietnam I–II. kötet, MNVK Tud. Osztály, Bp. 1983.

and reserve soldiers of the personnel of the Hungarian Armed Force participated in the mission commencing January 26, 1973, when the first group of the Hungarian contingent left for South Vietnam. The members of the contingent solved their tasks responsibly, in harmony with the Paris Treaty, in complicated international relations, in an area of operations.

Their activity focused on investigating the complaints submitted because of violations of the ceasefire, on keeping a record of weapons and equipment and on the supervision of military facilities. They paid particular attention to the exchange of prisoners of war and to monitoring the withdrawal of US troops and war equipment.

PEACE SUPPORT MISSIONS AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT THESE DAYS[3]

Following the mission in Vietnam, by the request of the UN, Hungarian officers took part in observing the settlement at the end of the Iraqi – Iranian war (UNIMOG). Our defence force was also present in the first Gulf War, where a medical team participated in the support of the operations in 1991.

Between 1991 and 1999, in a number of replacements, Hungarian officers took part in the UNAVEM II – III and MONUA missions and the Defence Force also took a role in the management of several crises in the 90s in Uganda, Mozambique, Kuwait Georgia, Tajikistan, Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, the Western Sahara and on the Sinai Peninsula. By the request of the UN and relying on the experience gained, our Defence Force also joined the multi-national peacekeeping mission on Cyprus (UNFICYP).

After the terrorist attack against the USA on September 11, 2001, neither did we stay away from the military tasks of the settlement in Afghanistan and the peacekeeping operations that followed the operations in Iraq known as the second Gulf War.

The participation in the increasing peace support and crisis management missions initiated by various international organizations as well as the transformation and modernization of the Hungarian Defence Force with their political and financial impacts make the leadership of the Ministry of Defence consider carefully which requests by the international organizations should be accepted and complied with. Nowadays the state and military leadership have set a limit of 1,000 soldiers to direct participation in peace support and crisis management operations.

On the basis of a bilateral agreement 350 Hungarian soldiers have served in Afghanistan and in Iraq. (Following a political decision, the contingent in Iraq finished its operations in the crisis stricken Middle East country after a short period of time.)

Due to the differences in their motives and in their legitimation, the international organizations approach and regulate military participation in the above mentioned operations in various ways, which the Defence Force has to respond suitably.

The concept of peace support and crisis management has broadened. Military power is applied in them not according to the interest or intentions of a small group of powers but according to legitimate procedures by organizations that are acknowledged by the international community.

---

3   Dr. Jakus János-Boldizsár Gábor: Nem háborús műveletek. Egyetemi jegyzet. Bp. 2002.

REFERENCES

1. A honvédelem négy éve (Four years of home defence). 1990–94. Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 1991.
2. A honvédelem négy éve (Four years of home defence). 1994–98. Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 1998.
3. A honvédelem négy éve (Four years of home defence). 1998–2002. Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 2002.
4. Dr. Jakus János – Boldizsár Gábor: Nem háborús műveletek. Egyetemi jegyzet (Operations other than war. University coursebook). Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, Budapest, 2002.
5. A magyarok békeküldetése (The peace mission of Hungarians). Hadimúzeum Alapítvány, 1998.
6. Domokos János: Vietnam. Egy évszázad háborúban (Vietnam. A century of war). Európa Kiadó, Budapest, 1975.
7. Győri Sándor: Magyarok Dél-Vietnamban (Hungarians in South Vietnam). Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 1985.
8. Gyugyi Béla: Naplók, Dél-Vietnam 1973–1974 (Diaries, South Vietnam 1973–1974). MNVK Tudományos Osztály kiadványa, Budapest, 1983.
9. Dr. Szternák György: Adatok a nemzeti biztonsági és katonai stratégiák elkészítéséhez II. (Facts for the preparation of the national security and military strategies II). Nemzetvédelmi Közlemények, Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, Budapest.
10. Ladocsi Jenő: A békétámogató műveletek sikeres végrehajtásának alapfeltételei és a tapasztalatok jövőt formáló szerepe (Basic conditions for the successful performance of peace support operations and the role of experience in the future). Nemzetvédelmi Közlemények, Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, Budapest.
11. Marinov Iván: A ciprusi konfliktus (The Cyprus conflict). http://konfliktus.index.hu/ciprus.html

RESUMÉ

János Jakus: Účasť maďarských ozbrojených síl na podporu mieru a operácie krízového riadenia

V posledných rokoch bola vojenská veda obohatená o novú oblasť výskumu, ktorá bola zahrnutá do bezpečnostných a vojenských štúdií ako *operácie na podporu mieru* v inom druhu operácií ako je vojna. Operácie iné ako vojna, sú politické (diplomatické) a vojenské aktivity, ktoré sa zameriavajú na dopĺňanie krízového riadenia, obnovu a podporovanie mieru s účasťou vojenských (alebo civilných) síl medzinárodnej organizácie s cieľom znížiť alebo ukončiť nepriateľstvo medzi štátmi alebo v rámci štátu.

Operácie iné ako vojna, ktoré sú na podporu mieru, nie sú objavom modernej doby. Za posledné storočie vojaci rôznych krajín uskutočnili množstvo podobných operácií tohto charakteru.

Rakúsko-uhorská monarchia tiež zohrala dôležitú úlohu v týchto medzinárodných snahách, hlavne v oblasti podpory mieru a krízového riadenia.

V období pred 1. svetovou vojnou sa vojaci rakúsko-uhorskej monarchie niekoľkokrát zúčastnili na podpore mieru alebo, ako to nazývali, na „operáciách na potlačenie streľby" (Kréta 1897 – 1898, Čína 1900 – 1914, Balkán 1903 – 1909, Skutar 1912 – 1913).

V krátkej štúdii sa autor sa snaží sústrediť pozornosť na tieto operácie.

Slovak Armed Forces in Peace Operations 1993–2005

Col. Ondřej Novosad

INTRODUCTION

At the turn of century the world is dramatically changing. The new treats the individual states have to face have appeared. Responding to these involves not only diplomatic, economic or political means, but sometimes even using force. The time has come when regional conflicts impact on whole continents and nations are facet unpredictable treats from the side of invisible attackers.

To date, we often come across the term "Out of Area", which characterizes the new concept best. That means, the deployment of troops in the territory of other countries cannot be considered a mere act of friendly act of friendly help, or even worse, an expansion.

The independent Slovak republic, which came into existence in 1993, did keep abreast of the challenges of the changing world. We had to shape the structure and organization of our own armed forces, come to agreement on the topical issues of their role in relation to the Slovak foreign policy and on how our armed forces should reflect the changing security environment.

SLOVAKIA IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The roots of the independent Slovak Peace-keeping reach back to 1992 when the Slovak soldiers were deployed within the Czechoslovak Federal Army into an observer mission in Somalia – UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia). Similarly, the Slovak soldiers in an infantry battalion in UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) peacekeeping mission worked hard to contribute to demilitarization of designated areas, providing humanitarian assistance and securing no-fly zones in former Yugoslavia. On 1st January 1993, when the independent Slovak Republic was established, the unit split into a Czech and a Slovak.

I would like to stress that members of the Slovak Armed Forces in international missions have significantly contributed, and still contribute to stabilizing regions torn by conflicts and crises. By operating in various locations, they act as emissaries of peace providing stability for local inhabitants and as notable representatives of their homeland. They serve the interests of security and of development of peace. Since 1993 about 10 500 Slovak soldiers have served in twenty 25 missions under the UN, NATO, the EU or the OSCE and about 850 soldiers served in 2 coalition missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Total number about 11 350 of soldiers have served in abroad missions in this period.

NATO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Albania

AFOR (Albania Force)

From May 1998 until July 1998 our republic helped at transit into IFOR operation, as well as building refugee camps and recovering roads in Allied Harbour operation within AFOR mission.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

SFOR (stabilization forces)

From 1998 until 2004 Slovakia was involved in this mission with 8 staff officers in SFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo and Tuzla. At the moment we have 4 officers in NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo.

From August 2002 until December 2003 an Mi-17 helicopter unit of the Slovak Armed Forces operated in the SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was assigned to the Royal Dutch Air Force to transport VIPs, larger units, material, armament and ammunition.

Kosovo

KFOR (Kosovo Force)

From August 1999 until January 2002 the engineer unit of the Slovak Armed Forces, deployed into operation Joint Guardian within KFOR mission as a part the Austrian mechanised battalion of South multinational brigade. There was 1 officer in battalion HQ and 39 engineers. They fulfilled clearance of mines.

Conducted more sophisticated activities, this signalling a new stage of a more intense co-operation with NATO countries. In February 2002 we started a mission in a joint Czechoslovak mechanized Battalion. There were 100 Slovak professionals. In nowadays Slovak Armed Forces has there 135 soldiers in independent mechanized company. They are monitoring the environment and buildings belonging to local residents, building local infrastructure and ensuring a gradual and safe return of Kosovo Serbians to their homes.

Afghanistan

ISAF (International security assistance force)

From May 2004 until December 2004 the engineer unit of the Slovak Armed Forces, deployed into ISAF mission as a part the Crisis Establishment of KAI Airport in Kabul. There was 1 officer in KAIA HQ and 16 engineers. They fulfilled clearance of mines in area of KAIA.

Since January 2006 Slovak Armed Forces, reinforced previous unit. There is 1 officer in KAIA HQ in Kabul and 56 soldiers in engineer company. They fulfilled clearance of mines and construction tasks.

Iraq
NTM-I (NATO training mission)
Since February 2005 the Slovak Armed Forces has 5 officers in NTM-I HQ in Baghdad. They accomplish special training of Iraqi Officers.

EU PEACE OPERATIONS AND MONITORING MISSIONS

Bosnia and Herzegovina
ECMM (European Community Monitoring Mission)
EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mission)
Slovakia started with participation as an associated member, since 1993 deploying contingents to ECMM mission (European Community Monitoring Mission) and its successor EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mission). There were 2 observers. Tasked with information supply and analysis our soldiers helped to shape the joint foreign security policy of Europe in relation to West Balkan, thus enhancing stability in the region.
EUFOR (European Forces)
Since December 2004 Slovak Armed Forces has 4 officers in EUFOR HQ in Sarajevo in operation ALTHEA.

Since January 2006 the Slovak Armed Forces deployed to the EUFOR/ operation ALTHEA the guarding platoon to Bosnia and Herzegovina in Tuzla. There is 35 soldiers and they fulfilled protection of the camp and patrolling.

OSCE OBSERVER MISSIONS

Kosovo
OSCE makes also a significant effort to support international community activities. We had our verification team working in the OSCE **Verification mission in Kosovo** in 1999.

Moldavia
Since 1998 our officers also monitored situation of hostilities between separatists and governmental forces, as well as implementation of the OSCE Istambul Summit resolutions concerning weapons and ammunition withdrawal from the territory of the Moldavian Republic.

Abkhazia, Ossetia, Georgia

Since Jun 2000 our units presence in Abkhazia and Cchinval region (South Ossetia, Georgia) helps eliminate persisting tension in the area, as none of the parties to the conflict is willing to withdraw their positions or change a stand.

UN PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVER MISSIONS

Since 1993 members of the Slovak Armed Forces have served in the following UN missions:

Angola – UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, MONUA
Somalia – UNOSOM I
Liberia – UNOMIL
Uganda and **Rwanda** – UNOMUR, UNAMIR
Iraq – UNGCI
Sierra Leone – UNAMSIL

Former Yugoslavia
UNPROFOR (United Protection forces)
A Slovak engineer Battalion was formed and it started to execute its duties part of the multinational UNPROFOR forces in May 1993. It provided protection to local residents and tried to prevent Serbian attacks in Croatia. Our battalion fulfilled engineer support for UNPROFOR. At the beginning of this mission, the engineer battalion numbered 425 personnel. The Parliament decided to extend the force by 183 additional men and by about 100 pieces of engineer equipment. End of the UNPROFOR mission was in January 1996.

Croatia – East Slavonia
UNTAES (United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia)
In 1996 our soldiers continued accomplishing the same tasks under UNTAES mission mandate, being the last UN troops to leave the territory of former Yugoslavia in February 1998. There were about 610 soldiers.

Syria
UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force)
Since May 1998 is Slovak unit within Austrian Battalion. There is 94 soldiers and they supervise protection of a demilitarised zone in the Golan Height.

East Timor
UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor)
UNMISET (United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor)
Experience and international reputation of the Slovak Medical Corps were the decisive factors to deploy our field hospital in the continent of Asia within framework of UNTAET, transformed into UNMISET. There were 40 soldiers since 2001 till 2003.

Ethiopia *and* **Eritrea**
UNMEE (United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea)
From December 2000 till July 2004. In terms of strength, the biggest African mission, monitoring cease-fire between Ethiopia and Eritrea and keeping the opposing forces separated by Ethiopian troops being withdrawn across the May Line 1998. It is the Slovak contingent that was given the responsibility for setting a new borderline between the two countries as an expression of trust and credibility they enjoy. There were 198 soldiers in beginning and after reduction 127 soldiers in December 2003. Main task was mine clearance, building and reconstruction of roads.

Cyprus
UNFICYP (United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus)

The Slovak Armed Forces have been operating in UNFICYP peace mission in Cyprus since May 2001, when we replaced Austrian Contingent. The SLOVCON started with 276 professional soldiers, 40 of them work at the HQ UNFICYP in Nikosia. Slovakia is the Lead Nation in Sector 4 and 118 member Hungarian guard company is included in our contingent. Main task is control the adherence of the law and peace by patrolling in Buffer Zone and to maintain the roads. Nowadays Slovak Armed Forces has there after reorganisation 210 soldiers. Our HQ is in Famagusta.

OPERATION UNDER THE COMMAND OF COALITION FORCES

Afghanistan
ENDURING FREEDOM Operation
From August 2002 till December 2005 was Slovakia involved in the Enduring Freedom operation in Afghanistan under command of Coalition Forces with Airport engineer construction unit. The main task of the Slovak contingent was reconstruction of runways, and infrastructure of Bagram Airport.

Kuwait
IRAQI FREEDOM Operation
From March 2003 till May 2003 Slovakia was involved in the Iraqi Freedom operation in Kuwait under command of Coalition Forces. In January 2003, The USA in verbal note asked Slovakia to consider joining international coalition's effort to take any measures, including massive military engagement, to have a dictator regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq removed. The Slovak Government endorsed our participation and accordingly adopted a resolution on deployment of a chemical company to support anti-Iraqi coalition. Deploying a unit with a total strength of 75, aimed at humanitarian tasks. From 8th March on, the Czech and the Slovak soldiers were patrolling in the streets of Kuwait City.

Iraq

IRAQI FREEDOM Operation

Since July 2003 is Slovakia involved in the Iraqi Freedom operation in Iraq with engineer unit, under command of Coalition Forces as part of Multinational Division Central South under Polish Command. Since beginning of operation strength of unit – 85 troops operated mainly around Al Hillah, Karbala, An Najav, Al Kut and an the border between Iraq and Iran. In February 2004 was our unit reinforced and he was extended up to 110 soldiers. Slovak unit is fundamentally involved in removal of great amount of antitank and anti-personnel mines and other dangerous booby traps. Durig the Iraqi Freedom operation the Slovak Armed Forces achieved rich experiences to be used in our future operations.

CONCLUSION

Slovakian presence in peace operations worldwide in last decade has been an excellent opportunity for validation of our new developed training standards and operational procedures. The result of higher requirements was higher moral of our deployed troops. We had a change to enhance interoperability and language proficiency. However we also learned about the shortfalls in the area of logistic as well as technical limits of our equipment especially under extreme weather conditions.

What is of greatest significance, thought, is the fact that Slovak peacekeepers have considerably contributed to prestige and international reputation of the young Slovak republic and its Armed Forces. They represented they country and Slovak people in a top manner and do deserve our respect, esteem and gratitude. Our special thanks also goes to organisation, states a helping hand at the times when we were just establishing ourselves as a peacekeeping contributing country or those directly involved and co-operating in the missions where our troops were deployed.

RESUMÉ

Ondřej Novosad: Slovenská republika v mierových operáciách 1993–2005

Slovenská účasť v mierových operáciách rozšírená v poslednom desaťročí mala vynikajúcu príležitosť potvrdiť náš novo vyvíjajúci výcvik štandardných a operačných postupov. Výsledok vyšších požiadaviek bol vyšším princípom rozmiestnených jednotiek. Mali sme šancu rozšíriť interoperabilitu a jazykovú znalosť. I keď musíme pripustiť nedostatky vo sfére logistiky a technické limity nášho vybavenia v extrémnych podmienkach počasia.

Čo je najsignifikantnejším znakom, je fakt, že slovenské mierové jednotky značne prispeli k prestíži a medzinárodnej reputácii mladej Slovenskej republiky a jej ozbrojených síl. Reprezentujú svoju krajinu a slovenský ľud vrcholným spôsobom a vysluhujú pre ňu zaslúžený rešpekt, ocenenie a uznanie. Naša špeciálna vďaka tiež patrí organizáciám, štátom za pomoc v čase, keď sme sa práve konštituovali ako prospievajúca krajina mieru alebo priamo zapojená a kooperujúca v misiách, kde boli naše jednotky rozmiestnené.

The US National Guard and Peace-keeping:
Are Reserve Forces the Answer?

Maj. Les' A. Melnyk

In 1993, spurred on by cuts in active duty troop strength and increasing demands for peacekeeping forces, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army directed that a composite battalion of active and reserve component soldier be trained to assume the Multinational Force & Observers mission in the Sinai desert. At the time, this was a rather remarkable step, given the "lingering doubts within the Regular Army that their part-time soldiers have what it takes to carry out important military operations."[1] The generally acknowledged success of this peacekeeping rotation, which took place in early 1995, allayed these fears. With the ever-mounting demands on the active Army, the Reserve Components – particularly the Army National Guard – converted in less than a decade from dabblers in peacekeeping to the operational force of choice for this vital mission. Despite some challenges, and contrary to the opinions of skeptics, the impact of peacekeeping on the morale and readiness of the National Guard has been generally positive. More importantly, anecdotal evidence suggests that Guardsmen actually compare favorably to their active component counterparts in peacekeeping. It is by necessity that Guardsmen have become peacekeepers in today's Army, but there is virtue in that necessity.

The early 1990s were a particularly low point in Regular Army-National Guard relations. The simmering tensions between citizen-soldiers and professional soldiers were heating up following a long period of amity during the Reagan era expansion of the military. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and only temporarily checked by the first Gulf War, U.S. military forces were being cut. National Guard, Army Reserve and Regular Army leaders all fought for their piece of a shrinking budgetary pie. There was a bitterness that still lingered from the failure of the Army to employ Guard ground combat

---

1   Steven Lee Myers, "National Guard Unit Adds Dimension to a Peacekeeper Role," *New York Times*, June 18, 2000, A1.

forces during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Army Chief of Staff Gordon R. Sullivan, who in 1993 ordered the creation of the composite peacekeeping battalion for the MFO Sinai mission, had just the previous year testified to Congress that the Army National Guard's divisions would not be combat capable without a full year's worth of training, in essence making it clear that he had no use for them in almost any conceivable contingency.[2]

While the Army's senior leadership may have considered the bulk of the Guard obsolescent, one way the Guard could be useful would be in easing the growing burden of peacekeeping. The Sinai composite battalion was given every chance to succeed. The MFO mission had been run continuously on 6-month rotations since 1982, and the experimental rotation was slated to be the 28th in that series in a stable, low-risk environment. Furthermore, rather than rely on reserve component soldiers alone, the Army provided a cadre of 20% regulars, to include the battalion commander and half of the officers, as well as half of the non-commissioned officers. The remainder of the battalion was composed entirely of volunteers, 72% National Guard[3] and 8% Army Reserve. A comprehensive training regimen was developed for pre-deployment preparation, one that focused more attention on leadership and peacekeeping skills than active component battalions typically employed prior to a Sinai rotation.[4]

Though the majority of the soldiers were Guardsmen from the 29th Infantry Division of the Virginia and Maryland National Guard, the battalion was designated 4th Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment due to its association with this 82nd Airborne Division regiment during training. The Army studied their MFO rotation in great detail, hoping to determine if its success could be sustained, and what effects employment of the Guard and reserve in peacekeeping might have on both those who participated in the mission, and on the units that the soldiers left behind when they deployed, in some cases, for a year.

Overall, despite the ad hoc creation of the battalion, the Army found that cohesion and morale were comparable to that of active battalions during their MFO rotations. While morale dropped during the tour, it resulted not from conflicts between active and Guard troops or an inability of reserve component soldiers to perform the mission, but because information about the mission provided before the tour (regarding such areas as leave and educational opportunities while deployed) was misleading.[5] While this initial study

---

2   Michael Doubler, *I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636–2000* (Washington DC: Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 130–1, 2001), 363.

3   The Guard provided some 401 men from 24 states, but more than half of these men were from Virginia and Maryland where the bulk of the 29th Infantry Division resided. The reason for the heavy reliance on the 29th Infantry Division was because the MFO peacekeeping battalion had always been a light infantry unit, and the 29th was the only light infantry division in the reserve components. In fact, save for a single infantry battalion, the Army Reserve had no infantry structure at all.

4   One recommendation from a follow-on study was that pre-deployment training could be shortened considerably if it was more focused on peacekeeping tasks. Ruth H. Phelps and Beatrice J. Farr, *Reserve Component Soldiers as Peacekeepers*, (Washington: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Science, September 1996), xx–xxi.

5   Ibid., xvii-xviii.

was completed too soon after the deployment to evaluate the effects of the deployment on re-enlistments, later studies showed that re-enlistment rates, both active and reserve, were higher – sometimes as much as 10 percent higher – for soldiers who deployed on peacekeeping missions.[6] Overall, despite some complaints (more on these later), the impact of peacekeeping on the individual soldier was a positive one.

Somewhat surprisingly, in the case of the Guard, the MFO study showed benefits not just for the individuals who were mobilized and served on the mission, but a positive impact on their units back home. This is a trend that would also be noted in reserve component peacekeeping rotations to come. While the units back in the states naturally suffered a decline in their readiness while their volunteer members were gone, they more than made up for it through the increased training and high morale that these deployed peacekeepers brought back to their units. In fact, 29th Infantry Division leaders who had lost soldiers for a year due to the deployment reported improved morale in both the returned soldiers and their units. These leaders overwhelmingly endorsed future peacekeeping missions for their soldiers.[7]

Anecdotal remarks were generally positive, and the Army certainly considered the experiment a success. The U.S. Ambassador to Egypt commented, "The only difference I can see from active duty battalions is that the soldiers are a little older, more mature and more resourceful." The active duty battalion commander gave what many consider high praise when he stated: "Here in the Sinai we're all soldiers. You can't tell whose active, who's guard and who's reserve."[8] This latter compliment is one that Guardsmen would hear many times over the course of the next decade.

Much to the credit of the Army-sponsored study, senior officers and officials were not the only ones given an opportunity to express their views. The soldiers portrayed a more negative picture when given free reign to anonymously comment about anything they wished, and reflect some of the underlying tensions that sometimes permeated interactions between Guardsmen and regulars. "Morale took a dive because of the treatment National Guard/Reserve units got." "The majority of the National Guard are over 21, educated, have civilian jobs, but are still treated as children." "I think the RC [Reserve Component] is able to do peacekeeping missions but I don't think using Active Duty mixed is a good idea." One particularly irate, though apparently not representative, soldier griped: "We, National Guardsmen, have been treated poorly, promised things that never happened, disrespected as human beings and consistently screwed."[9]

Success in the Sinai was a reflection of things to come, but not for some time. While other missions increasingly engaged Guardsman as peacekeepers, the Guard did not have a significant role in the Sinai again until after the September 11, 2001 attacks. The month

---

6   James Kitfield "The Peacekeepers," GovExec.com magazine, March 1, 2001.

7   Phelps, xix.

8   Arley J. Ball Jr., "Peacekeeping: Is it Feasible to Expand the Role of the Reserve Components?" (Carlisle PA: US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 1997), 7–8.

9   Phelps, 446–8.

after 9/11, the 2nd Battalion, 153rd Infantry was mobilized out of Arkansas to serve as the first all-Guard infantry battalion in MFO Sinai. After serving for the first six months of 2002, it was replaced by a second Guard battalion, 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry from Oregon. Oklahoma, Iowa and Michigan have all committed battalions to the mission in turn. In August 2002, the U.S. announced it was reducing the total number of troops that would be committed to each Sinai rotation. Beginning in July 2003, the rotations operated under a reduced manning of 425 in each infantry battalion.[10] By this point, the Guard had been assigned the MFO mission in its entirety and for the foreseeable future.[11]

Though some seven years passed between the initial composite MFO battalion rotation in 1995, and the next Guard MFO rotation in 2002, the use of reserve component troops in peacekeeping was well established. 1995 was a critical year for the Guard and peacekeeping. The Army Guard played a significant peacekeeping role in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti with elements of the 19th and 20th Special Forces Groups and several aviation units serving alongside their active component counterparts beginning in February. But the commitment for Bosnia-Herzegovina later that year dwarfed everything that came before. In December, 2,087 Guardsmen were mobilized in 53 units from 28 states for European peacekeeping tours in conjunction with the commencement of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). In 1996 they served in Germany, Hungary, Croatia and Bosnia, all in a support capacity. Between 1994 and 1999, approximately 13,400 Guardsmen served in Haiti, the Sinai, the Balkans, and the Persian Gulf primarily as peacekeepers.[12]

The most historic moment in the early stages of Guard participation in the Balkans once again was due to the 29th Infantry Division, the same unit that had provided the bulk of the men for the composite MFO battalion. Company C, 3rd Battalion, 116th Infantry of the Virginia Army Guard was mobilized in September 1997 for an important mission: guarding the Sava River bridge between Croatia and Bosnia, a vital logistical lifeline for U.S. forces deployed as part of Operation Joint Guard, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. This marked the first time since the Vietnam War a National Guard combat maneuver unit was mobilized and deployed for operational service overseas.[13]

Because this mobilization was both high-profile and seen as a harbinger of a more active role for the Guard in the post-Cold War world, the National Guard Bureau commis-

---

10   Annual Report of the Director General, Multinational Force & Observers, (Rome: Office of Publications, Multinational Force & Observers, February 2004), 7–8, 13. U.S. Department of Defense news transcript, "USD Feith Discusses Joint Statement On Multinational Force and Observers," Aug. 2, 2002, located at www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/ By 2003, U.S. commitment to the MFO mission was 687 soldiers, down from 1,200 upon the missions inception in 1982. The additional numbers above the 425 for the infantry battalion are for logistical personnel and staff.

11   Current rotational commitment for the National Guard, as of March 2006, is one infantry battalion of 440 soldiers. To date, the Army Guard has committed 3,819 soldiers to the MFO mission. Source: "ARNG: An Operational Force" weekly update briefing, 14 March 2006. National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard Readiness Center.

12   Doubler, 354–7. The Persian Gulf deployments were for Operations Northern and Southern Watch, and were primarily to provide force protection for U.S. assets maintaining the no-fly zones over Iraq.

13   During the Gulf War, two Army National Guard Field Artillery brigades were mobilized and deployed to combat in Kuwait and Iraq. Guard infantry, cavalry and armor formations were not deployed to Southwest Asia.

sioned a study of the mobilization by an outside contractor, Science Applications International Corporation.[14] Though the mission ultimately went well, the study found numerous problems with the mobilization process, from notification and selection of the unit, to training and equipping. The study was critical of U.S. Army Forces Command for its lack of understanding of the Guard and its mobilization processes, and a lack of communication about the intended mission – for example, the unit did not receive an operations order until well after it had deployed and was guarding the bridge. Repeated efforts during the post-mobilization training phase to get information regarding the nature of the mission were unsuccessful.[15] Unnecessary training requirements, such as insisting that every soldier submit to the U.S. Army Europe driver training course even though the roads in Bosnia were a far cry from the autobahns of Germany, wasted valuable training time.[16] One of the most consistent issues was the complaints about time wasted on inappropriate training; patrolling in the backwoods of steamy Ft. Polk, Louisiana did little to prepare the unit for patrolling downtown Bosanski Brod during the Balkan winter. Limited language and cultural orientation was another drawback.[17]

The Guard continued to provide both combat and combat support units to serve in Bosnia, or in a logistical supporting role in Germany or Hungary. With nearly each succeeding rotation, overall U.S. troop levels dropped, with the Guard and Reserve total as a percentage of the whole growing. Initially, in 1995 total U.S. strength committed to IFOR was more than 20,000 troops; by the time the Guard was given command of SFOR 7 in 2000 that had been reduced to 6,400.[18]

Nevertheless, SFOR 7 marked a third historic highlight in just five years of the National Guard serving as peacekeepers and peace enforcers. When the 49th Armored Division of the Texas National Guard took charge of Multi-National Division-North in Bosnia on March 7, 2000, it marked the first time since the Korean War that a Guard division headquarters deployed for an operational mission, and the first time since World War II that a Guard division commanded a large formation of active duty troops, in this case, three squadrons from the historic 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Truly, relations between the active component and the Guard had improved remarkably since the early 1990s, when Guard divisions were deemed irrelevant to the Army's operational plans.

The transition in Bosnia from regular Army command to National Guard command offers an opportunity to gain insight into differences in both style and substance between the two. As with the initial composite Sinai battalion, the switch in Bosnia to command by a reserve component unit was not something the Army took lightly. "The en-

---

14 Steve Rader et al., *Mobilizing An Infantry Company: The Experience of calling Up C/3–116th Infantry (Virginia Army National Guard) for Operation JOINT GUARD* (McLain, VA: Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), August 25 1998).

15 Ibid., 8–14.

16 Ibid., 23–24.

17 Ibid., F–4, 5.

18 U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned, *After-Action Report (AAR) SFOR 7 – Citizen-Soldiers in Bosnia.* (CALL Special Edition No. 02–12, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, October 2002), 1.

tire United States Army leadership was focused on making this transition work. … This was something that had the attention of the commander of TRADOC, that had the attention of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it had the absolute attention of the Chief of Staff of the Army."[19]

This observation came from John Finney, Ph.D., a long-serving U.S. Foreign Service Officer, who served as political advisor (POLAD) to several rotations of US troops in Bosnia, to include SFOR 6 with the 10th Mountain Division in 1999, SFOR 7 with the Guard's 49th Armored Division in 2000, and SFOR 8/9 with the 3rd Infantry Division in 2001. Thus, he saw the transition first-hand. Finney, who in addition to his work in Bosnia was involved in training exercises for nine U.S. rotations, observed that the only negative comparison he could make between the Guard and Regular troops was that the Regulars were far more crisp and professional in their staff work and analysis. "When the 49th AD came … their staff work was good, but it wasn't as crisp and taut and as totally professional as the 1st Cav and the 10th Mountain"[20]

The Army, in the person of retired General William Crouch, former commander of US Army Europe in 1995 and later SFOR commander in Bosnia, critiqued the Guardsmen mercilessly for their lax execution of the approved Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) while training for the Bosnia mission. Crouch served as a senior mentor during these exercises – some of the most demanding senior-level training ever developed by the Army – and is credited with focusing everyone's attention on proper staff work spelling the difference between success and failure. Much to Crouch's credit, Guard staff work and use of the MDMP improved while in training and as their rotation progressed, and was nearly indiscernible from that of Regulars by the end of the tour.[21] As Finney observed in 2000, "An enormous amount of work went into this. … I think it shows that the Total Army does work, that you can combine active duty with reserve forces … and put them in the field, give them a challenging mission, put them in the unique command and control environment, and make it work."[22]

As in the case of the first Guard rotation to the Sinai, the first Guard rotation to command MND-North in Bosnia was a complete success. For Finney, the significance of the 49th's rotation has become greater with time. "I would like to offer for your consideration this point: That the deployment of the 49th AD – National Guard division from Texas – marks the point when the National Guard moved from becoming a strategic reserve to an operational reserve."[23]

As an outside observer with a background in diplomacy, Finney paid particular attention to the differences in peacekeeping styles between the Europeans and Americans. While the Europeans and Canadians interacted freely with the Bosnians and could be very laissez-faire and patient – sometimes too patient, in his opinion – the Americans tended to be more insulated, focused on force protection, and aggressive in enforcing the

---

19 John D. Finney, Jr. Ph.D., Interview with author, March 29, 2006.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 John D. Finney, Jr., Ph.D., Interview with SFOR Historian James Orzech, Ph.D., August 9, 2000.

23 Finney (2006 interview).

Dayton Accords. The National Guard, particularly at the juncture at which the 49th Armored Division deployed in 2000, was somewhere between the two sides. "I think as the theater matures, as the theater evolves from a situation where the military has the lead in implementing Dayton, to a situation where the military is in support of the civilians carrying out the civilian aspect of Dayton … bringing in a National Guard division like the 49th makes good sense."[24] Six years later, Finney expanded on his comments: "Guard leadership was more patient, more willing to work through in a more deliberate manner – the active duty tended to plunge right ahead."[25]

The maturity of Guardsmen has been noted before. The average Guardsman is 33 years old, compared to 28 ½ for those on active duty.[26] While age 20 is about the peak of strength, physical endurance and reaction speed for most men, it is not the peak of maturity. Coupled with their greater maturity, reserve personnel benefit from a lack of constant immersion in the military culture. Stated one Guard peacekeeper: "We're business people. We work with people. You don't have that sense they do in the regular Army that everyone is either a friend or an enemy."[27]

A key to success in Bosnia was not just a different, more mature, approach to the mission, but the skills they brought. "… [M]any of the personnel in the National Guard division are police officers, or city managers, or hospital administrators, or DEA (U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency) agents, or work for the CIA, and have business skills, so they bring to the peacekeeping task some real strong assets which are helpful."[28]

The Guard is certainly aware of the civilian skills it brings to the table. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lt. General H Steven Blum, in his annual posture statement to Congress earlier this year, emphasized the value that Guardsmen now bring to nation-building in Iraq:

Guard units bring more to the warfight than just Soldiers and Airmen. There is ample anecdotal evidence that the civilian skills Guard members possess make them exceptionally well suited for peacekeeping and nation building. An Iraqi policeman may have limited respect for an American Soldier who attempts to train him in the methods of civilian law enforcement. But, when that Soldier is a National Guardsman with 20 years of civilian experience as a police officer, that Soldier's credibility and impact as a trainer is vastly enhanced.[29]

Similar anecdotes of unique Guard skills coming to bear on a peacekeeping problem are abundant. The *New York Times* in June 2000 reported how an Army Guard Captain with 49th Armored Division accompanied an Air Force team sent to identify the wreckage of an unidentified jet plane found in the Bosnian countryside. The Army captain's civilian job was as a manager on the F-16 production line for Lockheed-Martin, the plane's

---

24   Finney (2000 interview).
25   Finney (2006 interview).
26   Rader, F1.
27   Myers, "National Guard Unit Adds Dimension to a Peacekeeper Role," 1.
28   Finney (2000 interview).
29   National Guard 2007 Posture Statement, (Washington DC: National Guard Bureau) 2.

manufacturer, and he was able to identify the downed plane as an American F-16 from a contract number found on a part.[30]

The same article related how the 49th Division's chief engineer was able to inspect Srebrenica's damaged water purification plant and determine what was needed to repair it despite complete lack of cooperation from the plant's Serbian workforce. The colonel in his civilian job is an assistant director of the Water Utilities Department for the city of Dallas. "Show me where the Army has an investment banker or someone who runs an electrical grid" states an Army Reserve general. "We bring civilian skills that the Army doesn't have."[31]

Another article quotes Captain Jim MacIntyre of the Pennsylvania National Guard as he trained prior to deploying to Kosovo: "A lot of my guys work with the political side of life; others work in companies. I have a better understanding how, as an engineer, to deal with municipalities. That's something of an advantage that the National Guard and reservists have. We're older and a little more mature. We have a little more patience. And patience is very important."[32]

The 49th's commander, Major General Robert Halverson, counted his own civilian background in the Texas Emergency Management office and as deputy insurance commissioner as vital to his success in Bosnia. "What that gave me was 20 years experience working in state government, and working with local governments, so I had a feel for what it takes to operate either a small town, small village, up to a major city, and understand the political environment in which most of those city officials work. And having that, then was able to deal with them myself, and to assist in the direction of, particularly, my G5 staff and my CIMIC [Civil-Military Cooperation] battalion, to work with those communities."[33]

The Army has made some effort to categorize and take advantage of those skills in recent years. One fact that surveys of Guard and Reserve personnel makes clear is that employees in the public sector are proportionally over-represented in the reserve components. This is because state, local, and federal government jobs do not discriminate against reservists when hiring, are among the most generous employers in granting leave for military duties, and the least likely to penalize reservists who are deployed. What this means for peacekeeping effectiveness is that the average Guard and Reserve unit is far more likely to have the critical skills necessary to run a government, a power grid, a police or fire department, or a postal service, than a random sampling of the American public would have, much less a random sampling of a Regular Army unit.

General Blum, who prior to his assumption of duties at the National Guard Bureau commanded the 29th Infantry Division during its rotation in Bosnia, noted that the (at the time) all-volunteer nature of the tour meant he had the highest quality soldiers deploy with him. "Performance tends to be above average because people really want to be

30   Steven Lee Myers "National Guard Unit Adds Dimension to Peacekeeping Role," New York times, June 18, 2000, 1.

31   Ibid.

32   Don Chapman & Moni Basu, "Keeping the Peace a War in Itself: Stability, Security are Vital, Hard to Achieve" The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, May 18, 2003, B1.

33   Ibid., Halverson interview.

here, and that has a lot to do with how they perform and what their morale and attitude is like." … "We have had zero employer support problems, virtually zero military justice problems, and an insignificantly low number of family problems."[34]

Finally, the benefit a peacekeeping deployment brings to the Guardsmen themselves should not be ignored. General Halverson noted the benefits to both morale and readiness: "I see a positive impact [on retention], because the soldiers have had this opportunity." … "The other impact that I think is most significant is the experience gained by the soldiers, in excess of 380 days: the 270 days of mobilization and the 108 days of training prior to the deployment. For a Guard soldier that equates to about 10 years of Guard experience, when you figure that we normally train about 39 days a year." … "If we take that and spread that throughout the division as we return to Texas, everybody in the entire division will greatly benefit from that."[35] These comments, it should be noted with caution, date from before 9/11 and the widespread mobilizations that followed. While peacekeeping continues to provide benefits to Guard units that they could not get from normal inactive duty training, this has to be weighed now against the high operational tempo now being experienced by all components of the Army and the dangers that a second or third deployment present to units in terms of attrition when soldiers – and more often their families and employers – say they have had enough.

This is an ongoing mission. The trend to use reserves started after the end of the Cold war, but accelerated after September 11th. The Army had projected at the time the 49th Armored Division assumed command in 2000 that 2/3rds of the Bosnia force would be Guard or Reserve within only 2 years; by 2002 the entire mission, some 1,800 in all, was manned by the RC.[36] From 1995 through 2004, 12 U.S. Army division headquarters commanded Task Force Eagle and the multinational forces under its control. Six of these 12 were from the Guard.[37] Even after NATO formally handed the mission over to the European Union in November 2004, the National Guard continues to provide peacekeepers there. Today, some 200 Guard soldiers are in Bosnia for a variety of missions, while another 3,000 Guard soldiers maintain the peace in Kosovo, where a National Guard general officer has commanded U.S. forces since March 2003.

CONCLUSION:

The last ten years have shown us that the answer to the question posed in my title; "Are Reserve Forces the Answer?" is a resounding "yes" on several levels. Employment of reserve forces was first sought out to relieve stress on the active component. It has done that, though the multiplication of missions since September 11th has meant that operational tempo in the active component has increased dramatically despite the removal of the peacekeeping burden. But the contribution has been critical. Even before 9/11, Sec-

---

34 Major General H Steven Blum, Interview with SFOR Historian James Orzech, Ph.D., March 28, 2002.

35 Major General Robert L. Halverson, Interview with SFOR Historian James Orzech, Ph.D., September 24, 2000.

36 Joshua Kucera, "U.S. Bosnia Force Now Made Up Only of Guard, Reserve Units." Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, December 8, 2002, A-10.

37 In order, the 49th Armrd Div (3/00–10/00); 29th Inf Div (10/01–4/02); 28th Inf Div (9/02–3/03); 35th Inf Div (3/03–9–03); 34th Inf Div (9/03–3–04); 38th Inf Div (3/04–12/04).

retary of Dense William Cohen stated, "We simply could not undertake a sustained operation anywhere in the world without the Guard and Reserves."[38]

Studies have shown that peacekeeping has had a generally positive effect on the morale, cohesion, and effectiveness of Guard and Reserve units that are employed. There is also a large body of evidence that the reservists bring civilian skills to peacekeeping that are not resident in the active component, as well as a maturity and civilian mindset that are far more appropriate in this type of setting than the warrior ethos so deeply ingrained in the Regulars.

Two other benefits should be briefly mentioned. One is the removal of the "weekend warrior" stigma so long associated with being a member of the Guard or Reserve. Not only the nation, but a whole generation of active component soldiers have seen reservists in action, and the experience has done more than anything to remove this prejudice. Another benefit may be predictability. As one author points out "Freeing the active component's warfighting capabilities by taking over peacekeeping operations also enables the Guard to establish a predictable deployment rotation, a vital concern for the civilian soldiers, their families, and employers. Some have simplified it to saying the active component has taken on the "911" role [calls for emergency assistance], while the Guard is handling "411" calls [calls for routine services].[39]

Peacekeeping and other contingency operations had already begun to transform the Reserve Components prior to 9/11, as this article from 2000 points out:

The reservists faced only two presidential call-ups during the Cold War – one for the Berlin Airlift and the second for Vietnam. But today, for the first time in history, the reserves are being called to active duty by the same President under three separate call-ups – Bosnia, Kosovo, and the no-fly operations over Iraq. And over the past decade, the collective number of days annually that Reserve forces are on active duty and contributing to ongoing military missions has increased thirteenfold – from an average of 1 million duty days during the 1980s, to an average of 13 million duty days in each of the past four years. This increase in days comes despite Reserve troop cuts of 300,000 during that time.[40]

For the National Guard, the highlights were three historic moments in the short space of five years. The first use of reservists, primarily Guardsmen, in the Sinai in 1995; the first operational deployment of ground maneuver unit since Vietnam to the Sava River bridge in 1997; and the first Guard division to operationally deploy since Korea and command regulars in Bosnia in 2000. Guard service as peace enforcers and nation builders in Afghanistan and Iraq will doubtless present new "firsts" in years to come.

I've emphasized the role of the Army National Guard in this paper not just out of a sense of partisan loyalty but also to make a point: while they share many similarities, the Army Guard is different than its partner, the Army Reserve, and some of these differences are key considerations in peacekeeping operations.

---

38   Steven Lee Myers, "New Role of Guard Transforming Military," *New York Times*, January 24, 2000, A-22.

39   J.R. Wilson, "Civilian Skills Crossover: The Military Reaps the Benefits of Citizen-Soldier Occupational Talents" in *The Modern National Guard* (Tampa, FL: Faircount LLC, 2003), 129.

40   James Kitfield, "Peacekeepers Progress," *The National Journal*, Vol. 32, No. 52–53, December 23, 2000.

While both the Guard and Reserve contain older, more mature soldiers and a wealth of civilian skills that active component forces cannot hope to match, the most obvious difference between the two is size: the Guard is the largest of the seven federal reserve components, and is more than 50% larger than the Army Reserve when counting troops in organized units.[41] Thus, it stands to reason that the Guard has contributed the lion's share of soldiers to Bosnia, Kosovo, and MFO Sinai.

Two other differences make the Guard the best suited of the reserve components for peacekeeping: one structural, the other cultural. The structural difference is that a large portion of the Guard is organized as a combat force, while the Army Reserve is virtually devoid of combat units. While a support unit can plan and conduct a variety of logistical tasks, it does not have the training, personnel, or cultural mindset to conduct so many of the tasks that peacekeeping forces may be required to conduct – patrols, raids, operating check points, cordon and search operations, etc. It is for this reason that in the past five years Guard combat division and brigade headquarters were chosen to command peacekeeping operations, just as the Regular rotations that preceded them. Many U.S. leaders credit the beginning of success in Bosnia to the imposition of tough Rules of Engagement. It was a key difference between UNPROFOR and IFOR.[42] But peace enforcement only works if there is a creditable threat of force behind it.

The cultural difference stems from the centuries-long tradition of the Guard working for local civilian leaders. When not mobilized, the Guard falls under the command of a state governor, and has been used by those governors for local defense, riot control, restoration of law and order, and response to a bewildering array of natural disasters. To this day, the Guard annually expends hundreds of thousands of man-days on state active duty responding to local communities and their needs in time of crisis. The Army Reserve, organized in 1908, has always been a federal force and does not have this valuable experience of working with local political leaders and emergency responders on a regular basis. In simple terms, the culture of the Guard embraces its state mission of aid to civil authorities, as well as its federal mission of fighting the nation's wars. The culture of the Army, and to a lesser extent the Army Reserve, has traditionally been to resist all non-combat related missions, and while there are signs that the Army is embracing operations other than war with more enthusiasm, it is not there yet.

The past decade has removed any hesitation senior American military and political leaders may have had to employ reserve forces for peacekeeping. So long as more pressing conflicts prevail, it is likely that the United States will seek to minimize its role in peacekeeping operations, and transfer as much of that mission as possible to the reserve components. The negative impact of peacekeeping on the reserve components has yet to be fully assessed. While the evidence to date has shown that, in balance, deployments for peacekeeping have a positive effect on reserve units, there is certainly the danger that over-employment will be harmful. The U.S. media and Congress have begun to question the impact of constant mobilizations on recruiting and retention of soldiers. While fam-

---

41   The Army Reserve also includes the Individual Ready Reserve, a large pool of personnel who have a military obligation to serve if called but who are not required to train or belong to a unit.

42   Finney (2006 interview).

ilies and employers are generally supportive the first time a reservist is called away for overseas duty, will they remain that way for a second and third deployment, even if it is a regularly scheduled event every six years?

We are bound to find out. With the successful use of reserve forces for peacekeeping, as well as for stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is inconceivable that these missions will revert to the active Army in their entirety even after the current operational tempo falls off. On balance, keeping the Guard and Reserve involved is a positive development – for the regular Army, for the Guard and Reserve, and for those people who seek an end to conflict in their homelands. Perhaps the inherent benefits of using the Guard for peacekeeping will someday be reflected in the standard used to judge success – imagine the day when senior officials, in delivering their highest praise to active duty peacekeepers, will say: "You can't tell them apart from the Guard."

REFERENCES

Books and Reports

Congressional Research Service. "Bosnia and Kosovo: U.S. Military Operations." CRS Report for Congress, February 16, 2004.

Congressional Research Service. "Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement." CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Updated January 30, 2006.

Doubler, Michael. *I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636–2000.* Washington DC: Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 130–1, 2001.

Government Accountability Office. *Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges: Statement of Janet A. St. Laurent, Director Defense Capabilities and Management.* (Testimony Before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives) Washington DC, April 29, 2004..

Government Accountability Office. *Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions.* (Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, and Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, House of Representatives) Washington DC, November 2004.

Minuteman Inst. for National Defense Studies. *Citizen Soldiers as Peacekeepers: The Army National Guard in the Balkans.* (MINDS Study Paper #1), Washington, DC, June 2000.

Multinational Force & Observers. "Annual Report of the Director General – February 2004." Office of Publications, Multinational Force & Observers, Rome, Italy, 2004.

National Guard Bureau. *National Guard 2007 Posture Statement.* Washington DC, February 2006.

National Guard Bureau – Army National Guard Directorate. "ARNG: An Operational Force" PowerPoint presentation, March 14, 2006.

Phelps, Ruth and Beatrice Farr. *Reserve Component Soldiers as Peacekeepers.* Arlington, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioural and Social Sciences, September 1996.

Rader, Steve et al. *Mobilizing an Infantry Company: The Experience of Calling Up C/3–116th Infantry (Virginia Army National Guard) for Operation JOINT GUARD.* Science Applications International Corp., August 25, 1998.

U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned, *After-Action Report (AAR) SFOR 7 – Citizen-Soldiers in Bosnia.* (CALL Special Edition No. 02–12, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, October 2002), 1.

Articles

Chapman, Don & Moni Basu. "Keeping the Peace a War in Itself: Stability, Security are Vital, Hard to Achieve" *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, May 18, 2003.

Crawley, Vince. "Changing of the Guard: Revised Missions, Chain of Command Pattern Changing." *Army Times*, November 25, 2002.

Hodges, Sam. "NATO Mission in Bosnia: Texans in Command of Troops: Guard Unit has High-Profile Role in Peacekeeping Mission." *Austin American Statesman*, May 8, 2000.

Kitfield, James "Peacekeepers Progress," *The National Journal*, Vol. 32, No. 52–53, December 23, 2000.

"The Peacekeepers," *GovExec.com* magazine, March 1, 2001.

Kucera, Joshua. "U.S. Bosnia Force Now Made Up Only of Guard, Reserve Units." *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, December 8, 2002.

Myers, Steven Lee. "New Role of Guard Transforming Military," *New York Times*, January 24, 2000.

"National Guard Unit Adds Dimension to a Peacekeeper Role," *New York Times*, June 18, 2000.

Segal, David R. "Constabulary Attitudes of National Guard and Regular Soldiers in the U.S. Army." *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 24, Issue 4, Summer 1998.

Stone, Paul. "Bosnia Mission Helps Solidify Total Force Integration" *Aerotech News and Review*, February 2000.

Wilson, J.R. "Civilian Skills Crossover" in *The Modern National Guard.* Tampa, FL: Faircount LLC, 2003.

Papers

Ball, Arley. "Peacekeeping: Is it Feasible to Expand the Role of the Reserve Component?": US Army War College Strategic Research Project, Carlisle, PA: April 10, 1997.

Ewing, Angela D. "Peacekeeping Training in the Army National Guard." School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS: March 18, 2004.

Orr, Timothy E. "Small-Scale Contingency Operations and the Army National Guard." U.S. Army War College Research Paper, Carlisle, PA: April 7, 2003.

Oral Histories

Blum, Major General H Steven, interview by James Orzech, Ph.D., SFOR Historian, March 28, 2002.

Finney, John D. Jr., Ph.D., interview with James Orzech, Ph.D., SFOR Historian, August 9, 2000.

Finney, John D. Jr., Ph.D., interview with author, March 29, 2006.

Halverson, Major General Robert L., interview by James Orzech, Ph.D., SFOR Historian, September 24, 2000.

RESUMÉ

Les' A. Melnyk: Národná garda USA a mierové operácie: Sú odpoveďou záložné sily?

Začiatkom 90. rokov 20. storočia pod vplyvom zvyšujúcich sa požiadaviek na aktívne ozbrojené sily sa armáda USA obrátila na svoje záložné zložky, aby zmiernila tlak na sily poskytujúce vojakov pre zmiešaný prápor a aby ukončila mierovú rotáciu na Sinaji. Po úspechu tejto rotácie začiatkom roka 1995 rýchlo nasledovala ešte naliehavejšia potreba záložnej zložky mierotvorcov pre hlavné rotácie IFOR a SFOR v Bosne a Hercegovine.

Počiatočné pochybnosti v aktívnych silách ohľadom kompetencie záložných vojakov pre tento typ misií rýchlo vystriedala akceptácia a väčšie spoliehanie sa na záložné zložky pri vykonávaní zahraničných operačných misií v čase mieru, nielen na Sinaji a v Bosne, ale aj na Haiti, v Kosove a pri ochrane síl a strážení vzdušného priestoru v Saudskej Arábii, Kuvajte a oblohy nad severným a južným Irakom. Naozaj, civilné zručnosti a väčšia zrelosť záložných síl ich predurčila na mierové operácie a budovanie krajiny spôsobom, aký nie je schopná dosiahnuť aktívna armáda. Okrem toho, obavy, že mierové mobilizácie poškodia morálku a narušia pripravenosť v garde a záložných jednotkách, sa ukázali byť z väčšej časti neopodstatnené.

Príspevok rozoberá aj štrukturálne a kultúrne rozdiely medzi národnou gardou pozemných síl a záložnými zložkami pozemných síl, ako aj tvrdenia, že vďaka týmto rozdielom je garda spomedzi záložných zložiek najideálnejšia na vykonávanie mierových operácií a budovanie krajiny. Americká účasť v globálnej vojne proti teroru od roku 2001 iba zvýšila spoliehanie sa krajiny na gardu a je nepravdepodobné, že sa úloha gardy v týchto typoch misií v budúcnosti zmenší.

panel 3:

From Peace-keeping to Nation Building: Afghanistan and Iraq as Case Studies

Chair:
Colonel Robert Dalessandro, USA

Winning the Peace
Dutch Post Conflict Military Operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan

Dr. Arthur ten Cate,

INTRODUCTION

Because post conflict military operations nowadays attempt to implement ambitious state-building objectives, they are increasingly complex, long term and focused on the civil domain. Peace building is primarily achieved by, in the first place, effecting security, disarmament and demobilisation, and by security sector reform. But it is also achieved by non-military measures like stimulating reconstruction, repairing the infrastructure, facilitating education and health care, promoting good governance, training judicial personnel and starting up the economy. Supporting or substituting civilian authority, therefore, has become a vital part of the military mission in post conflict military operations.

Recent examples of Dutch armed forces conducting these kind of far-reaching peace support operations are the contributions of the Dutch military to the NATO-missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

From the Dutch point of view the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was a turning point. For the Dutch armed forces, operation *Joint Guardian*, as the mission was called, marked a new era in civil-military co-operation (CIMIC in NATO speech), because in Kosovo the field of civil affairs definitely became part of the military mission, not least because of the specific course of this conflict.

Let me explain this. The NATO bombing campaign forced the Yugoslav authorities to agree to let their southern province be placed under international control. The Serbs moved out altogether. On arrival the NATO expeditionary force therefore found itself in an administrative black hole. Kosovo Force (KFOR), which moved into the war-torn country on 12 June 1999, was automatically given responsibility for filling the power

vacuum the Serbs left behind. This was partly so because the United Nations Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK), the new international civil authority, would not be ready for several more months. KFOR, in the meantime, exercised *de facto* control. It maintained public order and security, and provided support for humanitarian aid, for reconstruction, and for the restoration of the rule of law and public administration.

The Netherlands took part in KFOR and contributed an artillery battalion, an engineer auxiliary battalion and a helicopter detachment. These units were assigned to a German brigade, known as Multinational Brigade South, which controlled a sector around the southern Kosovo towns of Prizren and Orahovac. The Dutch engineers performed support tasks and helped with, among other things, civil reconstruction projects in the area. The artillery battalion was responsible for securing and governing the area surrounding the town of Orahovac. The commander of the task force, Lieutenant Colonel (A.J.H.) Van Loon, was in fact a kind of military governor for his region. He later wrote: 'What it came down to was that KFOR temporarily took over the administration because creating a secure environment [the mission] could not be separated from law and order, overseeing the protection of human rights and restoring civil administration. There was simply no alternative.'

In the summer of 1999, after a year of civil war and two months of NATO bombing, Kosovo was a province without authorities. After the withdrawal of the Serbs no form of municipal administration was left in Orahovac, and the same was true for numerous other towns and villages in Kosovo. The police and the fire services were not functional either. Rubbish was not collected and the utilities supplied no gas, no water and no light. In this situation it was up to the occupying NATO troops to fill the vacuum until UNMIK could set up.

The military administration was not preceded by any specific planning. There were no preconceived ideas as to *how* law and order would be upheld, or even as to *which* laws would be upheld. In other words, there was no general legal basis, founded, say, on international law of war or occupation law, as one might expect. The operation in Kosovo was based on Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council, passed on 10 June 1999. It suspended Yugoslavia's sovereignty over Kosovo and transferred it for an indefinite period to KFOR and UNMIK. The NATO force, the military pillar of the international authority, was explicitly put in charge of the province's security, both internal and external. The latter meant law enforcement and policing, which are not regular military tasks. Admittedly, this maintenance of law and order was temporary (until it was taken over by UNMIKPOL, the police component of the UN administration), but it still had to be done for a couple of months.

From the outset, policing was the most important task performed by the Dutch armed forces in the Orahovac sector after 12 June 1999. The thousands of Albanians who had fled or been driven out by Serbian troops came back; after all their suffering they harboured deep feelings of revenge on the Serbian minority who had stayed behind. The Albanian resistance movement UÇK (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës), the Kosovo Liberation Army, took the lead in the reprisals against this group. As in the rest of Kosovo, Serb civilians were attacked and murdered. Their houses were set on fire. KFOR tried to curb these acts of violence and to protect the Serbian community. Action was taken to

stop the carrying of weapons, ill-treatment and arson. In addition, the peacekeepers addressed robbery, theft, kidnapping, looting, illegal logging and other forms of crime.

The Dutch unit in Orahovac also set up a 'complaints office' where Kosovars could report all kinds of offences or problems. It dealt not only with current criminal activities, but also with accusations about violations of human rights by the Serbs during the 1998–1999 war. One of the police tasks was to guard possible mass graves or other sites where war crimes had been committed. This made it possible for the forensic investigation teams of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to set to work. These teams were also given logistic support. Several Serbian suspects of war crimes who were still in the mission area were arrested.

Besides their police work, the Dutch troops in Kosovo played a facilitating role in the field of public administration. A consultation structure was set up with local Serbian and Albanian representatives. They were made responsible as far as possible for what went on in the municipality. KFOR put a great deal of time and effort into restoring the everyday services of the public administration. The military, often in consultation with civilian aid organisations, restarted services like garbage collection, health care, fire fighting, and water and power supplies.

Generally speaking, out of necessity the NATO expeditionary force in Kosovo in 1999 was temporarily allocated tasks that were part of administering an international protectorate. Kosovo was a territory which, pending its definitive status in the international system, was governed from the outside, by international authorities. The task of administering the territory had fallen to the United Nations and NATO. The mission in Kosovo was a post conflict military operation in which the military and civilian components overlapped to a considerable extent. Non-military tasks became an essential part of the military mission and proved to be indispensable elements in realising the political-strategic objective of the operation. This raised the question whether being temporarily in charge of public administration in a mission area should remain an exception to the rule, or whether in the future such missions with a large civil affairs component would be a structural part of the military profession.

It was to be the latter. After the terrorist attacks by Al Qaïda on the United States on 11 September 2001, the civil aspect of crisis management operations became even more important. The international community learned from '9/11' that the weak spots in the international system (such as Afghanistan) could harbour great danger if they were neglected. In the modern age of globalisation failing or failed states proved to be no longer a problem 'for other people far away' or a purely humanitarian issue. Destabilising states were real security risks on a global scale and were placed high on the political agenda. Civil and military domains were no longer easy to separate in the case of something as intangible as winning the 'Global War on Terror' and the military operations that followed from its objectives.

In the first place in 2001 an attack was launched against Afghanistan, where Al Qaïda had found refuge with the fundamentalist Taliban regime. This operation, named *Enduring Freedom*, went well for the Coalition. But the military defeat of the Islamic extremists in December 2001 was not sufficient. The United States and its allies initiated a nation-building process in order to have a long-term guarantee that no new threats could devel-

op. The Netherlands took an active part in this process, making many contributions. At first the Dutch government sent troops with a purely military task. From January 2002 to August 2003 a company of the Airmobile Brigade, rotated every three months, formed part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was deployed around the Afghan capital Kabul to support and protect the new central government. From February to August 2003, ISAF command was in the hands of a joint German-Dutch High Readiness Forces Headquarters. From March 2004 to March 2005, the Netherlands also stationed a squadron of Apache attack helicopters in Kabul to increase the fire power of ISAF, now under NATO command. And after the departure of the Apaches, a unit of F-16 fighter planes was stationed at Kabul airport. They are still there.

In the course of 2004, ISAF expanded under NATO command from a security operation into a reconstruction operation, with more than purely military tasks. This was achieved by taking over a number of the so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams that were originally set up by the United States after 2001. It had become the task of the PRTs to help the new (pro-Western) central government in Kabul to extend its authority over all of Afghanistan, to create a safe environment in the provinces, to make possible good public administration, to facilitate reconstruction and to monitor continually the general situation. From late 2003, several NATO members undertook to lead a PRT to aid this attempt at nation building.

In September 2004, the Netherlands also took command of a PRT in the North Afghan province of Baghlan. From a base camp near the provincial capital Pol-e Khomri, the Dutch helped the Afghan central government to increase regional stability and to establish new power structures in an area where after more than twenty years of war hardly anything worked. Supporting the civil administration was at the heart of this mission. Besides public safety, civil themes like good governance and reconstruction received special attention. The PRT should be seen, so argued the first commander, airforce Colonel (J.A.H.) Van Hoof, as a 'forward operating base' of the still weak central government of Afghanistan. This emphasis on the civil component gave the mission in Baghlan its special character.

Because the Dutch PRT was operating in a relatively safe northern province of Afghanistan, it was small and lightly armed. The commander was assisted by a political advisor from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Most important were the so-called Military Observation and Liaison Teams (MOLTs). Reports by the MOLTs show that in the beginning the PRT stayed close to the familiar ground of security issues and confined itself to taking stock and gathering information on the general situation in the province.[1]

The Dutch philosophy in Baghlan was that provincial reconstruction should be left as far as possible to the Afghans themselves and to non-governmental organisations. The Dutch armed forces regarded the PRT as a *facilitating* body. It was there to protect, to observe and report, to assess needs, to direct civil actors and mediate between them, and to assist where necessary. The most interesting thing about the PRT concept was that it proposed that the military should be explicitly and deeply involved in public, civil administration. The PRT was thus engaged in many dialogues – with the Afghan authorities at

---

1   Field archive 1 (NL) PRT Pol-e Khomri, Afghanistan.

various levels, with international bodies and with numerous non-governmental organisations. The MOLTs carried out 'civil' reconnaissance missions in the remotest corners of the mountainous province to chart political and administrative relations and social needs. As part of the security task, a start was made with disarming fighting groups and militias, and with explosive ordnance tasks. Work also soon began on creating a properly functioning police force. The PRT supported this effort by providing radios for police stations and training for police instructors.

One of the PRT's special tasks was to monitor the administrators and local politicians, and to promote what is known as 'good governance'. As part of the so-called 'Bonn process', the central government in Kabul appointed many new officials, such as district governors and police commanders. By watching this process closely, the PRT was to exercise an 'inhibiting influence on the misuse of power by local and regional authorities, so that the local and provincial officials appointed by the government in Kabul gained greater authority'. This was not an easy task, because public administration was 'to a large extent' corrupt.[2] In addition, the PRT assisted the Afghan authorities with security during the elections, such as those for the presidency in October 2004 and those for the new parliament in September and November 2005.

In December 2004, a so-called 'civil assessment' took place on reconstruction in Baghlan. A team of CIMIC experts looked at how the Dutch PRT could make a meaningful contribution to the well-being of the province, again, not really a military task, but very important to the strategic objectives of the mission. It was decided to focus on structural assistance with agriculture, stock breeding and electricity supplies. Help from the PRT in these areas was thought to be fundamental to regional stability because they were directed towards the vital economic sectors in the area. The reconstruction plans for Baghlan thus went further than the normal mission-supporting CIMIC, the hearts and minds campaign that was, ofcourse, also part of this operation.

Ingrained into the peace-building concept of the PRT was the idea that establishing a sustainable society must be the team's primary aim. The PRT was pre-eminently an instrument for winning the peace, not the war. The PRTs in Afghanistan were thus unique in the sense that they entered the civil domain not only for the sake of the military mission, but as a mission in itself. Civil and military were inseparable and continually overlapped. The PRT's raison d'être lay in helping to build a centrally governed Afghan nation-state.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Taking over or supporting the civil administration in international crisis management operations gradually became an integral part of Dutch military operations in the post-Cold War era. It turned out to be inherent to the new generation of peace support operations that the military and the civil domains could not be strictly separated. The idea that

---

2   Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence and the Minister for Development Co-operation to the House of Representatives of the States-General, 3 June 2005; 27925 no. 177.

CIMIC had a limited role in only supporting the military mission increasingly proved to be outdated. In the everyday practice of peacekeeping this task went far beyond just carrying out 'hearts and minds projects'. In particular, having to bear responsibility for public order and security suddenly and without preparation in Kosovo in 1999 brought about a change of thinking. Kosovo was a turning point. The takeover of the tasks of public bodies by the military was no longer seen as undesirable 'mission creep', but as an inevitable aspect of international operations. It was finally realised (the military themselves were perhaps among the last and most reluctant to see this) that a certain (or even considerable) involvement in the civil domain was essential if the political and strategic objectives of such an operation were to be achieved.

This awareness was certainly heightened after the devastating terrorist attacks of 2001. The negative influence that unstable states could have on a global scale (as bases for criminals or terrorists, as agents of proliferation, or as threats to other interests) made finding solutions for these weak points in the international system a pressing concern. In Afghanistan, but also in Iraq, the emphasis was inevitable very much on post-conflict nation building process. Winning the peace in both cases was a greater challenge than winning the war. Withdrawal is no longer an option, involvement in the civil domain is. In the new situation crisis management becomes a long-term business. Post conflict military operations have come full circle: no security without reconstruction, and no reconstruction without security.

RESUMÉ

Arthur ten Cate: Dosiahnutie mieru. Holandské postkonfliktné vojenské operácie v Kosove a Afganistane

Postkonfliktné vojenské operácie sú veľmi zložité, dlhodobé a zamerané na civilnú oblasť. Budovanie mieru sa dosahuje hlavne prostredníctvom bezpečnosti, odzbrojenia a demobilizácie a reformou bezpečnostného sektora. Okrem toho sa tiež dosahuje nevojenskými opatreniami, ako je stimulácia rekonštrukcie a oprava infraštruktúry, podporovaním vzdelanosti a zdravotnej starostlivosti, zabezpečovaním dobrej vlády, výcvikom súdneho personálu a naštartovaním ekonomiky. Podporovanie alebo výmena civilných úradov sa teda stáva životne dôležitou súčasťou vojenskej misie.
Najnovšími príkladmi holandských ozbrojených síl vykonávajúcich tento typ ďalekosiahlych operácií na podporu mieru sú príspevky holandskej armády k misiám NATO v Kosove (1999 – 2000) a Afganistane (od 2001 až po súčasnosť). Z holandského pohľadu bol zásah NATO v Kosove významným zvratom. Tam sa civilné záležitosti definitívne stali súčasťou vojenskej misie. Holandská armáda, podobne ako zvyšok KFOR, vykonávala *de facto* kontrolu tejto oblasti udržiavaním verejného poriadku, ako aj bezpečnosti a tiež poskytovaním podpory pre humanitárnu pomoc, pre rekonštrukciu a obnovu právneho poriadku a verejnej správy.
Už od začiatku patrilo stráženie k najdôležitejším úlohám, ktorú vykonávali holandské ozbrojené sily v Kosove. Jeho účelom bolo zabezpečiť odzbrojenie, dobré zaobchádzanie s obyvateľstvom, zamedziť podpaľačstvu. Okrem toho sa mierové jednotky zaoberali lúpežami, krádežami, únosmi, rabovaním, ilegálnou ťažbou dreva a inými formami zločinu. Holandská jednotka tiež zriadila 'úrad na podávanie sťažností', kde mohli Kosovčania hlásiť všetky typy priestupkov alebo problémov. Zaoberala sa nielen súčasnými kriminálnymi aktivitami, ale aj obvineniami z porušovania ľudských práv Srbmi počas vojnových rokov 1998 – 1999. Okrem tejto policajnej práce holandské vojská zohrávali pomocnú úlohu v oblasti ve-

rejnej správy. Armáda, často po konzultáciách s organizáciami civilnej pomoci obnovila služby ako zber odpadu, zdravotná starostlivosť, hasenie požiaru a dodávky vody a energie.

O niekoľko rokov neskôr v Afganistane holandské ozbrojené sily rozšírili svoje operácie opäť na civilnú oblasť v snahe o podporu medzinárodného projektu výstavby v tejto krajine. V septembri 2004 Holandsko prevzalo velenie provinčného rekonštrukčného tímu (PRT) v provincii Baglan. Holandská armáda pomohla afganskej centrálnej vláde zvýšiť regionálnu stabilitu a zriadiť nové mocenské štruktúry. Podstatou tejto misie bolo podporovanie civilnej správy. PRT ako 'predná operačná základňa' stále slabej centrálnej vlády by malo byť vidieť, tvrdil prvý veliteľ, plukovník vzdušných síl J.A.H. van Hoof.

Holandská filozofia v Baglane bola taká, že provinčná rekonštrukcia by mala byť čo možno najviac ponechaná na samotných Afgancov a na nevládne organizácie. Holandské ozbrojené sily považovali PRT za *pomocný* orgán. Mal chrániť, pozorovať a podávať hlásenia, hodnotiť potreby, riadiť civilných účastníkov a robiť medzi nimi prostredníka a pomáhať tam, kde to je potrebné. Do koncepcie budovania mieru provinčným rekonštrukčným tímom bola hlboko zakorenená myšlienka, že primárnym cieľom družstva je zriadenie udržateľnej spoločnosti. PRT bol predovšetkým nástrojom na dosiahnutie mieru, nie vojny. Civilný sektor a armáda boli nedeliteľné a nepretržite sa prekrývali.

Prevzatie alebo podporovanie civilnej správy v medzinárodných operáciách krízového manažmentu, ako ukazuje príklad Kosova a Afganistanu, sa postupne stali integrálnou súčasťou holandských vojenských operácií v období po studenej vojne. Ukázalo sa, že pre novú generáciu operácií na podporu mieru je charakteristické, že oblasť armády a civilného sektora neoddeliteľne spolupracujú. Zvlášť to, že museli niesť zodpovednosť za verejný poriadok a bezpečnosť v Kosove v roku 1999, prinieslo zmenu myslenia. Toto uvedomenie sa určite zvýšilo po roku 2001. Negatívny vplyv, ktorý môžu mať nestabilné štáty v globálnom meradle, spôsobuje, že hľadanie riešení pre tieto 'slabé miesta' v medzinárodnom systéme je naliehavou potrebou. V post-talibanskom Afganistane bol dôraz do značnej miery kladený na postkonfliktný proces budovania krajiny. Dosiahnutie mieru sa stalo väčšou výzvou ako víťazstvo vo vojne. Postkonfliktné vojenské operácie sa preto dostali opäť na začiatok: niet bezpečnosti bez rekonštrukcie a niet rekonštrukcie bez bezpečnosti.

Rumanian Military Participation in the Process of Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Carmen Rîjnoveanu

The aim of my paper is to outline a general perspective on the role Rumanian Forces are playing in Afghanistan, on the main missions they are carrying out, the main forces involved, taking into account that the developments in this region are underway, and there is a huge endeavor to be made further on until the Afghan political leadership will be able to assume by itself the responsibilities of leading and managing the country without an outside military support.

BACKGROUND OF INVOLVEMENT- POLITICAL AND MILITARY DIMENSIONS

At political level, the decision regarding Rumanian Armed Forces effectively participation in the military campaign in Afghanistan has been taken by the Rumanian Parliament through Resolution no. 21 of September 19, 2001. This document stated that Rumania will participate as 'a *de facto* NATO's ally', along with the other NATO members, in the fight against international terrorism, by all means, including military ones. To this purpose, on NATO's request, Rumania would grant to the Alliance access to its airspace, airports, land and sea facilities as support for possible counter-terrorism operations.

At military level, starting with October 1, 2001, the Ministry of National Defense implemented a set of urgent measures aiming at providing appropriate support for the United States and NATO member states' actions within Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle operations. In this respect, the Ministry of National Defense issued authorization for over flight of the national air space, providing approval for the transit flight of US aircraft in medical evacuation and support missions, including troops and dangerous materials transportation.

Briefly, the main missions Rumanian Armed Forces performs in Afghanistan include two major dimensions: on one hand, the necessary support and military assistance pro-

vided to the US-led coalition forces in view of successful carrying out their anti-terrorist operations or other such type-like missions and to address the whole range of specific terrorist threats and risks or by offering any other assistance deemed necessary to help create a stable environment through participating in Enduring Freedom US-led Operation, and, on the other hand, operations aiming at providing assistance in maintaining security and stability in and around the capital city of Kabul, providing the necessary support for reconstruction and rebuilding the country as well as for developing viable Afghan security structures, humanitarian support, military assistance and support within specific programs, training and other such activities performed within ISAF NATO-led operation.

Rumania is also participating starting with 25th of July 2003 with one liaison officer within UN Assistance Mission (UNAMA).

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE

In line with the decisions taken in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Rumanian Parliament adopted the Resolution no. 38 of December 21, 2001 regarding Rumania's participation in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) within "FINGAL" Operation. In such a way, Rumania committed itself to contribute militarily to the whole effort assumed by the UN-led coalition in the process of stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Another important step has been made on January 10, 2002, when Rumania signed in London the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for building up the International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan. On January 29, 2002, the first Rumanian troops arrived in Kabul being deployed within Kabul Multinational Brigade.

On February 3, 2002, the practical military participation of Rumanian Armed Forces in the ISAF Operation has been started.

From the beginning it should be said that all Rumanian ISAF military personnel were especially selected from elite military units based on their individual experience and achievement while participating in peace support operations in the Balkans and Africa. Other selection criteria included physical, medical and psychological fitness as well as English language proficiency. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the military personnel is comprised solely of volunteers.

The forces are deployed for a six months mandate and they have to perform different kind of activities within ISAF's area of responsibility (in and around capital city of Kabul).

Now in ISAF VIII are deployed the following forces:
▶ a Military Police platoon (25 military) from the 1st Territorial Army Corp;
▶ six military at the posts allocated to Rumania in ISAF Command and in the Multinational Brigade Command in Camp Warehouse;
▶ 1 liaison officer in Karachi, Pakistan;
▶ 2 liaison officers in The Joint Headquarters from NORTHWOOD- PJHQ and in the Multinational Movement Control Center- NMMCC from HIGH WYCOMBE, England;

- ▶ 8 staff officers and a Military Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Detachment (30 military), all deployed in Kabul;
- ▶ a C-130 Hercules airplane (14 pilots and technicians);
- ▶ a medical team of three specialists deployed in Konduz;
- ▶ a mobile observer team of seven military located in Mazar- e- Sharif Province.

The Military Police Platoon, which works within Multinational Brigade Kabul in Camp Warehouse, fulfills a large range of tasks and missions aiming at imposing ISAF protection measures in Kabul and to maintain a secure environment in their area of responsibility. Among these missions, it could be identified the following: ensuring the security of ISAF objectives, patrol and traffic control, reconnaissance, escort of refugees as well as of military and civilian convoys, monitoring of criminal activities in Kabul and anti-terrorist control, protection to the civilians, official personnel, around the main buildings, search and recce tasks on different routes, VIP escort, etc.

A C-130 Hercules aircraft is used for providing transportation of the Military personnel, equipment and for humanitarian missions.

RECONSTRUCTION MISSIONS

One of the most important tasks assumed by the Rumanian troops are carrying out in the filed of reconstruction and rebuilding the country. Rumanian forces deployed in Afghan theater of operations took part in different projects of re-construction of provinces aiming at granting expertise for stimulating the process of re-construction and also increasing the influence of the Afghani central authorities outside the capital.

Such a mission was to participate in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), established, starting with December 2002, under the control of US-led coalition. This decision has been taken by the Rumanian Parliament on April 2003 when it was officially decided that Rumanian troops will take part in the process of establishing the first PRTs structures in Afghanistan.

Rumanian troops are deployed in two such Teams in northern Afghanistan, namely in Mazar-e-Sharif located in Balkh Province, under UK lead, and in Konduz under German led. Rumania participates in this endeavor with one liaison officer, a mobile team of observation and a medical team. The mobile team of observation has been deploying starting with August 12, 2004 in Mazar-e-Sharif, and is made of 7 military. Among the main tasks they have to perform, one could mentioned the following: to identify possible re-construction and humanitarian projects, to identify the needs of reconstruction, to monitor the improving of infrastructure as well as patrol, observation and rescue missions and activities of identification the main Afghan leaders from within their area of responsibility. The medical team has been deploying starting with November 1, 2004, in Konduz area and is made of 3 military. The main mission is to provide medical assistance within the respective PRT.

The Rumanian military participation increased further on, Parliament Decision no. 1/ March 2, 2004 allowing that other 9 troops to be deployed in supporting the Reconstruction Team from Kunduz area.

Rumania is fully committed to be engaged further in such structures and to contrib-

ute to this endeavor taking into account that, once NATO took over the ISAF mission (December 2003), within the plan of enlarging the mission outside the capital, new such structures have been already created and the establishing of new additional teams is underway.

MISSION OF ASSISTING THE ELECTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Another important mission in which the Rumanian Armed Forces took part within ISAF Operation was to provide assistance and support during the 2005 elections process organized in Afghanistan as Rumania stated during the meeting of defense ministers of NATO members states held in Brussels (June 9–10, 2005).

Accordingly, between August and November 2005, the 26th Infantry Battalion „Neagoe Basarab" of Craiova (nicknamed Red Scorpions) consisting of 400 troops, offered as a strategic reserve for NATO, was deployed to Afghanistan within ISAF VIII for three month within a NATO-led force in which took part also troops from other nine countries, mostly NATO members states. The Rumanian troops were selected from among volunteers and underwent a mission-tailored training program.

The Battalion and its subordinate company, the "US Dragon", worked witihn NATO-led ISAF mission in Camp Julien in Kabul. During their three months mandate Rumanian troops performed over 300 missions in both their area of responsibility (in the northern Afghanistan) and in the Kabul region in supporting the electoral process. About 200 troops were engaged daily in fulfilling these missions. They mainly consisted of patrol missions, force protection, personnel and convoy escort, perimeter security as well patrol missions in the northern region of ISAF area of responsibility. They also performed rapid reaction force actions with self support for a limited number of days with sub-units as platoons/companies and peacekeeping missions together with the Multinational Brigade in Kabul area.

ENDURING FREEDOM OPERATION

As a brief outline on the Rumanian contribution within Enduring
Freedom US-led operation it should be said that Rumanian Armed Forces' practical involvement in the Enduring Freedom Operation started on June 25, 2002 in accordance with Parliament's approval issued on April 30, 2002.

Currently, the main forces involved consist of:
► one Infantry Battalion made of 405 military;
► ten staff officers in the Joint Multinational Command in Bagram;
► 46 military within ANA Training Detachment;
► a National Support Element (NSE) located in Kandahar area. The NSE has been created in 2004 as an 'interface'/an operational contact point between national forces deployed in Afghanistan and the logistic structures from Rumania. This is a small structure. 'The Command Center' is made of three military and it is completed with other five specialist officers and with one NCOs from the Infantry Battalion deployed within the Operation according to the rotation principle.

As about the Infantry Battalion, this is located in Kandahar being assigned to perform different kind of missions: to guard and secure Kandahar Airport, to patrol and control the main roads and ways of communications, to provide security to various logistic operations, to provide humanitarian support to Afghan population and medical assistance, to perform CIMIC projects as well as to conduct combat missions, independent or within different groups, as established by order of the multinational force commander.

At present, Rumania is represented within this operation with the 341st Infantry Battalion "White Sharks" (Rechinii Albi) from Topraisar which has been deployed starting with January 17, 2006 within Multinational Brigade "AEGIS" under Canadian command. In the first month of deployment, the 341 Infantry Battalion performed about 180 missions including patrol and traffic control, protection of Afghani local authorities from Dand and Daman, from within their area of responsibility.

TRAINING AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY MISSION

In 2003 Rumanian authorities decided to extend the national military contribution through taking over new kind of missions in Afghanistan. Therefore, on May 7, 2003, Rumanian Parliament approved the Decision no. 12 regarding Rumanian participation in training Afghani National Armed Forces (ANA Training), an US-led project developed within Enduring Freedom Operation. In accordance with the Parliament decision, Rumania participates in this mission with a Detachment of 46 officers and NCOs deployed in Kabul for taking part in programs of endowment and training, management of donations, recruiting and training of forces, inspection and maintenance of equipment and armament. Rumanian troops which work within ANA Training Detachment are organized on training mobile teams (infantry, tanks and maintenance) and are part of RO-MTT Team, based in Camp Phoenix – Kabul and of RO-ETT Team based in Camp Black Horse–Gardez. Their main mission is to train Afghani soldiers in different military specialties such as infantry, recce, tank, communications or logistics as well as to develop leadership and the qualities expected for professional soldiers. They also planned and delivered humanitarian relief granted by the Rumanian Government to the Islamic Transition Government of Afghanistan. This participation has been supplemented with other 9 troops based on the Decision no. 1 approved by the Rumanian Parliament in March 2004.

Since May 2003, Rumanian troops have been constantly participating in ANA Training, now being underway the 5th troops rotation within that mission.

THE WAY AHEAD

Currently, there are 920 troops deployed in the theater of operations in Afghanistan, 441 of which work within Operation Enduring Freedom, 478 troops within ISAF and one liaison officer within UN Assistance Mission (UNAMA).

During the meeting of ministers of defense from NATO member states taking place in Taormina (Italy) early on February, Rumanian minister of defense stated that during this

year, a part of the troops acting currently within Enduring Freedom Operation will come under NATO command, within International Security Assistance Force.

Moreover, based on the commitment assumed by the Rumanian leadership, early this year new forces have been deployed.

Since February 2006, 233 Rumanian troops of the SEEBRIG command and two support units have been deployed in ISAF mission for six months based on the agreement signed in Washington on December 6, 2006. The Brigade command has 101 position, 18 of which are assigned to Rumania. Rumanian participates with a staff company (125 troops) and a communication one (90 troops plus 30 Turkish troops). During its mission in Afghanistan, the Brigade acts under UN mandate and NATO operational command, under the name Kabul Multinational Brigade IX (KMNB IX).

Starting with the 1st of April 2006, Rumanian Air Forces took over the responsibility of providing security of Kabul Airport from Afghanistan for a four months period. Therefore, a new Detachment made of 39 troops has been deployed within this area being assign to fulfill air traffic control missions, to monitor air activities, to provide support to different other logistic operations.

For the next period, according to the new action plan launched in London (*Afghanistan Compact*) at the beginning of this year, Rumanian troops are scheduled to remain in Afghanistan till 2010, along with the other allies, but no timetable for withdrawal has been settled. Moreover, Rumanian is committed to be involved further on in the activities performed within both Operations and to augment its contribution to the process of extending the ISAF across the whole of Afghanistan. Country's political leadership underlined that Rumania will maintain further on its involvement in both theaters of operations (Afghanistan and Iraq), as long as the Afghan government as well as the Iraqi one will consider that presence as necessary.

RESUMÉ

Carmen Rîjnoveanu: Vojenské zapojenie Rumunska do procesu stabilizácie a rekonštrukcie v Afganistane

Cieľom môjho príspevku je načrtnúť hlavnú perspektívu úlohy, ktorú ruménske sily zohrávajú v Afganistane, hlavné misie, ktoré uskutočňujú, ako aj hlavné sily, ktoré tu pracujú, zohľadňujúc fakt, že v tomto regióne prebieha vývoj a že je tu mohutná snaha o to, aby afganské politické vedenie bolo schopné prevziať na seba povinnosti vedenia a riadenia krajiny bez vonkajšej vojenskej podpory na území.
Hlavné misie rumunských ozbrojených síl v Afganistane majú dve kľúčové dimenzie: na jednej strane potrebnú podporu a vojenskú pomoc poskytovanú koaličnými silami pod vedením USA – z hľadiska úspešného uskutočňovania ich protiteroristických operácií alebo podobných misií iného typu prostredníctvom účasti na operácii Trvalá sloboda pod ich vedením. Na druhej strane operácie zamerané na poskytovanie pomoci pri udržiavaní bezpečnosti a stability v hlavnom meste Kabule a jeho okolí, poskytujúc potrebnú podporu pre rekonštrukciu a znovuvybudovanie krajiny, ako aj pre rozvoj životne dôležitých afganských bezpečnostných štruktúr, humanitárnu podporu, vojenskú pomoc a iné podobné aktivity uskutočňované v rámci operácie ISAF pod vedením NATO.
Úsilie Rumunska pri podpore takýchto operácií je jednak presvedčivým dôkazom toho, že sa chce stať dôležitou súčasťou tohto globálneho procesu, pretože každá moderná armáda musí byť schopná reagovať

na všetky výzvy, ktorým čelí medzinárodná aréna, ako aj potvrdenie rumunskej voľby morálnych a demokratických hodnôt, na ktorých by mala byť založená svetová civilizácia.

V budúcnosti podľa nového akčného plánu, nazvaného celistvý Afganistan (Afghanistan Compact), rozbehnutého v Londýne začiatkom roka 2006, majú rumunské sily zostať v Afganistane do roku 2010, spolu s ostatnými spojencami, ale zatiaľ sa neriešil nijaký plán odsunu. Okrem toho sa Rumunsko zaviazalo, že sa bude ďalej zapájať do aktivít uskutočňovaných v rámci obidvoch operácií a že zvýši svoj príspevok do procesu rozširovania ISAF po celom Afganistane. Politické vedenie krajiny zdôraznilo, že Rumunsko si naďalej udrží svoju účasť v obidvoch priestoroch operácií (Afganistan a Irak), až dovtedy, kým afganská, ako aj iracká vláda bude považovať túto prítomnosť za potrebnú.

Defeating Saddam, Neglecting Diplomacy:
Iraq, April 2003

Maj. William Shane Story

As American ground forces prepared to seize Baghdad International Airport on April 3, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell held talks with European foreign ministers and laid out key principles that would guide future operations in Iraq. According to Powell, military commanders would assert military authority and would be responsible for stability and security. Further, the United States would work with the United Nations in brokering new international agreements for reconstructing and rebuilding Iraq.[1] After Baghdad fell, however, military press officers downplayed disorder, denied that Iraq was under occupation, and said American forces would not police the country.[2] By omission, key officials also dismissed the importance of working with the United Nations and using diplomacy to resolve the conflict.[3] The clash between Powell's sober views and the Pentagon's practices illustrates the importance of three closely related questions: Why was diplomacy at the heart of the conflict? Why did the Pentagon neglect diplomacy after Baghdad fell? And, why was the failure to return to diplomacy such an egregious mistake? The evidence suggests that military action created an opportunity and a need for a diplomatic breakthrough that the United States failed to grasp.

The conflict in Iraq was rooted in a diplomatic impasse. The impasse began, paradoxi-

---

1   News conference by US Secretary of State Colin Powell (3 April 2003),
    http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2003/04-natohq/0304-hq.htm
2   U.S. Central Command, Transcript of 4/11 CentCom Briefing (11 April 2003),
    http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030411-centcom01.htm
3   Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with NBC Meet the Press (13 April 2003), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030413-secdef0103.html; onathan Weisman and Mike Allen, "Officials Argue for Fast U.S. Exit from Iraq," Washington Post (21 April 2003), A1; Glenn Kessler, "State-Defense Policy Rivalry Intensifying; Gingrich to Urge Overhaul of Powell's Department," Washington Post (22 April 2003), A1; Eric Schmitt, "Rumsfeld Says U.S. Will Cut Forces in Gulf," New York Times (29 April 2003), A19.

cally, in one of the United Nations Security Council's rare displays of unity. In 1990, the Security Council condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and imposed sanctions on Iraq.[4] After the liberation of Kuwait, the Security Council demanded that Iraq dismantle its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs as a precondition for lifting sanctions.[5] However, while some viewed the sanctions as a temporary tool to enforce the ceasefire, the United States tried to use the sanctions to force Saddam Hussein from power. Nonetheless, Saddam survived, and a standoff developed between members who wanted to topple the regime and those who wanted to end Iraq's isolation. Council member's veto power over new resolutions insured that the sanctions and the impasse would continue indefinitely.[6]

The standoff in the Security Council was particularly frustrating because neither sanctions nor weapons inspections seemed to have their intended effects. By most accounts, Saddam defied many of his ceasefire obligations and hid key elements of his weapons programs. Occasional crises convinced the United States that Saddam was a continuing threat. At the same time, sanctions ruined Iraq's economy, impoverished the middle class, and fostered corruption. Beginning in 1995, the Oil for Food program eased the effects of sanctions but strengthened the regime's control through rationing. Military containment countered Iraqi threats, but endless crises eroded Iraqi civil society; Iraq devolved into a prison-state, with Saddam as its despotic warden. This situation heaped misery on a bankrupt and isolated society at the heart of an important region. Further, containment drained American military resources and offended public perceptions around the world. Nonetheless, the impasse continued. Seeing Hussein's regime as the cause of Iraq's problems, the United States insisted on regime change; viewing Hussein as a symptom of Iraq's problems, others wanted to lift sanctions and deal with Hussein openly. Iraq became a Gordian knot.

After conducting operations in Afghanistan in 2001, the United States initiated military preparations and diplomatic initiatives designed to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Governments around the world re-assessed their positions and made difficult calculations regarding their national interests. The Security Council united again in an effort to disarm Iraq, but remained divided on removing the regime. American military preparations and diplomacy proceeded in a tense balance because the United States was trying to build international pressure on Saddam without triggering a backlash. For the Pentagon, this meant that the military could not prepare a deliberate attack. Instead, Secretary Rumsfeld tried to calibrate force deployments amidst rising international tensions in an effort to control the crisis.

The gradual escalation of the crisis continued through President Bush's March 17 ultimatum and a Pentagon press briefing that forecast an unprecedented bombing campaign—dubbed "Shock and Awe"—of such scale and intensity that it would topple the

---

4   UN Security Council Resolutions 660 and 661 (2 and 6 August 1990), http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm

5   UN Security Council Resolution 687 (3 April 1991), http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm

6   For a concise examination of the complexities surrounding Iraq policy in the 1990s, see Stephen C. Pelletiere's *Managing Strains in the Coalition: What to do about Saddam?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996).

regime before Saddam could mount an effective defense. Unable to resolve the crisis through diplomacy, the United States would resort to military action. The military campaign began hesitantly. Before dawn on March 20, a few bombs and missiles struck a building in Baghdad. As smoke billowed from the building, military press officers, confused about what happened, avoided reporters. Rumors spread that the United States had launched a quick strike on Saddam Hussein's suspected location, that Saddam was dead or injured, and that the invasion might not be necessary. Iraq retaliated by launching a few missiles against coalition forces in Kuwait. That evening, coalition ground forces entered Iraq, and extensive air strikes targeted the regime.

On March 21, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the foremost exponent of American policy since 2001, explained that the coalition was mesmerizing Iraqi officials, and paralyzing the regime. Iraqi officials "are beginning to realize," Rumsfeld continued, "that the regime is history. And as that realization sets in, their behavior is likely to begin to tip and to change."[7] With those few words, Rumsfeld introduced an imagery of Saddam's regime as a dead weight crushing freedom in Iraq. Coalition forces—comprising at the time U.S., British, Australian, and Polish units—were a lever prying up this dead weight, gradually tipping it over. Once the mass passed through the critical "tipping point," Iraqis would turn on Saddam, add their strength to the coalition's power, and topple the regime.[8]

As the invasion continued, Rumsfeld discounted criticism and described the strategic situation as approaching the tipping point, such as when lost convoys, sandstorms, and supply shortages led to tactical setbacks. Critics claimed the invasion plan was faulty. Rumsfeld countered that the regime was going to tip over because "Saddam Hussein is through, and there will be a different government in that country."[9] By late March, critics were predicting a long, bloody battle for Baghdad. Rumsfeld, however, remained confident that the regime would tip just as dictatorships had tumbled across Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War.[10]

Criticism waned when U.S. forces captured Baghdad International Airport, and an American armored task force rampaged through Baghdad's western suburbs. The Second Brigade of the Third Infantry Division blasted its way to the Republican Palace in downtown Baghdad. As more troops and tanks entered Baghdad, the regime collapsed, its leaders fleeing. Seeing crowds celebrating in Firdos Square on April 9, Rumsfeld thought that Iraq was "in fact, tipping."[11] Rumsfeld's critics suddenly seemed naïve and uninformed. Crowing, Rumsfeld quoted a note he received from a Washington humorist

---

7   DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers (21 March 2003),
    http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t03212003_t0321sd1.html

8   "Special Report: Pentagon Admits Highest Hopes for Iraq War Have Not Been Met," *NPR News Special Coverage* (21 March 2003).

9   DoD News Transcript – Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Tim Russert, NBC Meet the Press (23 march 2003),
    http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t03232003_t0323nbc.html

10 DoD News Transcript – Secretary Rumsfeld Remarks on Fox News Sunday with Tony Snow (30 March 2003),
    http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t03302003_t0330sdfox.html.

11 DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, (9 April 2003),
    http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030409-secdef0084.html

paraphrasing Winston Churchill, "Never have so many been so wrong about so much!"[12] Rumsfeld treated the conquest of Baghdad as an opportunity to change the Pentagon. The Pentagon quickly began withdrawing troops from Iraq, pulling forces out of the region, demobilizing reservists, and planning major force shifts in Europe.[13] Analysts lauded Rumsfeld's vindication and his plans for future defense priorities and the world.[14] Military action—it seemed—had finally resolved a crisis that diplomatic niceties had failed to resolve for years. The Pentagon focused on transforming the American military.

The dominant view of the invasion, however, as a vindication of the Pentagon's irresistible firepower, ignored critical realities. One was that even irresistible firepower could not overcome all opposition without a lot more killing. The other reality was that when the shooting did stop, coalition forces encountered innumerable difficulties among Iraqi civilians for which they were not prepared, and the solutions required diplomacy. These realities emerged from the first days of the invasion, from the first moments that coalition troops began dealing with civilians amidst chaotic battlefields strewn with arms, unexploded ordinance, and endless weapons caches. Coalition forces took the port city of Umm Qasr early in the invasion because its docks and railhead were an important transportation hub for humanitarian and military shipments. In addition, the coalition wanted recovery operations in Umm Qasr to spark recovery throughout Iraq. The coalition also wanted the media to see Umm Qasr as a liberated city full of grateful Iraqis, both to encourage other Iraqis to turn against Saddam and to counter international opposition to the invasion.

The coalition was overoptimistic that the world would see Umm Qasr as a liberated city. The potential was there, but the invasion's fast-paced, crisis management tempo demanded immediate results, and Umm Qasr could not deliver. When British forces took Umm Qasr, they discovered a frustratingly interconnected set of problems that defied quick solutions.[15] Rather than liberation, reporters described scenes of "mangy dogs and wretchedly poor families," and mobs looting buildings and markets amidst chaos.[16] The troops brought humanitarian supplies for the population, but it was a pittance for the burgeoning number of civilians clamoring for food, water, and electricity. Adequate relief depended on putting the port into operation, but harassing fire and snipers forced troops to remain on the lookout while clearing mines and unexploded ordnance, and the ports facilities were in shambles due to the sanctions and looting.[17] Though grateful

---

12 Vernon Loeb, "Rumsfeld Assails War Critics and Praises the Troops," *The Washington Post* (29 April 2003), A11.

13 Eric Schmitt, "Rumsfeld Says U.S. Will Cut Forces in Gulf," *New York Times* (29 April 2003), A19; Esther Schrader, "U.S. Expedites Reshuffling of Europe Troops," *Los Angeles Times* (1 May 2003), A1; Dave Moniz and John Diamond, "Rumsfeld is perched at 'pinnacle of power'," *USA Today* (1 May 2003), A10.

14 Victor Davis Hanson, "Don Rumsfeld, radical for our time," *National Review* (5 May 2003), p. 31; Peter Boyer, "The New War Machine: A Reporter at Large," *The New Yorker* (30 June 2003), p. 55.

15 "Coalition forces near Basra," CBC News (22 March 2003), http://www.cbc.ca/stories/03/21/umm_qasr030321; Victor Mallet, "Ominous Signs for Coalition in Battle for Umm Qasr," Common Dreams News Center (23 March 2003). http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0323-01.htm

16 The quote pertains to a nearby village, Safwan, but corresponds to accounts of the situation in Umm Qasr as well. See Geoffrey Mohan and Tony Perry, "Convoys Rumble on at an Unyielding Pace," *Los Angeles Times* (22 March 2003), A1.

17 "Coalition Forces Secure Umm Qasr," *Online Newshour* (25 March 2003). http://www.pbs.org/newshour/up-

to be rid of Saddam, Iraqis distrusted the coalition's motives and feared a Ba'athist resurgence.[18] The docks were not ready to receive large cargo ships, most of the wharves remained closed, there were no skilled workers, and there was no electricity to run the machinery. Critical shortages worsened as criminals stole relief supplies to sell on the black market.[19]

Military planners expected stabilization to be difficult. They understood that the administration did not want to occupy Iraq and that the coalition did not have enough troops to secure the country. Therefore, they emphasized the importance of stabilizing Iraq quickly through international cooperation and relief efforts spearheaded by nongovernmental and international organizations like the World Food Program, UNICEF, and Save the Children. These groups had years of experience working in Iraq under the auspices of the Oil for Food program. [20] Planners hoped that humanitarian relief would promote stability, and that stability would ease security problems.

The plan to have international organizations spearhead Iraqi relief ran into significant problems, including a lack of resources and security policy. Resources were a problem because the United States had not set aside millions of dollars for humanitarian relief in Iraq. Instead, the United States wanted to use Iraqi funds held by the United Nations from the Oil for Food program to feed Iraqis.[21] Security was a problem because relief organizations relied on a United Nation's Security Coordinator to conduct a security assessment of the area and report the findings to the Security Council; only when the council deemed the area safe would they begin relief operations. Thus, the military's plan to stabilize Umm Qasr—and all of Iraq—depended on gaining resources and authorizations from the Security Council. The conflict has come full circle. Frustration with the diplomatic impasse led the United States to resort to military action to remove the problem: Saddam Hussein. However, as coalition forces took over various areas in Iraq from the regime, the coalition had to go back to the Security Council to ask for help with stabilization, and they again faced the same impasse.

In early April, the deteriorating situation in Umm Qasr—including appalling water shortages—underscored the importance of building a consensus in the Security Council in order to speed international relief efforts.[22] Instead of building a consensus, however, American officials insisted the coalition would control the stabilization mission while other council members insisted the coalition defer to the Security Council.[23] However, as

dates/umm_qasr_03–25–03.html

18 Tim Butcher, "This is no cakewalk; this is war," *The Spectator* (29 March 2003), 12.

19 David S. Cloud, "Struggle to Open Key Iraqi Port May Put Most Aid Weeks Away," *Wall Street Journal* (1 April 2003), A1; Yaroslav Trofimov, "In Iraqi Port City, Looters and Bandits Meet Little Resistance," *Wall Street Journal* (3 April 2003), A1.

20 "Coalition Forces Secure Umm Qasr," *Online Newshour* (25 March 2003). http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/umm_qasr_03-25-03.html

21 Colum Lynch and Kenneth Bredemeier, "U.S. Hits Snag in U.N. on Aid for Iraq," *Washington Post* (26 March 2003), A29.

22 Patrick Nicholson, "Umm Qasr aid effort 'a shambles,'" *BBC News* (4 April 2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2915091.stm

23 Susan B. Glasser and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Reconstruction Planners Worry, Wait and Reevaluate," *Washington Post* (2 April 2003), A1; David E. Sanger and John Tagliabue, "Bush Aide Says U.S., Not U.N., Will Rebuild Iraq," *New York Times* (5 April 2003), B1; Marcella Bombardieri, "Relief Organizations Struggle to Aid an Un-

M1 Abrams tanks thundered into Baghdad to shatter the regime, arguments about stabilization must have seemed like inconsequential diplomatic bickering.

CONCLUSION

One of the greatest challenges in comprehending the invasion of Iraq is reconciling how a brilliant military campaign led to such a difficult occupation. Many of the answers to that question have to be found in Iraq itself, the failings of Saddam's regime and the many divisions within Iraqi society. Some of the answers demonstrate all the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. armed forces. Institutional reasons aside, however, there are moments when individuals and policy choices make a difference.

In the latter half of April 2003, American officials enjoyed their greatest single opportunity to shape the future of Iraq. Saddam's fall placed the United States in a temporary position of strength vis-à-vis Iraqi affairs. Iraqis were ready for new leadership, and were prepared to tolerate a brief occupation. Around the world, governments that had vehemently opposed the invasion worried what would become of their loans to and contracts with Iraq, and openly signaled their readiness to forget past frictions with the United States. At the same time, in Iraq, long, overstretched supply lines exposed American forces' vulnerabilities. American units lacked the resources secure and to stabilize their areas of responsibility, a problem made worse by the daunting linguistic and cultural barriers separating them from the civilian population. The situation called for a diplomatic breakthrough, but the Pentagon's priorities did not include diplomacy. Instead, the Pentagon was determined to withdraw troops as quickly as possible and to minimize the American commitment to Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld's priority was transforming the military to make it leaner, faster, and lighter, able to track down terrorists and take out rogue regimes on short notice. Nimble ferocity, however, demands an equally agile diplomacy, an ability to build alliances and sooth bruised egos. Iraq's huge needs demonstrated that international cooperation was mandatory if stabilization was to succeed. Policymakers, however, dismissed signs of instability as baseless criticism of liberation.

It seems incomprehensible that policy makers prioritized troop withdrawals and military transformation over stabilization and diplomacy. In most recent conflicts, the United States has emphasized diplomatic agreements to legitimize military action, build broad coalitions, and set up some framework for resolving conflicts and for supporting the sovereign rights and powers of concerned governments. These agreements spread the burden associated with peacekeeping and dampened conflicts through international cooperation. On the other hand, these agreements forced the United States to commit troops to costly, frustrating, and seemingly interminable peacekeeping missions, often derided in American election campaigns as 'nation-building.' Apparently, the Pentagon's aversion to nation building and confidence that Iraqis required little foreign assistance led it to eschew diplomacy in favor of withdrawal.

---

stable Southern Iraq," *Boston Globe* (6 April 2003), A32; Edward Walsh and Peter Slevin, "U.N. Role in Postwar Government Debated; White House Claims Authority on Rebuilding," *Washington Post* (7 April 2003), A24.

In early May 2003, however, the American project entered a hiatus as the White House named Ambassador Paul Bremer to lay out a new course for stability in Iraq. The Security Council lifted sanctions, recognized the United States and Britain as occupying powers, urged other states to help, and created a "Special Representative" to work with Iraqis and Bremer in some muddled fashion to form a new government.[24] Bremer reversed American officials' previous efforts to create a new order based on reconciliation, choosing instead to purge the Ba'athists, refuse demands for elections, and assert total control. Troop withdrawals came to halt, and the Pentagon's plans to transform the force became an on-going effort to sustain an unplanned occupation. Diplomacy became harder as Iraqis' increasingly gave up on American oversight and other countries grew wary of the mission. The United States had to return to cold steel because it had not emphasized diplomacy when the iron was hot.

RESUMÉ

Wiliam Shane Story: Porazený Saddám. Neoficiálna diplomacia: Irak, apríl 2003

Jednou z najväčších výziev rozsiahlej vojenskej operácie v Iraku je zmieriť sa s tým, ako viedlo významné vojenské ťaženie k takému komplikovanému vojenskému obsadeniu. Mnohé odpovede na túto otázku treba hľadať v Iraku samom, nedostatkoch Saddámovho diktátorského režimu a mnohých rozdieloch vo vnútri spoločnosti. Niektoré z odpovedí demonštrujú silu a slabosť ozbrojených síl USA. Popri oficiálnych príčinách tu však vidíme aj také momenty, keď záujem jednotlivcov je iný ako záujem politiky.

V druhej polovici apríla 2003 sa americká administratíva tešila skvelej príležitosti formovať budúcnosť Iraku. Zvrhnutie Saddáma uvoľnilo Spojeným štátom dočasnú pozíciu sily vis-a-vis voči Iraku. Iračania boli pripravení na nové vedenie a boli pripravení tolerovať krátke obsadenie. Vlády okolitého sveta, ktoré boli vehementne v opozícii voči invázii, obávajúc sa, čo sa stane s ich pôžičkami a kontraktmi s Irakom, otvorene signalizovali svoju pripravenosť zabudnúť na bývalé trenice s USA. Stále sa zvyšujúci počet ozbrojených síl v Iraku na podporu zabezpečenia poriadku vystavoval aj americké sily väčšej zraniteľnosti. Americké jednotky postrádali prostriedky logistického zabezpečenia na stabilizovanie zóny, za ktorú boli zodpovedné. Problém eskaloval vzhľadom na neprekonateľné jazykové a kultúrne bariéry, ktoré vojakov invázej armády oddeľovali od civilného obyvateľstva.

Situácia volala po diplomatickom ukončení, ale priority Pentagonu nerátali s diplomatickým riešením. Namiesto toho bol Pentagon odhodlaný stiahnuť čo najrýchlejšie svoje jednotky a minimalizovať záväzok voči Iraku. Prioritou amerického ministra obrany Donalda Rumsfelda bolo transformovať armádu s cieľom spoľahlivejšieho, rýchlejšieho a pohotovejšieho vystopovania teroristov a eliminácie diktátorského režimu v čo najkratšom čase.

Zdá sa nepochopiteľné, že tvorcovia vtedajšej americkej zahraničnej politiky uprednostňovali stiahnutie svojich jednotiek a vojenskú transformáciu pred stabilizáciou a diplomatickým riešením. V nedávnych konfliktoch Spojené štáty americké zdôrazňovali diplomatické dohody na legitimizáciu vojenských akcií s cieľom riešiť konflikty a podporiť suverénne práva vlád zainteresovaných krajín.

---

24 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (22 May 2003), http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N03/368/53/PDF/N0336853.pdf

British Forces and Stabilisation in Iraq:
May to December 2003

Tabitha Swann

I am very pleased to be here today to present this paper on British Forces and Stabilisation in Iraq to my fellow PfP historians.

I plan to give a brief overview of the planning and actions of the British forces in the immediate aftermath of the war-fighting phase of TELIC. As this is history of the recent past, just under 3 years ago, I have not included any lessons for this phase. Nor, although this period saw significant political developments – the appointment and arrival in country of the first British ambassador to Iraq since 1991, UNSC resolutions on interim arrangements/ sovereignty of Iraq – have I included specific reference to these.

Looking at the topics listed on the call for papers – peacekeeping, military aspects of reconstruction, counter-insurgency ops – it was difficult to select just one of these to sum up the British military operations in Iraq during this period. By December 2003, troops of the British-led Multinational Division South-East (MND(SE)) were carrying out all three of these tasks to greater or lesser degrees, although it is open to question whether they themselves would have consciously divided up their tasks so starkly. The military have an impressive ability to focus on one particular goal, whilst, at the same time, multi-tasking to achieve that goal. In the Iraq post-conflict period under review, that goal was stability and eventually peacekeeping, reconstruction and counter-insurgency ops were all subsumed within the military's attempt to achieve this.

Background to Post-Conflict Stabilisation

In early 2003, diplomatic efforts were concentrated on the possibility of avoiding conflict in Iraq. In the background, however, the military had to plan for potential offensive action. These plans naturally included post-conflict ops.

CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) played an important part in this. I recently read a good definition of CIMIC in an article by Lt Col James Howard, a commanding officer of the British Army Civil Affairs Group. He wrote:

"The role of CIMIC staff is to ensure that the civil dimension of an operation is recognised within the military one and the aim is for military and civil actions to both contribute to what is likely to be the ultimate creation of peace and stability."[1]

CIMIC is not a new concept, but, over the years, it has become increasingly recognised for the unique contribution it can make to military planning, both in pre and post-ops phases and during the war-fighting phase itself. TELIC is no exception and CIMIC input was (and is) an integral part of the military's actions in Iraq.

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

In the pre-conflict stage, a main focus of military planning for the post-conflict situation was humanitarian relief. Work was undertaken to ensure that, should a humanitarian crisis be sparked despite the coalition's best efforts (and by this was envisaged large-scale displacement, with all the resulting demands of a refugee crisis), the military would be on hand to provide food, water and shelter. Although advice was taken from International Relief Organisations and NGOs when studying scenarios, it was uncertain pre-conflict how far the security situation would allow civilian organisations to work in Iraq in the period following the end of hostilities. If they were not able to do so safely, the military had to be prepared to organise and supply the necessary support themselves.

POLITICAL GOALS

Whilst the military were making their plans, politicians were thinking about a political framework for the future of Iraq. On 17 March, three days before the start of the war-fighting phase of TELIC, the British Prime Minister delivered his statement "Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People" to the Azores Summit. Obtaining stability was an integral part of this vision, the first stage in a move toward an independent and democratic Iraq. This vision also informed military planning.

First Stage: Small Scale Humanitarian Relief, Prevention of Crisis

On 1 May, US President George Bush declared "major combat operations in Iraq have ended…And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country".

In the British sector, the reality of the conditions on the ground meant that the large-scale humanitarian relief provisionally planned by the military was not necessary, although some direct relief was provided by British forces – as it had been during the pre-

---

1   'Civil-Military cooperation: the key to regeneration', Lt Col James Howard, ICE Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Civil Engineering Special Issue, May 2004, Vol 157, Special Issue One, pps 6–11, paper 13621.

vious month. The military were free to switch their focus from immediate large-scale humanitarian relief to the longer-term question of stability.

Stabilisation

The two fundamental elements of stability in any region are the provision of essential services (food and water, ensuring the supply of electricity and gas etc) and the maintenance of security. In Iraq this was no different and these are what the military prioritised.

One humanitarian crisis had been avoided, but with the summer months coming up and many Iraqi services running at less than full capacity (esp. water, sanitation and power) the military had to work fast to address these issues. An element of this involved emergency measures to prevent important systems collapsing, but the military also became involved in efforts to improve existing public services – Infrastructure Regeneration (health, education, sanitation facilities, water-treatment plants). Some of these had not been fully effective under the old regime (due to mal-administration, effect of sanctions), others had suffered due to the loss of central direction from Baghdad and other facilities had lost their workforce, with employees unwilling to return to work and be seen as 'assisting' coalition forces.

The main focus was always on improving the lives of ordinary Iraqis and this was as true of the security aspect as of essential services. By late August, a distinction was being made between civil unrest by 'people frustrated with the apparent lack of progress made in reconstruction' and 'terrorist activity', which targeted the coalition forces and Iraqi people alike.[2] There is much to say – and much has been written – on the rise of counter-insurgency ops in Iraq (the majority of which were not centred in the British Area of Operations), but this overview will concentrate on the first type of security ops – to overcome the negative effects of civil unrest.

During this period, the military had to become involved with the provision of essential services and the promotion of security to a significant degree. Given the level of destruction of the old Iraqi regime, there was no question of simply providing advice and a temporary umbrella structure on top of existing facilities, shortly to turn this over to local and central government representatives. However, in spite of their high level of involvement in these issues, the military always made an effort to cooperate with locals wherever possible, as they did with NGOs and other international organisations.

QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS

The British were keen to promote a positive image of the military to the Iraqi people. One way the military tried to achieve this, whilst at the same time contributing to their ultimate aim of stability, was the Quick Impact Project (QIP), which had been used to great effect in Afghanistan.

£10 million had been authorised to fund QIPs in Iraq and by the end of October,

---

2   Press Briefing by Brigadier Brealey. 21 August 2003.

around 620 projects had been carried out or were being planned – including over 200 in the education sector and over 50 in the health sector.

All the work carried out under QIPs provided discernible benefits for Iraqis. However, they were also of importance for the British military. QIPs were usually small projects designed to have a positive impact on how the civilian population viewed the military. The British troops needed this good-will if they were to succeed in promoting stability in the region.

Security and Essential Services

Unhappiness with conditions in the British sector was often expressed with outbreaks of civil unrest and this had an effect on the security of the region as a whole. Civil unrest could mean riots, necessitating action to control and subdue the population, as on 10 August when riots occurred in Basrah due to shortages of fuel and power – in this instance, the military also took immediate action to deliver 25 million litres of fuel to Basrah, with further supplies ordered, and their efforts to repair the electrical power supply were stepped up – or, alternatively, acts of sabotage and petty theft. Frustration at the slow pace of reconstruction efforts, as opposed the presence of the troops themselves, was often behind these outbursts.

In May 2003, a number of emergency measures, designed to meet the immediate need of the Iraqi population with regards essential services, were implemented by the military: A reverse osmosis water purification system was set up in the former Presidential palace complex in Basrah to boost the supply of fresh water to the city, troops oversaw the movement of food stocks to Umm Qasr by rail and fuel deliveries for civilian use were organised. These measures, along with the infrastructure regeneration that was to come, were often hampered by sabotage, looting and the actions of organised criminals.

THESE THREE PHOTOS BEST ILLUSTRATE THE POINT:

This is what the military aimed at – here Royal Engineers cooperate with electrical power maintenance workers to assess repairs to power lines.

This is what they often had to deal with – here water pours from pipes riddled with gunfire by Iraqis seeking to cool off in the hot weather.

Or this: –

Oil tankers impounded by British forces in Basrah, having been used for oil smuggling.

The time it took to deal with acts of sabotage and theft took resources away from other areas. In the case of the water pipes, specialist engineers from the British Army had to coordinate urgent repair work to ensure that the majority of the population did not go short of water.

Added to this, during this post-conflict phase, the level of organised crime increased. The photo of the oil tankers illustrates the level of the fuel smuggling that damaged the economy and prevented sufficient supplies from reaching the local community. Metal theft was also rife. At the end of August it was announced that an estimated $1.7 mil-

lion dollars of copper had been looted and 2500 tons of oil smuggled each week since the end of the war.[3]

Metal theft ranged from the fairly small:

Soldiers empty a shed of stolen metalwork – The theft of aluminium and copper from roofs and the electrical power infrastructure was a serious problem in some areas.

To the larger scale:

Over $250,000 worth of metal was recovered during an operation in Maysan province.

Military and police operations were organised to try and protect power lines, tank-

---

3   Press Briefing by Brigadier Brealey. 21 August 2003.

ers and other parts of the infrastructure from criminal gangs. In August, it was reported that 125 road tankers had been confiscated and 150 people arrested in just such an operation. However, efforts such as these were time and labour-intensive and were often conducted at the expense of other security measures to combat organised crime, smuggling and looting.

The military view was that long-term stability could only be achieved with the active support of the local population. Locals were engaged at many levels (officials, workers, police, security officers), building on existing organisations and structures, in an attempt to hand over some of the responsibility of reconstruction and stabilisation.

INFRASTRUCTURE REGENERATION

Much of the British military involvement in infrastructure regeneration was spearheaded by the Royal Engineers (REs). The REs were not only able to offer technical assistance or carry out repairs. They could also provide protection for the local workers on the ground, act as a point of contact between the various organisations involved in a project and supply logistics assistance.[4]

In Iraq, RE military personnel were assisted in their efforts by members of the Engineer and Logistic Staff Corps (Volunteers). Founded in 1865, membership of the Staff Corps – which is by invitation only – is comprised of chief executives, directors and senior technical or operational managers of engineering, transport and logistics firms and organisations. Staff Corps members travelled to Iraq to help the military in their reconstruction efforts, giving advice on emergency measures and infrastructure regeneration. They liaised with both local and RE engineers to provide support services and guidance on, amongst other things, electricity and water supplies.

In the immediate post-conflict period in Iraq, the REs provided stop-gap measures, such as in ensuring standby power generators had enough fuel to keep electricity levels up (only one of the five power stations in the Basrah region was still operating post-conflict) – this was used to prevent a power collapse completely disabling the main waterworks. Once this was done, the REs moved into the second phase of restoration of supply. This meant addressing the principal problem – in the case of the waterworks, only 60% of its power needs could be supplied by standby generators, resulting in insufficient water supplies for the population. The REs worked with the Staff Corps, locals and other organisations to ensure a mains electricity supply was reinstated.[5]

The process of restoring utilities to a town/region can be split into 3 stages:[6]

---

4   'Restoring destroyed public utilities', Lt Col Steven Boyd and Major John Taylor, ICE Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Civil Engineering Special Issue, May 2004, Vol 157, Special Issue One, pps 48–52, paper 13659.

5   'Restoring destroyed public utilities', Lt Col Steven Boyd and Major John Taylor, ICE Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Civil Engineering Special Issue, May 2004, Vol 157, Special Issue One, pps 48–52, paper 13659.

6   'Restoring destroyed public utilities', Lt Col Steven Boyd and Major John Taylor, ICE Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Civil Engineering Special Issue, May 2004, Vol 157, Special Issue One, pps 48–52, paper 13659.

► Stage 1: Urgent Action
► Stage 2: Achieve reliability
► Stage 3: Facilitate improvement

Ideally, the military should be heavily involved in Stage 1, partially involved in Stage 2 (as support) and have dropped out of the picture by Stage 3. In Iraq, May to December 2003 saw completion of Stage 1 projects and the next stage begin – as the waterworks project illustrates. But, by the end of this period, the situation on the ground meant that the military were unable to transfer responsibility for infrastructure regeneration to another body and work continued to be carried out (consultancy, interaction with local workers etc..) to maintain and improve essential services.

CONCLUSION

In early September 2003, the then Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, announced additional troop deployments to Iraq. Following a formal review of UK forces and resources in Iraq by the UK Divisional Commander, MND (SE), viewed 'in the light of the evolving security situation in Iraq and the increasing military tasks arising out of the reconstruction efforts in the south', the Commander had requested the provision of two extra Battalions and specialist personnel to enable him to fulfil the expanding range of tasks of MND (SE).[7] The deployment of these extra units was planned until around November as an 'interim additional capability', but come the end of November and the announcement of plans for the roulement of the British forces, it became clear that the situation would not allow for any significant drop in troop levels to Iraq.

It is doubtful that in the month following the end of hostilities, the military had foreseen that seven months down the line they would still be involved in stabilisation operations to the degree that they were. The short-term military reconstruction efforts had moved into a medium-term stage of infrastructure regeneration, with increased civilian participation but with no prospect of a complete handover to local civilian control. And the security situation had evolved to include a more serious threat – affecting both military and locals – of insurgency.

At the end of this period, although much had been done to improve stability in Iraq, stabilisation remained as much a priority in December as it had done in May.

RESUMÉ

Tabitha Swann: Britské sily a stabilizácia Iraku: Od mája do decembra 2003

Začiatkom septembra 2003 štátny sekretár pre obranu Geoff Hoon vydal oznámenie o dodatočnom rozmiestnení britských jednotiek v Iraku. Nasledovalo formálne posúdenie síl Veľkej Británie v Iraku divíznym veliteľom Multinárodnej juhovýchodnej divízie (MND/SE). Vychádzajúc z vývoja bezpečnostnej situácie v Iraku a zvyšovania vojenských úloh vyplývajúcich z úsilia obnovy poriadku na juhu krajiny, po-

---

7   Written Ministerial Statement to the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, 8 September 2003. The balance of 2 Battalion, The Light Infantry (1 Company was already in theatre) and 1 Battalion, The Royal Green Jackets were subsequently sent to Iraq.

žadoval o podporu v sile dvoch práporov špeciálneho určenia, ako aj poskytnutie špeciálneho personálu umožňujúceho mu naplniť široký okruh úloh MND/SE. Rozmiestnenie týchto zvláštnych jednotiek bolo plánované až do novembra 2003.

Ale vývoj situácie bol taký, že po siedmich mesiacoch od vzniku konfliktu mohla byť britská armáda zapojená do stabilizačných operácií. Krátkodobé vojenské rekonštrukčné úsilia sa pohli k strednodobému obdobiu obnovy infraštruktúry za zvyšovania civilnej účasti, ale nie s vyhliadkou na kompletné prevzatie lokálnej civilnej kontroly. Bezpečnostná situácia na juhu krajiny bola poznačená vážnejšími konfliktmi – revoltami, postihujúcimi britské a ďalšie spojenecké jednotky, ako aj civilné miestne obyvateľstvo.

Koncom roku 2003 zostala úloha stabilizácie vnútorných pomerov v Iraku takou istou veľkou prioritou, ako bola stanovená v máji.

panel 4:

Conflict Consequences on the Military

Chair:
Professor Maria Gabriella Pasqualini, Italy

La gendarmerie nationale et la démobilisation des armées Françaises, 1918–1920

Aspirant Louis Panel

« *11 novembre 1918. Rien à signaler* »: la mention apparaît sur la plupart des journaux de marche prévôtaux à la date de l'armistice franco-allemand! Ce jour est pourtant historique, mais les gendarmes laissent l'impression de n'en avoir nullement conscience. Non pas, cependant, que la nouvelle de la fin des combats ne leur soit pas parvenue, ou qu'elle ait suscité l'indifférence. La levée exceptionnelle des punitions, décrétée par le commandement et relayée par la force publique, atteste en effet, sur ces mêmes registres, que les gendarmes ont bien pris acte, à leur niveau, de la signature de Rethondes. Mais, de même que selon le mot de Poincaré la mobilisation n'était pas la guerre, l'armistice n'est pas la paix, ou pas encore. Simple suspension des armes – selon son étymologie – préalable à toute négociation, elle laisse l'armée française sur le qui-vive et n'influe donc guère sur le quotidien des soldats et des prévôtaux qui les encadrent.

En effet, la victoire sur les troupes allemandes célébrée le 11 novembre n'est plus une surprise à l'automne 1918, mais elle est attendue depuis de nombreuses semaines. Le succès français sur la Marne en juillet précédent, puis la progression rapide des troupes alliées, enfin les armistices bulgare du 29 septembre, turc du 31 octobre, puis autrichien du 3 novembre, laissaient prévoir une issue prochaine des opérations contre l'Allemagne.

Pour autant, rien n'est achevé de l'immense tâche auprès des armées françaises qui s'impose aux gendarmes. Á partir du 11 novembre 1918 et jusqu'au 23 octobre suivant, date de la démobilisation générale, plus de cinq millions d'hommes sont à rendre à leurs foyers, au fil d'un lourd et pénible processus administratif dont l'Arme à plus que sa part. En outre, durant cette même période, les prévôtés doivent continuer d'assurer l'ordre au sein de troupes de plus en plus perplexes quant à l'utilité de leur maintien sous les drapeaux et gagnées par une légitime impatience du retour dans leurs foyers.

Ce retour, les gendarmes, au front parfois depuis les premiers jours de la guerre, l'attendent eux aussi, mais ils sont les derniers à en faire l'objet, une fois entièrement dis-

soutes les grandes unités auxquelles ils sont attachés. Ils sont donc à la fois des acteurs et des témoins privilégiés du grand « remue d'hommes » qui s'opère dans les armées françaises en 1919. Une partie de ces gendarmes, d'ailleurs, ne rentre pas, mais est envoyée par-delà les frontières, avec les forces d'occupation et d'expédition. En effet, la Gendarmerie nationale, prise par l'armistice alors qu'elle est en pleine phase de réformes, et sans avoir trouvé le temps de recompléter ses forces, doit entreprendre, dès 1918, un vaste redéploiement, tant en Europe que dans le monde. Pour les autres, les plus nombreux, rentrer au pays signifie retrouver la brigade, dans un contexte de tension sociale, de cherté de la vie et d'épidémie qui rend le service particulièrement difficile pour une institution très affaiblie. Pourtant, 1919, année de la paix, est aussi pour l'Arme celle du « Grand renfort », moment d'un renouvellement complet de ses forces et d'une modernisation décisive de ses moyens.

DÉMOBILISER

Rendre les combattants à leur famille, progressivement et sans dégarnir le front des troupes, représente pour la gendarmerie une tâche administrative considérable. En effet, le parti pris égalitaire adopté par la Chambre des députés, primant sur les considérations tactiques, entraîne une démobilisation des soldats par classe et par charge de famille, plutôt que par unité, ce qui complique singulièrement le travail de l'autorité militaire et crée profusion de dérogations[1]. Aussi les circulaires précisant les conditions de retour à l'intérieur, en « congé permanent de démobilisation » sont-elles sans cesse renouvelées, se contredisant souvent. S'ajoutant à tout l'arsenal réglementaire produit par la récente sous-direction de la gendarmerie, ces textes ont tôt fait d'égarer le gendarme dans sa mission de contrôle des soldats à leur foyer[2]. En effet, courant 1918, les déserteurs à l'intérieur se sont faits de plus en plus nombreux à mesure que l'opinion a senti approcher l'issue du conflit. Les permissions accordées avec plus de largesse depuis 1917 ont en outre donné de l'ampleur au phénomène de la désertion[3]. Or, si l'armistice sonne la fin des combats entre Français et Allemands, il n'en va pas de même entre gendarmes et déserteurs: les gendarmes Sicurani, abattu à Sens le 29 décembre 1918, ou Tassez, tué dans les mêmes circonstances le 11 mars suivant, en offrent la tragique illustration.

Les brigades doivent en outre vérifier si les permissionnaires présents sur leur circonscription remplissent les conditions de démobilisation, pour éviter de les renvoyer inutilement aux armées[4]. Dans l'application de toutes ces mesures, la bonne foi des troupes n'est pas toujours manifeste. Impatients de rentrer à l'intérieur, excédés par la multiplicité des contrôles et par l'absurdité de règles qui accordent plus de droits, par exemple, aux fils de

1   Bruno Cabanes, *La victoire endeuillée. La sortie de guerre des soldats français (1918–1920)*, Paris, Le Seuil, 2004, pp. 284–304.

2   Ainsi, le *Mémorial de la Gendarmerie* pour l'année 1919 (n° 38) représentent 765 pages, plus du double de celui de 1913 (n° 32, 360 p.).

3   Louis Panel, « Le front inavoué: la gendarmerie face aux déserteurs à l'intérieur », *14–18*, n° 22, octobre 2004, pp. 50–56.

4   Bruno Cabanes, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

veuve qu'aux orphelins[5], nombre de soldats se prêtent de mauvaise grâce aux exigences de gendarmes qui n'ont pas combattu à leur côté. D'autres s'essayent à la falsification de leurs livrets, d'autant plus aisée que bien des pièces, sommairement adjointes au fascicule initial, ont très bien pu disparaître à la faveur des mouvements et des batailles.

La gendarmerie organise enfin le retour et la réintégration des prisonniers, pointant les listes de rapatriés, recherchant parmi eux les éventuels déserteurs à l'ennemi, tentant d'identifier formellement ceux qui perdu tout document au cour de leur captivité… voire la mémoire, comme l'infortuné soldat Mangin, « soldat inconnu vivant » dont deux gendarmes de service à la gare de Lyon-Brotteaux finissent par constater l'amnésie[6].

MAINTENIR L'ORDRE

La lenteur de ces opérations de démobilisation entraîne insensiblement une montée de la tension au sein des corps de troupe. S'ils sont évidemment satisfaits de la fin des combats, les soldats sont également désoeuvrés, voire démotivés, du fait de l'armistice. Beaucoup d'entre eux, conscrits pour certains depuis huit années consécutives, s'interrogent sur la pertinence de leur maintien sous les drapeaux. En outre, la victoire, dont ils se disent à bon droit les artisans, leur laisse escompter une plus grande clémence du commandement quant aux règles disciplinaires appliquées en temps de guerre. Les officiers eux-mêmes, dont beaucoup sont des réservistes promis eux aussi à une démobilisation prochaine, ont souvent la tentation de « démissionner » de leur rôle de garants de l'ordre des troupes. Le personnage du *Capitaine Conan*, héros du prix Goncourt 1934, en est l'illustration célèbre. Touché par l'armistice bulgare plusieurs semaines avant la fin des hostilités en métropole, la cessation des combats laisse cet officier désemparé et le pousse à chercher de nouveaux adversaires, dont les gendarmes fournissent une variété toute trouvée. Or, cette fiction est largement corroborée par la lecture des archives[7]. « *Ils se sont exposés, il est donc juste qu'ils soient les maîtres ici et fassent tout ce qu'ils voudront* », ce mot, adressé au cœur des opérations par un officier de chasseurs au capitaine Faivre, prévôt de division[8], ne risque-t-il pas de devenir, au lendemain de Rethondes, le mot d'ordre de tous les combattants? Toujours est-il que la certitude d'en avoir bientôt fini avec la vie militaire, de même que d'être redevable de la Nation, n'accroît pas l'obéissance. Le même prévôt s'en aperçoit dès septembre 1918: « *dans une armée où l'on avait signalé des espions circulant en tenue française ou alliée, l'ordre fut donné de vérifier les papiers de tous les isolés quel que soit leur grade. Un lieutenant de zouaves refusa de prouver son identité malgré l'ordre écrit du général qu'on ne manqua pas de lui présenter; il s'exprima même en termes si peu mesurés que les gendarmes furent obligés de l'arrêter* »[9].

---

5   *Ibid.*

6   Jean-Yves Le Naour, Jean-Yves, *Le soldat inconnu vivant*, Paris, Hachette, 2002, p. 13.

7   Roger Vercel, Capitaine Conan, Paris, 1934. Ce roman est en effet largement autobiographique, l'auteur ayant lui-même été, comme son narrateur, officier sur le front d'Orient et rapporteur d'un conseil de guerre.

8   Capitaine Charles Faivre, *Mémoire sur les observations personnelles faites au cours de la campagne 1914–1918*, original manuscrit, Aubusson, 1920, deuxième partie, chapitre 1. SHD-DGN, 4 Mu 89.

9   *Ibid.*

Dans ce contexte, l'Orient est sans doute le front le plus difficile. Les hommes y ont entendu le clairon de l'armistice dès le mois de septembre 1918, mais seront néanmoins maintenus sur place jusqu'au traité de paix, et même au-delà, comme force d'occupation et comme « veille face au bolchevisme ». On comprend dès lors que la situation soit mal vécue par des hommes envoyés si loin de chez eux, ayant eu au cours de la campagne le sentiment d'être oubliés de la métropole, lésés par le système des permissions, puis retranchés du nombre des artisans de la victoire. C'est ce que traduisent les mutineries du 21e colonial le 22 novembre 1918 puis en février-mars 1919. Cette unité, disciplinée pendant les opérations, se révolte ainsi quand cessent les combats[10].

En effet, après le 11 novembre, quand est connu le succès des armées sur le front occidental, le relâchement est général et, en décembre, les gendarmes de l'armée française d'Orient doivent sans cesse intervenir, dans les salles de spectacle ou sur la voie publique pour rétablir l'ordre et séparer notamment les hommes – et les officiers! – français et italiens[11]. Le rapatriement des troupes est l'occasion de scènes de désordre indescriptibles, ainsi le 23 novembre 1918, quand une poignée de prévôtaux doit veiller à l'embarquement d'un millier de zouaves affluant isolément, ivres et débraillés. S'égayant aux escales, s'abreuvant dans les ports, ils forcent les gendarmes à les poursuivre à nouveau, retardant d'autant le retour. « *La démobilisation longtemps attendue par les soldats libère chez eux la sourde révolte qu'ils entretenaient contre leur situation et l'Orient en général* »[12].

C'est pourquoi ceux qui demeurent, jusqu'à l'automne 1919, sur ce théâtre d'opération, sont une source de violences répétées: des fusillades éclatent presque chaque nuit, des heurts se multiplient avec les troupes grecques et alliées et le petit détachement de gendarmerie laisse l'impression d'être débordé. La force publique de Macédoine est finalement supprimée en mars 1920. Entre temps, ses effectifs ont fondu, rendant illusoire une complète exécution de ses missions[13].

RÉOCCUPATION ET REDÉPLOIEMENT

Au lendemain de la victoire, le réinvestissement par les autorités françaises des territoires perdus en 1870 recouvre une importance politique essentielle[14]. Dès 1915, c'est déjà la gendarmerie qui a été chargée d'assurer l'administration, la réorganisation et l'épuration des cantons « libérés » de Dannemerie, Thann et Masevaux[15]. Après l'entrée des troupes françaises dans Strasbourg et la réoccupation complète de l'Alsace et de la Moselle, l'Arme prend en charge, dans l'ensemble des « chères provinces », une mission considérable: la renationalisation des institutions et des habitants. C'est pourquoi est créée, le

---

10 Patrick Facon, « La crise du moral en 1917 dans l'armée française d'Orient », *Revue historique des Armées*, 4e trimestre 1977, pp. 93–114.

11 Isabelle Roy, *La gendarmerie en Macédoine (1915–1920)*, Maisons-Alfort, SHGN, 2004, pp. 179–180.

12 *Id.*, pp. 191.

13 *Id.*, pp. 186–187.

14 Cf. Joseph Schmauch, *Les services d'Alsace-Lorraine et la réintégration des départements de l'Est*, Thèse d'archiviste-paléographe, École nationale des Chartes, sous la dir. de Georges-Henri Soutou, 2004, 3 volumes.

15 Général Georges Philippot, « Gendarmerie et identité nationale en Alsace et Lorraine après 1918 », *Revue historique des Armées*, n° 213, 1998, p. 64.

31 décembre 1918, une légion de gendarmerie d'Alsace-Lorraine, sur un modèle particulier[16]. Immédiatement subordonnée au commissaire général de la République à Strasbourg, cette unité doit réintégrer, progressivement mais rapidement, ce territoire dans la communauté nationale, en y participant au rétablissement d'une administration selon le modèle français et surtout en réalisant le triage de la population, selon ses origines et ses sentiments. C'est ainsi qu'à la fin de 1919, 1200 gendarmes, issus pour deux tiers d'entre eux du recrutement local, assurent la sécurité, l'administration et, surtout « la pénétration des idées françaises » sur ces trois départements[17].

En Rhénanie, où viennent de pénétrer les armées françaises, est également établie une « prévôté de l'armée du Rhin », ultérieurement érigée en légion autonome[18]. Les gendarmes doivent veiller au maintien de l'ordre et à la discipline au sein des troupes françaises, mais aussi exercer leur « surveillance continue et répressive » sur les populations locales, dont elles assurent en outre l'épuration. De l'armistice à la signature de Versailles, les gendarmes français font également office de juges sur le territoire allemand occupé.

De même en Orient, à l'issue de « l'énorme travail de liquidation »[19], qui distribue les hommes et le matériel vers Constantinople, le Levant ou la métropole, le résidu des gendarmes encore présents en Macédoine entre dans la composition d'une police interalliée. Cette force, instituée le 15 janvier 1919 par décision de Franchet d'Esperey, est placée sous les ordres conjugués d'un colonel des carabiniers, d'un *provost-marshall* britannique et d'un chef d'escadron de gendarmerie français[20]. C'est ainsi qu'une demi-douzaine d'officiers de gendarmerie et cent à deux cents gendarmes assurent le relais de la politique française dans la région. « *Nos effectifs*, raconte un capitaine, *réduits à diverses reprises par l'envoi de détachements en Asie mineure, au Liban et en Thrace, furent entretenus à l'aide de gendarmes auxiliaires recrutés dans les troupes du corps d'occupation et même de quelques Crétois venus de Salonique, sous l'uniforme de gendarmes français* »[21]. Tel est l'embryon des détachements permanents du Levant, en Cilicie[22], au Liban et en Syrie[23], promis à une longue postérité.

De tels redéploiements semblent témoigner du dynamisme retrouvé par un corps qui, dès 1918, envoie de nouveau des hommes, non seulement outre-Rhin et sur tout le pourtour méditerranéen, mais encore en Afrique, en Inde et jusqu'en Chine! Pourtant, ce rayonnement ne doit pas masquer la faiblesse des effectifs concernés, qui traduisent, quant à eux, la grave crise numérique traversée par la gendarmerie.

---

16 Capitaine Pecastaing, « La création de la Gendarmerie d'Alsace-Lorraine en 1919 », *Gendarmerie nationale. Revue d'étude et d'information*, n° 76, 1968, pp. 64–65.

17 Général Georges Philippot, « Le colonel Michel et ses gendarmes en Alsace et Lorraine après 1918 », *Revue de la Gendarmerie nationale*, hors série Histoire, 2000, pp. 113–130.

18 Général Louis Larrieu, *Histoire de la maréchaussée et de la gendarmerie*, Maisons-Alfort, SHGN, 2002, p. 619.

19 Isabelle Roy, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

20 Chef d'escadron Balley, « La police interalliée de Constantinople (1919–1920) », *Revue de la Gendarmerie*, n° 35, septembre 1933, p. 649.

21 *Id,* p. 660.

22 Yves Le Lanniou, « Gendarmes français en Cilicie (1918–1922) », *Cahiers d'étude sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien*, n°28, 1999, pp.187–206.

23 Hélène Faisant de Champchesnel, *La gendarmerie du Levant pendant le mandat (1918–1946),* DEA, Histoire, Paris IV, sous la direction de Jacques Frémeaux, 2000, pp. 53–69.

UN ÂPRE LENDEMAIN DE VICTOIRE…

En effet, l'Arme finit par faire elle-même les frais de la démobilisation qu'elle orchestre. Quelques jours seulement après l'armistice disparaissent les gendarmes auxiliaires, recrutés à partir de 1915 « pour la durée de la guerre » parmi les réservistes de l'armée territoriale (RAT) et libérés en même temps qu'eux dès 1918. Pour autant, on ne peut encore rappeler à l'intérieur les éléments d'active, détachés aux armées jusqu'à la dissolution complète des unités qu'ils encadrent. On comprend l'inquiétude d'une sous-direction de la gendarmerie rendant compte au général en chef, le 2 janvier 1919, que « *la libération de toutes les classes de la RAT va diminuer les effectifs de la gendarmerie à l'intérieur d'un nombre total de 6 041 hommes qui, ajouté à un déficit déjà existant de 5 924 portera ce déficit à 11 355* », soit près de la moitié des gendarmes départementaux[24]. En outre, tous les gendarmes, officiers et sous-officiers, qui au cours de la guerre ont atteint l'âge de leur retraite mais ont été maintenus à leur poste en raison du contexte des opérations, quittent également le service par gros bataillons. Pour l'Arme, la fin de la guerre s'apparente donc, du strict point de vue numérique, à une hémorragie.

Or, la gendarmerie doit alors faire face, à l'intérieur, à un important mouvement de grèves et de troubles populaires. La faiblesse du personnel disponible pour maintenir l'ordre inquiète par conséquent les préfets, qui réclament, dès le printemps 1918, le prélèvement de sections prévôtales aux armées et leur envoi dans les départements[25]. Au même moment, la démobilisation des ouvriers requis à leur poste, dans les usines, leur rendant du même coup l'intégralité de leurs droits sociaux, donne par la suite de la vigueur à un mouvement dont seule la reprise économique, en 1920, puis la création spécifique de pelotons mobiles, en 1921, finissent par soulager les brigades.

Ce lourd contexte se double également d'une crise alimentaire et sanitaire, terreau favorable au développement, non seulement de mouvements sociaux, mais encore, à partir de septembre 1918, de la grippe dite « espagnole »[26]. La gendarmerie elle-même paye un lourd tribut à la pandémie. Les militaires de l'Arme, qui ont souvent fait campagne à quarante ans passés, représentent en effet une population relativement fragile. De fait, plus d'une cinquantaine d'entre eux meurent entre septembre 1918 et avril 1919 d'une « maladie contractée en service », bien souvent explicitée par le service de Santé comme « grippe pulmonaire endémique »[27]. Or, le sous-effectif béant de la gendarmerie rend peu propice le recours aux évacuations et aux hospitalisations. Ainsi, si le gendarme Duhamel, au front depuis le 1er août 1914, et sérieusement atteint par le virus à l'automne 1918, a la chance de s'en remettre, c'est pour intégrer aussitôt, courant 1919, la prévôté de la Sarre, en cours de reformation[28].

---

24 Lettre de la sous-direction de la Gendarmerie, 2 janvier 1919. SHD-DGN, 16 N 191.

25 Cf. par exemple les rapports du préfet de l'Isère au ministre de l'Intérieur. AN, F⁷ 12992.

26 Elle est plus vraisemblablement d'origine asiatique. Cf Jean-Claude Demory, « La grippe espagnole », *14–18*, n° 9, août 2002, pp. 52–55.

27 Symptomatiquement, le seul héros de roman qui soit un gendarme de la Grande Guerre est un gendarme auxiliaire de 41 ans, « mort le 5 décembre 1918 de la grippe à l'hôpital H4/22 ». Cf. Léo Larguier, *François Pain, gendarme*, Paris, Editions françaises illustrées, 1919, p. 21.

28 Capitaine Julien Duhamel, *Mémoires d'un officier de Gendarmerie*, s.l., 1953, 121 p. SHD-DGN, 7.Mud.doc.03.

« LE GRAND RENFORT »

Tel est le nom adopté, en 1919, par l'une des premières promotions de l'école de gendarmerie de Versailles, créée par le président du Conseil le 31 décembre 1918 pour former une nouvelle génération d'officiers[29]. Quelques mois plus tard, des écoles préparatoires destinées à l'instruction des hommes ouvrent à leur tour leurs portes[30]. C'est qu'en effet, au lendemain de l'armistice, le problème de l'effectif conditionne tout. La démobilisation entraînant, dans les rangs de la gendarmerie, un appel d'air considérable, la question du recrutement est donc de loin la plus urgente.

Par chance, la masse des anciens combattants, pour la plupart très jeunes, constitue un vivier propice au recrutement d'un personnel d'une haute qualité militaire, venu d'horizons très divers. Le taux de renouvellement est tel que les candidats à la gendarmerie peuvent espérer un avancement rapide. En outre, beaucoup d'anciens poilus, appelés sous les drapeaux sept ou huit ans plus tôt, n'ont pas connu d'autres métiers que celui des armes. En cette période de crise, le retour à la vie civile et la recherche d'un emploi sont pour beaucoup d'entre eux une perspective difficile. Á ceux-là, la gendarmerie offre un débouché providentiel[31]. Le cas du gendarme Villemin est sur ce plan éloquent, sans être rare: engagé en 1914, démobilisé comme sergent au 5e bataillon chasseurs alpins en 1919, titulaire de la croix de guerre avec palme, il est invité par son capitaine, qui fait le choix de la gendarmerie – et y deviendra général – à suivre le même parcours. Reçu à l'école préparatoire de Varennes-sur-Allier, il en sort au printemps 1920 pour être affecté dans le territoire de Belfort. Deux ans plus tard, il est le plus ancien de sa brigade à cinq, et la commande par intérim, signe du très fort renouvellement opéré en si peu de temps[32].

Revers de la médaille de la Grande Guerre, distribuée en 1920, tous ces poilus, briscards rompus au combat de peloton, ne possèdent généralement qu'une instruction générale sommaire, alors que le service de la gendarmerie se judiciarise fortement. Les quelques mois d'école préparatoire ne pouvant suffire à fabriquer un gendarme, les anciens encore présents sous l'uniforme se transforment souvent en instructeurs: « *Le service intérieur de cette époque*, se souvient le fils d'une recrue de 1919, *comportait une grosse part d'instruction du personnel récemment recruté. En effet, les hommes de cette génération avaient eu d'autres préoccupations pendant la guerre que d'apprendre la règle d'accord participe passé conjugué avec l'auxiliaire avoir et il importait de compléter non seulement leur instruction professionnelle mais aussi leur formation générale. En conséquence de quoi, il y avait le soir deux fois par semaine au lieu de l'heure quotidienne de "théorie" un exercice de dictée et de rédaction au bureau de la brigade. Les cahiers étaient vus tous les mois par le*

---

29 Benoît Haberbusch (dir.), *Pour la Patrie, l'honneur et le droit. Les Parrains de promotion de l'école des officiers de la Gendarmerie nationale (1919–2004)*, préface du général d'armée Parayre, SHGN, Maisons-Alfort, 2004, p. 23.

30 Décret ministériel du 28 mai 1919 instituant les écoles préparatoires de gendarmerie de Mamers, Moulins, Strasbourg et Toul.

31 Catherine Paysan, « Puisque je suis fille de gendarme », *Revue de la Gendarmerie nationale*, n° 203, 2002, pp. 113–120.

32 Georges Villemin, « Comment vivait-on dans une caserne de Gendarmerie en 1920 », *Gendarmerie nationale. Revue d'étude et d'information*, 1978, n°116, pp. 3–7.

commandant de section. Par bonheur la femme d'un gendarme était institutrice et apportait son aide précieuse à ces cours de recyclage avant la lettre... »[33].

En quelques semestres donc, la majorité des gendarmes en service durant l'entre-deux-guerres, puis pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, intègre l'Arme. Cette génération promet par conséquent d'être particulièrement homogène, soudée par l'expérience commune des tranchées et trempée par la victoire de 1918. C'est ainsi qu'en 1920, un certain lieutenant Guillaudot[34], engagé volontaire en 1911, combattant pendant toute la guerre, blessé quatre fois et six fois cité, intègre la gendarmerie – arme de son père –, en même temps que le lieutenant Jean Favre, chasseurs alpins depuis 1914[35]. Quant à Jean Vérines, classe 1914, également officier combattant et grand blessé, il est passé dans l'Arme l'année précédente, dans la première promotion de l'école[36]. La gendarmerie attire également des soldats de rang plus modeste: le statut de sous-officier, attribué à tous ses membres en février 1918, de même que le réseau d'écoles préparatoires mis en place le 28 mai 1919, vont en ce sens. L'artilleur Cabrol, classe 1918, a découvert pendant sa campagne en Lorraine puis en Allemagne les charmes insoupçonnés que présentait la gendarmerie; libéré en 1923, il postule à l'école de sous-officiers de Moulins en 1924, et en sort quatrième[37]. Marcellin Cazals le suit quelques temps plus tard[38]. Á la faveur de la démobilisation générale, toute une génération investit ainsi les rangs de l'Arme: marquée par les combats, fière de sa victoire sur l'Allemagne, elle est, vingt ans plus tard, le fer de lance de la gendarmerie en Résistance[39].

Enfin, c'est encore dans la foulée de l'armistice que l'Arme peut combler le profond retard matériel accumulé avant-guerre. Ainsi, en 1919, les surplus de l'armée américaine permettent de doter les brigades en side-cars et en voitures Ford[40]. Si le téléphone, dont l'installation se généralise dans les unités à la demande expresse de Clemenceau[41], reste encore faiblement utilisé, la tenue quant à elle ne tarde pas à s'adapter aux exigences du service, reléguant au musée de l'armée la tunique à trèfles et aiguillettes, ou encore le casque à crinière que les gendarmes comptaient dans leurs effets de mobilisation. Le casernement, l'armement, laissent sans doute encore à désirer... mais voilà qui apporte du grain à moudre à la sous-direction, prévue pour la seule durée de la guerre, et qui pourtant, érigée au rang de direction autonome, bientôt confiée à un général de l'Arme, subsiste pendant près de quinze ans!

Incontestablement, les deux ou trois semestres qui suivent la signature de l'armistice franco-allemand représentent pour la Gendarmerie nationale une période aussi intense

33   *Id.*

34   Charles Gilbert, *Soldats bleus dans l'ombre. Maurice Guillaudot et ses gendarmes dans la Résistance*, Les Sables d'Olonne, Le cercle d'or, 1977, 173 p.

35   Pierre Favre, *Histoire d'un militaire peu ordinaire*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1992, 272 p.

36   Patrick de Gméline, *Jean Vérines, gendarme, garde républicain, soldat de l'ombre*, Paris, Lavauzelle, 1985, 136 p.

37   Louis Panel, « Louis Cabrol, doyen de la Gendarmerie nationale », *14–18*, n° 23, décembre 2004, pp. 6–7.

38   Marcellin Cazals, *Journal de marche d'un gendarme*, Rodez, Canitrot, 1995, 127 p.

39   Cf. Bernard Mouraz (dir.), *Gendarmes résistants*, Vincennes, SHD, 2006, à paraître.

40   Georges-André Euloge, *Histoire de la police et de la gendarmerie*, Paris, Plon, 1985, p. 295

41   Louis Panel, *Gendarmerie et contre-espionnage (1914–1918)*, Maisons-Alfort, SHGN, 2004, p. 195.

que contrastée. Ses hommes, qui n'ont guère noté l'évènement, ne vivent ni plus ni moins qu'une révolution de leur arme. Cette dernière est en effet sortie déconsidérée et exsangue de quatre années de guerre. Elle est, de surcroît, confrontée à la redoutable responsabilité de démobiliser des combattants par millions, et frappée, comme le reste de l'Europe, par les difficultés du contexte de l'immédiat après-guerre. Pourtant, en quelques mois, elle parvient à renouer avec une présence internationale et un rayonnement importants, à réformer profondément ses structures et à moderniser ses moyens. Surtout, dans la foulée de la démobilisation, la gendarmerie procède au plus vaste renouvellement jamais connu de son personnel, intégrant de la sorte une génération aussi brillante et féconde que l'était celle de la « Revanche »[42].

RESUMÉ

Louis N. Panel: Koniec vojny a navrátenie poriadku: Francúzske žandárstvo a demobilizácia francúzskych armád 1918 – 1920

Clemenceau, rovnako ako predtým Claude LeBlanc, vedel, ako zvrátiť kontext od vzniku krízy k hlbokým a trvalým reformám. Využívajúc výhodu konjunktúry, ktorá mu okrem rozpočtu a slobody manévrovania, dala aj podporu zo strany značnej časti francúzskeho obyvateľstva,sa predseda vlády mohol pustiť do rozsiahlej reorganizácie žandárstva. Okrem toho vďaka pokračovaniu rozsiahlej výmeny personálu iba počas niekoľkých mesiacov, ako aj v ich povyšovaní a výcviku, došlo k obnove, ktorá bola nielen štruktúrovaná, ale aj generačná. Takže sa stalo, že žandárstvo v roku 1940 a všeobecnejšie v nadchádzajúcom dlhom polstoročí, malo svoju genézu v roku 1918.

SUMMARY

Louis N. Panel: The War's End and the Return to Order: the French Gendarmerie and the Demobilisation of the French Armies, 1918–1920

Clemenceau, just like Claude Leblanc previously, knew how to turn the context of the emergence from a crisis into the opportunity to bring about deep and durable reforms. Taking advantage of a conjuncture that gave him, besides a budget and freedom of manoeuvre, the approval of a large part of the French population, the prime minister was able to set about a massive reorganisation of the Gendarmerie. In addition, by proceeding to bring about a large-scale renewal of its personnel in the space of just a few months, as well as their promotion and training, he achieved a renewal that was not just structural but was also generational. Thus it was that the Gendarmerie of 1940, and more generally that of the coming long half-century, had its genesis in 1918.

---

42 Cf. la préface du général Georges Philippot, *in* Général Louis Larrieu, *Histoire de la maréchaussée et de la gendarmerie*, Maisons-Alfort, SHGN, 2002, p. 6.

The Military Impact of Victory or Defeat on the Political and Social Structure of a Nation
The First WW Victory's Impact upon the Royal Carabinieri in Italy, 1919–1922

Maj. Flavio Carbone[1]

INTRODUCTION

The idea at the base of this paper is to reflect about the evolution of the Royal Carabinieri Corps during and after the First World War.

It is important to achieve this goal to know the principal transformations of the structure during the First World War.

Particularly, this paper analyzes the organisation of the Corps and some aspects related to the training and to the recruitment of the officers and the noncommissioned officers of the Royal Carabinieri.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ORGANISATION AND THE PERSONNEL OF THE ROYAL CARABINIERI DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR.

According to colonel Ulderico Barengo, he gave, some years later, some news about the number of the Carabinieri personnel units during the First World War specifying that "Il personale mobilitato si triplicò ed all'epoca dell'ultima battaglia il contingente fornito

---

1   Major of Italian Carabinieri, Junior Teacher to the Military Art and Peace-keeping Operations Chair, Carabinieri Officers College. The opinions expressed in this paper are related by the personal point of view and don't reflect the official one of the Carabinieri Corps.

dall'Arma era di 488 ufficiali e di 19.556 uomini di truppa, dislocati ovunque"[2]. Another officer, Giuliano Ferrari synthesized the organisation structure of the Corps by the mobilized Army: (constituted "in 4 Armies, 12 army-corps, 41 divisions") to the burst of the hostilities: "Nel complesso, pertanto, i servizi di polizia militare assorbivano l'impiego di circa 80 ufficiali e 3.000 sottufficiali e carabinieri: aliquota già considerevolissima, in relazione alla forza organica dell'Arma, all'epoca inferiore alle 30.000 unità, disperse in un elevato numero di reparti territoriali"[3], so at the beginning of the war the personnel of the corps involved in front operations was composed by 10% of all over the Carabinieri corps. The request to employ Carabinieri to the front had to be continuous so much that in October 1917, the General Command of the Corps communicated to the Supreme Command that the Corps was not to be able to stick to new requests of Carabinieri units to draw from the territorial area for the zone of operations anymore[4]. In every case, the good results in battle and under the disciplinary profile of the army during the "battaglia del Solstizio", induced the Supreme Command to return above all on call a part of the strength of Carabinieri to the front to the territorial zones for the public order activities and hunting to the deserters hidden in the cities and in the countries. "I comandi d'armata vorranno tener presente che non sarà possibile d'ora in poi trarre altri Carabinieri dal Paese, ove sono già forti le deficienze, e che, di conseguenza, questo Comando [Supremo] non potrà sopperire ad alcuna eventuale richiesta di CC.RR. da parte delle armate salvo casi di riconosciuta, eccezionale necessità, per i quali si provvederà con spostamenti fra un'armata ed un'altra"[5].

At the end of the world conflict or precisely at the end of the hostilities along the Italian-austrian front the Carabinieri on duty amounted about 19.500 noncommisioned officers and carabinieri to the orders of 488 officers. It means that with a strenght of 31.300 personnel (66% of all personnel), only 11.200 carabinieri (34%) were on duty out of the front[6].

It must not be forgotten, besides that there was also an organisation evolution of the

---

2   Cfr. Comando Generale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali, *Vecchia Arma Fedele – conferenza tenuta dal maggiore Ulderico Barengo nel Circolo Ufficiali della Legione CC. RR. di Roma l'8 aprile 1933 inaugurandosi il primo ciclo di conferenze storiche sull'Arma, promosso dal Museo Storico dei Carabinieri Reali*, Rome, may 1933, p. 17.

3   Cfr. G. Ferrari, *La Polizia Militare profili storici, giuridici e d'impiego*, Supplement to n. 2 of the "Rassegna dell'Arma dei Carabinieri", April–June 1993, p. 106.

4   The records in foot-notes are available in copy in the author archive and are originate from the following files of the archive of the Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito: B-1 "Diari storici 1ª guerra mondiale", E-1 ed F-2 "Carteggio sussidiario armate", E-2 "Comando Corpo di SM – Carteggio G.M.", F-1 "Comando Supremo – Vari uffici", F-3 "Carteggio sussidiario 1ª G.M.", F-4 "Studi, carteggio, circolari dell'Ufficio Ordinamento e Mobilitazione". AUSSME, foglio n. 36/13 in data 11 october 1917, *Servizio tradotte 3ª Armata*, Ufficio Mobilitazione – Comando Generale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali.

5   AUSSME, circolare n. 17374, july 21st 1918, *Trasferimento di riparti di CC.RR.*, Ufficio Ordinamento e Mobilitazione – Comando Supremo. The lack of personnel of the Carabinieri corps was linked to the strong increasing of the armies more or less doubled than 1917. Badoglio wrote to underline the necessity to economize the carabinieri duties in war theater only for the corps duties. In november one autonomous temporary battalion of Carabinieri Reali was structured in two coys (the 4th and the 6th).

6   "Ciò significa, tra l'altro, essendo l'intero organico dell'Arma in quel momento di 31.300 uomini, che il servizio di istituto, quello di polizia giudiziaria e gli altri servizi particolari sull'intero territorio dovettero essere disimpegnati dai solo 11.200 Carabinieri residui: meno della metà che in tempi normali", in Rutilio Sermonti, *I Carabinieri nella storia d'Italia,* Rome, Centro Editoriale Nazionale, 1984, p. 758.

territorial structure of the Royal Carabinieri Corps during the conflict. The Decreto Luogotenenziale October 5th 1916 n. 1314 modified the organisation of the corps, establishing that it had to include: the General Command of the corps, 14 territorial legions, a cadets Legion, a Cadets officers School and a Cadets Noncommissioned officers School[7]. A following decreto luogotenenziale of April 23rd 1917 included a new reorganization of the structure, even dictated by temporary needs of. In fact, it was established "provvisoria istituzione di comandi superiori dell'Arma mediante comandi di gruppi legioni destinati ad alleggerire il Comando Generale di una complessa serie di attribuzioni inerenti alla disciplina, all'amministrazione ed al servizio d'istituto delle legioni, oramai aumentate di numero e cresciute di forza, nonché destinati a far sentire in modo più vicino ed efficace alle legioni stesse la superiore azione ispettiva e di controllo".

Besides, beginning from 1917, it is had to apply to a new figure of Carabinieri, named "ausiliario", enlisted among the most trusted troop personnel of the army to manage the needs of public order inside the country and the discipline keeping among the troops to the front.

By Ferrari, nevertheless, "il contributo dell'Arma alla prima guerra mondiale era stato nel complesso grandioso e non limitato alle sole operazioni belliche, in cui pure fu impiegato un carabiniere su due (500 ufficiali e 20.000 sottufficiali e carabinieri), con un tributo di sangue di 1.400 caduti e 5.000 feriti"[8]. Pagano also remembers that "il contingente mobilitato che all'epoca dell'ultima battaglia dell'Isonzo era di 488 ufficiali e 19.556 uomini di truppa, e che aumentò ancora durante il 1918, rappresentò un contributo enorme dato dall'Arma alle operazioni belliche. Il tributo di sangue pagato nella campagna fu di circa 1.400 morti e 5.000 feriti".

After the rewards conferred to the Carabinieri units or to single personnel that fought on the front (200 collective solemn citations; 1 military order of Italy[9]; 4 gold medals, 303 silver; 828 bronze; 916 crosses of war to the military valour; 8.182 crosses to the valour of war; 6.247 individual solemn citations; 21 promotions for merit of war among the officers; 215 promotions for merit of war among noncommissioned officers and troop; 2 promotions of officers for exceptional merit[10]) it was profiled a situation of great instability in what the interiour front had been already at the end of the conflict, it had shown above all signs of tiredness for the restrictions imposed by the economy of war.

It is necessary, to this point, to introduce some conclusion. The effort conducted by

---

7 ANNUARIO MILITARE DEL REGNO D'ITALIA, vol. I, parte 3^, *Sunti Storici ed organici delle armi, dei corpi e dei servizi del Regio esercito – Allegato Permanente*, Roma, Provveditorato Generale dello Stato – Libreria, 1928, pp. 12–31, *Arma dei Carabinieri Reali*. In comparison with the organisation of the corps published with the regolamento organico of december 1911, it had the increase of three territorial legions and the foundation of the NCOs cadets school.

8 Cfr. G. FERRARI, *La Polizia Militare* cit., p. 113.

9 Colonel Giuseppe Petrella was awarded with the knight cross of the Military Order of Savoia, to be "Royal Carabinieri Commander of an army". Cfr. MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA, UFFICIO STATISTICO, *Statistica dello sforzo militare italiano nella Guerra Mondiale – L'Ordine Militare di Savoia durante la guerra 1915–1918*, Rome, Provveditorato Generale dello Stato – Libreria, 1927, p. 230. About the history of the order cfr. VIRGILIO ILARI, FLAVIO CARBONE, *Lineamenti dell'Ordine Militare d'Italia*, Rome, Gruppo Decorati dell'Ordine Militare d'Italia, 2003.

10 Cfr. SCUOLA UFFICIALI CARABINIERI, *Sinossi di Storia dell'Arma, dalle lezioni del T. Col. (r) dei Carabinieri Mario Pagano*, Tipografia della Scuola Ufficiali Carabinieri, 1961, pp. 88–9.

the Royal Carabinieri corps in the continuous dispatch of men to the mobilized army, the young people recruitment to the corps to fill the gaps among spins of carabinieri, the presence of many officers inside the Staffs to the various levels during the conflict constituted, undoubtedly, the features of the most greater "militarization" of the institution at the end of the First World War. It occurred so a conceptual division in the action and in the thought in many people of the Corps dividing these last among those people who had served in the military on the front and, therefore, they had mostly drawn near to their own armed force and those people which had remained on duty in the territorial organization guaranteeing public order in the cities and in the Italian countries maintaining a functional dependence from the Interior Ministry by the Prefects.

It occurred another situation that created more than few cases of conscience in the Italian army: the crisis of Fiume and the march of Ronchi by some smaller units and single soldiers that stuck to the call of D'Annunzio for the occupation of Fiume and the following constitution of the Regency of the Carnaro[11].

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE CARABINIERI CORPS AND THE INTERVENTIONS ON THE OFFICERS CAREERS

After the First World War a growth of the number of the officers[12] was had, also widening the base of recruitment to face the numerous demands connected with the military operations. A first consequence was to facilitate the nomination of the noncommissioned officers to second lieutenant[13]. To conduct such activity, the aspirants officers had to be convinced to accept un ethos […], amalgamati dalla consapevolezza di far parte di un corpo selezionato per meriti e da un'atmosfera d'efficienza"[14].

The necessity of urgent amplification of the Carabinieri personnel forced to contract the period of the iter for the formation of the new second lieutenants of the "marescialli d'alloggio" (warrant officers) and the "brigadieri" (sergeants) that attended the Royal Carabinieri Cadets Officers School[15]. It was decided to pass from two years each course[16],

11   Cfr. Luigi Emilio Longo, *L'Esercito italiano e la questione fiumana (1918–1921)*, Rome, Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito – Ufficio Storico, 1996, 2 voll..

12   For a study about the general situation of the officers corps of all over the army during the first world war, cfr. Giorgio Rochat, *Gli ufficiali italiani nella prima guerra mondiale*, in Giuseppe Caforio e Piero Del Negro (a cura di), *Ufficiali e società*, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 1988, pp. 231–252. The essay is about the strengh of the officers on duty in the corps and services of the Army but it is possible find some news about the carabinieri officers too.

13   With the Regio decreto 29 aprile 1915, n. 540, "riguardante la nomina di marescialli a sottotenenti in servizio attivo permanente nell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali". For the new officers coming from the warrant officers, the promotion to the rank of lieutenant should be arrived after the specific course by the Royal Carabinieri cadets school, the training centre for the Carabinieri warrant officers and brigadieri. After the two years course they would be promoted second lieutenants.

14   Luigi Rossi, *L'aristocrazia europea nel XIX secolo. Alcune linee di ricerca*, in G. Aliberti, L. Rossi (a cura di), *Formazione e ruolo delle elites nell'Età Contemporanea*, Naples, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1995, p. 41–42.

15   Some studies about the school are going on. The goals is to evaluate the real impact in the Institution life and the problems that were connected with the training and the recruitment of the Royal Carabinieri Officers. The first results help to discover the school as a new element in the Carabinieri Corps opening with the subjects led by university or college professors for "civilian" matters and Carabinieri officer for military matters.

16   AUSSME, fondo A-1, busta 0548, memorie Scuola Allievi Ufficiali Carabinieri Reali (from this point SAU-

necessary to complete the regular course of studies as it was verified in the past, to six–seven months. Cause the necessities and the duration of the war the course weere "accelerated"; It was not provided for final examinations but a simple suitability as title to wear the ranks of officer[17].

The officers of the Corps didn't suffer particular selections, but it was increased of numerous unities, that went to thicken its structure strength[18]. In this way, it was made essential, in the first postwar period, numerous provisions directed to guarantee an opening of career to the personnel that was serving widening, in every case, the base of recruitment of the officers of the corps[19]. An aspect that still needs to be submitted to investigation is the number of the officers that passed from the mobilized army to the corps and the importance that had on the institution. Since the recruitment was only reserved to the lieutenants of the various corps, they could dress again, in the immediate postwar period, the degree of lieutenant or, at maximum, to reach that of captain. This point is important to discover the reflects of the war mentality in the Carabinieri corps.

With the decreto luogotenenziale of April 23rd 1917 had widened the officers structure, through a transitory increasing of the strength, in first place with others four brigadier generals, three colonels and twelve lieutenants colonels[20]. Particularly, the five Royal Carabinieri groups of legion commands established (of which is previously mentioned already) would have been commanded by four brigadier generals plus the brigadier general that till that time had acquitted the functions of appointed to the General Command[21]. The three colonels would have covered the same charges of their camarades by the new "great unities of war", while the lieutenants colonels would have assumed the "commands of division of Royal Carabinieri in the principals centers of the Nation" in relationship to increases the necessity of management of the public order services. As it regarded, instead, the inferior officers it was anticipated an increase of thirty-five captains (of which five for the commands of group of legion) and of sixty subordinates. For these last ones it was not specified the charge that they would have had to cover.

To overcome the problem of the lack of captains, in September 1917, the General Command proposed to the Supreme Command[22] "the suppression of the command of

---

CCRR) for the years 1917, 1918 e 1919.

17 AUSSME, memorie SAUCCRR for the years 1917, 1918 e 1919. In any case, this choice doesn't guarantee a right level training for the personnel who attended the course.

18 Cfr. Ministero della Guerra – Ufficio Statistico, *Statistica* cit.. Analyzing the schedules (pp. 3–20), the full number of Carabinieri officers grew from 797 (in active permanente duty, in temporarily relieved and "ausiliaria") when the war began, up to 1.342 at december 31st 1918. From these numbers we cannot count the officers of the Territorial Militia class (all warrant officers of Carabinieri promoted officers with request at the moment or after the discharge), reserve officers (only two) and reserve reserve officers. We must remember that, during the war, it was awarded twenty-one promotions for war merits to Carabinieri officers.

19 P. Del Negro, *Condizione militare*, in Società Italiana di Storia Militare, *Storia Militare d'Italia 1796 – 1975*, Rome, Editalia, 1990, p. 66.

20 It was established that the strenght growing of the officers should be erased in six months after the peace agreement.

21 Every commander should have for each command one captain, one, warrant officer, one "brigadiere", one "appuntato" and two carabiniers. The troop was only "on foot".

22 AUSSME, foglio n. 46/1, september 9th 1917, Comando Generale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali – Ufficio Mobilitazione.

the Carabinieri by the commands of the army-corps" with the purpose to recover 26 captains to destine "to cover the numerous companies in action deprived of the holder".

The Supreme Command replied suggesting "la promozione da tenente a capitano del numero di ufficiali occorrenti per coprire le attuali vacanze" and the execution "di cambi di capitani dei CC.RR. fra l'interno del Paese e la zona di guerra. Ciò permetterebbe di utilizzare per i comandi territoriali CC.RR., che richiedono maggiore pratica del servizio, i capitani anziani dei CC.RR. che ora sono impiegati in zona di guerra". The commander in second of the corps, general Cauvin, returning on the matter[23], remembered that the "Comando Generale, mentre ha sempre fatto del suo meglio per esaudire qualsiasi richiesta rivoltagli da codesto Supremo Comando, mobilitando i migliori ufficiali dipendenti, di fronte alle difficoltà che si fanno sempre più gravi per assicurare convenientemente il regolare funzionamento del servizio nell'interno del paese, si vede costretto alla maggiore economia di personale in considerazione dei numerosissimi comandi rimasti privi di ufficiali o affidati per necessità di cose a subalterni di scarso valore e rendimento".

It is evident, therefore, that such proposal if from a side it formally resolved the matter lifted by the top management of the corps, from the other one it reduced the everything to a formal aspect around the covered degree while, for the General Command the substantial matter was tied up to the professionalism acquired by a captain during his own career and that he could not simply be replaced raising some lieutenants to the superior degree.

Anyway, the third year of war on the Italian front (1917) imposed a greater attention for the management of the public order, that behaved the necessity to resolve some problems that also interested the Supreme Command. On January 16th 1917 the Minister of war sent a telegram[24] from the alarming tones. In it the minister underlined "situazione interna paese e imprescindibili esigenze ordine pubblico le cui ripercussioni su Esercito mobilitato possono essere gravi e immediate, specie nei riguardi della affluenza alle armi dei nuovi contingenti e della partenza dei complementi". The solution showed was a "rinvio da zona di guerra in paese massimo numero possibile Carabinieri scelti fra elementi più provetti dell'Arma. Detti Carabinieri potranno nei servizi dell'Esercito mobilitato essere sostituiti da Carabinieri aggiunti, preferibilmente tratti da Milizia Territoriale, mentre Carabinieri effettivi sono indispensabili per stazioni piccoli comuni e centri rurali dove si intensifica azione propaganda contro la guerra".

The necessity to guarantee a presence of carabinieri on the national territory had subsequently been resolved foreseeing of urgency to the assumption "in servizio di 12.000 Carabinieri ausiliari da reclutare fra i militari in servizio sia nell'interno del territorio sia presso l'Esercito mobilitato"[25]. Following some problems during the phases of recruitment of the "carabinieri ausiliari", the Government raised some worries on the necessity to guarantee the various demands of public order. Orlando telegraphed April 24th 1917 to

---

23 AUSSME, foglio n. 5/893, october 4th 1917, Comando Generale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali – Ufficio Mobilitazione.

24 AUSSME, telegram n. 5742, Divisione Stato Maggiore – Ministero della Guerra al Comando Supremo.

25 AUSSME, promemoria del Ministero della Guerra indirizzato al Capo Ufficio Ordinamento e Mobilitazione del Comando Supremo, date february 7th 1917.

the Supreme Command, asking of "sollecitare per quanto più è possibile il reclutamento dei 12.000 Carabinieri destinati aumentare la forza per l'ordine interno del Paese [in relazione] alle difficoltà dell'ordine pubblico le quali aumentano sempre più".

Still in September 1917 the Ministry interested the Supreme Command[26], since it held "indispensabile assumere in servizio senza indugio altri 10.000 Carabinieri ausiliari. Per coloro i quali avevano presentato domanda per diventare "Carabinieri *ausiliari* e che, pur risultando idonei, non furono esauditi", to cause evidently of the tall number of forehead questions of the available places, the possibility remained to introduce an analogous question for "to get the passage to Carabinieri *permanent*"[27] on the base of the dispositions by the Minister of the War November 2nd 1918.

THE FIRST POSTWAR PERIOD

The army and the Nation had overcome the test of four years of war with a notable effort in terms of men and materials, above all after the necessary reconstitution of about half army following the defeat of Caporetto[28]. It was grown enormously coming, at the end of the conflict, to have on duty a strength of around 2.858.000 soldiers and 186.000 officers[29]. Also the Royal Carabinieri corps has numerically grown, in consequence of the increased duties that the war had brought with itself.

The period that followed was extremely troubled, not only for the social struggles and politics of the so-called one "biennio rosso"[30] that produced continuous and serious problems of public order, during which the Carabinieri especially in the small centers and in the countries were busy. Besides the Emilia where general strikes and various actions of violence were developed with particular reference to the cities and provinces in Bologna and Modena, problems of public order they were also had to La Spezia, also to Campoligure, Chieti and in the whole Country following the peace agreement of Versailles. They also had "violent Demonstrations were organized by parties extremists, with formations of «red teams» and of «committees of public health». In 1919 serious disorders were had to Novara, Milan, Brescia, Rome, Piombino, Viareggio, Cosenza, Venice, occurred also where accidents between Italian soldiers and French. In the various places of Puglia there were railway strikes and serious unrests. In Piedmont soldiers aggres-

---

26 AUSSME, foglio n. 10575, september 5th 1917, Ministero della Guerra – Segretariato Generale – Divisione Stato Maggiore – Sezione 3ª.

27 AUSSME, circolare n. 24200-G, november 2nd 1918, *Assunzione in servizio di Carabinieri effettivi,* Ministero della Guerra – Segretariato Generale – Divisione Stato Maggiore – Sezione 3ª.

28 Cfr. Giorgio Rochat, *Ufficiali e soldati – L'esercito italiano dalla prima alla seconda guerra mondiale,* Udine, Gaspari editore, 2000, pp. 55–62.

29 Ministero della Difesa – Stato Maggiore Esercito – Ufficio Storico, *L'esercito italiano tra la 1° e la 2° guerra mondiale*, Rome, Tipografia regionale, 1954, p. 7. For a general analisys of the First World War, cfr. Piero Melograni, *Storia politica della Grande Guerra 1915–1918*, Bari, Laterza, 1967, now also Milan, Mondadori, 1998. For the organisation evolution between 1918 and 1926, cfr. F. Stefani, *Storia della dottrina e degli ordinamenti dell'Esercito italiano*, vol. II, tomo I, Roma, 1985 pp. 48–109.

30 For some aspects related to a part of the armed forces and police forces in the period 1919–1922 and for some aspects related to the public order and private security, cfr. Mimmo Franzinelli, *Squadristi*, Milan, Mondadori, 2003 and Jonathan Dunnage, *The Italian Police and the Rise of Fascism: a case study of the Province of Bologna, 1897–1925*, Westport (CT), Praeger Publishers, 1997 and specifically pp. 117–146.

sions, meetings and violent demonstrations. In 1920, to Milan, during an attempt of revolutionary motion (with barricades, violences and lootings) the brigadiere Giuseppe Ugolini was killed because refused to deliver the weapons to the rebels (gold medal to the military valour to the memory). In the same year new disorders and insurrectionary attempts occurred in La Spezia, with assault to the Navy's ammunition depot, during that the carabiniere Leone Carmana defended alone, holding the assailants with the fire of his musket, till the arrive some reinforcements (gold medal to the military valour)"[31].

The internal Nation situation between 1919 and 1921 had assumed the strength of a direct and immediate clash among opposite formations and mainly between socialists and fascist. For instance, speaking of the necessity to guarantee the suitable intervention in subject of public order, the circular of the Minister of the interior Bonomi of December 23rd 1921 prescribed to proceed to the disarmament of the citizens also proceeding to the withdrawal of "strong clubs, animate batons with sharp ferrules and truncheon"[32] also guaranteeing some prizes to the distinguished agents and officials. Besides, the same circular prescribed the break up of armed teams of any parties, with the seizure of the weapons, the occupation of the places of the organization.

There were other services of various nature conducted by the Carabinieri in Italy that it can be summarized in 233 special operations like disorders, strikes et cetera with 43 killed carabinieri and 474 wounded. For individual values, it had given 2 gold medals, 55 silver and 62 bronze medals for bravery and hundreds of citations[33].

The result was that the Fascism, with its advent, maintained narrow links with the top management of the Armed forces[34] in exchange for their support. In this way, it made necessary to impose some correctives to the army in its complexity. They were revealed numerous and they not only behaved changes in the organisation (and to Carabinieri one too), also with the emanation of turned provisions to reorganize the structure of the officers corps. As it has previously been in relief, it suffered, during the conflict, numerous changes and integrations, on the base of an immediate state of necessity apparently without an articulated planning of medium-long period.

The first Postwar period also saw a situation of latent conflict between the Royal Carabinieri Corps and the young "Regio Corpo della Guardia di Pubblica Sicurezza" taken over to the "Corpo delle Guardie di Città" for the transformation in militarist sense wanted by the President of the Council Francesco Saverio Nitti. Particularly, "il problema del riordinamento e del potenziamento delle forze di polizia si era presentato – con il carattere di urgenza che la situazione del Paese richiedeva – già al governo Nitti, nei primi mesi successivi al termine del conflitto. Nell'ottobre 1919 era stato così triplicato, rispetto all'anteguerra, l'organico dell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali, che raggiunse i ses-

---

31 Scuola Ufficiali Carabinieri, *Storia dell'Arma*, Rome, 2001, pp. 125–6.

32 Cfr. the column "Spigolando tra Decreti e Circolari" in "Fiamme d'Argento", a. II, n. 1 – january 1922, pp. 31–32.

33 *Ibidem*. "233 speciali operazioni di servizio, in occasione di sommosse, attentati, conflitti, scioperi, e via dicendo nel corso delle quali caddero in servizio 43 militari e 474 riportarono ferite. Per atti di valore individuale furono concesse 2 medaglie d'oro, 55 d'argento e 62 di bronzo al v.m., nonché centinaia di encomi solenni".

34 Cfr. Giorgio Rochat, *L'esercito italiano da Vittorio Veneto a Mussolini (1919–1925)*, Bari, Laterza, 1967 and Giorgio Rochat – Giulio Massobrio, *Breve Storia dell'Esercito Italiano dal 1861 al 1943*, Turin, Einaudi, 1978, pp. 197–207.

santamila uomini, e, dall'aprile 1920, comprese anche diciotto battaglioni mobili, destinati al mantenimento dell'ordine pubblico. Fu anche militarizzato il Corpo delle «Guardie di Città», il quale assunse la denominazione di «Regia Guardia di Pubblica Sicurezza» (nell'uso comune, «guardia regia»), ed un ordinamento chiaramente modellato su quello adottato, nel 1906, per la Guardia di finanza, comando generale retto da un generale dell'esercito, articolazione in legioni territoriali, oltre a battaglioni mobili e squadroni a cavallo"[35].

Also the Corpo della Guardia di Finanza suffered some organic modifications; with R.D. November 9th 1919, n. 2073 were inserted "nella linea gerarchica un nuovo organo, il «comando di gruppo di legioni» – esistente nell'Arma dei Carabinieri fin dal 1917 – retto da un maggior generale; ne furono istituiti quattro (a Genova, Bologna, Napoli e Palermo) mentre il numero delle legioni fu portato a quattordici. L'organico degli ufficiali, rispetto all'anteguerra, passò da 411 a 694 (di cui sei generali), quello dei sottufficiali da 3.556 a 5.380, quello degli appuntati e dei finanzieri da 14.270 a 20.620"[36].

THE ALBRICCI ORGANISATION (1919)

In other papers the organizational aspect of the army has broadly been faced known under the name of the minister of the period and realised with Regio decreto November 21st 1919[37], so-called "ordinamento Albricci". Together with the reorganization of the armed force, a series of correctives were also introduced for guaranteeing a gradual diminution of the number of officers in "servizio attivo permanente – SAP" (active permanent duty). A second chance to allow the officers reentry in the civil society was offered by the transit in the "*Regia Guardia o altre attività estranee all'esercito*"[38] and Carabinieri also.

This seems to be the key point of the Regio decreto of November 20th 1919 n. 2276 ("Reclutamento degli ufficiali subalterni effettivi dell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali"). The decree modified the law March 21st 1915, n. 301 on the promotion of the Italian Army. It was established that in the Carabinieri corps the organisation of the junior officers would have been completed (art. 1) "*one third from noncommissioned officers of the corps promoted second lieutenants and two third from permanent or complement lieutenants caming by infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineer corp*"[39] provided of the requisite provided for the regulation for the execution of the law on the promotion. The innovations of the law in comparison to that of pre-war are evident from the percentages were capsized among the personnel coming from the noncommissioned officers and from the lieutenants of the various corps in favor of these ones. Besides, It was admitted in the Royal

---

35 Pier Paolo Meccariello, *Storia della Guardia di Finanza*, Florence, Le Monnier, 2003, p. 148.

36 Pier Paolo Meccariello, *Storia della Guardia di Finanza* cit., p. 151.

37 Cfr. G. Rochat, *L'esercito* cit., pp. 129 – 154 and Ministero della Difesa – Stato Maggiore Esercito – Ufficio Storico, *L'esercito italiano tra il 1° e la 2° guerra mondiale*, Rome, Tipografia regionale, 1954, p. 31.

38 Cfr. G. Rochat, *L'esercito* cit., p. 152.

39 Regio decreto 20 novembre 1919, n. 2276, for the recruitment of the permanent service junior officer of the Carabinieri corps.

Carabinieri officers corps also reserve's lieutenants (ufficiali di complemento), as evident tangible identification mark for the activities managed during the war period[40].

A further explanation to the law dispositions could be linked to the necessity to guarantee an easier reentry in the society of the complement officers offering them the possibility to move to the Carabinieri on the basis of the request by the General Command to admit an elevated number of officers in SAP[41].

After the Regio decreto appeared in the "Giornale Militare Ufficiale"[42], there were published also the executive norms. For the complement officers the limits for the transit in the corps were exclusively tied to the age (not over 28 y.o.) and to the period of service in war zone (18 months).

The interventions for the corps when the Ministry of war was general Albricci also concerned other aspects, the main point of which it was the reorganisation of the Royal Carabinieri corps (Regio decreto October 2nd 1919, n. 1802). Besides including the reorganisation of the institution its "*officers cadets school*", it established in 1057[43] the total number of the officers of the corps. It must be remembered that, on the basis of this and the decreto n. 2143 of November 21st 1919 with which the whole Armed force was re-organised, the Royal Carabinieri corps included "the general command, 7 commands of group legions, 22 legions (10 in more in comparison to the old structure), 1 officers cadets school and 1 noncommissioned officers cadets school"[44]. Particularly, the institution of the three territorial legions was confirmed (Genoa, Catanzaro and Messina) after their foundation with the decreto luogotenenziale n. 1314 of October 5th 1916[45]. Moreover, "nell'immediato dopoguerra furono poi costituite due legioni territoriali provvisorie (Trento e Trieste) e fissato un nuovo organico […] che in pratica triplicò gli effettivi dell'arma"[46].

The First World war has raisen the number of the officers of 384 unities[47].

Consequently it assisted to an increase of seven general (major and brigadier), twelve colonels, fifty lieutenants colonels, fifty majors, one hundred thirty captains, one hundred fifty-two lieutenants and eighteen sottotenentis.

The increasing of the strengh can be probably connected to the demands to guaran-

---

40 Another reason should be "*far fronte alle mutate esigenze derivanti dall'aumento degli organici dell'arma*", in Cesare Manzoni, *Ordinamento dell'esercito metropolitano delle forze coloniali e dei corpi armati*, Turin, Società Tipografico-Editrice Nazionale, 1923, pp. 60–61.

41 Cfr. Piero Del Negro, *La mobilitazione di guerra e la società italiana (1915–1918)*, in "Il Risorgimento", a. XLIV, n. 1–1992, p. 21.

42 G.M.U., 1920, dispensa 80ª, circolare 672, pp. 988–989.

43 1 Lieutenant general commander, 1 lieutenant general, 4 major general, 4 brigadier general, 25 colonels, 71 lieutenant colonels, 100 majors, 338 captains, 412 lieutenants, 100 second lieutenants and 1 director of the music band.

44 Ministero della Difesa – Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito – Ufficio Storico, *L'Esercito italiano tra la 1° e la 2° Guerra Mondiale*, Rome, tipografia regionale, 1954, p. 31.

45 Oreste Bovio, *Storia dell'Esercito Italiano (1861–1990)*, Rome, Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito – Ufficio Storico, 1996, p. 245.

46 *Ibidem*.

47 The difference is estimated comparing the strengh in the Spingardi organisation (1912) two generals too. These last officers were non calculated in the Carabinieri corps but in the General Staff strength. It has not calculated the General commander of the Carabinieri.

tee the officers for the management and the control of the Carabinieri mobilized unities during the conflict that they converged in the structure reorganization of the corps subsequently.

THE BONOMI ORGANISATION (1920)

For this paper, from the Bonomi organisation[48] it can be useful known some data, the first one among everything is that the organisation of the corps didn't suffer some contraction unlike what happened to the others structures and units of the Army. Rather, with decreto of May 2nd 1920, foundation of Carabinieri 18 mobile battalions, spreading out the army from normal public order in Italy[49]. In remuneration, the growing of the officers[50] number reached 1291 unities, with an increase of two hundred thirty four plus one unit (the more one is reported to the General Commander that was not inserted in 1920 in structure of the corps). In generale, it was provided for one major General commanding in 2nd, eight brigadier Generals, twenty-one Colonels, ninety Lieutenants Colonels, one hundred majors, three hundred fifty-nine captains, six hundred seventy-four Lieutenants and second lieutenants and one Chief of the carabinieri music. Through the new and provisional organisation of the Italian army, the corps increased the organic strength of six Colonels, nineteen Lieutenants Colonels, twenty-seven majors, twenty-one Captains, one hundred sixty-two other officers (Lieutenants and second lieutenants).

This was also the period in which there were "*delle reclute assorbite dai corpi di polizia*" poiché "*l'ampliamento dell'arma dei carabinieri e la costituzione della guardia regia si erano svolti nel 1919–20 sottraendo militari addestrati ai reparti dell'esercito*"[51].

Besides, continuing with the recruitment of the officers of the army, it was widened the base of recruitment of the officers, with the Regio decreto of February 20th 1921, n. 228 (it modified the paragraph 55 of the regulation for the execution of the law on the promotion of the Italian army, approved with R.d. July 21st 1907, n. 626), which provided for *all* the noncommissioned officers of the corps that they could compete for the admission to the School, with some specific requirements[52].

The change assumes interest because in this way, at least under the formal profile, *whatever* noncommissioned officer in possession of those requisites could access to the course by the Officers cadets School. In every case, there was however the release of the

---

48 Regio decreto april 20th 1920, n. 451, about the temporary organisation of the Italian Army. Cfr. Ministero della Difesa – Stato Maggiore Esercito – Ufficio Storico, *L'Esercito Italiano* cit., p. 38.

49 O. Bovio, *Storia dell'Esercito Italiano* cit., p. 247, "autorizzò la costituzione di 18 battaglioni mobili autonomi, ciascuno su 3 compagnie appiedate e 1 di ciclisti, liberando le unità dell'esercito dal sempre poco gradito impiego in ordine pubblico. E questa «benemerenza» gli deve essere riconosciuta". Every battalion was composed by 750 personnel. The units were erased in 1923 with the foundation of the Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale. Cfr. Scuola Ufficiali Carabinieri, *Storia dell'Arma* cit., p. 126.

50 Ministero della Difesa – Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito – Ufficio Storico, *L'Esercito italiano tra la 1° e la 2° Guerra Mondiale* cit., pp. 35–41.

51 Cfr. G. Rochat, *L'esercito* cit., p. 286.

52 Two years of active duty as Nco, six months, at least, as carabinieri station commander, non more than 34 y.o.; one year of active duty as Nco "*trascorso in effettivo servizio d'istituto*", if the candidate had the high school degree; moreover the personnel must be valued as deserving to be promoted officer.

judgment from the commissions in charge to value the promotion proposals. A last interesting aspect, that represents an important innovation of the period, has been given for one year of service for noncommissioned officer if the competitor was in possession of an high school license.

The corps of Royal Carabinieri was growing and showed it in this period, finally, starting with the didactic activities by the Noncommissioned officers cadets School with its foundation in Florence inside the convent of Saint Maria Novella[53].

In effects, the necessity to gather all the noncommissioned officers cadets in one only center to guarantee them a homogeneous formation had already been decided during the First World war when the School had been founded but, because of problems of various nature, this not could begin its own activities before April 11th 1920. In every case, scholastic activities aroused the appreciation of a Minister of the War "civil", as mister Gasparotto[54].

THE CONTRAST ASPECTS FOR THE PUBLIC ORDER MAINTAINING, THE "MARCIA SU ROMA" AND THE END OF LIBERAL ITALY

I think it is very important to give an idea of the laws in the following period even if it is out of the time period of the paper.

"The first government Mussolini, while it took advantage of the adhesion and the collaboration of all the sectors of the Italian top management class and while he was continuing to use the support of all the bureaucratic apparatus structure of the State, it began a restructuring of the block of dominant power in Italy. […] as every other «strong» government of united Italy, Mussolini immediately realized a vast movement of prefects between the November 1922 and the February 1923 using the transfers and of the institute of the retirement, introducing in the prefecture personal only rarely some fascists, but preferring applies military of career, especially in the southern regions"[55].

"Then the political situation had stabilized and the general Diaz had called to the ministry of the War in the first government Mussolini (October 31st 1922). […] Diaz went to Mussolini on December 26th to remember him the appointment to approve an organisation of the army bigger than that of Bonomi and to confirm that to the militia would have had to be attributed only extra military functions. January 7th 1923 was promulgate, as a matter of fact, the decree that fixed the new organisation of the army, the 14th

---

53 *La Scuola Allievi Sottufficiali*, in "Fiamme d'Argento", a. I, n. 1 – december 1921, pp. 23–27.

54 Ivi, p. 27.

55 *Ibidem*. "Il primo governo Mussolini, mentre si giovava dell'adesione e della collaborazione di tutti i settori della classe dirigente italiana e mentre continuava ad avvalersi dell'apporto di tutti i gangli dell'apparato burocratico dello Stato, dava inizio ad una ristrutturazione del blocco di potere dominante in Italia. […] come ogni altro governo «forte» dell'Italia unita, Mussolini realizzò immediatamente un vasto movimento di prefetti tra il novembre 1922 e il febbraio 1923 avvalendosi dei trasferimenti e dell'istituto del collocamento a riposo, immettendo nel personale prefettizio solo in casi sporadici dei fascisti, ma preferendo ricorre, soprattutto nelle regioni meridionali, a militari di carriera". From this it is obvously that "l'azione immediata dei prefetti fu rivolta a continuare l'opera di disarticolazione del movimento operaio organizzato nei suoi centri di potere locale già perseguita dallo squadrismo, perfezionandola". Particularly, "The immediate action of the prefects was turned to continue the work of disarticulation of the workers movement organized in its local power centers already pursued by the squadrismo, improving it."

of the same month another Regio decreto founded the "Milizia volontaria per la sicurezza nazionale (MVSN)", legalizing in such way a party's militia whose principal performs was the defense of the fascist regime. Organization, recruitment and command of such new formation were of competence of the head of the government. The army had satisfied."[56].

Many laws had been signed by the minister of the War, general Armando Diaz, mainly included the reorganization of the army; for this general « l'adozione nel 1920 di una ferma di otto mesi e di un tasso di reclutamento del personale militare uguale a quello del conflitto, furono eliminati quando le Forze armate abbandonarono le posizioni più "democratiche" per assumere posizioni chiaramente di destra, ritornando così ad una situazione di maggiore allargamento del corpo ufficiali creando, conseguentemente, un arenamento delle carriere»[57]. Nevertheless, it must be shown, that in these years it was possible thinning the officer corps inflated during the war with the immission of personnel in other organizations as, for instance, the Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale.

It is possible to summarize the Diaz activities in this way: "The basis measures were realized with unusual rapidity: the decreti on the army organisation and service duty are of january 7th 1923, those on the constitution of the highest commands of 11 January [...] these first activities were followed during 1923 by numerous others, that rearranged all the army corps and services, so that to set term to the state of uncertainty"[58], so that the army's reorganization conducted that year was "*exclusive work of its highest hierarchies.*"

The number of the officers of the Carabinieri, with the new organisation chart, rose to 1391[59] units (art. 9) reported to the senior and junior officers, to which a division/army-

---

56   O. Bovio, Storia dell'Esercito Italiano cit., p. 249. "La situazione politica poi si stabilizzò ed il generale Diaz fu chiamato al dicastero della Guerra nel primo ministero Mussolini (31 ottobre 1922). [...] Diaz si recò da Mussolini il 26 dicembre per ricordargli l'impegno ad approvare un ordinamento dell'esercito più ampio di quello Bonomi e per ribadire che alla milizia avrebbero dovuto essere attribuite solo funzioni extra militari. Il 7 gennaio 1923 fu emanato, infatti, il decreto che fissava il nuovo ordinamento dell'esercito, il 14 dello stesso mese un altro regio decreto istituiva la "milizia volontaria per la sicurezza nazionale (MVSN)", legalizzando in tal modo una milizia di partito il cui compito principale era la difesa del regime fascista. Organizzazione, reclutamento e comando di tale nuova formazione erano di competenza del capo del governo. L'esercito si ritenne soddisfatto".

57   P. Del Negro, *Condizione Militare*, in Società Italiana di Storia Militare, op. cit., p. 66. «the adoption in the 1920 of a eight months service and a recruitment rate of the military personnel on tha same level of the war period was eliminated when the Armed forces abandoned the more "democratic" positions to assume clearly right-wing positions, returning to a situation of greater widening of the officer corps creating, consequently, a stranding of the careers».

58   Cfr. G. Rochat, *L'esercito* cit., pp. 461 e 463. but P. Pieri – G. Rochat, *Pietro Badoglio Maresciallo d'Italia*, Milan, Mondadori, 2002, pp. 343–346, too. The same author underlines that "Diaz aveva impostato un ordinamento [...] tale da «sistemare» tutti gli ufficiali in soprappiù", cfr. G. Rochat, *L'Esercito italiano in pace e in guerra – studi di storia militare*, Milan, RARA, 1991, p 25. "I provvedimenti base furono concretati con rapidità inconsueta: i decreti sull'ordinamento dell'esercito e sulla durata della ferma sono del 7 gennaio 1923, quelli sulla costituzione degli alti comandi dell'11 gennaio [...] questi primi provvedimenti furono seguiti nel corso del 1923 da numerosi altri, che riordinarono tutti i corpi ed i servizi dell'esercito, in modo da porre termine allo stato di incertezza".

59   It were provided for the following organisation positions: 26 colonels, 75 lieutenant colonels, 109 majors, 376 captains, 804 lieutenants and second lieutenants, in addition to the chief of the Carabinieri music band. In comparison with the Bonomi organisation, there are 5 colonels, 15 lieutenant colonels, 17 captains minus, with the increasing of 18 major positions and 130 in the ranks of lieutenants and second lieutenants.

corps general must General Commander, a General of Division commander in 2nd, eight brigadier general[60]. In this way, close to 16.500 officers of career and 3.500 of complement of the army, the policemen maintained on call 1401 officers[61].

With the reorganization of the police forces happened with R.d. December 31st 1922, n. 1680, the Carabinieri officers' number, following the transit from the personnel to the Regia Guardia per la Pubblica Sicurezza in the Carabinieri climbed to 1400 but always with the exclusion of those putted in the organisation one of the Colonial Troops Royal Corps and those that covered positions assigned to official out of the organisation charts. The same regio decreto also dissolved the "corpo degli agenti di investigazione" that was absorbed in the new specialized role of the Carabinieri.

As it regarded the organisation, "oltre al comando generale dell'arma comprendeva: 7 comandi di gruppo legioni, 1 comando di gruppo scuole e legioni allievi (in più rispetto all'ordinamento Bonomi), 21 legioni territoriali e 1 legione allievi, 1 scuola allievi ufficiali, 1 scuola allievi sottufficiali, 12 battaglioni mobili e 2 squadroni"[62].

The interventions on the organisation of the officers and on the one of the corps, however, were managed continuously. In fact, the absorption of the dissolved "corpo della Regia Guardia per la Pubblica Sicurezza" conducted to a new changement with the Regio decreto february 25th 1923, n. 448 "that brings some modifications to the R. decreto january 7th 1923 n. 12, on the organisation of the army and specifically to the Royal Carabinieri corps" (in G.M.U. circ. n. 137). For the training structure was founded a Group Command of cadets schools and legions, a second royal carabinieri cadets legion[63], with a new barracks in Turin and one "*technical school of police for the qualification to the specialized services in civil clothes.*" This Group Command that had not been anticipated in the precedents organisations, was probably constituted for conforming the teachings and training in all the schools (officiers cadets, noncommissioned officers cadets and technical of police) and in the cadets legions (Rome and Turin). The general of brigade commander, Palizzolo of Ramione Baron Comm. Joseph[64], had his own office inside the General Command.

Speaking about the organisation of the officers, this one was raised of other twenty-eight personnel[65]. Altogether the senior and junior officers raised to 1419 units (to which

---

60 Cfr. R.d. january 21st 1923, in G.M.U. circ. n. 44, "che approva la tabella graduale e numerica dello Stato Maggiore Generale del R. Esercito". Totally the decree fixed the strengh to 1401 officers.

61 Cfr. G. Rochat, *L'esercito* cit., p. 262–263.

62 Ministero della Difesa – Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito – Ufficio Storico, *L'Esercito italiano tra la 1° e la 2° Guerra Mondiale* cit., p. 52. "except the general command of the corps there were: 7 commands of group legions, 1 command of group schools and legions cadets (more in comparison to the Bonomi organisation), 21 territorial legions and 1 cadet legion, 1 officers cadets school, 1 noncommissioned officers cadets school, 12 mobile battalions and 2 squadrons."

63 Cfr. C. Manzoni, op. cit., pp. 14 e 58.

64 Palizzolo di Ramione had commanded yet, with the rank of colonel, the NCOs cadets school, from its foundation (1st march 1920) to the promotion to general (R.d. 8 ottobre 1922). Cfr. AUSSME, Repertorio A-1, Fondo Memorie Storiche, 0548, Scuola Allievi Sottufficiali Carabinieri Reali, Memorie storiche per gli anni 1920–21 e 1922.

65 The increasing of "ordinary" role of officers established 1 colonel, 2 lieutenant colonels, 2 majors, 18 captains e 5 lieutenants or second lieutenants.

we must add 10 generals) excluded the one hundred eight junior officers organised in the specialized role.

Besides, "close to the creation of the Gran Consiglio, the breakup of the "squadre d'azione" and the constitution, according to the suggestion of the Gran Consiglio and with government decree of December 28th 1922, of the Milizia volontaria per la sicurezza nazionale, which the organisation of the effaced "Guardia Regia". […] Meaningfully, the general Emilio De Bono, one of the quadrumviris of the "marcia su Roma", unified in his person the positions of head of the police and commander of the Milizia"[66].

Generally it is well understandable that Diaz interventions also reverberated on the re-organization of the police forces, anterior (R.d. December 31st 1922, n. 1680, "reform and unification of the police armed corps") to his reorganisation of the army.

THE END OF THE OFFICERS CADETS SCHOOL

A very important aspect was tied up to the opening of the Infantry and Cavalry academy for the noncommissioned officers of the Carabinieri and this opening had the consequence to close the Royal Carabinieri Officers cadets School. It had been founded with law december 30th 1906 ns. 690 to allow an university level formation for the noncommissioned officers cadets that had passed a concourse and that had been select to become officers. The charges for the School activities were loaded to the Minister of the Interior budget that also chose the teachers. Well, later over eighteen years of efficient and qualified job, starting from the academic year 1924–1925, with the Regio decreto of December 30th 1923, n. 2986, "the officers' recruitment on active permanent service", was granted to the noncommissioned officers of the Carabinieri the possibility to access the "special course" by the Infantry and Cavalry Military academy in Modena (art. 2) providing for, at the same time, "*the last admission of noncommissioned officers in the royal carabinieri officers cadets school*" (art. 13).

To be honest, the losing of competences between the Royal Carabinieri officers cadets School and the Noncommissioned officers one had already happened a few times before (1921), in Florence, center of formation of the noncommissioned officers cadets, with the integration courses for the lieutenants of the army admitted in the Carabinieri after the first world war[67], even if it generally is considered an orders passage of the officers training, because the Officers cadets School activities stopped would have been absorbed, *in toto*, from the Military academy in Modena[68].

---

66 E. RAGIONIERI, *La storia politica e sociale* cit., p. 2127. "Accanto alla creazione del Gran Consiglio, va segnalato lo scioglimento delle squadre d'azione e la costituzione, su proposta del Gran Consiglio e con decreto governativo del 28 dicembre 1922, della Milizia volontaria per la sicurezza nazionale, cui furono affidati i compiti della disciolta Guardia Regia. […] Significativamente il generale Emilio De Bono, uno dei quadrumviri della marcia su Roma, unificava nella sua persona le cariche di capo della polizia e di comandante della Milizia".

67 About this point for another analisys, cfr. ENTE EDITORIALE DELL'ARMA DEI CARABINIERI, *I Carabinieri – 1814 – 1980*, Rome, p. 393.

68 By Paolo Di Paolo, on the contrary, "*conseguentemente* [with the new special courses for Carabinieri NCOs in the Academy] *la "Scuola Allievi Ufficiali dei Carabinieri" divenne di fatto soltanto Scuola d'Arma o di Applicazione, nella quale cominciarono a svolgersi corsi di abilitazione per ufficiali (non più allievi ufficiali) dei Carabinieri*". Cfr. PAOLO DI PAOLO (a cura di), *Abbecedario del carabiniere – Dizionario storico essenziale per la conoscenza dell'Arma*, Rome, Comando Generale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri, 1996, p. 286.

With the Infantry and Cavalry Military academy opening to the noncommissioned officers of the carabinieri, after twenty years[69] the General Command decided to close the autonomous institute for the training of the future second lieutenantss, that grasped between the courses by the ducal building (center of the Military academy) and the Florentine monastery (center of the Noncommissioned officers School, then CC.RR. Central School). So the school for second lieutenant stopped existing giving the competences of the carabinieri in the field of the training of the officers to the Royal Carabinieri Central School in Florence.

It appears clear the engagement to raise the formation of the future officers received by the officers cadets School with university level, highest for quality and level of the teachers to that of the Military academy in Modena. Many factors pushed the General Command to choose the new Noncommissioned officers School and the academy of Infantry and Cavalry as centers for the officers' training. We can summarize with the necessity of: to guarantee a whole the formation of the future officers; to overcome the lack of the premises for the School in Rome; to conduct an activity of updating for the greater part of the officers as it happened in the other corps and services of the army; and to escape the choice of the non military teachers to the Minister of the Interior as to that moment was happened.

CONCLUSIONS

It is important to underline that the Royal Carabinieri corps re-structured after the First World War is more "military" of that it had been during the "giolitti" period (1900–1914). The officers, noncommissioned officers and carabinieri put inside the mobilized army permitted them to approach the top management and the mentality of the army pushing to get a greater separation of the corps from the Minister of the Interior.

The general situation of Italy in those years had seen the Carabinieri to be between the two principal fires of the political struggle. More a carabiniere (Giovanni Burocchi) had been murdered by some legionaries fiumani after the deviation of a steamboat to conduct it to Fiume.

On the same time, cause the difficulties connected to assure the public order the Carabinieri corps grew a lot and, after the raising of the Fascism with the "marcia su Roma", lived when at same time the Fascism decided to erase the Regia Guardia di Pubblica Sicurezza, wrongly or not, because it was thought of opponent that political movement.

RESUMÉ

Flavio Carbone: Vojenský vplyv víťazstva alebo porážky na politickú a sociálnu štruktúru krajiny. Vplyv víťazstva v 1. svetovej vojne na kráľovských karabinierov v Taliansku 1919 – 1922

Tento príspevok sa zamýšľa nad vývojom zboru kráľovských karabinierov po prvej svetovej vojne. Je veľ-

---

69 Paolo Di Paolo wrote, on the contrary, "*quasi 17 anni*". Cfr. Paolo Di Paolo (a cura di), *Abbecedario* op. cit., p. 287.

mi dôležité zamerať pozornosť na vývoj organizácie a štruktúry zboru karabinierov a zvlášť na transformáciu výcviku dôstojníkov a poddôstojníkov kráľovských karabinierov.

Prínos karabinierov v 1. svetovej vojne, na fronte a v talianskej vláde bol veľmi intenzívny. Počet ich príslušníkov sa zvýšil z viac ako 20 000 až na 32 000. Musíme si uvedomiť aj to, že sa vyskytli niektoré problémy počas takzvaného "biennio rosso" pri riadení verejného poriadku a bezpečnosti, keď sa vynorili iné problémy, spojené s krízou vo Fiume, a pochod na Ronchi s "nacionalistickou" okupáciou mesta Fiume vedenou Gabrielom D'Annunziom.

Po týchto ťažkostiach bol zbor karabinierov reorganizovaný tak, aby dosiahol nové ciele regrutovaním mnohých dôstojníkov a vojakov, čo pre nich znamenalo novú kariéru.

Súčasne rástla štruktúra s novou úrovňou velenia, ako je velenie skupín légií vedené brigádnymi generálmi a nadáciou poddôstojníckej školy vo Florencii. Zbor karabinierov bol zapojený aj do troch významných znížení počtov v armáde s organizáciami Albricci (1919), Bonomi (1920) a Diaz (1923) a súčasne došlo k nárastu jednotiek karabinierov.

Veľmi dôležitý aspekt sa spája s výcvikovými aktivitami kadetskej školy kráľovských dôstojníkov karabinierov zameranými na prijímanie poddôstojníkov karabinierov do Vojenskej akadémie v Modene.

Treba zdôrazniť, že kráľovský karabiniersky zbor reštruktúrovaný po 1. svetovej vojne je väčšmi "vojenský", ako bol počas obdobia "Giolitti" (1900 – 1914). Dôstojníci, poddôstojníci a karabinieri zaradení do mobilizovanej armády umožnili ich priblíženie k hlavnému veleniu, čím sa charakter armády vzdialil od zborov ministerstva vnútra.

Les forces armées canadiennes après la Seconde Guerre mondiale:
douce victoire, amers lendemains, 1945–1962

Dr. Richard Carrier

La Seconde Guerre mondiale est une «bonne guerre» pour le Canada. Un effort prodigieux permet le développement d'une force militaire spectaculaire qui dépasse largement l'influence politique du pays entre 1940 et 1945. La douce victoire de 1945 crée deux illusions très tenaces.

La première est la croyance chez les militaires que le pays est devenu une puissance militaire importante et qu'il est normal qu'il le reste dans les années d'après-guerre. Bien sûr, personne ne croit que le Canada peut avoir les mêmes effectifs et moyens militaires qu'en mai 1945. Mais pour certains, l'après-guerre permet enfin d'envisager la mise sur pied d'une force professionnelle composée de plus de cent mille hommes et disponible dans le meilleur état de préparation. Les armées de citoyens de la Grande Guerre et de la guerre de 1939–1945 sont choses du passé. Une force militaire professionnelle imposante est le seul moyen d'éviter à nouveau des entrées en guerre chaotiques et improvisées et ainsi de sauver la vie des jeunes Canadiens.

La seconde illusion est encore plus profonde. L'immense effort humain et matériel consenti par le pays entre 1940 et 1945 doit faire réaliser aux Canadiens et à leurs gouvernements la suprême importance des questions de défense et de préparation à la guerre. Une force armée nombreuse en parfait état de préparation et soutenue par la population et le gouvernement est un gage de sécurité. À cette fin, les Canadiens doivent donner un appui quasi inconditionnel à leurs militaires, accepter ce qu'ils demandent, allouer les moyens financiers que ces derniers estiment nécessaires à la défense du pays. À titre de professionnels de la guerre, ils sont les seuls à savoir quels sont les besoins du pays en termes de financement, de matériel et d'effectifs militaires, mais aussi en termes de menaces à la sécurité nationale.

Ces deux illusions sont de fâcheuses et décevantes déformations de la réalité. Après

1945, le Canada n'est plus une puissance militaire de premier plan. La puissance militaire atteinte entre 1940 et 1945 est un accident historique lié à la nature du conflit[1]. Le phénomène, selon toute probabilité, ne peut guère se reproduire dans les années de l'après-guerre et durant la Guerre froide. Les chefs militaires ne comprennent pas cette réalité et souhaitent disposer d'une force militaire imposante et puissante. Or, dans les décennies postérieures à 1945, le rôle politique international du Canada prend une nouvelle dimension, plus développée que son rôle militaire. C'est le retour de la prépondérance du politique sur le militaire. De plus, la relative démilitarisation des sociétés occidentales depuis les années 1960 n'épargne pas l'institution militaire canadienne. Les valeurs militaires ne sont guère à la mode après 1945[2].

La seconde illusion est une autre source de déception. Les militaires et leurs supporteurs ne comprennent pas que les Canadiens veulent revenir à leurs préoccupations premières après le conflit. Il en est ainsi dans les sociétés démocratiques. L'emploi, la santé, la prospérité générale de la nation reprennent leur place dans les priorités des Canadiens. Leurs soucis quant à la défense et la sécurité sont réels mais étroitement liés aux conjonctures nationales et internationales. La lecture faite par les citoyens et leurs gouvernements de ces circonstances est plus adéquate que celle des militaires, et cette distance a rarement été comblée. Elle est à l'origine de cette idée malsaine, entretenue par certains cercles, selon laquelle les Canadiens et leurs politiciens sont en général négligents à l'égard de la sécurité du pays. Pis encore, que les Canadiens sont des pacifistes naïfs. La double idée, habilement alimentée au fil des décennies, permet même de demander «who killed the Canadian Military»[3]?

Mais les Canadiens ne sont pas dupes. Ils comprennent les menaces que représentent l'Union soviétique de Staline et de Khrouchtchev ou la Chine communiste de Mao Tsé Toung[4]. Ils appuient le rôle joué par la Canada sur la scène internationale et dans les missions relatives à la paix et paient le prix humain et financier de leur sécurité *lorsque nécessaire*. Leurs gouvernements analysent les événements nationaux et internationaux en termes assez justes, même si souvent ils sont malhabiles à les traduire en politiques de défense astucieuses. Si les militaires ont le sentiment récurrent d'être abandonnés par leurs citoyens et leurs gouvernements depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, c'est en partie à cause de leur manque de finesse politique et intellectuelle. La logique de Michael Howard leur échappe complètement:

> "The military have the obligation to state their requirements with clarity and moderation. Like all demands of public expenditure they will, very properly, be contested and scrutinized. Vociferous minorities will remain stubbornly unconvinced of their necessity. But there is nothing inherent in the structure of our societies or in the nature of our political systems to prevent them from being met".[5]

---

1   J'entends par accident historique un événement dont les causes se trouvent dans son propre déroulement.
2   Michael Howard, *La guerre dans l'histoire de l'Occident*, Fayard, 1988, p. 153.
3   Jack. L. Granatstein, *Who killed the Canadian Military?*, HarperCollins, 2004.
4   Ou plus récemment, la menace terroriste et l'organisation de Bin Laden.
5   Michael Howard, *The Causes of Wars*, Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 84.

Il est permis de croire que personne n'a «tué» les forces armées canadiennes. Les prochaines pages cherchent à expliquer pourquoi.

PUISSANCE MILITAIRE ET RÔLE POLITIQUE À LA FIN DE LA GUERRE

Il est difficile de comprendre les hauts et les bas de l'institution militaire de l'après-guerre si on ne porte pas un bref regard sur la puissance militaire du Canada en 1945. Ce moment d'apogée est un point de départ incontournable. Il forge des mentalités et des attitudes difficiles à déboulonner.

À la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le Canada est une puissance de premier plan. Parmi les puissances victorieuses, seuls les États-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne et l'URSS déploient des effectifs et moyens militaires plus importants[6]. Durant le conflit, l'armée enrôle 730 159 hommes et femmes, la marine, 106 522 et la force aérienne, 249 662[7]. Au total plus d'un million de Canadiens portent l'uniforme, soit près de dix pour cent de la population. Le bond effectué en termes de mobilisation humaine est spectaculaire: en 1939, les trois armes combinent à peine 9 000 hommes en service actif sur une population de 11 267 000[8].

Au-delà des effectifs et de l'effort matériel, les forces canadiennes jouent un rôle important dans la reconquête de l'Europe à partir de 1943. La participation aux opérations en Italie et dans le Nord-est du continent met en évidence les qualités difficilement acquises des troupes canadiennes. Elles jouent un rôle de premier plan dans la campagne puis la victoire de Normandie[9]. La libération des Pays-Bas, un autre fait d'armes, démontre encore une fois le savoir-faire des soldats et officiers canadiens.

On ne peut passer sous silence le rôle politique effacé du Canada pendant le conflit. William Lyon Mackenzie King mène la guerre en minimisant les pertes humaines et en ménageant les Canadiens les plus réticents à la participation au conflit. Le premier ministre canadien comprend bien la position d'une «moyenne puissance»[10]. Il sait que la contribution à la victoire est significative mais moindre que celles de la Grande-Bretagne ou des États-Unis, deux grandes puissances. Il sait que le Canada doit consentir à des actions militaires conçues sans son avis ou son consentement. King accepte donc, dans les faits, le rôle de second violon et abandonne à Churchill et Roosevelt la direction politico-stratégique de la guerre. Rarement un effort économique et militaire d'une si grande importance a été combiné à un rôle politique aussi discret.

La participation canadienne au second conflit mondial se termine donc avec le sentiment du devoir accompli. Comme lors de la Grande Guerre, le Canada joue un rôle mili-

---

6   Il faut probablement ajouter la Chine à la liste des grandes puissances militaires en 1945, bien qu'il soit plus difficile d'avoir une idée claire des effectifs et des moyens qu'elle aligne à ce moment.

7   Jack. L. Granatstein, "Canada", in I. C. B. Dear et M. R. D. Foot, *The Oxford Companion to World War II*, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 185.

8   F. H. Leacy (ed), *Statistiques historiques du Canada, 2ᵉ édition*, Ministère des Approvisionnements et Services Canada, 1983, D124–133.

9   Terry Copp, *Fields of Fire. The Canadians in Normandy*, University of Toronto Press, 2004.

10   Sur cette question de la conduite de la guerre et du rôle politique du Canada, C.P. Stacey, *Armes, hommes et gouvernements. Les politiques de guerre du Canada, 1939–1945*, Ministère de la défense nationale, 1970, pp. 151–223.

taire qui dépasse son importance politique. Mais plus encore que le dominion de 1914, le jeune État souverain de 1939 démontre une impressionnante capacité d'adaptation économique et militaire.

DUR RETOUR À LA RÉALITÉ, 1945–1948

Dès 1945, le Canada amorce, comme les autres pays victorieux, la démobilisation[11]. Granatstein note:

> «The Canadian Army that emerged from the Second World War disappeared with amazing rapidity, exactly as the Canadian Corps had in 1919. The professionals of 1945, whether the Permanent Force, Militia, or civilians who served, got on with their lives as quickly as they could."[12]

Malgré cette démobilisation massive, les effectifs militaires combinés de 1946 sont encore nombreux: un peu plus de 200 000 hommes. Ils chutent à moins de 50 000 en 1947 et se maintiennent sous ce chiffre jusqu'en 1951[13]. Le pays ne fait pas que démobiliser: il se retire également du vieux continent. Au printemps 1946, les troupes canadiennes qui participent à l'occupation de l'Allemagne rentrent au pays et celles qui sont encore présentes aux Pays-Bas font de même à la grande déception du gouvernement britannique[14]. L'immédiate sortie de guerre du Canada est consommée.

L'institution militaire canadienne est victime de sa première illusion en 1945 lorsqu'elle propose la mise en place d'une force militaire de temps de paix composée de forces régulières et, pour la première fois de l'histoire du pays, de conscrits. L'idée d'établir un service militaire obligatoire n'est pas morte avec la fin du second conflit mondial[15]. L'armée conçoit le plan G en 1945 et le présente au ministre de la défense nationale en juin de la même année. Le plan prévoit une force terrestre de 55 788 hommes en service permanent (force régulière) et une force de réserve de près de 180 000 hommes. La plus grande partie des effectifs proviendrait d'un entraînement militaire obligatoire d'une durée de 12 mois suivi d'une période de service dans la force de réserve[16].

Le plan G reçoit un accueil glacial de la part du gouvernement. King le trouve "per-

11 Les démobilisations britannique et américaine sont tout aussi importantes: en mai 1945 on trouve 1 300 000 soldats britanniques et 3 000 000 de soldats américains en Europe; douze mois plus tard ils sont respectivement 488 000 et 391 000.

12 Jack L. Granatstein, *Canada's Army. Waging War and Keeping the Peace*, University of Toronto Press, 2002, p. 311.

13 Granatstein, *Who killed the Canadian Military?*, p. 243.

14 Mary Halloran, "Canada and the Origins of Post-War Commitment", in Margaret O. MacMillan, David S. Sorenson, *Canada and NATO. Uneasy Past, Uncertain Future*, University of Waterloo Press, 1990, pp. 1–2.

15 Jack. L. Granatstein, J. M. Hitsman, *Broken Promises. A History of Conscription in Canada*, Copp, Clark Pitman Ltd., p. 245.

16 La marine et l'aviation ne sont pas moins gourmandes: la première demande une force de 20 000 hommes, deux porte-avions, quatre croiseurs et une flottille de destroyers; la seconde souhaite 30 000 hommes dans sa force active et plus de 15 000 dans ses unités de réserve. Par contre, ni l'une ni l'autre n'estiment nécessaire un service militaire obligatoire afin de combler les besoins en effectifs. Voir Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, McClelland and Stewart, 1999, p. 227.

fectly outrageous" et souligne son ressentiment à propos de "postwar proposals based on the needs of another major war and the necessity of being in readiness for it"[17]. La réaction de King et du gouvernement s'explique facilement: le pays sort à peine de la guerre et la conscription fut le problème politique le plus délicat à résoudre. Le premier ministre imagine mal comment, en 1945, on puisse aspirer à une armée de temps de paix dépendante d'un service national obligatoire. Comment les militaires canadiens de 1945 en arrivent à ce plan? Quelle logique les anime? Il y a plusieurs pistes à explorer.

Il y a d'abord l'inertie organisationnelle. Habitués aux immenses effectifs durant la guerre, les militaires ne peuvent pas s'adapter à une autre logique, à une autre manière de voir l'institution et son organisation. Une attitude corporatiste se greffe à cette inertie: seule une force militaire nombreuse permet à tous ces officiers de conserver leurs rangs et leurs commandements[18]. Ainsi, une forme ou une autre de conscription qui permet des effectifs nombreux (mais qui n'ont rien à voir avec ceux de la guerre) est un moyen efficace de satisfaire cette double dynamique d'inertie et de corporatisme. R. J. Walker va plus loin en affirmant que le plan G s'inscrit dans une «logique de la conscription», entretenue par un establishment militaire corporatiste[19]. À son avis, les militaires canadiens rêvent depuis le début du siècle d'une force armée basée sur un service national. Je ne sais pas si Walker a raison, mais il est clair que l'institution militaire cultive un esprit corporatiste très développé à la fois pour des raisons d'efficacité et de conservatisme organisationnels.

On peut ensuite invoquer les circonstances historiques pour justifier l'immédiate réorganisation des forces armées et surtout de la force terrestre. Granatstein raconte qu'en 1945, la création de l'O.N.U. laisse croire en la nécessité éventuelle que les pays membres puissent contribuer à une imposante force armée d'intervention, et qu'à cet égard, le Canada doit disposer de généreuses forces militaires après la guerre[20]. Selon lui, "the prospect of Canada's supplying troops for the UN must have come like manna from heaven to the military planners at Cartier Square in 1945"[21].

Les propos de Granatstein aident à comprendre le contexte politico-militaire de l'époque. En 1945, c'est la perspective onusienne qui alimente l'idée de généreuses forces militaires canadiennes. Mais cette perspective perd rapidement de sa pertinence avec les premiers pas de l'organisation internationale et la dynamique de blocage au conseil de sécurité. Alors, quoi d'autre? On peut croire que la Guerre froide est le meilleur argument que les militaires canadiens peuvent utiliser afin de justifier leurs demandes. Or, cet argument tient difficilement la route.

L'analyse de Soutou permet de constater que la Guerre froide n'est pas commencée. La période qui va de 1945 jusqu'à la fin de 1946 correspond à une phase d'ambiguïté et de tensions entre les vainqueurs de l'Allemagne nazie, mais il ne s'agit pas encore de ce qu'il

---

17 Granatstein, *Canada's Army,* p. 315.

18 Granatstein, Hitsman, *Broken Promises,* p. 246.

19 R. J. Walker, "22 November 1944: The Death of Canadian Army Corporatism and the Culture of Conscription", communication présentée dans le cadre du colloque *Le Canada de 1900 à 1950: un pays prend sa place*, Montréal, 3–4 octobre 2002.

20 Granatstein, Hitsman, *Broken Promises,* p. 246.

21 Granatstein, Hitsman, *Broken Promises,* p. 246.

appelle la «guerre de cinquante ans»[22]. L' «affaire Gouzenko» frappe peut-être l'imaginaire collectif des Canadiens, mais elle n'est rien d'autre qu'une banale affaire d'espionnage[23]. Il faut attendre 1947 pour que la Guerre froide devienne une réalité. Bien sûr, toute l'Europe traverse une ère d'incertitude. Si les Européens souhaitent dorénavant être défendus plutôt que libérés, ce sentiment n'a pas de sens en 1945 pour les militaires canadiens qui conçoivent un plan basé sur un service militaire obligatoire. D'ailleurs à cette époque, les Européens et spécialement les Britanniques souhaitent une force canadienne d'occupation et non pas un *continental commitment* pour une éventuelle guerre sur le continent.

Le projet des chefs de l'armée de construire dès 1945 une imposante force militaire de temps de paix basée sur la conscription est un échec. Ce souhait témoigne de leur manque de finesse politique et intellectuelle. Ils oublient, comme Michael Howard le souligne, que "now as in the past military institutions are accepted by the great majority of the population as a disagreeable necessity, and they leave it to governments to decide what their size and shape may be"[24]. Les hommes politiques ne voient pas quelles circonstances stratégiques et militaires peuvent justifier le projet de l'armée canadienne.

«Regular forces backed by the necessary auxiliary formations and reserves provide undoubtedly the most economical and efficient method of meeting our commitments in peace and the requirements of our strategy in the early stages of a war."[25]

Ces paroles ne sont pas celles de King ou de l'un de ses ministres hostiles au plan G. Il s'agit plutôt d'un passage des minutes du comité des chefs d'état-major britanniques en juin 1949, deux ans après l'adoption du *National Service Act*. L'adoption d'un service militaire obligatoire en Grande-Bretagne est vue comme «a temporary expedient, a necessary evil» de la part de ses supporteurs, si bien que son abolition en 1957 ne surprend guère[26]. Le cas britannique est intéressant. Rendu possible par un amalgame de considérations politiques et stratégiques, le service national existe aussi longtemps qu'un autre ensemble de conjonctures le rende non désirable. En d'autres mots, il n'y a pas en Grande-Bretagne un soutien de fonds (*deep-rooted support*) et la survie de la conscription dépend uniquement d'une évaluation de la situation politique nationale et internationale[27]. Une logique identique s'applique au cas américain: c'est la montée des tensions avec les Soviétiques en 1947 et en 1948 qui pousse l'administration Truman à demander au Congrès la mise en place d'une conscription sélective[28].

Si les Britanniques et les Américains attendent jusqu'en 1947 et en 1948 pour en arriver à la décision de remettre en place un service national, il est alors tentant de croire que

---

22 Georges-Henri Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans. Les relations Est-Ouest 1943–1990*, Fayard, p. 111 et p. 114.

23 Reg Whitaker, Steve Hewitt, *Canada and the Cold War*, James Lorimer, 2003, pp. 13–17.

24 Howard, *The Causes of Wars*, p. 69.

25 S. J. Ball, "A Rejected Strategy: The Army and National Service 1946–1960", in Hew Strachan, *The British Army. Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century*, Frank Cass, 2000, p. 36.

26 Ball, "A Rejected Strategy ", p. 36.

27 Ball, "A Rejected Strategy ", p. 36.

28 Daniel Yergin, *La paix saccagée. Les origines de la guerre froide et la division de l'Europe*, Éditions Complexe, 1990, p. 268.

le plan G ne repose pas sur une évaluation d'une situation stratégique et militaire mais bien sur une motivation organisationnelle. La conviction de Granatstein que le plan G, conçu en 1945, est peut-être logique en termes militaires et en termes de *readiness* n'est pas convaincante[29].

LE TEMPS DES ILLUSIONS, 1949–1962

Les immédiates années d'après-guerre sont donc difficiles pour l'establishment militaire. Une réduction massive des forces et des budgets caractérise la période 1946–1950. Avec la dynamique des rapports Est-Ouest qui se met en place à partir de 1947, le gouvernement redonne progressivement aux forces armées les moyens d'une action militaire robuste et adéquate.

Le début effectif de la Guerre froide, la création de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord et la guerre de Corée amènent une période «d'expansion rapide et de réarmement»[30]. Le tableau 1 démontre la tendance.

Tableau 1:
Évolution des effectifs militaires combinés en hommes (forces régulières) et du budget de la défense en millions de dollars canadiens (chiffres OTAN) avec variations relatives en pourcentage, 1949–1962.

1949	44 000	372
1950	53 000	495 (33%)
1951	77 000	1 220 (146%)
1952	98 000	1 875 (53%)
1953	106 000	1 970 (5%)
1954	114 000	1 771 (-9%)
1955	117 000	1 819 (2,7%)
1956	117 000	1 888 (3,7%)
1957	118 000	1 829 (-3,1%)
1958	120 000	1 740 (-4,8%)
1959	120 000	1 642 (-5,6%)
1960	119 000	1 654 (0,7%)
1961	121 000	1 716 (3,7%)

29   Granatstein, *Canada's Army,* p. 315.
30   Granatstein, *Canada's Army,* p. 311.

| 1962 | 126 000 | 1 810 (5,4%) |

Source: Leacy (ed), *Statistiques historiques du Canada, OTAN.*

Ce réalignement de la politique de défense constitue pour les adeptes des deux illusions un moment de grâce, une sorte d'apothéose. Il est la source principale de ces illusions: la première, celle selon laquelle le Canada est vraiment une puissance militaire de premier plan et, la seconde, celle selon laquelle la défense devient la plus importante priorité des gouvernements canadiens de l'après-guerre et qu'il est normal qu'il en soit ainsi. Les propos de Granatstein illustrent cette idée:

> "Peacetime army strength rose to unprecedented heights, and the brigade groups in Korea, in West Germany, and in Canada became highly professional forces – well equipped, well led, and carrying a military punch far beyond their weight. For the first and only time in its peacetime history, Canada mattered militarily"[31].

Le pays a de l'importance militaire pour la première fois de son histoire en temps de paix justement parce que l'époque en est une de grandes perturbations et de tensions. Le premier ministre Saint-Laurent et son ministre des affaires étrangères Pearson voient les dangers potentiels que la conjoncture internationale fait courir à la sécurité des Occidentaux. Les augmentations substantielles de fonds alloués à la défense ne constituent pas une prise de conscience soudaine de l'importance de la sécurité nationale, mais correspondent plutôt à une évaluation juste et adéquate d'une menace de plus en plus concrète. Une évaluation qui, à coup sûr, change dans le temps.

Les années entre 1949 et 1962 sont bonnes pour les militaires canadiens. Des effectifs nombreux, des budgets généreux, des engagements et des menaces qui correspondent exactement à leurs schèmes mentaux et à leurs manières de comprendre la guerre qu'ils «souhaitent» faire. À propos de la force terrestre, Granatstein affirme:

> "The army of the 1951–65 era, the golden age of Canadian military professionalism and, for most of those years, the only period in peacetime in which it received adequate funding, was also very efficient. The fact that professionalism, funding, and efficiency came together should surprise no one."[32]

Si la croissance des effectifs militaires canadiens est lente de 1949 à 1951, la part du budget de la défense nationale en pourcentage du P.I.B. augmente rapidement pour atteindre des niveaux très importants. Le tableau 2 montre cette rapide évolution.

Tableau 2: Évolution du budget de la défense nationale en % du P.I.B., 1949–1962

---

31 Granatstein, *Canada's Army,* p. 311.

32 Granatstein, *Canada's Army,* p. 341.

1949/50	2.2%
1950/51	4.1%
1951/52	6.4%
1952/53	7.8%
1953/54	6.9%
1954/55	6.3%
1955/56	6.0%
1956/57	5.4%
1957/58	4.8%
1958/59	4.0%
1959/60	4.0%
1960/61	3.9%
1961/62	4.0%

Source: Granatstein, *Who killed the Canadian Military*, p. 242.

Une comparaison de l'évolution en pourcentage des budgets de la défense du Canada et des États-Unis permet de constater pour toute la période 1949–1962 de très fortes similitudes, surtout entre 1950 et 1954. Comme si la lecture de la menace était la même. Dans le cas du Canada, les variations sont de 33% en 1950, 146% en 1951, 53% en 1952, 5% en 1953 et enfin de −9% en 1954, année qui suit la fin de la guerre de Corée. Les variations dans le cas américain sont de 5,3% en 1950, 131% en 1951, 143% en 1952, 3,7% en 1953 et −15% en 1954[33].

Le tableau 2 indique l'importance prise par les questions de défense à cette période, l'une des plus dangereuses et instables de toute l'histoire de la guerre froide entre l'Est et l'Ouest. La création de l'Alliance atlantique et la guerre de Corée sont les deux moments forts de l'histoire de la guerre froide pour le Canada. D'abord, la participation du pays à l'OTAN signifie, pour la première fois en temps de paix, le déploiement de forces militaires canadiennes en Europe, un *continental commitment* historique qui durera plus de quarante ans. Ensuite, l'envoi d'un contingent en Corée marque la seule participation canadienne de l'après-guerre à un conflit militaire conventionnel. Une action significative car, comme dit Catchpole, «proportionate to her population, Canada had made a bigger contribution than most other countries that sent ground forces to Korea…»[34]. Et la

---

33 NATO Press Service, *Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries 1949–1963*.
34 Brian Catchpole, *The Korean War 1950–53*, Constable, 2000, p. 280.

contribution du pays annonce un engagement pour l'idée de sécurité collective. Pour Catchpole:

> "It had marked the willingness of Canada to contribute to the high principles of the United Nations and a readiness to make sacrifices in the name of international peace and security, a process that remained of paramount importance for the remainder of the century."[35]

La volonté canadienne de faire sa part, tant en Corée qu'en Europe, est le résultat d'une juste évaluation de la situation internationale. Après la fin de la guerre en 1953, le budget de la défense chute d'environ neuf pour cent mais les effectifs demeurent sensiblement les mêmes. En termes de pourcentage du P.I.B., la guerre de Corée marque le sommet des dépenses militaires canadiennes de l'après-guerre. À partir de l'année fiscale 1961–1962, cette part du P.I.B. décroît graduellement et de manière constante. Les années cinquante manquent aux nostalgiques. Les propos de Granatstein donnent une idée:

> «This heyday of Canadian military professionalism did not last long. The election of John Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservative government in 1957 coincided with the end of the postwar economic boom, and budgets and numbers soon began to decline."[36]

Granatstein analyse l'évolution de la défense canadienne à partir de 1957 à partir de deux déterminants: une politique intérieure peu favorable à l'institution militaire et un choix néfaste en termes de politique étrangère et de sécurité, celui du maintien de la paix et de la sécurité collective. La seconde illusion, celle selon laquelle les Canadiens et leurs gouvernements abandonnent les forces armées, prend ici tout son sens.

Entre 1957 et 1962, les trois principaux problèmes intérieurs liés à la politique de défense sont la nucléarisation des forces canadiennes, la position du pays dans l'OTAN et les coupures budgétaires. Selon Granatstein, la question de l'introduction d'armes nucléaires dans le dispositif militaire canadien brise le consensus sur la défense[37]. Cette question divise les politiciens et le public, éloigne les militaires, qui appuient les Américains et la nucléarisation, du gouvernement. Je ne dis pas que cette «crise» n'a pas eu lieu, mais j'estime qu'elle est passablement superficielle. L'idée d'introduire des têtes nucléaires dans l'arsenal militaire canadien à la fin des années 1950 et au début des années 1960 ne transforme guère la sécurité du Canada et la défense de l'Occident. Celles-ci sont déjà à ce moment, et irrémédiablement pour le futur, dépendantes du parapluie nucléaire américain. La course aux armements stratégiques rend à moyen terme les scénarios d'emplois d'armes nucléaires à des fins tactiques sur le théâtre européen (allemand) hautement hypothétiques.

La question du rôle du pays à l'intérieur de l'Alliance atlantique relève d'une autre lo-

---

35   Catchpole, *The Korean War,* p. 280.
36   Granatstein, *Canada's Army,* p. 311.
37   Granatstein, *Canada's Army,* pp. 348–349.

gique. Granatstein écrit qu'à cette époque le chef d'état-major de la défense croit que la protection de l'Amérique du Nord est la priorité de l'armée et qu'il est question de rapatrier la brigade stationnée en Europe. L'historien ajoute:

> "Canada's days as a major player in the alliance seemed to be ending. If, despite the quality of the brigade in Germany, Canada did not matter much in NATO, and if NATO did not matter to Canada, Canadian military professionalism and the army's era of peak efficiency were in jeopardy."[38]

Le Canada ne laisse pas tomber l'OTAN, ni à cette époque ni après[39]. Les troupes canadiennes en Europe ont encore une place importante dans la BAOR (*British Army of the Rhine*). D'ailleurs, il faut mentionner que les Britanniques eux-mêmes reconsidèrent leur présence sur le continent avec le livre blanc commandé par le ministre de la défense Duncan Sandys. Ainsi la BAOR voit ses effectifs diminués au début des années 1960 avec la nouvelle doctrine stratégique britannique dominée par la force nucléaire et le choix de l'appui inconditionnel pour l'allié américain[40]. La Grande-Bretagne décide alors de prévenir la guerre plutôt que de la préparer[41]. La France choisit une voie différente, celle de l'autonomie par rapport aux *Grands*. La R.F.A. est maintenant une force militaire imposante au sein du dispositif de l'Alliance. Celle-ci, après la crise de Cuba, n'est plus dans une situation de faiblesse et de plus en plus on comprend que les Européens prennent une part active dans leur défense même si le lien atlantique avec les Américains leur semble tout à fait fondamental. C'est dans cette relative période de détente que les effectifs militaires canadiens passent de 119 000 en 1960 à 92 000 en 1970, une baisse de 22%. Doit-on conclure que le Canada se désarme et abandonne l'OTAN? Que le professionnalisme des forces armées canadiennes est sur le point de disparaître? Je ne vois pas comment on peut en arriver à une telle conclusion.

Des considérations économiques jouent dans l'évolution de la défense canadienne, comme ailleurs dans les autres sociétés démocratiques depuis 1945. La situation de l'économie influence la détermination d'une société à consacrer de l'argent à sa défense; une économie en croissance sourit aux militaires, une économie en difficulté leur nuit et les gouvernements sont très sensibles à ces fluctuations. Comme le remarque Howard, "on these governments there do of course come short-term economic and political pressures of varying intensity; and it is these, rather than any deeper social patterns, that limit the military effectiveness of the West"[42]. Entre 1957 et 1962, le budget de la défense reste en chiffres absolus à peu près le même, donc il diminue en termes réels. La part du P.I.B. consacrée à la défense passe de 4.8% en 1957–58 à 3.6% en 1962–63, une baisse qui n'ampute pas sérieusement l'efficacité militaire canadienne à l'époque. Si Diefenbaker arrive au pouvoir dans une période de ralentissement économique, il est normal que cet-

---

38 Granatstein, *Canada's Army,* p. 350.
39 Sean M. Maloney, *Au coeur d'une guerre sans combat. La brigade canadienne de l'OTAN en Allemagne, 1951–1993*, Ministère de la défense nationale, 1996.
40 Raymond Aron, *Paix et guerre entre les nations*, Calmann-Lévy, pp. 472–473.
41 Lucien Poirier, *Des stratégies nucléaires*, Éditions Complexe, 1988, p. 92.
42 Howard, *The Causes of Wars*, p. 69–70.

te situation se reflète sur le budget de la défense nationale. Mais cela ne signifie pas pour autant que ses capacités soient réduites de manière significative.

L'analyse de la politique intérieure ne suffit pas pour comprendre les mutations de la politique canadienne de défense. La situation internationale change beaucoup entre le milieu des années 1950 et la fin des années 1960.

À partir de la seconde moitié des années 1950, l'OTAN est fermement en place et l'intégration politique et militaire de la République fédérale d'Allemagne est en cours. Aucune crise internationale n'a l'importance de la guerre de Corée et une mutation dans les politiques de défense se dessine. La Grande-Bretagne, qui choisit l'option nucléaire à la fin des années 1940, fait exploser une première bombe atomique en 1952 et un engin thermonucléaire en 1957, année où le gouvernement décide de renoncer au service national. La nucléarisation de la défense britannique est en marche.

> "In August 1955 Eden ruled that the forces in Europe were at the core of British defence policy. He conceded, however, that they had no military purpose. A year later 'he did not believe that the nation would continue to accept, after 1958, National Service as it now (was) unless the international situation deteriorated' "[43].

Un peu plus tard, la France choisit à son tour l'option nucléaire. L'idée que la défense conventionnelle est au cœur de la sécurité de l'Occident devient de moins en moins pertinente. Comme le remarque Raymond Aron,

> «Au début des années 60, les États-Unis tentèrent de convaincre leurs alliés européens qu'une défense plus forte en armes classiques ajouterait à la valeur de la dissuasion américaine. Les Européens et, en particulier, les Français et les Allemands ne se laissèrent pas convaincre…»[44]

La tendance à la nucléarisation de la défense de l'Occident devient la donnée la plus fondamentale dès le milieu des années 1950. C'est également dans ce contexte que la politique canadienne de défense doit être vue et analysée. La diminution progressive des effectifs et des budgets à partir de la fin des années 1950 et au début des années 1960 n'est ni incompréhensible ni anormale: la dynamique militaire de l'affrontement Est-Ouest s'établit de moins en moins sur le rapport des forces conventionnelles en Europe. Le rôle si important et si apprécié joué par la brigade canadienne dans les années 1950 prend une dimension nouvelle. Le propos de Maloney vont dans ce sens:

> «C'est le pouvoir de destruction de la bombe à hydrogène qui a eu l'effet le plus grand et le plus durable sur la viabilité de la brigade. Le gouvernement du Canada avait dès 1958 entièrement accepté le fait que toute guerre globale entre l'Occident et l'Union

---

43   Ball, "A Rejected Strategy ", p. 45.
44   Raymond Aron, *Penser la guerre, Clausewitz. L'âge planétaire*, Gallimard, 1976, p. 159.

soviétique comprendrait le recours à des armes nucléaires, à tout le moins durant la première phase du conflit»[45]

La viabilité de la présence canadienne en Allemagne évolue au rythme de la lecture de l'évolution stratégique et de l'orientation de la politique étrangère du pays. Il est difficile d'imaginer un scénario différent.

Malgré ou à cause de la Guerre froide, la guerre, la vraie, sort de l'Europe. Comme le remarque Hannah Arendt, «war has become a luxury that only small nations can afford»[46]. Les conflits violents ailleurs dans le monde appellent une réponse de la société internationale. À partir des années 1950, les opérations de maintien de la paix se succèdent et le Canada y prend une place de plus en plus importante[47][48]. Certains considèrent les opérations relatives à la paix d'après 1945 comme une forme de mutation non désirable de la profession militaire. Pour Granatstein, l'engagement du pays dans le *peacekeeping* est une distraction fatale qui crée l'illusion que le Canada est une nation pacifique[49]. À ses yeux, les interventions des militaires canadiens dans le monde afin d'aider au rétablissement de situations non violentes dénaturent leur vrai rôle, celui de se battre contre un ennemi clairement identifié et contre lequel on se prépare depuis longtemps. En d'autres mots, contre l'Union soviétique et idéalement dans les plaines d'Allemagne[50].

L'évolution de la guerre et des conflits armés dans les années 1960 est donc mauvaise pour ceux qui croient que la vraie nature d'une force militaire consiste en de traditionnelles opérations de combat. En effet, les opérations relatives à la paix demandent généralement moins de troupes et de moyens que les engagements classiques contre de «vrais» ennemis[51]. Dans le cas du Canada, la baisse graduelle des effectifs et les réductions de budgets à partir des années 1960 correspondent parfaitement aux mutations stratégiques mondiales et à la prolifération des «petites guerres» ailleurs dans le monde. Pour les militaires canadiens et leurs indéfectibles supporteurs, il s'agit du début d'une profonde crise d'identité qui se traduit en une forme sévère d'anomie. Ils croient à tort que les Canadiens ne les appuient plus, que les gouvernements, surtout libéraux, sont antimilitaristes et qu'une culture de la paix est en train d'envahir le subconscient des citoyens canadiens.

LA FIN DES ILLUSIONS

Je crois que le Canada sort véritablement de la Seconde Guerre mondiale dans les an-

---

45 Maloney, *Au coeur d'une guerre sans combat,* p. 502.

46 Cité dans Simon Trew, Gary Sheffield (ed), *100 Years of Conflict 1900–2000*, Sutton Publishing Ltd., 2000, p. 262.

47

48 L'expression «maintien de la paix» est trompeuse et souvent inappropriée. Il vaut presque toujours mieux utiliser l'expression «opération relative à la paix» afin de parler de ces engagements de forces militaires à des fins de maintien, d'interposition ou d'imposition de la paix.

49 Granatstein, *Who killed the Canadian Military?*, p. 1, pp. 12–34.

50 Granatstein, *Canada's Army,* p. 342.

51 Pour une revue des opérations onusiennes, *The Blue Helmets. A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1996.

nées 1960. Entièrement équipés du bagage positif des deux grandes guerres totales et conventionnelles, totalement dépourvus de toute autre conception non traditionnelle de la guerre, les militaires canadiens embarquent de plein pied dans la Guerre froide. Mais après ses bonnes années, les chefs militaires canadiens et leurs supporteurs sont amèrement déçus. C'est un dur retour à la réalité.

Les dix premières années de la participation militaire canadienne dans l'OTAN et la guerre de Corée ravivent l'illusion de la puissance militaire. L'obsession de la *readiness* ou de la *preparedness* deviennent pour les militaires canadiens leur principal motif afin de justifier des effectifs nombreux et des budgets généreux. Or, la société canadienne évolue. Les politiques des gouvernements en matière de défense sont assises sur une lecture plus ou moins juste de la réalité nationale et internationale, jamais sur des dogmes. Pire encore, les militaires ne saisissent pas que l'Occident se transforme après 1945.

> "After many centuries during which the cost of warfare was the biggest influence on state budgets, that role was usurped in the second half of the twentieth century by the cost of welfare. No doubt this is a great change for the better: though idleness is no virtue, it is morally preferable to pay men for doing nothing than to pay them for killing one another. But the remarkable extent and novelty of this change are not well understood. It is no exaggeration to speak today of the demilitarization of the West and, indeed, of large areas of the rest of the world."[52]

La capacité des militaires de comprendre une telle transformation est limitée. L'institution est par définition conservatrice et corporatiste. Son habileté à lire des réalités socio-historiques complexes est peu développée. Comme l'observe Howard:

> "The difficulties that we experience in creating a militarily effective defence posture in the West thus arise not from any moral deficiency in our societies but from precisely those characteristics in them that we wish to defend and that our adversaries would wish to eliminate."[53]

L'histoire du Canada au 20e siècle démontre que les Canadiens n'hésitent pas à se défendre ou à se préparer lorsqu'une menace réelle se dresse devant eux. La même histoire ne permet pas d'affirmer que les réductions d'effectifs militaires et de budgets de la défense depuis les années 1960 traduisent une quelconque «faiblesse morale» de la société canadienne. Enfin, il n'y a pas eu non plus de *fatal distraction*. La participation effective et intelligente des forces armées dans de nombreuses missions relatives à la paix les années 1950 ne contribue pas à «tuer» les forces canadiennes. Bien au contraire, elle procure une seconde culture à l'institution militaire, un ensemble de savoir-faire uniques et une expérience reconnue mondialement dont les militaires ont de quoi être fiers. Avant 1950, les forces canadiennes ne savaient faire rien d'autre que la guerre conventionnelle.

---

52 Niall Ferguson, *The Cash Nexus. Money and Power in the Modern World 1700–2000*, Basic Books, 2001, pp. 23–25.

53 Howard, *The Causes of Wars*, p. 70.

Aujourd'hui en 2006, elles ont une expertise dans les missions relatives à la paix que peu d'autres forces armées possèdent.

RESUMÉ

Richard Carrier: Kanadské ozbrojené sily po druhej svetovej vojne: Sladké víťazstvo, trpká budúcnosť 1945 – 1962

Druhá svetová vojna bola pre Kanadu "dobrou vojnou". Pozoruhodné vojnové úsilie premenilo malé sily z roku 1939 na mocné vojenské sily v roku 1945. Armáde prinieslo sladké víťazstvo ilúzie, že krajina bude aj naďalej významným vojenským hráčom vo svetových záležitostiach, a že otázky bezpečnosti a obrany budú mať v povojnovom období pre Kanaďanov najväčší význam. Po obvyklej fáze demobilizácie a scvrkávajúcich sa rozpočtoch, bude obdobie rokov 1949–1962 živiť tieto dve ilúzie vysokými výdavkami na obranu, rozsiahlou vojenskou silou a záslužnou úlohou v NATO. Hovorí sa, že kanadská armáda nebola nikdy šťastnejšia ako počas týchto zlatých rokov.

Bolo to však iluzórne. Podpora, ktorú armáda dostala od Kanaďanov a svojej vlády koncom 40. a v 50. rokoch, bola výsledkom presného chápania medzinárodnej situácie *v tom čase*. Účasť v kórejskej vojne a spoľahlivá vojenská prítomnosť v NATO sa považovala za normálnu a potrebnú. A Kanaďania boli ochotní platiť účet: v rokoch 1951 až 1956 národné obranné rozpočty predstavovali viac ako 6% hrubého domáceho produktu – úžasné vypätie pre takú malú krajinu. Je zbytočné hovoriť, že to nemohol byť trvalý trend.

Svet a hrozby sa, samozrejme, menili. Studená vojna priniesla jadrové zbrane do západnej obrany a udržiavanie mieru ako voľbu pre armádu a zahraničnú politiku. Západné spoločnosti sa súčasne stávali stále viac demilitarizovanými. Ich ozbrojené sily nevyhnutne trpeli dôsledkami tohto sociálneho trendu. Kanada nebola výnimkou. Koncom 50. a v 60. rokoch 20. storočia začali výdavky na obranu a počet príslušníkov armády veľmi pomaly, ale plynule klesať. Kanadské ozbrojené sily už nikdy viac nebudú významným vojenským hráčom vo svetových záležitostiach.

Kvôli ilúziám z roku 1945 armáda nepochopila tento trend a cítila, že Kanaďania, najmä politici, ju zradili. Po vojne armáda zvlášť nebola schopná pochopiť svetové udalosti a politické a sociálne otázky. Táto neschopnosť bola reálnou príčinou sklamania, ktoré utrpela.

SUMMARY

Richard Carrier: The Canadian Armed Forces after the Second World War: Sweet Victory, Bitter Future, 1945–1962

The Second World War was a "good war" for Canada. A phenomenal war effort transformed the tiny force of 1939 into a powerful military power in 1945. For the military, the sweet victory brought the illusions that the country will continue to be a major military player in world affairs and that security and defence matters will be of the greatest importance for Canadians in the postwar period. After a normal phase of demobilization and shrinking budgets, the 1949–1962 period will feed these two illusions with high defence spending, large military force and an instrumental role in NATO. It is being said that the Canadian military have never been happier than during these golden years.

But it was illusory. The support the military got from Canadians and their government in the late forties and in the fifties was the result of an accurate reading of the international situation *at that time*. The involvement in the Korean War and the solid military presence in NATO were seen as normal and necessary. And Canadians were willing to pay the bill: between 1951 and 1956, national defence budgets will repre-

sent more than 6% of the gross domestic product, an amazing effort for such a small country. Needless to say, that could not be a lasting trend.

Inevitably, the world and the threats changed. The Cold War brought the nuclearization of the Western defence and peacekeeping as a choice of military and foreign policy. At the same time, Western societies became more and more demilitarized. Necessarily, their military forces suffered the consequences of this social trend. Canada was no exception. In the late fifties and in the sixties, defence spending and military manpower started a very slow but continuous decline. Canadian armed forces will never be again a major military player in world affairs.

Because of the illusions of 1945, the military did not understand the trend and fell betrayed by Canadians, especially by politicians. After the war, the military were particularly incapable of reading world events and political and social issues in a thorough and accurate way. This incapacity was the real cause of the disappointment they suffered.

panel 5:

(Re)-Constructing a Post Conflict National Identity

Chair:
Professor Brian J. C. McKercher, Canada

British North America, *Le Canada* and the Seven Year's War, 1756–1763

Dr. Ronald G. Haycock

The theme of this conference is to look at how wars are exited. Given the contemporary situations in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, it is instructive to examine what happened in a similar conflict in the18th century, specifically the Seven Year's War as fought by France and England in North America. While a major part of a greater European conflict, neither country had a viable exit plan for their war in America, and the results were very costly to them and their new world subjects.

The larger war lasted from 1756 until 1763 during which Britain and Prussia were ranged against France, Austria, Russia and finally Spain. Most Europeans view that war as being fought mainly on that continent by professional armies in the bloody battles such as Rossbach and Leuthen. Surprisingly, it was much more than that. This was truly a global conflict fought against a geo-political backdrop easily as complicated as any facing the nations and coalitions of today. Hostilities took place all over the world from continental Europe and the Mediterranean, to Africa, North America, the Caribbean, India and the Far East.[1]

For North Americans, the Seven Year's War was a bloody conflict by rival French and English colonists and Indian allies which ranged over thousands of miles of wilderness and was known for its brutal savagery. But to the great European powers, the North American theatre was just part of an on-going economic-driven military contest between the French and the British for control of the continent and its valuable unsettled land and lucrative fur trade. This belligerent rivalry dated well back into the previous century so that the Anglo-Americans, who always outnumbered the French Canadian colonists by up to 28 to 1, were no strangers to conflict. For over a century, the *Canadien* subjects of "His Most Catholic Majesty" of France had kept the English-speaking Prot-

---

1   A good survey narrative of the entire conflict is in Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, <u>The Encyclopaedia of Military History, from 3500 BC until the Present </u>(New York: Harper and Row, 1986), pp. 667–678. Also see Dennis Showalter, <u>The Wars of Frederick the Great </u>(London, 1996), and Russell F. Weigley, <u>The Age of Battles: the Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo </u>(Bloomington, 1991).

estants to the south at bay on the frontier with an effective combination of hit and run tactics supported by a strong Indian alliance.[2] This sanguine frontier warfare had been made even more protracted by European events involving the parent states in the wars of the Spanish (1701 – 14) and later the Austrian(1740 – 48) successions.

When the Seven Years War broke out in 1756, the political and economic causes of the European conflict once again folded into the North American one. The war in North America was also multi-layered and very complicated. At the grand strategic level, England was seriously threatened by France's resurgent maritime and mercantile success. In London, the leading proponent of war for the economy's sake was William Pitt. And so the British government was soon convinced to use her naval prowess to drive France from the high seas and destroy her international markets. According to Pitt, England could then pick up the pieces and perhaps an empire.[3] Just as much, France was determined to keep its profitable empire and markets, and if it meant war, so be it.

Part of Paris' strategy to fend off the English was to make New France into a fortress stretching from the Gulf of the St Lawrence to New Orleans through the Ohio and Illinois country and down the Mississippi to its colony in Louisiana. With willing Indian allies and a „petite guerre" military stratagem, it was thought to be an inexpensive way to force London to spend millions on sea and land forces in defending its American colonies, thereby leaving France hopefully unmolested elsewhere.[4] Ominously this French imperial strategy suggested that at best *Nouvelle France* would get only limited resources from the mother country; it even implied that *Les Canadiens* could be sacrificed to the larger policy.

However, in the New World, little of the consequences of either imperial strategy were known or understood. And each party in the coming conflict had their own interests to serve. The Anglo-Americans, especially those from Pennsylvania and Virginia, wanted the western lands in the Ohio and beyond for settlement; others coveted the lucrative fur trade held effectively there for decades by the French. But this same area of the Ohio and Mississippi basin was traditional Indian land. The aboriginals were determined to keep the Europeans out. To them an alliance with *Les Canadiens* who most respected their life style and claims and who had no big settlement aspirations seemed the best way to do it.[5]

The actual battles of the Seven Year's war do not concern us save to say that the fight-

---

2   I. K. Steele, Guerrillas and Grenadiers: the Struggle for Canada, 1689–1760 (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969) and his later Warpaths: Invasions of North America (New York: OUP, 1994) explains very clearly the success that the French had in North America using petite guerre and a 'forward defence'. Also see G.F.G Stanley's New France: the Last Phase, 1740–1760 (Toronto, 1968) and Douglas Edward Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607–1763 (New York, 1973).

3   Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest, the American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism (New York: Lippincott, 1970), pp.72–94. He notes that the British economy was expanding rapidly and was very aggressive. There was also an alliance of business with politics pursuing the former's special interests. Also see W.J. Eccles, France in America (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1972), p. 178. On the political alliance between William Pitt and the Duke of Newcastle see Richard Middleton, The Bells of Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct of the Seven Year's War, 1757–1762 (Cambridge, England, 1985).

4   W.J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 1534–1760 (New York, 1969), pp.157–160.

5   Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Year's War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), pp. 11–73.

ing in the colonies began well ahead of the war in Europe when in 1749 the Canadian *Troupes de la Marine* and Militia from Quebec started to occupy the Ohio valley.[6] For several years thereafter, the colonial militia from Virginia under the command of Colonel George Washington tried to expel the French from the western land only to be ignobly routed. When the European war started in 1756, the *Canadiens*, soon bolstered by some regular French troops under the professional soldier, the Marquis de Montcalm continuously and systematically defeated the Anglo-American colonists and British regular units. As long as the French combined a "petite guerre" style with a strong Indian alliance in a forward defence well away from the vital Quebec – Montreal line, they could win.[7] But in 1758 Montcalm decided to fall back on Quebec. Then in September 1759, he got suckered by the impetuous and reckless British General James Wolfe into an open European professional style fight on the Plains of Abraham outside of Fortress Quebec. The French lost the battle in 30 minutes, and both commanders were killed. Any hope that the defeat could be undone by the residue of the French forces from Montreal reconquering Quebec disappeared in the spring of 1760 with the arrival of the Royal Navy and British troop reinforcements in the St. Lawrence below the fortress.[8] In short, French Canada became the 14th British colony, albeit a military one, and the organized fighting in the North American theatre came to a fitful and fragile end. But in Europe and elsewhere, war continued to rage for another three years. These complications only made it harder for the all parties in North America to exit the conflict when it finally ended with the Peace of Paris in February 1763.[9]

It is hardy fair for a historian with perfect hind sight to remind his audience that in a little more than a brief decade after that peace, North America was once again at war. This time it was the long struggle of the American Revolution (or as some Canadians call it the American Rebellion!). Yet the roots of this latter event lay in the way that all parties tried to deal with the aftermath of the Seven Years War.

Between the end of hostilities in North America in 1760 and the war's official cessation 3 years later, it was clear that the British Government had no plan for the end of the conflict; nor had it any sympathetic understanding of how their American colonists felt about a war that continued to put more demands and changed conditions on them even though it was now being fought outside their continent. In fact, relations between the two groups had seriously deteriorated during the conflict. British professional soldiers

---

6   Rene Chartrand, <u>Canadian Military Heritage, 1000–1754</u> (Montreal: art Global, 1993) vol.1, pp. 192–197 and Leach, <u>Arms for Empire</u>, pp.307–350.

7   G. F. G. Stanley, <u>Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People</u> (Toronto: Macmillan. 1974), pp. 61–81, Eccles, <u>France in America</u>, pp.181–189 and Chartrand, <u>Canadian Military Heritage</u>, vol. 1, pp. 196–197. Chartrand has a succinct discussion of the development of unique strategic concepts for the defence of Nouvelle France, and a Canadian way of war. See pp. 81–100.

8   Charles P. Stacey, <u>Quebec, 1759: the Siege and Battle</u> (Toronto: Macmillan, 1959), pp.138–155. This is the best analysis of the siege and battle. For an assessment of the generalship on both sides, see Stacey's "Postscript: Generalship at Quebec". Le Chevalier de Levis had about 6,600 troops at Montreal at the time of the battle. The next spring he marched on Quebec and defeated James Murray as quickly as Wolfe had Montcalm. Unfortunately, it was the Royal Navy that showed up a few days later. For Levis' victory, see Col. Ian McCulloch, "From April Battles and Murray Generals, Lord Deliver Me: the Battle of Sillery April 28 1760" in Donald Graves, ed., <u>More Fighting For Canada: Five battles, 1760–1944</u> (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2004), pp.19–70.

9   Anderson, <u>Crucible of War</u>, pp.503–506.

and civil officials often treated the colonial politicians and militiamen with an arrogant disdain. The latter group they frequently and openly despised for their apparent lack of professionalism, their "uncivilized" ways and their savagery in the conflict. British administrators resented the fact that colonial governments were always reluctant to provide men, money and material for what London thought was their own self-defence. They also tweaked the well-developed colonial egalitarian sensitivities by failing to consult and to deny colonial soldiers appropriate ranks with their English counter-parts. Moreover, as the fighting stopped in North America in 1760 but continued elsewhere, the Anglo-Americans could see no reason why they should be taxed to pay for a fight outside of their continent that was now none of their concern and in which they had no say.[10]

And even though the British side had won against French Canada, there was none of the expected spoils of land and business opportunities or the basic rights of Englishmen. To add grief, when the conflict shifted away from North America, the British spent far less money in the centers like Boston, New York and Philadelphia, yet much more in re-building Quebec and Halifax. Finally, in order to pay for a war that was threatening to bankrupt England, London then imposed revenue generators on the colonies. As these forms of imperial taxes went up, the colonial ability to pay went down. Immediately, there was a lot of resentment which in the next 10 years greatly increased the tensions between colonists and their imperial administrators. These sometimes led to riots and soon to a revolution. The colonists wanted the French western lands and their trade with the Indians for which, in anglo-colonial minds at least, the late war had been fought.[11]

So, in 1760 as soon as the fighting stopped, the Anglo-Americans just started large western migrations and they ignored British attempts to stop it. Consequently, shortly after the signing of the Peace of Paris, in the spring of 1763 a serious Indian rebellion broke out. Pontiac, chief of the Ottawas, led his people and other tribes in bloody Indian warfare all along the frontier against the white colonists who were dispossessing them. In turn in October that year, the British imposed the Royal Proclamation which not only set up the new colony of Quebec, it drew a line down the Appalachian Mountains relegating all the land to the west as exclusively Indian territory. When hundreds of settlers were killed and many forts destroyed, it was the British who were forced to put down Pontiac's revolt at great and bloody expense and with little colonial help. It took nearly two years. It did not stop the land hungry settlers from the eastern colonies; but now the Indian territory had been guaranteed officially by the British proclamation which continued to exasperate colonial expectations. For their part, the Québécois, although still numb from the conquest, were also not happy about the proclamation. Not was clearly assimilative, but drawing much smaller the boundaries of the new province along either

---

10 Leach, Arms for Empire, pp. 503–508 summarizes the growing antagonisms, but Anderson in Crucible of War gives great detail through-out his marvellous book, and nicely analyses the growing alienation in his "Epilogue: Mt Vernon, June 24, 1767".

11 Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, The Growth of the American Republic (New York: OUP, 1962), vol.1, pp.154–198, Also see Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1775–1865 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,1968), pp.36–40.Cunliffe notes the resentment that the colonists had about the imposition of the 10,000 British troops who were defending the colonies after the Seven Year's war without first getting the approval of the colonial legislatures. Billeting in private houses also was a grievous issue.

side of the St Lawrence south west to the Great lakes, it cut them off from their traditional lands and future trade.[12]

One need not describe all the details of the road to the American Revolution. The story is well known. Suffice it to say that among the victors there were two opposed ideas about what the Seven Year's War meant. To England, the victory in North America was simply one part of her larger Imperial dream. And each component of the Empire would have to fit in and contribute to that vision; but for the colonists, the North American war was fought to put down an old enemy, to get land, increased business opportunities and their rights as Englishmen. Victory only heightened these expectations, and made their denial even more aggravating.[13]

For the conquered *Canadiens*, there was the harsh reality that the British Army was in Quebec in force. In part, French Canada of about 80,000 disarmed souls had suffered both a social decapitation and a dilution. Historically structured as an absolutist, aristocratic and military society, after the defeat, many of the *functionnaires* of the Ancien Regime and the army were expelled. This left the seigneurs who owned the land in and around the St Lawrence, the Ottawa and the Richelieu rivers, their tenant farmers-*habitants*, the clergy, and *petty bourgeoisie*. In the scheme of their new world, *Les Canadiens* were vastly outnumbered by the southerly "old subjects" of the new English monarch, George the Third. Most Canadians hoped that when the war would finally end that the negotiations between the parent states would see them returned to France. It was not to be.[14]

In fact they did not likely know anything of evolving French imperial policy. When it was clear that France was not going to win the larger war, the French foreign minister, Le Duc de Choiseul mutated his earlier theory into first what was tantamount to letting the French forces lose in North America, then into not wanting the colony back thereafter. His successor, le Comte de Vergennes held the same view. Both men theorized that when the British won in North American, once the Canadian threat was removed, the Anglo-Americans and the British would likely end up fighting each other, so obvious were the antagonisms before and during the war. It was a sound prediction, but the victims were the former yet hopeful subjects of "His Most Catholic Majesty" in Canada.[15]

As for the British governors of the newest colony of Quebec, they were doing almost the complete opposite of what their counter-parts to the south did or expected. Even though the initial British intent was to assimilate French Canada,[16]the first military gov-

---

12 A.R.M. Lower, Colony to Nation: A History of Canada (Toronto: Longmans, 1964), 4th edition, pp.66–67, and Anderson, Crucible of War, pp.535–546 and 617–637.

13 Anderson gives an eloquent analysis of the 2 separate visions in his concluding chapters, "Future of Empire" and "Epilogue: Mount Vernon, July 24, 1767."

14 On the French Canadians from the Conquest to the American Revolution, see Michel Brunet, Les Canadiens Apres La Conquete, 1759–1775: de la Revolution canadienne a la Revolution americaine (Montreal: Fides, 1969), and Hilda Neatby, Quebec: The Revolutionary Age, 1760–1791 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966). Mason Wade, The French Canadians, 1760–1967 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), vol. 1, p.48 says that the population was 70,000 to 2,000,000.

15 Eccles, France in America, pp.216–218; also see Eccles', "The Social, Economic and Political Significance of the Military Establishment in New France, " in the Canadian Historical Review, March 1971, pp.1–22. He argues that next to the Fur Trade, the colony's main driver and ethos was military.

16 Royal "Instructions to Governor Murray, 7 December, 1763" Document VIII, in W.P.M. Kennedy, Statutes,

ernor after 1760, General James Murray, had a sympathy for his new charges that was also tempered by hard reality. He and his officers had been very impressed with the tough martial prowess of French Canadians. Compared to their 80,000, his numbers were small. The last thing he needed was for them to take up arms again.[17] Consequently, both he and his successor, Sir Guy Carleton, later the Lord Dorchester, worked at winning the *Canadiens* "loyalty"in whatever form. For instance, in the next few years, they kept the influx of spoils- hungry English and Anglo-American merchants at a minimum, and for those that stayed, they were denied representative bodies that would have seen them dominate the local society. The governors also ran the administration in ways similar to the Ancien Regime. The higher levels of *Canadien* society, the clergy and the seigneurs were returned certain privileges. The British Test Act which denied any Catholic the right to hold public office and which was law everywhere else in the Empire, was not exercised in French Canada. The seigneuries and church lands and tithes were protected. James Murray even allowed a new Bishop of Quebec to be consecrated unofficially by the French monarch. In law, the Custom of Paris was restored to *Canadiens* and the British system denied in civil cases, much to the chagrin of the 'old subjects' who had come from England and the 13 colonies with the expectation of all the rights of Englishmen.[18]

Carleton in particular assumed that if he got the support of the church and the seigneurs, then the rest of Canadian society – mostly the *habitants*, would follow those whom he took to their natural leaders. That was not to be the case. The bulk of the *Canadien* population came from this *habitant* group. They were a suspicious and practical lot and they had experienced war for many years. Even before the conquest, they had experienced and remembered the corruption of the old order and the sometimes hauteur of the French regulars. Coupled with the disruption of years of mobilizations on their precarious agricultural lives it had all taken its toll.[19] When the official peace came in 1763, no *Canadien* could see that France had bargained hard for the return of the colony. Instead Paris considered fish, spices and slaves more important. At the negotiations with the British, the French insisted on retaining in North America only 2 small islands off the Newfoundland coast, St Pierre and Miquelon, and dry fishing rights on Newfoundland's north shore. They preferred more lucrative possessions like the islands of Guadeloupe, Martinique and parts of Santo Domingo in the Caribbean to Canada.[20]

Not likely did the *Canadiens* know about Choiseul's strategic policy; certainly none would have known of Voltaire's sneering dismissal that Canada was just "a few acres of snow" or that France's close relationship with Spain was, in the French Foreign ministers mind, worth a thousand times the value of Canada. But what the *habitants* were in-

---

Treaties and Documents of the Canadian Constitution, 1713–1929 (Toronto: Oxford, 1930), pp. 43–42. Hereafter cited Kennedy, Canadian Documents.

17 Nearby, Quebec, pp.17–57, and Michel Brunet, French Canada and the Decades of Early British Rule, 1760– 1791, Canadian Historical Association, Historical Booklet no. 13, pp.3–8.

18 A.L. Burt, Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester, 1724–1808, Canadian Historical Association, Historical Booklet No. 5, pp.3–5; Eccles, France In America, pp.203–239, and Wade, The French Canadians, vol.1, pp.48–63.

19 Brunet, Les Canadiens Apres le Conquete, chps. 2, 7 and 8 examine the beginnings of the passive resistance and the hopes, allusions and deceptions of les Canadiens during Murray's and Carleton's administration up to the Quebec Act in 1774.

20 Eccles, France in America, pp.217, 219 and 229.

creasingly aware of was a sense of abandonment. Furthermore, after 1763, their own natural leaders seemed to be overly co-operative with the British administration. More and more *Les habitant* developed a practical 'wait and see' attitude. For them, survival was the key. In the next decade then, for example during the crisis of Pontiac's Rebellion few of *Les habitants* volunteered to help the British put it down. Those few who did, did so late and for cash.[21]

As the *Canadien* attitude became more sceptical, their new governors' threat perception shifted away from them toward the growing belligerence in the 13 colonies. While still concerned about the future political and military posture of *Les habitants,* the main military threat was increasingly Anglo-American. This eventuality would be far more dangerous if there was a resumption of general war with France. Like his French Canadian charges, Carleton did not know that Choiseul's plans were indeed for a resumption of war against Britain at a propitious moment. Nor was it clear that his plans involved exploiting North America, but they did not include winning or even taking back Canada.[22]

To ensure that his colony did not go the rebellious way of the Americans, Governor Carleton succeeded in convincing London to make legal in legislation what he and his predecessor had been practicing at Quebec. This became the Quebec Act promulgated in June, 1774. [23] However, to the Anglo-American colonists its terms were the very culmination of their grievances against the British colonial administration. Among other things, it extended the political boundaries of the French Canadian colony south west well into the Ohio region to the Mississippi making it huge once again. The act also still guaranteed a significant amount of land as Indian territory, all of which blocked American colonial settlement, land speculation and access to the fur trade. These aspects were in addition to the legislation's other terms which, to the colonial victors of the war, legally denied English rights, gave Catholics public offices, discouraged Anglo-American migration and put some of them who were resident in Quebec under French civil law and without representation in government. It was almost as if the old Canada had been restored and that the Seven Year's War had not been fought – or fought and bled for in vain. Ironically, in centers like Boston and Philadelphia the effect of the British Quebec Act seemed as if the deft hand of le Duc de Chisel had written it specifically to foment the rebellion of the 13 Colonies.[24]

It was not long after this —just a matter of months until the first skirmishes of the American Revolution began. At Quebec, Governor Carleton was so confident that the French Canadian *habitants* would not rebel and would defend the colony, that in Sep-

21 Brunet, <u>Les Canadiens Apres le Conquete</u>, pp.58–70; Eccles, <u>France in America</u>, pp.220–221 and Margaret Conrad, Alvin Finkel and Cornelius Jaenen, <u>History of the Canadian People: Beginnings to 1867</u>(Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman,1993), vol.1, p.244 –the latter for Voltaire's sneering comment.

22 Eccles, <u>France In America</u>, pp.216–231.

23 The Quebec Act, 14 George III, c.83, in Kennedy, <u>Canadian Documents</u>, Doc. XXI, pp.137–140. On the reaction and protest to the Act, see Hilda Nearby, <u>The Quebec Act: Policy and Protest</u> (Toronto: Prentice hall, 1972).

24 "Address of the General Congress to the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec", October 26, 1774 in Kennedy, <u>Canadian Documents</u>, pp.143–147. Doc. XXIII..It listed the other 'American' colonies' grievances and tried to induce the inhabitants of Quebec to attend the Continental Congress scheduled for 1775. See <u>ibid</u>., Doc XXI for the terms of the Quebec Act

tember 1774, he sent most of his regular troops south to Boston to help General Thomas Gage, Governor of Massachusetts who was indeed faced with insurrection. It left less than 600 regular troops to defend a land mass that was in 1774 nearly as big as it had been under the French regime. When the fighting actually started, the general attitude of *Les habitants* was sullen indifference just as it was toward the Quebec Act. [25] The revolutionary ideas of the Continental Congress did not necessarily strike a cord with the average *habitant*. The revolutionary war was not their fight. However, the British were a known entity albeit a distasteful and untrustworthy one; and they had protected certain *Canadien* rights. On the other hand, the emerging secular and largely Protestant American state espoused melting pot theories and a republican format which was foreign to the traditions of French Canadian society. Little that the Quebec clergy or the seigneurs could cajole, or order could activate them to help the British. A few *habitants* joined the rebels and some sold things to them; but when their cash ran out so did the French Canadian co-operation.[26] In contrast, most of the time the British paid in gold not in worthless continental script. Besides, as the war went badly for the British in the 13 colonies, their garrisons at Quebec and Halifax in fact grew immensely stronger with more and more money being poured into them. Perhaps there was the perception that Quebec would benefit from being the first instead of the 13th colony if the others succeeded in breaking away. When France joined the American side in 1778, there was no mention of her reclaiming her old territories. In the end, French Canada remained in British North America. And it was a very significant part in size and strategic position.[27]

On the surface, in the decade between the end of the Seven Year's War and the American Revolution, it would have seemed that Chisel's strategy had succeeded; but in reality, the British had failed.. London had gone into the conflict with one vision – their colonists another. British leaders had conceived only half a strategy: how to fight and win a war. They had not developed the other half—a viable plan to account for the aftermath of the conflict. War and victory gave no guarantee of a smooth exit. Old demands re-emerged; new conditions and new expectations were unleashed. Strategic and socio-political concepts must fit with the peace, and must be co-ordinated to meet both the hopes and aspirations of the victors and the vanquished alike. But more to our point, the Seven Year's War in North America poignantly demonstrated the necessity for nations to adroitly exit one war lest their actions become prologue to another.

RESUMÉ

Ronald G. Haycock: Britská severná Amerika, *Le Canada* a Sedemročná vojna 1756 – 1763

Tento príspevok sa zaoberá príkladom z 18. storočia, ako ľahko krajiny skĺzli do vojen a aké ťažkosti mali, keď sa z nich chceli dostať. Zaoberá sa úsekom 7-ročnej vojny, ktorá sa odohrávala v severnej Ameri-

25 Eccles, France in America, pp.231–235.
26 Fernand Ouellet, "Roles of the *Elites Traditionally*, the *Bourgeoisie* and the *Habitants*", in George Rawly, ed., Revolution Rejected, 1775–1776 (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1968), pp. 119–127.
27 Brunet, French Canada and the Early Decades of British Rule, 1760–1791, CHA Booklet no.13, pp. 9–14, and Burt, Guy Carleton: Lord Dorchester, 1728–1808, Revised Version, CHA Booklet no. 5, pp. 5–7.

ke. V tomto rozsiahlom konflikte sa britské strategické motívy zamerali na oslabenie francúzskej obchodnej ríše a podľa možnosti jej zbankrotovanie. Pokiaľ ide o Francúzov, chceli si ekonomické úspechy vojny o rakúske následníctvo vychutnať, ba aj rozšíriť svoju novo vytvorenú medzinárodnú obchodnú moc. Každá krajina mala koloniálnu ríšu v novom svete. Do 50. rokov 18. storočia neboli charakter a ašpirácie 13 kolónií Británie rovnaké ako mala ich materská krajina. A rozsiahlejší konflikt v Európe a inde bol pre nich dôležitý iba potiaľ, pokiaľ ich tradičný nepriateľ- nové Francúzsko bolo v danej oblasti stálou hrozbou. V skutočnosti konflikt medzi dvoma severoamerickými spoločnosťami pokračoval celé desaťročia, pretože títo dvaja sa hádali o lukratívny obchod, voľnú pôdu a životne dôležitú lojalitu Indiánov.

Ani vo väčšom kontexte vojny Francúzsko nevidelo svoje severoamerické domínium ako niečo, čo bolo pripravené brániť za každú cenu. Namiesto toho bol Paríž pripravený použiť túto kolóniu ako obeť, aj za cenu, že ju stratí – na vykrvácanie britských belochov, aby Francúzsko bolo v lepšej pozícii pri rokovaniach o lukratívnejších majetkoch inde, nech by už z konfliktu vzišiel hocijaký mier. Osadníci nového Francúzska o tom vedeli len málo a päť rokov odvážne vzdorovali často v zúrivých vojenských bojoch, aby si udržali svoju kolóniu čeliac nesmiernej britskej moci. Nakoniec do roku 1760 Británia porazila Francúzov v Amerike. Ale podobne ako Francúzsko aj Británia bola v tomto procese na pokraji bankrotu. Okrem toho, anglo-americkí kolonisti, súc na víťaznej strane, nedostávali nijakú očakávanú pomoc, hoci sami zaplatili vysokú cenu v humánnych aj finančných prostriedkoch na podporu Británie v severoamerickej časti 7-ročnej vojny. Namiesto toho sa im zo strany Londýna dostalo pohŕdanie, vyššie dane a neustále dožadovanie sa pokračovania bojov mimo severoamerickej sféry, aj keď podľa ich názoru bolo to mimo ich záujmu. Záver konfliktu v roku 1763 priniesol veľa nespokojnosti a násilia na obidvoch stranách v kolóniách a došlo k brutálnej indiánskej vzbure. V anglo-amerických častiach britskej severnej Ameriky to v podstate viedlo k revolúciám v roku 1776, vo francúzskych častiach boli celkom presvedčení, že Francúzsko ich zradilo a opustilo. Pokiaľ ide o nový britský režim, francúzski Kanaďania zostali podráždení a podozrievaví a uzavreli sa do seba. Tento príspevok teda názorne dokazuje, že vojna a víťazstvo nedáva nijakú záruku hladkého ukončenia konfliktu. Znovu sa objavili staré požiadavky; uvoľnili sa nové podmienky a nové očakávania. Strategické a sociálne koncepcie musia byť vhodné pre mier a musia byť koordinované tak, aby vyhovovali nádejam a túžbam víťazov a rovnako aj porazených.

Post Conflict Operations in the American South, 1865–1872

Dr. Robert S. Rush

No army in previous history was ever called on to discharge such delicate and responsible duties, involving powers, that if abused, might have led to the most serious consequences; and yet, the transition from military to civil power was so imperceptible as to have passed unnoticed for the special means to make it public.

Major General George Gordon Meade[1]

Like most nations the United States endured a period of civil war and upheaval. During the years immediately following, 1865–1872 the United States Army served as the executive agent for the reconstruction of the south, and was by far the most important instrument of federal authority there, regardless of whether that policy was under executive leadership or congressional mandate. The realignment from the view of the "united States" meaning the several states united to the United states with Federal Government supreme was an epochal transformation that carries forth to this day.

After the war, the Federal government lacked a comprehensive plan for rebuilding the South – and in fact the concept of helping a defeated enemy rebuild a strong new society that was aligned with the victor's interests would not be widely understood for almost another century. In this setting, ill prepared and with some misgivings, the United States Army, in 1865 a victorious, battle hardened formation and one of the world's largest armies, embarked on what it believed would be unpleasant occupation duty with the wish that it would be short. It was correct in the first case, but disappointed in the second. General Gordon G. Meade, once commander of the Army of the Potomac, wrote,

We of the Army have done our work It remains for statesmen,…, to bring the people of the South back to their allegiance and into the Union. In the meantime I presume our armies will have to occupy the Southern States.If we are going to punish treason, as per-

---

1   Report of the Secretary of War, House Executive Document Number 1, 40th Congress, Third Session, 82.

haps strict justice would demand, we shall have to shed almost as much blood as has already been poured out in this terrible war."[2]

Much blood had been shed. The Civil War saw more soldiers were killed, died of wounds, injury or disease in this war than in any war in which the United States participated. Of the 4,864,600 white men 18–45 582,222 lost their lives. An additional 36,000 „Colored" soldiers also perished. The men of the South suffered a staggering 24 percent mortality rate; a higher percentage than that suffered by Germany 1939–1945. Many of those died were heads of household, leaving families dependent upon assistance from the impoverished states.[3]

The South had expended all its financial capital in the war and those who had invested in Confederate central and state government bonds lost everything. Total property evaluation in the South fell from $8,124,061,704 in 1860 to $2,738,662,000 in 1870.[4] The emancipation of slaves resulted in a loss of $1,603,402,429 in capital and the remaining reduction was losses of livestock, a decline in the cultivated areas and reductions in real estate values. Plantations and farms lay idle, roads and bridges were in disrepair or ruined, factories were burned and gutted, and the rail system, not particularly strong to begin with, had been almost completely destroyed.

There was great bitterness on both sides over the terrible human cost as well as the widespread dislocation of society. One Union soldier wrote

"If I should speak my real feelings, I should say that I am sorry the war has ended. Pray do not think me murderous. No; but all the punishment we could inflict on the rebels would not atone for one drop of the blood so cruelly spilled. I would exterminate them, root and branch. They have often said they would prefer that before subjugation, and with the good help of God, I would give it them. I am only saying what thousands say every day.[5] Feelings among the Southerners were just as bitter. It was into this environment the US Army entered.

THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF WAR

In the aftermath of the Confederate evacuation of Richmond Virginia, fires broke out and large crowds filled the streets. Deserters and criminals released from prison mixed with the crowds, stealing what they could, and acting as a catalyst to the larger crowds, who rushed the government warehouses for the foodstuffs left behind, then spreading to businesses, government buildings and individual homes. With the army and government fled, lawlessness reigned supreme. The next day, the Union Army entered, subdued the

---

2   As quoted in James E Sefton, *The United States Army and Reconstruction 1865–1877* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 10.

3   1860 Census; Livermore, Numbers & Losses in the Civil War; Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat: on National Trauma, Mourning and Recovery* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001), 38. Shivelbusch states that both Germany and the Southern States lost approximately 20 percent of their male populations. A detailed examination of Livermore (above) show a greater loss for the South.

4   *Statistics of the United States*, Eighth Census, (Washington: GPO, 1866), Table 1, 294.

5   Lydia Minturn Post, ed., *Soldiers' Letters* (New York: Bunce, Huntington and Company, 1865), 468.

lawlessness and as divisions marched through the town in pursuit of Lee's army, while others fought to prevent the fires from spreading.[6]

Chaos also occurred in other Southern cities, with much the same result. When the Confederate forces pulled out, and before Union forces arrived, the population, discharged and deserted soldiers would raid government storehouses and buildings for food and supplies. Once Union forces arrived, order was usually restored within days.[7]

Slide Occupation of the Southern States

After the armies of Lee and Johnston surrendered, the efforts to restore order and establish Confederate effective military control over the all areas of the South became first priority. In some areas Confederate irregulars, guerilla bands and outlaws using the Confederate cause continued to attack Federal patrols and raided towns, farms, and army camps.

Realizing these bands had to be eliminated before the country further destabilized, the Army spared no effort to wipe them out. When General George Stoneman received reports of terrorism and violence against the civilian population in western North Carolina and southwestern Virginia he sent the 9th Tennessee Cavalry Regiment (US) into the territory with orders to „thoroughly scan and clear the area, using the most vigorous and severe measures." Stoneman instructions to the regimental commander were clear:

> The persons with whom you have to deal are outlaws, and as such should be treated. When taken prisoner they must be treated as prisoners, and are entitled to trial which takes time and expense. Give them to understand that no false mercy will be shown to them, and no prisoners taken, and that every man found in arms under whatever pretense, will be treated as a public enemy and an outlaw, and killed like a mad dog by anyone who meets him.[8]

GO 90 PUNISHMENT OF GUERRILLAS

On May 11, The War Department, on General Grant's order, issued a directive designed to halt the raids of the Confederate insurgents, and to eliminate the so-called „cause" of the outlaw bands. General Order 90 declared that since there were no authorized Confederate troops operating east of the Mississippi River, „any and all persons found in arms against the United States, or who may commit acts of hostility against it will be regarded as guerillas, and punished with death." [9]

The stringent measures enacted caused the editor of the New York Times to comment on "the „non-advent" of widespread guerilla warfare after the surrender, remarking that the „prompt, wise, and careful posting of troops throughout the South was the correct policy and had „prevented the continuation of hostilities by unorganized bands of despa[e]radoes."[10]

---

6 *Official Records*, XLVI, Series I: Part I: 1292–1295; Colonel E.H. Ripley, "The Burning of Richmond" Southern Historical Society Papers, v. XXXII, (Richmond VA: Jan–Dec 1904), 73–77.

7 *Official Records*, LXVII, Series I: Part 3: 490

8 *0fficial Records*, XLIX, Series I, Part 2, 475–76.

9 *Official Records*, XLVI, Series 1, Part 3, 1134.

10 *New York Times*, July 2, 1865. As quoted in John Robert *Kirkland Federal Troops in the South Atlantic States Dur-*

Concurrent with the pacification efforts, Union Commanders undertook to relieve the suffering and hardship of the refugees and those destitute and unable to help themselves. In late April, General William Tecumseh Sherman issued orders to provide provisions, animals and any public supplies that could be spared to relieve their suffering and want. In May the free issues for everyone stopped because many had begun relying solely on Union Army rather than trying to support themselves. Instead, thirty days rations were issued to those absolutely destitute and with no other means of support.[11]

PRESIDENTIAL RECONSTRUCTION

There was no settled reconstruction policy at war's end. President Lincoln in November 1863 had offered a plan which pardoned all southerners, except Confederate leaders, who took an oath affirming loyalty to the Union and support for emancipation. After 10 percent of the state's voters had affirmed their allegiance they could establish a new state government. The states of Louisiana, Tennessee and Virginia had used this method during the war, although their representatives were not accredited by Congress. Many Republicans thought this to be too lenient and enacted the Davis Wade Bill in 1864 which proposed to delay the formation of new southern governments until a majority of voters had taken a loyalty oath.

Senator Thaddeus Stevens of Massachusetts demanded more. Although the fundamental condition of Negro suffrage was his major goal, he persistently advocated even harsher terms of peace. In a speech at Lancaster, Pa., in September, 1865, Stephens argued for the confiscation of the estates of rebels worth more than $10,000 or 200 acres of land, forty acres of land to be given to each freedman, and the balance, estimated at $3,500,000,000, to go toward paying off the national debt. He supposed that only one-tenth of the whites would lose their property, while nearly all southern property would be confiscated. This proposition was never formally considered, but it made Stevens the incarnation of evil in the eyes of southerners.[12]

AMNESTY OATH

With Congress out of session, and after President Lincoln's assassination, it fell to his successor, Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, to outline plans for the South's readmission. In May 1865, he issued a series of proclamations that inaugurated the period of Presidential Reconstruction. Johnson offered a pardon to all southern whites except Confederate leaders and those with more than $20,000 in assets (although most of these subsequently received individual pardons), appointed provisional governors, and outlined steps whereby new state governments would be created. Apart from the requirements that they accept a provisional governor, abolish slavery, repudiate secession, and abro-

---

ing Reconstruction, PhD Diss. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1967.

11   Official Records, XLVII, Series I, Part 3, 322; XLVII Series I Part 2, 615–616.

12   Speech of Hon Thaddeus Stevens, Lancaster VA, 6 September 1865; http://history.furman.edu/~benson/hst41/red/stevens2.htm

gate the Confederate debt—all an inescapable outcome from the southern defeat—these governments managed their own reconstruction.

The most immediate problem facing the Army was that many in the South were starving. Only a small crop could be planted in 1865 because the soldiers were absent and the freedmen, as former male and female slaves were being called, too disorganized until after planting time, and a severe drought practically ruined the crop and the harvest of foodstuffs as well as the money crops, cotton and tobacco suffered.

In March 1865, the US Congress had established the Freedman's Bureau to assist the liberated slaves as well as to help whites who had sworn loyalty to the United States. The operations of the Freedmen's Bureau although operated under the War Department and in many locations staffed by Army officers, was a separate organization and operated separate from the field army under General Grant. The perennial problem between the Army and the Bureau was a basic disagreement at to what constituted a successfully reconstructed Southern society, and what means were necessary to bring this about. While the Bureau officials were more in sympathy with the Radicals and considered equality and protection for the Negro as the chief aim of Reconstruction, the Army commanders felt their primary duty was to maintain peace and order so that civil governments could be re-established in the South as soon as possible.[13]

Presidential reconstruction progressed rapidly during the summer and autumn of 1865, so that, when Congress met in December, claimants for seats in the house and senate were ready from all the seceding states, except Texas. The work of reconstruction was then ended, so far as the presidential theory could carry it; and Secretary Seward issued a proclamation on 18 December 1865, announcing the ratification of the 13th amendment. Unfortunately, many of the Southern states legislatures enacted a series of onerous Black Codes curtailing the rights and behavior of freedmen. Blacks strongly resisted the implementation of these measures. The evident inability of the white South's leaders to accept emancipation, and the resulting violence, fatally undermined northern support for Johnson's policies.

In June 1865, Captain D. W. Whittle wrote while on garrison duty in Alabama that the white people found it difficult to grasp the idea that slavery was dead "there has got to be a constant pressure brought to bear upon the former slave holders, " Whittle continued, "to make them deal fairly with the negroes…. They were very well as slaves, but in any other relation they hate them, and will place every possible obstacle in the way of their elevation….[14]

Major General Carl Shurz found while traveling through the south after the surrender numerous instances of blacks being brutalized to force them back to the plantations.

Reports of bloody outrages inflicted upon colored people came from all quarters…. Dead Negroes were found in considerable numbers in the country roads or on the fields, shot to death, or strung on the limbs of trees. … These conditions in their worst form

---

13   By authority of a joint resolution of March 30, the Freedmen's Bureau devoted half a million dollars to the purchase and distribution of food in the South. — Report of Commissioner Howard

14   John A. Carpenter, "Atrocities in the Reconstruction Period" *Journal of Negro History*, Vol. 47, No 4 (Oct. 1962) 234–247; 237

were only local, but they were liable to spread, for there was plenty of inflammable spirit of the same kind all over the South. It looked sometimes as if wholesale massacres were prevented only by the presence of the Federal garrisons which were dispersed all over the country.[15]

The duties performed by troops in the South during this period were many and varied. Detachments were stationed throughout the section to assist in the preservation of order and to carry out regulations designed to complete the pacification of the seceded states. An example of the Army's activities in this period is found in a report of Colonel John Frazer Sprague, commander of the district of Florida. Sprague wrote that he had established military posts at strategic points throughout the state, from which detachments were made „to protect the freedmen, and to enforce the law under the provisions of the Civil Rights Bill and the Bureau of Freedmen and Refugees.“ According to Sprague, these forces, which he said operated „under command of judicious officers,“ allayed excitement and insured „satisfactory adjustment o claims between whites and freedmen.“ Commenting in greater detail, Sprague wrote:

> Detachments move through the country when necessary and take post where disorders occur and where citizens apprehend danger from freedmen or from marauders infesting the frontier…..The presence of these commands has had a good effect on the… freedmen… and allayed much angry feeling between citizens of all political opinions in regard to tax titles and the occupation of property attained under them. The officers in command were instructed to keep the peace, secure property, and protect life and to arrest all parties attempting to obtain their rights by force.[16]

CONGRESSIONAL OR "RADICAL" RECONSTRUCTION

The course adopted by the new southern governments turned much of the North against Presidential Reconstruction. Congress refused to seat the congressmen and senators elected from the southern states and in early 1866 passed and sent to Johnson the Freedmen's Bureau and civil rights bills. The first extended the life of an agency Congress had created in 1865 to oversee the transition from slavery to freedom. The second defined all persons born in the United States as national citizens and spelled out rights they were to enjoy equally without regard to race—making contracts, bringing lawsuits, and enjoying „full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property.“[17] Shortly thereafter, Congress approved the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbade states from depriving any citizen of the „equal protection of the laws,“ barred many Confederates from holding state or national office, and threatened to reduce the South's representation in Congress if black men continued to be kept from voting. Every Confederate state except Tennessee initially rejected the amendment. This so angered

---

15 Carl Schurz, "First Days of Reconstruction" McClure's Magazine, Vol XXXI May 1908 (Project Gutenberg, e-book 17663, rel. 2 Feb 2006.

16 Colonel John Frazer Sprague to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Gulf, December 31, 1866. Letters sent, Department of Florida, 1866. Record Group 98, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

17 The Civil Rights Act – April 9, 1866

moderate Republicans that they joined the Radicals in passing the even more severe Reconstruction Act of 1867.[18]

The soldiers' task during this phase of Reconstruction replaced some of those skills needed in wartime such as impetuosity and ruthlessness with tact, an ability to communicate and the ability to wisely use discretion. All of the district commanders had distinguished themselves in the war and had acquired reputations that guaranteed success in any military capacity. But now they were to carry out a great political policy, which was to be resisted not by armed force, but by political means. They were to act under a commander-in-chief who was a violent adversary of the Congressional Reconstruction Policy, and under a general of the army whose conscientious efforts to maintain an impartial attitude failed to conceal his disposition in favor the policy. They had to deal, moreover, with civil governments which their commander-in-chief insisted were constitutional organizations, but which Congress had declared destitute of legality.

Congress was not prepared to endorse black suffrage until 1867. This happened after two developments further strengthened the Radical Republicans. First, northern voters overwhelmingly repudiated Johnson's policies in the fall 1866 congressional elections. Then, the southern states, with the exception of Tennessee, rejected the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress now decided to begin Reconstruction anew. The Reconstruction Acts of 1867 divided the South into five military districts and outlined how new governments, based on manhood suffrage, were to be established. Thus began the period of Radical or Congressional Reconstruction, which for the purpose of this paper extends to 1872.

In the spring of 1867, when the first Reconstruction Act went into effect, the general situation in the South was poorer than it was at the beginning of the preceding winter. The crops had in many parts of the South failed entirely in 1866. The pressure of famine began to be felt early in the winter, and by the beginning of the next spring the distribution of food through both public and private agencies had assumed large proportions. The greatest destitution existed in the mountainous districts of the different states, where many had been loyal to the Union and where all were comparatively poor. This was a populous region of small farmers, mostly white, who cultivated their farms by their own labor. For these reasons it was sometimes necessary to issue two or three times as many rations to whites as to Negroes. The issues were made without regard to loyalty, and thus many persons loyal to the Confederacy during the war were the recipients of the charity of the Government.[19]

At the outset all five district commanding generals announced an intent, and most of them a desire, to interfere as little as possible with the ordinary civil administration.[20] Of-

---

18   14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

19   By authority of a joint resolution of March 30, the Freedmen's Bureau devoted half a million dollars to the purchase and distribution of food in the South. – Report of Commissioner Howard. Brigadier General Wagner Swayne to Chaplain Samuel S. Gardner, Sub-Assistant Commissioner, Selma, Alabama, November 3, 1865; Report of Inspection of Bureau Affairs in Alabama by Brigadier General Frederic D. Sewall, Assistant Inspector General, B.R.F.A.L., Washington, October 30, 1866. Cf. Fleming, *Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama,* 277–83, 442.

20   The most important orders and correspondence relating to military government in its initial and determining stages are embodied in Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 14, 1st Session., 40th Congress.

ficials of the existing governments were directed to continue in the performance of their duties until duly superseded. All elections under state laws were forbidden, since Black suffrage would be in place before the popular will should again be consulted. As to the administration of justice, whenever it appeared to the military officers that the ordinary courts were not sufficiently active or impartial in their work, cases were transferred to the military tribunals that were expressly authorized by the Reconstruction Act. Each of the four Reconstruction Acts gave added powers to the district commanders.

The commanders could either allow the local civil tribunals to try offenders or organize military tribunals for the purpose. In case the latter method were employed, the sentence of the tribunal was subject to approval by the district commander; and if involving the death penalty, the approval of the president. Interference with the military under color of state authority was declared null and void, while the existing civil governments in the states were declared provisional only, and subject to the paramount authority of the United States, to abolish, modify, control or supersede the local government.

Once the district commanders decided to use the state governments as the agency by which they would administer civil affairs, they saw little need for a sizable increase in troop strength. With the exception of a few additional companies, the troops which had occupied the South during 1865–1866 continued in service during „military reconstruction.“ Nor did the district commanders change the command structure. Since they anticipated no significant opposition the commanders did not concentrate their forces, but continued the policy of maintaining small posts throughout the states so that troops would be readily available to settle minor disputes in any given locality.[21]

Commanders followed the tenets of General Orders 100 „Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field” one of the first set of rules governing the law of land warfare. Article 37 stated "The United States acknowledges and protects, in hostile countries occupied by them, religion and morality; the persons of inhabitants, especially those of women; and the sacredness of domestic relations. Offences to the contrary shall be rigorously punished.“[22]

Local commanders understood that they were to protect all persons in their rights of person and property, to suppress insurrection, disorder and violence, and to punish, or cause to be punished, all disturbers of the public peace and criminals. By shifting the burden of ordinary police duty to the local civil authorities as well as many of the finer details of civil administration, the soldiers were free to supervise the larger responsibilities the Army had to the reconstruction program.[23]

When policemen or sheriffs failed to arrest suspected or notorious offenders, the troops did the work; when district-attorneys failed to prosecute vigorously, or judges to hold or adequately to punish offenders, the latter were taken into military custody; when juries failed to convict, they were supplanted by the military courts. It was fully realized

---

21 Report of the Secretary of War, House Executive Document No 1, 40th Congress, Second Sessions, 462–463.

22 War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Article 37, General Orders No. 100, April 24, 1863.

23 John Robert Kirkland *Federal Troops in the South Atlantic States During Reconstruction*, PhD Diss. (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1967), 149.

from the outset that, in the prevailing Southern public opinion, trial by jury could not be expected to mete equal justice to Union men or, in general, to the freedmen.

There were legal challenges to the extent of the Army's role in the different states' reconstruction efforts, which were essentially political. In 1867, the removal of Governor Wells of Louisiana, a Republican, by Major General Philip Sheridan using his discretionary power brought on a firestorm of controversy. Demands were made to President Johnson that he relieve Sheridan. Attorney-General Henry Stanbery gave the opinion that the Reconstruction Acts gave no authority whatever for either removal or appointment of executive or judicial officers of a state. Congress then passed the supplementary act of July 19, 1867 which afforded commanders the power to remove at their discretion any state officer. The act provided further that it should be the duty of the commanders to remove from office all persons.[24] Sheridan stayed, at least for the time being.

The same act played out in regards to legislation. The district commanders assuming that they were endowed with all the powers incident to "the military authority of the United States," and that their duty to "protect all persons in their rights of person and property" required the unlimited use of such powers, they refused to regard the state laws as of any significance save as auxiliary to the military government.

Attorney-General Henry Stanbery further argued that no power was conferred on the commanders in the field of legislation. They were to protect persons and property, but the sole means for this purpose that the law gave them was the power to try offenders by military commission; save where such procedure was deemed necessary, the jurisdiction and laws of the old state organization remained intact. In the same supplementary act allowing the removal of elected officials Congress declared explicitly that the ten state governments, at the time the Reconstruction Act was passed, „were not legal state governments; and that thereafter said governments, if continued, were to be subject in all respects to the military commanders of the respective districts, and to the paramount authority of Congress."[25]

When commanders changed, policies changed with them. When General Winfield S. Hancock, succeeded Sheridan in the Fifth District (Louisiana Texas), in November, 1867, he revoked Sheridan's order requiring jurors be chosen from the registered voters which did not include those earlier disenfranchised, and reinstated the old state laws. Hancock's General Orders, No. 40, reversed that of his predecessor. „Crimes and offenses must be left to the consideration and judgment of the regular civil authorities."[26] This reluctance to interpose, either through military courts or through modification of the

---

24 The attorney-general of the state and the mayor and city judge of New Orleans were removed March 27; Sheridan's report in Secretary of War's Report for 1866; 2d Session, 39th Congress; Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 14, 1st Session, 40th Congress, 275; Section 2 of "An Act [Third Reconstruction Act] supplementary to an Act entitled „An Act to provide for the more efficient Government of the Rebel States," passed... [March 2, I867], and the Act supplementary thereto, passed... [March 23, 1867]," passed 19 July, 1867. General Sheridan's orders and correspondence afford copious evidence that his temper was sorely tried by the Louisiana politicians. In several of his dispatches to General Grant his language in reference to the president's policy was perilously near the line of insubordination; but it won for him the enthusiastic support of the radicals in the North, and the House of Representatives passed a special vote of thanks to him for his services in Louisiana.

25 Ibid., Section 1.

26 For the whole subject see Hancock's report in Report of Secretary **of** War for 1868; See his report for a sharp correspondence with Governor Pease, of Texas.

jury laws, in the ordinary administration of justice, offended the Federal loyalists in the South and to the radical Republicans throughout the Union; but made him the darling of Democrats and Southerners.

Ensuring the political process was a major portion of Field Army's role in reconstruction, but care had to be taken to demonstrate that voters were not influenced. Union soldiers were close at hand in case of disorder during elections, but commanders were leery of intimidating the voters. Officers and men were strictly prohibited from approaching the actual polling places on election day unless a disturbance took place and they were called on for help by the civil authorities. [27]

Voters were principally Northern whites who had settled in the South, blacks, and those who had taken an oath of loyalty. Under Congressional Reconstruction, an estimated 55 to 65 percent of white males registered to vote in 1867; 10 to 15 percent of the white population were disenfranchised, and 25 to 30 percent of those eligible did not register. The black males who registered in this period numbered 735 000. Although 80 percent of registered blacks voted in the fall 1868 elections, fewer than 50 percent of registered whites did. This was high enough, though, to call for constitutional conventions. Seventy-five percent of the elected delegates were Republicans; Unionist whites, Northern whites, and blacks, and the constitutions they produced enfranchised.[28]

Additionally, when the constitutional conventions under the new registration met in the various states, strong pressure was put upon the generals and upon Congress to bring about a „clean sweep" of the existing officials. But General Schofield declared that the adoption of this policy would render government impossible.

> It is folly to attempt to bring back a revolted people by disfranchising all the leaders in whom they trust and confide. These leaders, if they will act in good faith, can bring their people back to their allegiance. Without them it cannot be done during the existing generation.[29]

Ratification of the new constitutions required approval from a majority of registered voters. Many white Southern white voters stayed away from the polls, while others terrorized black voters to keep the number of those voting below fifty percent. The tactics proved successful in Alabama and congress subsequently passed the fourth Reconstruction Act, which required only a majority of the votes actually cast to ratify the constitutions. Within two months, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina ratified their constitutions and were readmitted into the Union in 1868.

By 1869, the Republican Party was firmly in control of all three branches of the federal government. President Johnson had been impeachment and almost convicted after attempting to remove Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton from office in apparent violation of the Tenure of Office. The former Chief of Staff of the Army Ulysses S. Grant was elected president on the Republican ticket that fall. Soon afterward, Congress approved the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibiting states from restricting the franchise because of race.

---

27 Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. 2, p. 1093; GO 40, Second Military District, March 13, 1868.

28 Library of Congress, *Civil War Desk Reference* "Reconstruction" (Washington: Smithsonian Press, 2001), 1864

29 Statement found in speech, n.d., probably delivered at Vanderbilt University, John M. Schofield Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

The freedmen, in alliance with carpetbaggers and southern white Republicans known as scalawags, temporarily gained power in every former Confederate state except Virginia.

In 1870, Mississippi, Texas, Georgia, and Virginia were also restored. In 1871, the administration launched a legal and military offensive that destroyed the Klan. Grant was reelected in 1872 in the most peaceful election of the period.

Slide US Soldiers on Occupation Duties

The readmission of the seceded states to the Union did not mean that the Army was withdrawn. The number of soldiers was reduced, but commanders continued to garrison permanent posts and forts, many of which remain in existence today. Most commanders reduced the number of smaller garrisons, consolidating them into larger ones for purposes of economy, discipline and efficiency, and to caution the civil and Freedmen's Bureau agents that the army would not intervene in "trifling difficulties" and to centralize where they might be rapidly dispatched to meet any contingency. [30]

Violence against blacks, and against white Republicans, however, did not disappear. Throughout the South members of various white organizations did what they could to disenfranchise the black vote. In 1875, Democratic rifle clubs in Mississippi broke up meetings of Republicans and beat political leaders. When Mississippi governor Adelbert Ames asked President Grant to send in troops to protect voters, Grant stated, "The whole public are tired out with these annual autumnal outbreaks in the South... [and] are ready now to condemn any interference on the part of the [national] Government."

The Ku Klux Klan, an organization dedicated to a return to the pre Civil War South and closely affiliated with the Democrat Party in the South did much to intimidate both Negro voters as well as those trying to assist them. Perhaps the clearest contemporary summary of the Klan's objectives was provided by President Grant. He wrote that the Klan aimed „by force and terror to prevent all political action not in accord with the view of the members; to deprive colored citizens of the right to bear arms and of the right to a free ballot; to suppress schools in which colored children were taught and to reduce the colored people to a condition closely akin to that of slavery. [31] There is little question that Grant was correct in ascribing political objectives to the Klan. The Klan itself avowed its political partisanship.

After some delay the Federal Government moved to suppress the Ku Klux Klan, especially in South Carolina. Congress had acted several times to provide Grant with the powers needed to cope with the secret order. In the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, Congress made interference with the exercise of the right to vote a criminal offense. In a supplementary act of February 28, 1871, Congress strengthened the Enforcement Act by placing elections for members of Congress under Federal control. United States marshals were empowered to appoint large numbers of deputies to prevent any interference with voting rights. The third and most important piece of legislation was the Ku Klux Klan Act, passed on April 20, 1871. Under this act the President was given the power to

---

30   George G Meade to Secretary of War, August 5 1868, Letters Sent, Department of the South, 1868. Record Group 98, National Archives, Washington DC.

31   Message to the House of Representatives, 19 April, 1872; J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington, 1898), VII, 164.

declare any unlawful combination that menaced the public safety of a state to be a rebellion against the United States. To meet such a rebellion the President was empowered to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus,* which provided for arrest and confinement without charges being offered. On the same day as the Ku Klux Klan Act was passed, a Joint Committee of Congress began an extensive investigation of the organization.[32]

Grant ordered the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus,* which approximately 800 members of the Ku Klux Klan either surrendering, taken into custody and paroled or jailed. Louis F. Post later wrote that „confessions became quite the fashion as arrests multiplied."[33]

By 1876, all of the states had voted out the Republicans by limiting the black vote through intimidation and more. By 1890 much of what had been accomplished during Reconstruction regarding the political status of the Negro had been undone; and it was not until 1956 that a new Civil Rights Bill passed that stripped away many of the limitations on minority voting.

The preceding paper reflects reconstruction efforts in the American South. Much of what transpired with regards to reconstructing an established order is applicable today in Iraq and Afghanistan. The policy of military intervention in reconstructing the South failed in the end because reconstruction could not be continued indefinitely and there was no conclusion except to abandon the policy. Instead of a tranquility and a harmonious relationship between the races that Reconstruction was supposed to produce, there resulted an even greater determination on the part of the Southern whites to end all semblance of Federal control, all vestiges of rule by outsiders, and for the time being, any attempt to allow the Negro civil and political equality. That this would be the result might have been anticipated before any intervention began but even if it had been, the obligation to intervene would still have been there.

RESUMÉ

Robert Rush: Postkonfliktné operácie na americkom Juhu 1865 – 1872

Ako väčšina krajín aj Spojené štáty zažili obdobie občianskej vojny a sociálneho prevratu. Počas rokov po vojne armáda Spojených štátov slúžila ako výkonný činiteľ pri obnove Juhu a bola tam najdôležitejším nástrojom federálnej moci; či už pod prezidentským vedením alebo pod mandátom kongresu.
Prvou prioritou armády Únie bolo obnoviť poriadok a zriadiť efektívnu vojenskú kontrolu nad všetkými oblasťami Juhu. V niektorých oblastiach bandy zradcov a vyhnancov konfederácie naďalej útočili na mestá a na malé predsunuté stráže a armáda používala tvrdé opatrenia, aby ich vyhladila predtým, než bude krajina ešte väčšmi destabilizovaná, pričom sa súčasne snažila o zmiernenie utrpenia a biedy utečencov, chudobných a oslobodených otrokov.
Boli dve obdobia obnovy. Prvým bola prezidentská obnova (1865 – 1866), keď bola väčšina belochov z Juhu omilostená. Štáty riadili svoju vlastnú obnovu, museli však akceptovať dočasného guvernéra, zrušiť otroctvo, zrieknuť sa odtrhnutia a zrušiť konfederačný dlh. Druhým bola kongresová obnova (1866 –

---

32 Cited in Ellis Oberholtzer, *A History of the United States Since the Civil War, II (New* York, 1922), 383.

33 Louis F. Post. „A ‚Carpetbagger' in South Carolina," *Journal of Negro History*, X (January, 1925), 49.

1877), ktorá sa začala potom, ako južanské štáty schválili niekoľko "čiernych zákonníkov" obmedzujúcich práva a správanie oslobodených otrokov.

Zákony o obnove z roku 1867 vyhlásili vlády odtrhnutých štátov iba za dočasné a rozdelili Juh do 5 vojenských obvodov. Ukázali, ako majú byť zriadené nové vlády založené na volebnom práve mužov. Každý obvod spravoval významný vyšší generál podriadený prezidentovi, ktorý bol ostrým odporcom kongresovej politiky obnovy, a náčelníkovi armády, ktorého poctivé úsilie o udržanie nestranného prístupu zlyhalo pri skrývaní snahy o uprednostňovanie politiky. Museli sa dohodnúť; naviac aj s občianskymi vládami, pri ktorých ich hlavní velitelia presadzovali, aby to boli ústavné organizácie, ktoré však kongres vyhlásil bez právneho opodstatnenia.

Velitelia nechali riešenie civilných otázok na vlády štátov a bežné policajné povinnosti na miestne úrady. Spochybňoval sa rozsah úlohy armády pri obnove v rôznych štátoch, pričom kongres a prezident mali protikladné názory na právomoci udelené veliteľom obvodov. Spochybňovala sa aj legislatíva prijatá dočasnými vládami štátov, pričom velitelia obvodov považovali štátne zákony za pomocné pri presadzovaní ich právomoci a kongres znovu potvrdil kompetencie veliteľov obvodov vo všetkých oblastiach týkajúcich sa obnovy.

Mnohí chceli odstrániť z úradu všetkých bývalých úradníkov Konfederácie, ale iní si uvedomovali, že zbaviť hlasovacieho práva južanských lídrov by bolo nerozumné a že bez nich by trvalo generáciu, kým by Juh bol opäť lojálny. Ako štáty znovu vstupovali do Únie, väčšina veliteľov spájala menšie posádky do väčších a centralizovanejších, aby slúžili ako sily rýchlej reakcie podporujúce civilné úrady.

Kvôli akciám Ku Klux Klanu, organizácie zameranej na návrat k Juhu pred občianskou vojnou, kongres trestal zasahovanie do volebného práva a dal prezidentovi právo dočasne odložiť rozkaz na predvedenie zatknutého. Prezident Grant využil túto právomoc v roku 1872, keď potlačil narastajúcu vzburu v Južnej Karolíne. Násilie proti čiernym a bielym republikánom však nezmizlo. Do roku 1875 už bol národ unavený z južanských problémov a pripravený odmietnuť akýkoľvek zásah zo strany vlády. Obnova potom skoro skončila.

Nebol nijaký komplexný plán na prebudovanie Juhu – a v skutočnosti koncepcia pomoci porazenému nepriateľovi pri vybudovaní silnej novej spoločnosti, ktorá by bola oddaná záujmom víťaza, nebude v širokom meradle pochopená ešte takmer celé storočie. Politika vojenskej intervencie pri obnove Juhu nakoniec zlyhala, pretože obnova nemohla pokračovať donekonečna a nebola iná možnosť, ako sa jej vzdať. Už pred začatím intervencie sa dalo predpokladať, že výsledok bude takýto, ale aj ak by tu bol taký predpoklad, stále zostávala povinnosť zasiahnuť.

When the Fighting Stops:
The Austro-Hungarian Experience with Military Government in Occupied Territories During World War I.

Dr. Tamara Scheer

This presentation is a mid-way product of a longer research project, aiming at comparing the Austro-Hungarian experience in interim or military administration during the Great War. It is based on primary sources and – where possible – the existing secondary literature.[1] This paper does not aim at giving an overview of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces in the War of 1914–18 in general, nor of the Danube Monarchy's war effort. In this context important, however, was the fact that the Habsburg Monarchy was a multi-national empire encompassing a dozen different ethnic groups, from Germans and Italians to Hungarians and Ukrainians, to Czechs and Serbs, to name but a few. This was also reflected in the composition of the armed forces. In the context of this paper, this meant that soldiers involved in occupation duties might have had at least rudimentary basic knowledge of the local languages. In addition, like in most contemporary armies, the majority of military personnel were reservists, not professional soldiers, and thus able to bring in previous experience and knowledge from their civilian professions into military administration work.

Austria-Hungary maintained military administrations in seven countries or regions: Serbia (1915–1918), Montenegro (1916–1918) and northern Albania (1916–1918) in the Balkans; (Russian) Poland (1914/15–1918), Rumania (1916–1918), and Ukraine (1918) on the Eastern Front, and northern Italy (1917–1918). These administrations differed in

---

1   I would like to thank Dr. Ronald G. Haycock and Dr. Erwin A. Schmidl for having read and commented upon an earlier version of this paper.

many respects. The differences were not intentional, but were mainly caused by external factors.

- The Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) defined a country as 'occupied', when an army took over a foreign territory by force and exercised power there. During World War I, such was the case for Italy, Montenegro, Rumania, Russia and Serbia. In contrast, Albania, only created in 1913, was seen as a friendly state which Austria-Hungary just helped to stabilize. On similar grounds, Poland and Ukraine were occupied Russian territories, but where at the same time considered as 'nascent countries' gaining (or regaining) their independence during the war, and hence were viewed as potential allies. This naturally influenced the policy of the Austro-Hungarian military governments.
- Some of the countries listed were occupied and administrated by Austria-Hungary alone. This was mainly the case in the Balkans – Serbia, Montenegro and Albania – and (with exceptions) in Italy. On the Eastern Front, military administration was usually organised jointly with Germany or other allies.
- The attitudes of the populations concerned also differed considerably. Many Poles, for example, had positive feelings about Austria-Hungary because of the encouraging example of Austria's administration of other Polish and Galician territories. Austrians had the reputation of being more tolerant and well-meaning than, for example, the Germans. In addition, many Poles felt 'liberated' from Russian rule, and therefore were well-disposed towards the Austrians.

By contrast, after heavy fighting and horrendous casualties, many Serbs and Italians were sullen and resentful at being defeated and then occupied. In Albania, Montenegro, Rumania and Ukraine, attitudes were more mixed or relatively indifferent.

- Austro-Hungarian officials held different perspectives for the future of these countries. Some of them were seen as possible future allies or even as candidates to become eventually part of the Dual Monarchy. Poland especially was thought of as a possible Habsburg territory in spite of the fact that our German allies naturally held different plans. Albania and Ukraine should be established as allied states. Austro-Hungarian optimism for an enlarged monarchy even included parts of northern Italy.
- The various countries concerned differed in their infrastructure and economic potential. Italy was a highly industrialized state and also had a mature and sophisticated agricultural base. This made it possible for the occupying powers (Austria-Hungary and Germany) to exploit it both for agricultural products and for machinery. Existing factories were either utilised for the purposes of the occupiers or even dismantled and moved elsewhere.

If one discounts Rumania's oil refineries (which were, of course, most important for the war effort) most other countries concerned had little or no industry. However, Ukraine, Rumania and Poland were rich of raw materials and agricultural products. This was especially important in the case of Ukraine which – it was hoped – would supply enough bread to feed the starving populations back home. (The Peace of Brest-Litovsk was even commonly known as the 'Brotfriede' or 'peace for bread'.)

Serbia offered a rich potential for agriculture, but this had not been too highly devel-

oped before the war. In Albania and Montenegro, for a variety of reasons, the agricultural sector was barely able to feed the local population.

▪ One last point should be noted here: 'Military government' took different forms, depending on the course of the war, but also on various political aspects. In some cases, such as Montenegro, parts of Russia and northern Italy, the occupying government was directly organised by the military. In Serbia, the military 'government general' was in theory a military affair, but – due to the complex make-up of the Dual Monarchy – many Austrian and Hungarian civil institutions exercised their influence on the Serbs, often with conflicting aims.

In Albania, a 'civilian commissar' appointed by the foreign ministry held an important position in the Austro-Hungarian administration, but – like in northern Italy – the territory also formed the immediate hinterland to the frontline, thus strengthening the military's position.

'PLANS FOR PEACE?' AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S POLICY OF OCCUPATION

Austria-Hungary had a certain tradition of post-conflict military government. This was especial true in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had been occupied by the Austrians in 1878 and (at least during the first years) largely administered by the military. During this time experience had been gained in what we would now call 'post-conflict peace-building' or 'nation building'. This not only meant taking over the existing forms of government and administration, but actually building an entirely new administrative structure if necessary. As far as possible, the extant organizations were utilised on the lower levels. The basic approach was to evaluate existing structures before forcibly rebuilding them. In general, this was also the approach taken in World War I.

Of course, circumstances were different in the cases mentioned – community structures and administrative traditions differed dramatically between, for example, northern Italy, western Ukraine or Albania.

One must point out that all the examples examined in this paper happened during a lengthy war. For the populations concerned this meant severe limitations of local civil rights and freedom, despite all positive attitudes which might or might not have existed on the sides of the occupiers as well as the occupied. At the same time, we should not forget that during this war, civil liberties were also dramatically reduced in certain parts of the Monarchy itself. A state of emergency was in force even in some regions far from the frontlines, and potentially hostile population groups were deported and interned, sometimes for the duration of the war.

In general, when establishing a military or interim administration of an occupied territory, the Austro-Hungarian authorities tried to implement the following guidelines even though in reality this did not always work out as planned:

▶ Adherence to the Hague Conventions and other principles of international law;
▶ Equal treatment of all population groups and religious communities at least in theory;
▶ Respect for religious feelings and country-typical peculiarities; and

► The appointment of qualified personnel for leadership positions. If at all possible, officers and officials were expected to be able to speak the local language and have some experience in the region.

For example, the commander of occupation troops in the Sanjak of Novipazar, and then military governor of Serbia, General Adolf Baron Rhemen zu Barensfeld, had spent most of his earlier service in Zagreb and Temesvar. He was able to speak Serbo-Croatian fluently. In Poland, it was possible to use officers and officials with experience from Austrian Galicia, including ethnic Poles. Even one of the governors, Major General Stanislaus Count Szeptycki, was himself a Polish nobleman.

Being able to recruit suitably qualified personnel made it easier for the Austrians than for other nations, such as Germany, to ease the relationship with the local populations. This does not mean, of course, that there were no problems at all. As everywhere, personnel seconded to the military government or occupation authorities often lacked proper qualifications or motivation. Even today, it is not unheard of that commanders are reluctant to send their best people off to other missions or to other institutions. Yet back in the Great War, attempts were made to acquire talented and experienced people. For example, for personnel serving in occupied countries, handbooks were published to familiarise the soldiers with local conditions and customs. Apart from personnel brought in from the Monarchy, locally recruited personnel were often used to a large extent for lower-level administration, such as town administrations and local police. Also, where possible, the judicial system was revived with local personnel, keeping the local laws (with some modifications).

Establishing and maintaining internal order was obviously a priority. This included:
► a general and comprehensive disarming of the inhabitants (which did not happen in all cases);
► establishing constabulary and police forces, if possible including the local population under Austrian officers;
► combating marauding gangs terrorising the civil population;
► and establishing special mobile units of platoon and company size, so-called 'Streifzüge', often comprising Austrian as well as local personnel.

Unlike today, of course, military government in World War I was not the result of an intervention for purely humanitarian reasons: it was a consequence – and often a part – of military operations during a war. Therefore, exploitation of economic and personnel resources was an obvious priority. Personnel were needed first of all to maintain the agricultural and, where it existed, the industrial production in the occupied territories. In addition, workers were also recruited for labour in the factories in Austria-Hungary which by this time were suffering from war induced a shortage of manpower. If possible, the local population was also used to work for the military government, as local police or – in some cases – was even recruited as soldiers.

Concerning the economic resources, Austria-Hungary naturally aimed at a maximum exploitation. The regulations of the Hague Conventions allowed requisitions for the use of the occupying army, but only against proper receipts. For goods thus confiscated in an 'orderly fashion', the inhabitants were reimbursed by the authorities. For this purpose, the Austro-Hungarian administration installed special compensation offices. More of-

ten than not, soldiers did not follow these instructions properly. For example, frequently fake receipts were issued, and inhabitants were reluctant to trust this 'paper money'. Therefore, receipts were eventually replaced by payment in cash, or by bartering.

As far as possible, the Austro-Hungarian authorities aimed to recover the costs of the occupation forces through taxes by the inhabitants. Previous taxes were maintained and collected by the new military government, although in some cases taxes were suspended for an intermediate period to allow for economic recovery. This was done in Serbia in 1916, for example. In fact, Serbia was the only country which actually yielded a surplus income for the occupation authorities. But on the whole such 'taxation' was not popular among the occupied peoples. Fortunately the authorities quickly realized that in order to achieve long-term politic effects, brutal exploitation was not always the best course of action. Therefore, programmes were initiated to enhance agricultural production. Within the military governments, statistic data were collected about population, geography, and agricultural methods, all meant to improve the local governance. In Albania, this almost took the form of a semi-colonial administration, collecting such data for the first time at all. Appropriate administrative commissions were established and regulations issued to supervise and improve farms and agricultural production facilities such as mills and factories. The military government aimed at extending the area under cultivation, and at modernising the production processes. Model factories and farms were established, and new plants and husbandry methods introduced to increase efficiency. As in Austria-Hungary itself, factories and other enterprises operated under military control. The officers used for these purposes usually were reserve officers with proper technical or economic experience, all of which supported this attempt at a benign and efficient occupation.

In some cases, such as in Albania, where the military government also built roads and bridges and established a railway system, these activities had remarkable good long-term effects, actually boosting the modernisation of the country. Of course, conditions differed from country to country. In northern Italy, for example, circumstances were totally different, and both agriculture and industry were on the highest levels. Unfortunately, the Austrians did not always handle these resources in a responsible manner. In some cases, factories were dismantled and shipped to the hinterland, which caused heavy damage for the local industry and much unemployment and its subsequent dissatisfaction without yielding appropriate results for the Austrian authorities.

SOME CASE STUDIES:

Disarmament

Demobilisation and disarmament of former fighters is obviously a major topic today. Therefore it seems justified to spend some words on experience in this field. In Albania, being armed made a man – just before the war, an Albanian had complained about efforts to educate the people by establishing schools, because 'what good does it bring if my son can read and write, but not shoot?' Therefore, disarmament was not easy. Surprisingly, it worked reasonably well, because the Austrians decided not to confiscate weapons,

but to collect and store them, maintaining the individual ownership. Later, mixed commissions were to be appointed to handle the question of firearms on a local level, buying weapons at reasonable market prices.

Likewise, supported by local mayors and religious leaders, the Austrians managed to have the vendetta among Albanians suspended for the duration of the war in an attempt to enhance internal security.

Winning hearts and minds

Partly because of cultural differences and communication problems, there were always cases of maltreatment of local people by Austro-Hungarian soldiers and officials. Small garrisons in far-removed places made control and discipline often difficult. Subalterns, sergeants and corporals often were obliged to make on the spot decisions spontaneously and without prior consultation with their superiors. Consequently some abuses of power happened which of course were counterproductive for 'winning hearts and minds', to use a contemporary phrase. Therefore, the military administration made efforts to ensure proper discipline of its troops, thereby demonstrating to the local people that offences by soldiers or officials would not be tolerated by the occupying power. When they did occur, special commissions were established to investigate such cases and in some instances actually found soldiers or civilian employees guilty. The basic aim was to assure the inhabitants that the occupying power would not tolerate unlawful behaviour even by its own troops or officials, and thus create a climate of stability and confidence.

In countries like Albania, activities of local criminal gangs were a major problem. Police, mobile columns, and in some cases even 'friendly gangs' were created to fight the hostile groups. Often, attacks led to conditions not unlike those in insurgencies during which isolated – and helpless – units over-reacted. Houses were burnt, cattle were stolen, and people were killed. There was one, admittedly isolated, case of brutal reprisals following a surprise attack on an Austro-Hungarian patrol. The incident left some Austrian soldiers dead and wounded; consequently, 44 Albanians were summarily executed in a near-by village under martial law. This prompted the foreign ministry's representative with the military government to intervene. Eventually, the chief of staff of the military administration was replaced, and care was taken to avoid such escalation in the future. Complaints by locals were properly handled by police and courts. Control procedures were introduced, and personnel was rotated between units to prevent the growth of ill-controlled 'unit subcultures'.

Equal treatment of local religions

Being a multi-national empire with a distinctly supra-national identity, Austria-Hungary could claim a tradition of comparatively tolerant attitudes towards religious or ethnic minorities. Usually, equal treatment of ethnic and religious groups was also practiced in occupied territories. This could, however, also fail – as is shown by the following example from Albania. In 1916, Colonel Zhuber, commanding the 26th 'Landsturm' (Reserve) Brigade and being at the same time district commander of Shkodra in northern Albania, introduced mixed after-school child care for Catholics and Muslims. This was a very enlightened measure, of course – we often believe today that prejudices can

be avoided by bringing children from different backgrounds together. However the local Muslims in 1916 perceived this as an attempt at assimilation or religious conversion, and so started massive protests. Eventually, Zhuber's well-intentioned measure had to be withdrawn, and the foreign ministry's representative there who had served as consul in this region for a long time before the war, and therefore had intimate local knowledge, warned against such mistakes in the future.

End of occupation

From its intention, the occupation policy instituted by Austria-Hungary during the First World War aimed at utilising the occupied territories to the maximum for the Habsburgs' war effort; but it also introduced many measures aiming at long-term reforms and improvements. With the sudden collapse of the Dual Monarchy in the autumn of 1918, however, the military government in the occupied territories vanished within days, sometimes hours. Only in few cases, there was an orderly hand-over to the new authorities of the Allies or the resurgent local administrations.

In some cases however, such as Albania, infrastructure built and reforms introduced had long-lasting positive effects, leading to a general improvement of living conditions. With some limitations, and without wanting to overly stress the positive aspects, this can also be said for some of the other occupied territories. More important, however, is that some of the lessons which can be derived from this experience might actually be of interest nowadays: many of the challenges faced in modern peace operations, peace-building or reconstruction efforts are not unlike those faced by the Emperor's soldiers and officials in the Great War, when they had to establish military or interim administrations in occupied territory.

RESUMÉ

Tamara Scheer: Keď skončí boj: Rakúsko-uhorská skúsenosť s vojenskou vládou na okupovaných územiach počas 1. svetovej vojny

V priebehu "Veľkej vojny" Rakúsko-Uhorsko okupovalo niekoľko zahraničných území, na ktorých boli inštalované vojenské vlády – niektoré z nich so silnými civilnými prvkami. Počas vojny Rakúsko-Uhorsko udržiavalo vojenské správy v siedmich regiónoch: Na Balkáne to bolo Srbsko (1915 – 1918), Čierna Hora (1916 – 1918) a severné Albánsko (1916 – 1918); na východnom fronte časti Poľska (1914/15 – 1918), Rumunska (1916 – 1918) a Ukrajiny (1918); a na juhu to boli časti severného Talianska (1917 – 1918). Okupované a spravované územia sa značne odlišovali, jednak z hľadiska štruktúry ich civilných spoločností, ako aj svojimi regionálnymi hospodárskymi podmienkami. Sympatie a antipatie ľudí pri stretnutí so svojimi rakúsko-uhorskými okupantmi sa pohybovali od otvorenej averzie až po celkom priateľský postoj. Rakúsko-Uhorsko sa mohlo spoliehať na určité predchádzajúce skúsenosti z okupačných správ (napr. v Bosne a Hercegovine v roku 1878).

Rakúsko-Uhorsko sledovalo na okupovaných územiach rôzne ciele. Hlavným cieľom bolo zjavne využívanie surovín a potravín a okupované územia boli zásobárňou vojnových dodávok. V niektorých chudobnejších krajinách boli zavedené rozsiahle štrukturálne reformy, vrátane investícií do regionálnej infraštruktúry s dlhodobými účinkami.

Fakt, že rakúsko-uhorská armáda bola mnohonárodná a multietnická, zahŕňajúca asi dvanásť etnických

skupín, nielenže viedol k o čosi tolerantnejšiemu postoju, ale aj uľahčoval nájdenie vhodne kvalifikovaného personálu pre okupačné správy, niektorí z nich vedeli hovoriť miestnymi jazykmi. Skutočnosť, že väčšina vojakov v správnej službe boli záložníci, sa ukázal byť ďalšou výhodou, vzhľadom na ich skúsenosti z civilu a zrelší vek. Robili sa pokusy na dosiahnutie rovnakého zaobchádzania s miestnymi etnickými skupinami a náboženstvami a do správy bol čo možno najviac zapojený miestny personál.

Pokiaľ ide o vzťahy medzi vojenskými správami a miestnym obyvateľstvom, boli urobené niektoré pozitívne zásahy, ale ich protiváhou boli snahy o nepriateľskú propagandu. Rakúsko-Uhorsko malo odlišné názory na budúcnosť okupovaných území, od anexie niektorých až po zriadenie priateľských režimov, ktoré takisto ovplyvňovali okupačnú politiku a miestne postoje. Vo všeobecnosti tu však bol nedostatok jasných plánov do budúcnosti, ktoré brzdili snahy o získanie miestnej podpory. V novembri 1918 okupačné režimy skolabovali spolu s cisárstvom a jeho armádou.

East German Army Personnel and Equipment in the Bundeswehr After 1990

Col. Winfried Heinemann

1. POLITICAL PARAMETERS

It is worth noting that the term "German re-unification" is not entirely correct. In fact, it was not that one new state was formed out of two former states, but that the one – the failed GDR – acceded to the other – the Federal Republic, which continued to exist. This is important in that the West German state's military forces continued to exist, too, with all their rights and liabilities, legal structure, and property, and that the East German state's "Volksarmee" or "People's Army" ceased to exist on October 3, 1990[1].

Ex-NVA personnel tend to insinuate today that the GDR was in one way or another "taken over" by the West. This is in line with allegations that the June 1953 uprising in East Germany had been sponsored by the West, that Hungarian and Czech policies in 1956 and 1968, respectively, had been "counterrevolutionary", and that Polish Solidarnosc, too, had been CIA-instigated. From a marxist perspective, world history can be explained as a series of class struggles, pitting by historical necessity one such class against the other. Against this general background, the difference between internal and external enemies tends to blur, and no attack against the "workers' paradise" can be explained other than as caused by the class enemy[2]. In truth, it was not the West German military which conquered East Germany, tank guns blazing, but it was the East German population which decided to liberate itself from an antiquated, oppressive benevolent dictatorship which had kept people captive behind the most elaborate border arrangements ever designed by man. It were these 17 million East Germans who voted, in free elections, for

---

1   Leonhard, Armee der Einheit, p. 70.
2   Digutsch, Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee, p. 25.

those parties which had clearly stated German unity as their political aim, and the dissolution of both the GDR and its armed forces came about by democratic majorities[3].

Actually, former "Volksarmee" officers still congratulate themselves on not having fired on demonstrators during the heady days of autumn 1989. It shows an odd understand of what role the "People's Army" should have played in their minds that not shooting the people they were supposed to serve can count a merit, but as it is, neither the party nor the Soviet "friends" gave the army the order to shoot, and to the end, they were sufficiently under Soviet and Party control to leave it at that[4].

2. NVA STRENGTH BY OCTOBER 1990

By spring 1990, it became clear that the GDR was failing fast. Elections in March brought an anti-Socialist government, and on July 1, 1990, the GDR officially introduced West German currency[5]. Once economic unity had been established, political unity would surely follow, but it seems that East German politicians believed they had about two years left to prepare their country – and their military – for eventual unification[6]. However, the East German government began to reduce troop strength. From about 170,000 men during the Cold War period, the East German army was whittled down to just under 90,000 by October 1990[7]. This was done mostly by drafting vastly reduced numbers of conscripts, so that about 50,000 of those 90,000 were volunteer and career soldiers.

The NVA as a whole had been seized by an inflexibility and lack of reform characteristic of the GDR system as a whole. The forces had developed an aspiring generation of junior generals eager to improve the socialist military, but led by geriatric commanders, they had not been in a position to achieve anything substantial. Now, the 69-year-old Minister of Defence, General Heinz Keßler, had to go and make room for one of the more cautious reformers, Admiral Theodor Hoffmann. The new NVA leadership went to work on the assumption that they, too would have several years in which to bring their army up to modern, and western standards[8].

Even when it became obvious that the GDR would cease to exist in the autumn of 1990, for a while there was talk of two separate armies within the one state. One reason for this was that for a while, Poland, Germany's Eastern neighbour, was unwilling to concede that there should be NATO troops right on their borders. Eventually, Poland withdrew its reservations – not least because they had realised this might mean an independent German military force under no international control or guidance right on their frontier – the very last thing Poland wanted at a time when Warsaw was still insecure as to German intentions regarding the Oder-Neiße border. East German minister of arms reduction and defence, Rainer Eppelmann, a pacifist pastor, aimed at a dissolu-

---

3 Leonhard, Armee der Einheit, p. 72 f.
4 For the former NVA officers' view of their own history cf. Was war die NVA?
5 Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990, pp. 1057–1088; Armee ohne Zukunft, p. 522.
6 Ehlert, Armee, pp. 699–703.
7 German MoD figures.
8 Ehlert, Armee, pp. 695–699.

tion of both Cold War alliances alike, and led the NVA top brass to believe that therefore, even the West German government had agreed to retain two military forces even after re-unification, one in the West as part of NATO, and the other in the East, without international affiliation. On July 20, 1990, the anniversary of the attempted military coup against Hitler, the NVA was sworn to a new oath, omitting any reference to both Socialism and the Soviet Union[9].

Alas, all that was not to be. In mid-July, Michail Gorbachev had agreed to all-German membership in NATO, and that put an end to all speculations about a continued existence of a separate East German army. Overall German military forces would not exceed 370,000, down from the 495,000 West German and 170,000 East German military personnel only two years previously. Soviet troops were to leave East Germany by 1994 – a vast logistic feat which would require substantial support from the fledgling all-German army[10].

East German officers began to realise that they would soon have to face a life outside the military. Political support for their situation was virtually non-existent: the GDR was now governed by former dissidents for whom the army had always seemed to represent the oppressive state. The former socialist party, eager to secure for itself a role in the unified Germany, had taken a radically pacifist stand, calling for general disarmament[11].

Eppelmann saw his role in preparing the NVA for eventual take-over by the Bundeswehr. As the West German army then had no female soldiers, all women in the NVA were sent into retirement, as were all general officers and all career soldiers of 55 years and more.

Altogether, the East German military had remained disciplined and quiet, despite rumblings of discontent. Even at a time when it had become clear there was no perspective for most of its officers, they had continued to serve loyally, in particular making sure that the vast amounts of equipment would be collected and secured against theft or misappropriation.

3. EQUIPMENT

In fact, NVA equipment was a major source of concern. Some 2,700 MBTs, 208 naval units, 2,200 artillery pieces became part of the Bundeswehr inventory on October 3, 1990. More worrisome still were the 1,3 million handguns, 300,000 tons of ammunition, and 63,000 tons of critical chemical substances such as rocket propellants[12]. As the Bundeswehr was to reduce its overall size anyway, and would have to keep complying with NATO STANAGs as well as with West German environmental and safety regulations, virtually all this equipment was found unsuitable for continuing use. In fact, the only weapons system still in use after four years were the MiG 29 jet fighters which continued

---

9   Digutsch, Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee, p. 44.

10   Ehlert, Von der Wende, pp. 35–39.

11   Ehlert, Armee, p. 699.

12   Leonhard, Armee der Einheit, p. 73; slightly different figures in Digutsch, Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee, pp. 278 f.

to be flown from Rostock airbase – quite a sight with their iron crosses painted on. Even those have since gone to Poland, and are being replaced by the new Eurofighter.

Another category of equipment which came in handy were NVA containers for housing expeditionary forces. When Bundeswehr Air defence missiles and jet fighters deployed to Turkey in 1991, to protect Anatolia against possible Iraqi air attack, this might have been near-impossible had not East German equipment been readily available. The Bundeswehr had never considered fighting outside its own country, and had been logistically unprepared to do so.

4. PERSONNEL

General Officers, Political Officers, Border Guards, Stasi

While these were problems which needed solving (others included dismantling and de-mining the 1,300 kms of inter-German border), the major question was what to do with East German military personnel. Now, the first step had to be categorisation. The GDR had been the country with the highest density of armed formations in German history, quite apart from the Soviet troops, some 10 percent of the adult population had been involved in one way or another with the security of the state.

From the outset, it was decided that no officers from the former border troops would be taken on into the Bundeswehr, whereas quite a number of them found their way into the federal border police. Similarly, not a single political officer was given the chance of a Bundeswehr career – the reason why no uniformed historians were taken on from the East German military history institute, which had been part and parcel of the political administration. No members of the GDR's military intelligence were retained, nor were any generals or admirals considered. Lastly, it was decided that nobody would be retained in the Bundeswehr who had in any way co-operated with the Ministry for State Security, usually known as the Stasi[13].

This last decision was by far the most controversial. While most Stasi files had survived and would eventually be analysed, many tended to hope that their particular, minor role would go unnoticed, and preferred to tick off "no" in the relevant questionnaire. They knew full well that if they admitted to even minor Stasi involvement such as signing up without ever ratting on anyone, they would be rejected. In that case, they would be on the dole immediately, whereas if they decided to deny their secret police involvement, they would retain a job, even if only temporarily.

For the Bundeswehr, this caused major problems. For years to come, officers and NCOs were suddenly ejected from their jobs because the slow but systematic sifting of Stasi files had brought to light their secret past. In one instance, a former NVA officer had already been selected to command of a Military Police Battalion, and was then sent packing within hours.

---

13   German MoD informatio; Digutsch, Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee, Chapter 3.

Rank structure

Another serious problem was the very different rank structure. In the NVA, as in the Soviet Army, officers had been promoted swiftly, and 37-year-old colonels were not uncommon. Another major difference was that the Bundeswehr is almost unique in that is has a separate NCO corps, proud career soldiers who often occupy positions of leadership. The NVA, however, had only had a few specialists as NCOs, so that many jobs which in the Bundeswehr were done by NCOs were given to NVA officers.

As a result, it was decided that former NVA officers would not retain their former rank. What was more: some would be offered a career as Bundeswehr NCOs but not as officers, or would be given a chance to serve as "Fachoffizier" – a specialist officer career which ends at the rank of captain as a maximum.

Obviously, it would have been unacceptable for pre-1989 Bundeswehr Lieutenant-Colonels of, say, 47 or 53 years of age to serve under 37-year-old ex-NVA colonels, and taking NVA officers on in their former ranks would have meant leaving the entire Bundeswehr leadership of the future to them, as the reduction in overall numbers combined with this influx would have prevented virtually all "Western" officers from ever being promoted again.

Actually, the Treaty on German Unification concluded between the GDR and the Federal Republic stipulates that all NVA officers lose their rank automatically, a provision which is still highly contested by former NVA officers. For the Bundeswehr as such, this is not a major problem, on the contrary: if a former Major who is now a First Lieutenant because he successfully joined the Bundeswehr had to call a former colleague, who was not taken on because of his secret police connections, by his former rank, this would be felt to be patently unfair.

As a result, applicants were offered a career either as regular officers, as specialist officers, or as NCO, and if they accepted, they would be taken on with the rank they would have attained at their age in an average Bundeswehr career.

For the remainder of 1990, former NVA military personnel were employed in a special status, to determine their future and select suitable applicants. During this period, about 1,000 were placed on a waiting list, with pay, while the other 50,000 professionals were employed on active duty. During this period, their pay corresponded to their last NVA pay, while their ranks were modified as explained, but were given only as temporary ranks. All 51,000 were permitted to apply for future service in the Bundeswehr. About 11,700 applied for an officer career, about 12,300 applied for NCO status, and some 1,000 wanted to serve as privates. Of these, 11,200 (or more than 90 percent) of the NCO candidates, and 80 percent of the applicants for private, were accepted, while only 6,000, or just over 50 percent, of applicants for officer careers, were actually employed. The rest left the Bundeswehr at the end of December, 1990. By the end of 1998, the number of former NVA military personnel still on active duty in the Bundeswehr had dropped to 9,300, all ranks.

Recruiting

This does not mean that East Germans have no home in the Bundeswehr. On the contrary, the German forces are becoming "Easternized", as current recruiting relies heavily

on East German applicants. While the former GDR represents just under a quarter of the German population, it accounts for between 40 and 45 percent of Bundeswehr recruits and cadets. We believe that unemployment, which is far higher in the East, and the greater social prestige the military enjoys in the East combine to explain this effect. However, distinctions are beginning to blur. Let me just take my own 20-year-old son as an example. He was drafted into the Army in October 2005, liked it, and applied for a cadetship. Should he be accepted, he will count as "from the East" – as that is where he was resident when he was drafted. In fact, his father is a formerly West German officer, and his mother is Irish – so much for the East-West distinction today.

Pay

One sore still is pay. In 1990, the cost of living was drastically lower in the East, and so were wages. To match the difference, and to compensate for the new member states' financial limitations, public sector wages were set more than 10 percent lower in the East. However, former Western employees who transferred to the East, retained their original, i.e. Western, salary. Even more than 15 years after 1990, this difference has been reduced, but continues to exist. The Bundeswehr would be more than happy to solve the problem and pay every soldier the same wages, but as it is tied into the public sector pay structure, and as the East German states still do not agree to full pay, there is very little the Ministry of Defence can do to alleviate an injustice felt by everybody, not least in deployments abroad where East and West German soldiers work side by side.

5. SOVIET TROOPS

Another problem to be faced was the presence of about 360,000 Soviet troops within the GDR, far more than the entire East German army[14]. Early in 1989, these troops, until then the "Group of Soviet Troops in Germany" had been renamed the "Western Group of Troops", omitting any reference to Germany – taken by some as another indication that the Soviet Union was preparing to withdraw from East Germany[15]. The problem was both political and logistic. Politically, the period foreseen for this staged withdrawal was the time during which the Soviet Union collapsed. Officers who had been looking forward to a return to a proud Soviet Union which traditionally honoured its military, were now suddenly faced with the bleak prospect of arriving in a country such as Ukraine, or Lithuania, which possibly had neither the will nor the means to integrate the incoming families. In fact, a major pre-requisite for the withdrawal was a promise from the German government to fund housing for the officers' families, and a rigorous supervisory effort by German officials to make sure the accommodation provided would eventually be offered to the intended recipients[16].

Logistically, the problem was that, just ten years after 1981, Poland was less than keen on having sizeable numbers of Soviet troops in country, even if only in transit, and that,

14 Mroß, Sie gingen als Freunde.
15 Digutsch, Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee, p. 177–187.
16 Digutsch, Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee, p. 252–260; Mroß, Sie gingen als Freunde.

on the other hand, the Poles discovered transit fares as a source of income. As a result, facilities came into use which had been built to supply a Soviet Army while pushing westward: the ferry line from Mukran, Ruegen, Northern GDR, to Klaipeda in Lithuania. The withdrawal necessitated substantial Bundeswehr support, e.g. for transport organisation, food supplies, and traffic regulation. While the Bundeswehr was busy organising itself from scratch, and became involved in deployments around the globe, it also had to manage these support operations[17].

6. REAL ESTATE

Both the NVA and the Soviet troops left behind huge areas which had been used for military purposes of all kinds, mostly as training areas. Nobody who used to fly regularly into and out of Berlin during those first years will ever forget the vast expanses of almost barren countryside, criss-crossed by tank trails. After all, the GDR had had the densest concentration of military formations per square kilometer world-wide. What could not be seen from above was the extent to which these sites had been contaminated and polluted. Environmental procedures had been scarcely observed by the NVA, and not at all by the Soviet Army. Any kind of POLs or even more noxious substances had been poured into the ground, without control or documentation. Even today, large parts of these areas must not be accessed as they still contain unexploded ordinance. Only a small part of these premises could be converted to civilian use; in a rather thinly populated country like the GDR; demand for real estate in the countryside is low, and potential profits do not make de-contamination or de-mining operations economically viable. While some barracks, especially in inner-city areas, have been converted into housing, office, or public spaces, other barracks have been demolished to make way for other use, or stand idle and gradually rot away – a huge environmental and economic problem for the five East German states. Let me just quote one example: What had been the Olympic village for the 1936 games was soon after converted into Wehrmacht barracks which, in turn, were then taken over by the Soviet Army in 1945. The Soviets continued to occupy the premises until 1994, including the huge training area (some 4,000 hectares – 40 km²) to the south. Both the former Olympic village and the training area are now disused – except for a Bundeswehr training are which accounts for about 20 percent of the former area (800 hectares – 8 km²).

7. "ARMEE DER EINHEIT" IN DEPLOYMENT

Altogether, the integration of the former NVA into the Bundeswehr is perceived as a success. At times, this is contested in public, but usually by those former NVA officers who did not, or did not want to, make a career in the Bundeswehr, sometimes still referred to as the "occupying army". This success was achieved despite a number of adverse circumstances.

---

17   Armee ohne Zukunft, p. 235 (Bundeswehr MajGen Foertsch); Mroß, Sie gingen als Freunde.

No advance planning had gone into this process – the Bundeswehr leadership did not start to seriously consider the problem until the summer of 1990.

The process had to be achieved during a period in which a number of tasks had to be achieved simultaneously: Even the old, western, Bundeswehr had to downsize considerably to conform to the internationally agreed figure of 350,000 men. At the same time, the Bundeswehr had to learn how to deploy abroad, first to Turkey during the 1991 Iraq war, later to Bosnia-Hercegovina, then to Kosovo and Afghanistan, not to mention a dozen of other places. On top of all that the Bundeswehr had to adapt to internal change, not least through opening all Bundeswehr careers to women.

What helped the Bundeswehr greatly to gain acceptance among the East German populace was the 1997 flooding of the Oder[18]. The Bundeswehr coordinated the operations of NGOs as well as civilian authorities, together with military formations from all of Germany. Working together, and because of a few courageous decisions by military leaders, the worst was prevented from happening. Pictures of soldiers toiling away to support failing dykes were broadcast into all households, and provided the new, all-German army with general recognition throughout the East – maybe more so than in the West.

The reasons for the successful integration of former NVA personnel into the new Bundeswehr were in the innate comradeship, and national spirit, of soldiers from East and West. Sufficient numbers of East German officers and NCOs proved able and willing to adapt to the new circumstances. Their Western counterparts turned out to be open-minded and helpful. Legislation to allow step-by-step selection and integration proved adequate, even if some harsh decisions had to be taken. Different pay between East and West is still a source of annoyance, but cannot detract from the fact that the military played a leading role in unifying Germany.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Armee ohne Zukunft. Die NVA und die deutsche Einheit. Zeitzeugenberichte und Dokumente, hg. von Hans Ehlert, Berlin: Links 2002 (= Militärgeschichte der DDR, 3).

Digutsch, Gunnar: Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee und der Aufbau der Bundeswehr in den neuen Ländern, Frankfurt: Lang 2004 (=Europäische Hochschulschriften. Reihe 31: Politikwissenschaft, 503).

Ehlert, Hans: Die Armee, die nicht mehr gebraucht wurde. Die NVA im Vorfeld der deutschen Einheit, in: Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft in der DDR. Forschungsfelder, Ergebnisse, Perspektiven, hg. von dems. und Matthias Rogg, Berlin: Links 2004 (=Militärgeschichte der DDR, 8), S. 689–716.

Ehlert, Hans: Von der „Wende" zur Einheit. Ein sicherheitspolitischer Rückblick auf das letzte Jahr der Nationalen Volksarmee, in: Armee ohne Zukunft. Die NVA und die deutsche Einheit. Zeitzeugenberichte und Dokumente, hg. von dems., Berlin: Links 2002 (= Militärgeschichte der DDR, 3), S. 1–73.

Kirchbach, Hans Peter von, Manfred Meyers und Victor Vogt: Abenteuer Einheit. Zum Aufbau der Bundeswehr in den neuen Ländern, Frankfurt: Report 1992

---

18 Cf. Kirchbach et al., Abenteuer Einheit; ibid., Mit Herz und Hand.

Kirchbach, Hans Peter von: Mit Herz und Hand. Soldaten zwischen Elbe und Oder, Frankfurt: Report 1998.

Kohl, Helmut: Erinnerungen. Band 2: 1982–1990, München: Droemer 2005

Leonhard, Nina: „Armee der Einheit". Zur Integration von NVA-Soldaten in die Bundeswehr, in: Handbuch Militär und Sozialwissenschaft, hg. von Sven B. Gareis und Paul Klein, Wiesbaden: VS Verl für Sozialwissenschaften 2004, S. 70–80

Mroß, Bernhard: Sie gingen als Freunde... Der Abzug der Westgruppe der sowjetisch-russischen Truppen 1990–1994. Dolmetscheraufzeichnungen in Momentaufnahmen, Harrislee: Selbstverlag 2005.

Was war die NVA? Studien – Analysen – Berichte. Zur Geschichte der Nationalen Volksarmee, hg. von der Arbeitsgruppe Geschichte der NVA und Integration ehemaliger NVA-Angehöriger in Gesellschaft und Bundeswehr beim Landesvorstand Ost des DBwV. Zsg. von Egbert Fischer, Hansjürgen Usczeck und Werner Knoll, Berlin: DBwV 2001.

RESUMÉ

Winfried Heinemann: Príslušníci Východonemeckej armády (NVA) a ich výzbroj v Bundeswehri po roku 1990

3. októbra 1990 prestala Východonemecká armáda existovať. Časť príslušníkov armády a výzbroje prevzal Bundeswehr. Ešte pred zjednotením znížila východonemecká vláda počet príslušníkov z približne 170 000 v období studenej vojny na menej ako 90 000 do októbra 1990. Nedostali sa tam dôstojníci z bývalých pohraničných jednotiek, politickí pracovníci, príslušníci vojenského spravodajstva NDR ani konfidenti Stasi. Zo štrukturálnych dôvodov bývalým dôstojníkom NVA nemohla zostať ich predchádzajúca hodnosť.

Počas niekoľkých fáz z približne 51 000 bývalých príslušníkov NVA, ktorí slúžili v Bundeswehri v októbri 1990, ich asi 17 000 pokračovalo v službe do roku 1991. Koncom roka 1998 počet bývalých príslušníkov armády NVA v aktívnej službe v Bundeswehri klesol na 9300, týkalo sa to všetkých hodností.

Bundeswehr výrazne pomáhal v logistickej úlohe odsunu bývalých sovietskych vojsk do Ruska. Odovzdanie bývalého vojenského nehnuteľného majetku do civilného používania, to bola ďalšia výzva. Bundeswehr súčasne riešil prvé nasadenia do zahraničných misií.

Таджикский вооруженный конфликт 1992 – 1997 гг. и его мирное урегулирование

Полковник Олег Белослудцев
(Col. Oleg Belosludtsev)

После распада СССР Центральная Азия считалась наиболее вероятным конфликтным регионом, районом нестабильности, который может распространиться на другие бывшие республики СССР. Поэтому конфликт в Таджикистане не явился неожиданным для специалистов. Считалось, что он может разразиться на основе этнической вражды среди местного населения, например, между таджиками и узбеками, или начаться с притеснения и ущемления русских. Однако на деле гражданская война в Таджикистане развернулась между различными группами и кланами самих таджиков. Клановость, трайбализм — характерная черта всех центральноазиатских стран — бывших республик СССР, которые не располагали временем и опытом создания своей национальной государственности, и подобная угроза имеет место в любом государстве Центральной Азии. Возможная этническая дезинтеграция соседнего Афганистана увеличивала эту угрозу.

После провозглашения независимости Таджикистана (9 сентября 1991 г.) в условиях резкого ухудшения социально-экономического положения в стране началась активная борьба за власть между различными политическими, религиозными и клановыми группировками. Политическое противостояние было обусловлено исторически сложившимся делением таджикского народа на 7 региональных групп: северяне (ленинабадцы), кулябцы, душанбинцы, курган-тюбинцы, гармцы, карцы и бадахшанцы, каждая из которых состоит из различных родовых и клановых группировок во главе со своими религиозно-кастовыми лидерами. 95% населения республики (около 6 млн чел.) исповедует ислам: свыше 5 млн чел. сунни-

ты, 350–360 тыс. чел. – исмаилиты, небольшая община имамитов, т.е. умеренных шиитов.

Религиозные противоречия стали одной из важнейших причин начавшегося гражданского противостояния. Политическая борьба обострилась в начале 1992 г. после победы на выборах президента страны представителя ленинабадского и кулябского регионов Р.Набиева. Оппозиция, объединившая членов Демократической партии, Партии исламского возрождения Таджикистана и др., не признала результатов выборов и призвала к борьбе против «коммуно-кланового засилия» в стране, выступая за создание «исламского демократического государства». Оппозиционное движение получило моральную и материальную поддержку от Афганистана, Пакистана, Ирана, Саудовской Аравии и других мусульманских государств.

Душанбе захлестнула волна погромов. В мае 1992 г. вооруженные отряды таджиков из горных районов захватили президентский дворец, аэропорт и железнодорожный вокзал в Душанбе. На условиях, выдвинутых оппозицией, было создано коалиционное правительство. В августе вооруженная борьба между сторонниками президента и оппозицией обострилась.

Действия противоборствующих сторон в ходе конфликта отличались жестокостью и непримиримостью. Правительственные войска, основу которых составляли северяне, развернули широкомасштабное наступление на опорные базы оппозиции в различных регионах страны. В ноябре 1992 г. Набиев подал в отставку. Верховный Совет Таджикистана возглавил Э. Рахмонов (с ноября 1994 г. президент страны).

На территории ряда районов между правительственными войсками и силами оппозиции шли тяжелые бои, в результате которых большая часть вооруженных отрядов оппозиции и её активных сторонников среди гражданского населения (свыше 600 тыс. чел.) была вытеснена на территорию сопредельного Афганистана. По ориентировочным оценкам, в ходе боевых действий в Таджикистане погибло от 30 до 50 тыс. чел. (из них 80% гражданского населения), сотни тыс. чел. стали беженцами; потери миротворческих сил: убитыми – св. 190 чел., ранеными – 85 чел.

19 ноября 1992 г. Верховный Совет Таджикистана обратился к руководящим структурам СНГ с просьбой о создании коллективных сил по поддержанию мира в Таджикистане. На алма-атинской встрече президентов казахстанско-среднеазиатского региона идея создания миротворческих сил на базе дислоцировавшееся в Таджикистане 201-й мсд Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации получила одобрение. При этом предусматривалось, что в целях стабилизации обстановки в Таджикистане российская дивизия могла привлекаться только для выполнения следующих задач:

► поддержание правопорядка;
► охрана важнейших объектов и сооружений;
► оказание помощи в беспрепятственной доставке продовольствия, медика-

ментов, гуманитарной помощи и других грузов хозяйственного назначения;

▶ разоружение незаконных вооруженных формирований, террористических групп;

▶ оказание помощи беженцам.

При этом 201-я мсд не должна была принимать участие в политической борьбе и непосредственных боевых действиях. На практике же оказалось невозможным сохранить политический и военный нейтралитет, хотя об этом и было официально заявлено.

Руководители центральноазиатских государств и российские военные серьезно восприняли угрозу исламского экстремизма, нависшую над Таджикистаном. Главы государств — участников СНГ 24 сентября 1993 г. приняли «Решение о формировании Коллективных миротворческих сил и начале их функционирования», а также «Соглашение о Коллективных миротворческих силах и совместных мерах по их материально-техническому обеспечению». В соответствии с этими документами было определено, что коллективные миротворческие силы (КМС) формируются на срок шесть месяцев; при необходимости срок их пребывания может быть изменен. В состав КМС должны были быть выделены миротворческие контингенты из Казахстана, Киргизии, России, Узбекистана. Это было выполнено всеми участниками данных решений, кроме Республики Казахстан, парламент которой упомянутые документы не ратифицировал. Данное положение явилось основой для формирования КМС СНГ, которые были введены в Таджикистан 15 октября 1993 г.

Перед миротворцами были поставлены следующие задачи:

▶ содействие нормализации обстановки на таджикско-афганской границе и созданию условий для прогресса диалога между всеми заинтересованными сторонами о путях политического разрешения конфликта;

▶ содействие доставке, охране и распределению чрезвычайной и иной гуманитарной помощи, созданию условий для безопасного возвращения беженцев в места их постоянного проживания и охрана необходимой для вышеуказанных целей инфраструктуры и других жизненно важных объектов;

▶ содействие во взаимодействии с Комиссией по национальному примирению поддержанию безопасности и стабильной обстановки в стране, реализации межтаджикских мирных договоренностей;

▶ содействие выполнению Протоколов о прекращении огня и другим военным проблемам;

▶ сопровождение личного состава, оружия и боеприпасов вооруженных отрядов Объединенной таджикской оппозиции (ОТО) до пунктов сбора, согласованных сторонами;

▶ наблюдение за разоружением и расформированием отрядов ОТО, их сосредоточением в пунктах сбора;

▶ наблюдение и содействие поддержанию безопасной обстановки в районах

сбора формирований ОТО и складов сданного вооружения, военной техники и боеприпасов;

▶ содействие в ликвидации заграждений и минных полей;

▶ содействие обеспечению соблюдения норм международного гуманитарного права;

▶ содействие обеспечению безопасности персонала Миссии наблюдателей ООН в Таджикистане, ОБСЕ и других международных организаций в случае их обращения и по согласованию с КНП.

На первом этапе операции в состав КМС были выделены:

▶ от Российской Федерации — 201-я мсд (6056 чел.) с пунктами дислокации в городах Душанбе, Курган-Тюбе и Кулябе;

▶ от Республики Узбекистан — мсб (450 чел.), который был размещен в населенном пункте Шаартуз;

▶ от Киргизской Республики — мсб МВД (400 чел.), размещенный в населенном пункте Мургаб Горно-Бадахшанской автономной области. Общая численность КМС составляла 6906 человек.

В дальнейшем Киргизия в одностороннем порядке в течение 1995 — 1997 годов вывела свой батальон из состава КМС, а Узбекистан сократил численность своего контингента до одной роты, которую затем также вывел.

В начале 1994 г. находившиеся в Афганистане вооруженные отряды оппозиции (около 12 тыс. чел.), примкнувшие к ним афганские моджахеды-таджики (около 14 тыс. чел.), несколько тысяч выходцев из Пакистана и некоторых арабских стран составили костяк Армии исламского возрождения Таджикистана, которая стала главной силой временного правительства в изгнании ОТО. В Горном Бадахшане и других районах Таджикистана были сформированы отряды самообороны исламской ориентации. На территорию Таджикистана через границу регулярно проникали боевые отряды ОТО для совершения диверсий и террористических актов, захвата заложников, оказания моральной и материальной помощи региональным группам оппозиции с целью активизации борьбы за передел власти и свержение правительства Рахмонова. Кровопролитные бои продолжались до весны 1995 г., когда состоялось несколько раундов межтаджикских переговоров под эгидой ООН с участием России и 6 стран ближнего и дальнего зарубежья.

Операция в Таджикистане по своей сути являлась уникальной и не вписывалась в рамки ни одной проводившейся до этого миротворческой операции ООН. Во-первых, она началась по просьбе только одной стороны конфликта. Во-вторых, развертывалась по всей территории республики, т. е. не были обозначены зоны разъединения, безопасности, демилитаризованная зона, так как не было выраженных противостоящих группировок конфликтующих сторон.

В Таджикистане КМС действовали в интересах безопасности не только этого государства, но и всего Центрально-Азиатского региона. Усилия миротворцев позволили стабилизировать обстановку в стране и создали условия для процесса мирного урегулирования.

Летом 1995 г. начался прямой диалог правительства Таджикистана и оппозиции. 27 июня 1997 г. в Москве президентом РТ Эмомали Рахмоновым и руководителем

Объединенной таджикской оппозиции Саидом Абдулло Нури, а также специальным представителем Генерального секретаря ООН Г. Мерремом было подписано «Общее соглашение об установлении мира и национального согласия в Таджикистане», которое предусматривало соответствующий режим его выполнения. Без открытости и прозрачности с обеих сторон это Соглашение просто не могло быть выполнено, а процесс национального примирения не состоялся бы как таковой. Сказанное относится в том числе к таким пунктам Общего соглашения, которые прямо относятся к военной сфере, а также к гражданскому контролю над ходом их выполнения. Среди них:

▶ расформирование, разоружение и реинтеграция вооруженных формирований оппозиции в государственные силовые структуры (например, в войсках министерства обороны, министерства внутренних дел, министерства безопасности, а также другие государственные вооруженные структуры);

▶ реформирование правительственных силовых структур;

▶ поправки и дополнения к закону о выборах, к закону о политических партиях (легализирующие запрещенные оппозиционные и иные политические партии и движения), к закону о средствах массовой информации (позволяющие функционирование свободных и объективных средств массовой информации);

▶ полный обмен военнопленными и заключенными;

▶ принятие закона об амнистии.

По мнению всех участвующих в урегулировании конфликта сторон, КМС явились основным стабилизирующим фактором в Таджикистане. Только в 1997 г. они осуществляли охрану более 40 жизненно важных объектов, оказали содействие возвращению свыше семи тысячам беженцев, разминировали около 100 зданий и объектов, а также несколько сотен километров дорог, обнаружили и уничтожили более 11 тысяч взрывоопасных предметов. Шесть специальных групп осуществляли сопровождение формирований ОТО в назначенные пункты сбора для последующей их реинтеграции.

Анализ ситуации в Таджикистане показывает, что с точки зрения военной теории и конфликтологии, в данном регионе имел место современный вооруженный конфликт со всеми характерными для него особенностями: применением новейшей военной техники и оружия, интенсивной информационно-психологической борьбой, проведением специальных операций, быстротечностью изменения обстановки, смещением причинно-следственных связей. Приметой времени стало использование противостоящей стороной оружия религиозной фразеологии.

Учитывая специфическую ситуацию, в Таджикистане российскому военному руководству при проведении миротворческой операции удалось оптимально совместить форму силы и способы ее реализации.

По решению Совета глав государств СНГ от 21 июня 2000 г. миротворческая операция в Таджикистане была завершена, а 14 сентября того же года КСПМ были расформированы. 201-я мсд вошла в состав вновь образованной Российской военной базы в Таджикистане.

RESUMÉ

Oleg Belosludtsev: Tadžický ozbrojený konflikt v období rokov 1992 – 1997 a jeho mierové urovnanie

Po rozpade ZSSR sa predpokladalo, že stredná Ázia sa stane konfliktným regiónom, priestorom nestability, ktorý sa môže rozšíriť aj na ostatné republiky ZSSR. Práve takouto rizikovou udalosťou sa stal Tadžický ozbrojený konflikt. Autor veľmi podrobne rozoberá vnútropolitickú situáciu po vyhlásení nezávislosti Tadžikistanu a charakterizuje zloženie jeho obyvateľstva. Zaoberá sa jednotlivými politickými zoskupeniami, náboženskými skupinami, klanmi a pod., ktoré usilujú o politickú moc v krajine. Zároveň podčiarkuje, že hlavnou príčinou týchto občianskych konfliktov sú náboženské rozpory a ich vyhrotenie po voľbách v roku 1992. Ďalšie stupňovanie politického napätia medzi vládnou mocou a opozíciou, ktorá usilovala o vytvorenie „Islámského demokratického štátu", sa vyhrotilo a nadobudlo otvorený ozbrojený konflikt. Na jednej strane charakterizuje vojenskú odbornú stránku vznikajúceho konfliktu, hodnotí ozbrojené stretnutie medzi vládnymi a opozičnými silami a na druhej strane vyčísľuje prvé obete a pod. Najvyšší soviet Tadžikistanu (19. novembra 1992) sa obrátil so žiadosťou o pomoc k vrcholných predstaviteľom Spoločenstva nezávislých štátov (SNŠ). Na stretnutí prezidentov stredoázijských štátov (SNŠ) 24. septembra 1993, vzhľadom na obavy rozrastajúceho sa islamského extrémizmu, prijali „Rozhodnutie o vytvorení Kolektívnych mierových síl (KMS) a ich nasadení", ako aj „Dohodu o Kolektívnych mierových silách a spoločných opatreniach na ich materiálno-technické zabezpečenie". Autor príspevku poukazuje na to, že okrem Kazachstanu (neratifikoval prijaté dokumenty zo stretnutia prezidentov z 24. septembra 1993), boli do zostavy KMS SNŠ vyčlenené mierové kontingenty z Kirgizska, Ruska a Uzbekistanu. Podrobne rozoberá úlohy KMS, charakterizuje ich zloženie a vyčleňovanie síl a prostriedkov z uvedených štátov. Chronologicky opisuje činnosť mierových síl v jednotlivých oblastiach Tadžikistanu pri riešení uvedeného konfliktu. Zároveň poukazuje na dialóg medzi vládou a opozíciou, ktorý sa začal v lete 1995, ako aj na celý rad opatrení na urovnanie konfliktu.

Autor v závere príspevku predstavuje názor všetkých zainteresovaných účastníkov na urovnaní konfliktu, že Kolektívne mierové sily boli základným stabilizujúcim faktorom v Tadžikistane. Poukazuje na celý rad úspešných akcií, ktoré boli mierovými silami vykonané. Zároveň zvýrazňuje, že v Tadžikistane KMS plnili úlohy v záujme bezpečnosti nielen jedného štátu, ale v záujme celého stredo-ázijského regiónu.

SUMMARY

Oleg Belosludtsev: Tagic Armed Conflict 1992–1997 and Its Peace Settlement

After the breakdown of the Soviet Union it was forecasted, that middle Asia will change to conflict region and a space of instability, which can enlarge to the other former Soviet union republics as well. At the time the Tagic armed conflict was this risk event.

Author very detaily analysis political situation after declaration of independent Tadjikistan and defines composition of the country population. He goes into particular political grouping, religious groups, clans and so on, which aspire for political power in country.

At the same time he underlines, that the main reason of these civil conflicts are religious contradictions and their escalation after election in 1992. Next escalation of political stress was between the government power and opposition, which aimed at creation of „Islamic democratic state" and came into open armed conflict.

He defines the military specialistic aspect of rising conflict, evaluates armed interventions between governmental and oppositional parts, but he also quantifies the first victims etc. The Tadjikistian Supreme

Soviet (November 19th 1992) had appealed with the request of render to the leading representatives of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Concerning the fear from accumulative islamic extremism, there was held the council of head of states of CIS on September 24th 1993, where they accepted „The Decision about creating the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CIS CPKF)" and another document called „The agreement on collective peacekeeping forces and joint measures for their material and technical maintenance" was signed.

Author hints as that besides Kazakhstan's (who had not ratified signed documents from council of head of states held on September 24th 1993), peace contingents from Kirgiztan, Russia and Uzbekistan were included to the CIS CPKF. In detail he analyses the tasks of CIS CKPF, defines their composition and earmarking of forces and capabilities from mentioned states.

He chronologically describes the activity of peacekeeping forces in particular areas of Tadjikistan by the process of solving of this conflict. At the same time he illustrates the dialogue between government and opposition, which begun in summer 1995, and he describes all measurements aimed to conflict settlement.

At the end author introduces the opinion of all conflict settlement stakeholders, that CIS CKPF was the basic stabilize factor in Tadjikistan. He illustrates the successful operations, which were done by CIS CKPF. As well he underlines, that mission of CIS CKPF was to defend security of not only one state, but the whole middle-Asia region.

panel 6:

From Winning Peace to Preventing War

Chair:
Colonel Frédéric Guelton, France

La transformation d'un conflit conventionnel en une guerre non conventionnelle:
l'exemple de la guerre entre les États-Unis et l'Espagne de 1898

Prof. Jean-David Avenel

La guerre que menèrent les États-Unis contre l'Espagne de mai à août 1898 avait plusieurs objectifs. D'un point de vue géopolitique, les Républicains au pouvoir, grâce à l'élection du président McKinley en 1896, avaient pour but d'obtenir le contrôle de la mer des Caraïbes et de l'accès au futur canal interocéanique ainsi que de contrecarrer l'influence allemande et japonaise dans le Pacifique. D'un point de vue humanitaire, et c'est ce que le discours officiel fit ressortir, il s'agissait de libérer les populations cubaine et philippine du joug de la colonisation espagnole. En réalité, la mauvaise définition de ces buts de guerre et leur relative inadéquation provoqua un malentendu entre les Américains et leurs alliés locaux qui perpétua pendant une quinzaine d'années une instabilité politique à laquelle la guerre de 1989 aurait dû normalement mettre fin.

Le conflit en lui-même fut une guerre-éclair. La marine américaine élimina son homologue espagnole durant deux combats qui durèrent quelques heures chacun: 2 mai à Manille et 3 juillet à Santiago de Cuba. Le siège de cette dernière, au terme duquel les hostilités terrestres cessèrent, dura trois semaines. Les combats qui provoquèrent l'investissement de Manille, à la suite d'un blocus plus ou moins étanche, le 12 août durèrent une matinée. La disproportion des forces et l'avantage géographique que possédaient les États-Unis sont deux facteurs explicatifs fondamentaux de leur succès: mobilisation de trois cent mille hommes en quelques semaines, contrôle de l'espace maritime grâce à une flotte technologiquement supérieure à celle de ses adversaires et possédant un moral et une détermination supérieurs à ceux de ses adversaires.

Si la guerre fut en elle-même un succès, la gestion de l'après-guerre ne connut pas une

destinée analogue puisque l'armée américaine dut affronter une guérilla qu'elle avait elle-meme créée pendant quinze ans aux Philippines et que Cuba connut l'instabilité politique durant la période. L'objet de cette communication est d'exposer comment s'effectua cette sortie de guerre et la gestion de l'après-guerre qui s'ensuivit dans ces deux pays.

La capitulation de Santiago de Cuba le 12 juillet 1898 mit fin aux opérations militaires terrestres bien que le blocus de La Havane se maintint jusqu'au 13 août, date de la suspension des hostilités déclarée par le président McKinley. Le protocole signé par le secrétaire d'État américain, William R. Day qui représentait son gouvernement, et l'ambassadeur extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire de la République Française, Jules Cambon (1845–1935), qui représentait le gouvernement espagnol comportait six articles: selon le premier, l'Espagne renonçait à sa souveraineté sur Cuba. Le deuxième précisait qu'elle céderait Porto Rico, ses possessions dans les Antilles et Guam aux États-Unis. L'armée américaine occuperait Manille pendant les négociations. Un gouvernement devait ensuite y être mis en place (article 3). L'article 4 stipulait que les troupes espagnoles seraient évacuées des territoires espagnols et acheminées en métropole dans les trente jours suivant la signature du protocole aux frais du gouvernement des États-Unis et sur des navires affrétés par lui. Selon l'article 5, le gouvernement américain enverrait cinq délégués à Paris pour négocier et signer un traité de paix. Enfin, l'article 6 prévoyait la suspension des hostilités.

L'application du protocole ne posa pas de difficulté majeure d'un point de vue militaire. Les vainqueurs se montrèrent respectueux de leurs adversaires qu'ils traitèrent souvent mieux que leurs alliés locaux. A Cuba, les prisonniers furent toujours logés dans les conditions les moins défavorables possibles: le commandant du corps expéditionnaire, le général Shafter, demande régulièrement qu'on leur fournisse des vivres. Les blessés sont renvoyés dès le début juillet dans leurs foyers, après qu'ils ont donné leur parole de ne plus combattre, afin de contrecarrer la propagande officielle selon laquelle on tuait les blessés. Les relations entre officiers semblaient satisfaisantes. Quant aux marins capturés après la défaite du 1er juillet, ils sont acheminés à Portsmouth (New Hampshire). La reddition de Santiago s'effectua dans des conditions honorables pour les vaincus: les officiers conservaient leurs armes et leurs biens tout en demeurant libres de circuler dans la ville. L'afflux de prisonniers posa des problèmes logistiques: le commandant en chef de l'armée américaine, le général Miles, ordonna la fourniture de trente jours de rations en pain aux douze mille prisonniers affamés le 16 juillet. Les blessés et malades bénéficiaient des mêmes soins que leurs homologues américains: trois mille sont hospitalisés le 13 août dans des hôpitaux. Enfin, les officiers espagnols conservaient leurs armes, chevaux et logements.

Il est certain que ces conditions incitèrent les militaires espagnols à déposer les armes. La reddition les mettait à l'abri des représailles des rebelles. Toute résistance cessa après la chute de Santiago; les prisonniers furent progressivement regroupés à Guantanamo d'où les transports de troupes les conduisirent en Espagne à partir du 22 août. Les forces espagnoles commandées par le général Macias quittèrent Porto Rico le 13 octobre. Le drapeau américain y flotta le 18. On observera le même phénomène aux Philippines où l'occupant craignait surtout la guérilla.

Sur le plan politique, le général Brooke devint en 1898 le premier gouverneur améri-

cain à Cuba. L'occupation s'effectua sous les auspices du département à la Guerre jusqu'à la formation de la République (20 mai 1902). Brooke, qui était chargé de mettre en place un gouvernement stable, recevait des ordres très vagues en raison de la division de l'opinion publique américaine sur le sort destiné à l'île. Deux courants de pensée s'opposaient au sein du Congrès. Les annexionnistes qui, reprenant l'interprétation d'une partie de la classe dirigeante cubaine, redoutaient l'influence croissante des responsables radicaux de l'Armée de libération cubaine (A .l.c). Elle avait investi de nombreuses localités évacuées par les espagnols et pouvait devenir une menace pour les forces armées d'occupation soucieuse d'éviter le déclanchement d'une insurrection. Les anti-annexionnistes souhaitaient la transmission de la souveraineté de l'île au peuple cubain conformément aux objectifs fixés lors de la déclaration de guerre. Ils votèrent le « Teller Amendment », du nom du sénateur républicain Teller qui le rédigea. Il interdisait aux États-Unis d'exercer une quelconque souveraineté sur l'île.

Le sort de Cuba se joua en définitive à Washington. Brooke géra les affaires courantes avec l'aide d'une partie des révolutionnaires cubains, parmi lesquels le général Gomez. Les deux officiers signèrent une convention relative à la démobilisation de l'A.l.c. Chaque soldat recevait après avoir déposé ses armes soixante-quinze dollars. Trente- quatre mille hommes bénéficièrent de cette convention dont le coût s'éleva à environ trois millions de dollars.

Les annexionnistes se montrèrent très critiques envers Brooke qu'ils jugeaient trop favorable aux Cubains. Ils obtinrent son remplacement par le général Wood (20 décembre 1899). Favorable à l'annexion, Wood s'efforça de fomenter dans la population locale un sentiment en sa faveur. Il encouragea l'ouverture d'écoles et la formation d'enseignants, la construction de routes et d'hôpitaux. Il promut la réforme du système judiciaire, introduisit le mariage civil et le divorce; il définit également le futur corps électoral et parvint à éradiquer la fièvre jaune. Ces succès locaux et ponctuels ne se traduisirent pas par des résultats sur le plan politique. Les États-Unis affrontaient en effet la rébellion philippine et leur nouveau président, Théodore Roosevelt, ne voulait pas ouvrir un second front militaire. Par ailleurs, l'opinion publique américaine ne soutenait pas la politique d'annexion. Les démocrates, qui avaient voté la guerre en 1898, appuyèrent l'amendement Teller. La ligue anti-impérialiste (Anti-imperialist league), fondée en 1898 à Boston pour s'opposer à l'acquisition des Philippines, avait pris de l'importance. Elle comptait fin 1899 plus de sept cent mille membres répartis dans le pays. Composée de personnes d'âge moyen, d'origine sociale aisée, elle n'avait pas pu empêcher la signature du Traité de Paris mais conservait une réelle influence sur certains membres du Congrès grâce à ses publications et à ses actions de lobbying. En conséquence, l'hypothèse de l'annexion fut définitivement rejetée en 1901 en échange du vote de l'amendement Platt. Les soldats et les volontaires furent progressivement rapatriés. Ils n'étaient plus que cinq mille fin 1901 dans l'île (onze mille un an plus tôt). La constitution cubaine fut rédigée. Elle incluait l'amendement Platt: le président cubain pouvait demander aux États-Unis d'intervenir si l'armée cubaine ne parvenait pas à assurer le maintien de l'ordre, ce qui serait bientôt le cas. Wood organisa les élections qui se déroulèrent normalement. Tomas Estrada Palma devint le premier président de la République le 20 mai 1902.

Parallèlement et afin de consolider la présence au pouvoir d'un gouvernement ami,

l'autorité américaine procéda à la constitution d'une force armée cubaine, la Guardia rural de la Isla de Cuba, le 26 février 1900. Elle comprenait mille deux cents hommes, en général d'anciens soldats au comportement professionnel. Elle constituait une force de police armée par les Etats-Unis et financée par les propriétaires terriens, à l'exception des chevaux que chaque soldat apportait. Ses membres étaient répartis dans deux cent quarante -sept localités.

La révolte de 1906 démontra que la garde rurale était incapable de maintenir l'ordre. Le gouverneur provisoire américain, Magoon, la réorganisa. Il confia à des officiers du corps expéditionnaire le soin de l'encadrer et de la transformer en une force capable de « défendre les individus, la propriété et la liberté individuelle ». Les troupes furent regroupées dans des garnisons. On organisa des programmes de patrouilles, la logistique bénéficia d'améliorations notables. Les Américains organisèrent par ailleurs une artillerie côtière à partir de 1901 sur le modèle de celle de leur pays. Ils formèrent initialement trois compagnies constituées de Cubains, mais dont les officiers étaient des Blancs.

Conformément au vœu des libéraux cubains arrivés au pouvoir après la révolte de 1906, les Forces armées cubaines furent créées le 4 avril 1908. Elles ne se substituaient pas à la garde rurale: les deux totalisaient environ dix mille hommes en 1909. Elles ne purent empêcher l'instabilité politique qui régna dans l'île.

Le succès de cet après-guerre doit néanmoins être relativisé: les élections de 1905 donnèrent lieu à des fraudes. Une révolte éclata et, la nouvelle armée cubaine se révélant incapable de la mater, Roosevelt ordonna une intervention militaire qui dura près de trois ans. Le corps expéditionnaire américain qui y prit part comprit jusqu'à six mille hommes. La paix fut rétablie mais les désordres reprirent en 1912. Le président Taft ordonna en conséquence une nouvelle intervention qui dura plusieurs mois. C'est finalement l'intervention de 1917 qui permit d'instaurer un régime stable et d'assurer la présence militaire et économique recherchée en 1898.

La situation aux Philippines évolua de façon totalement différente. La guerre contre les Espagnols dégénéra, une fois la paix signée, en un nouveau conflit mais, cette fois, contre les nationalistes philippins.

Les États-Unis avaient, à l'origine, accordé leur soutien à ces nationalistes dont le chef se nommait Aguinaldo. Ces derniers débutèrent leur insurrection en 1897 mais, après plusieurs échecs, Aguinaldo et les principaux responsables du mouvement insurrectionnel furent emprisonnés puis exilés. Aguinaldo, émigré à Hong- Kong, bénéficia début 1898 du soutien du gouverneur britannique et du commandant de l'escadre américaine du Pacifique stationnée dans ce port, l'amiral Dewey. A la veille du conflit, qui semblait inévitable, Aguinaldo et les partisans de l'indépendance des Philippines furent envoyés dans leur pays où, bénéficiant d'un soutien financier et logistique américains, ils relancèrent une guérila efficace contre l'armée espagnole. Elle se retrancha à Manille et dans quelques localités sans chercher à reconquérir les zones rurales.

L'occupation de Manille, pratiquement sans combat, par le corps expéditionnaire américain le 11 août, fut accueillie avec soulagement par les autorités espagnoles locales qui redoutaient les représailles de la part des nationalistes. Les militaires espagnols reçurent le même traitement que leurs homologues stationnés à Cuba. En revanche, le comman-

dant en chef du corps expéditionnaire américain accapara tous les pouvoirs pour réglementer la vie locale: il avait la responsabilité du maintien de l'ordre, était habilité à instaurer de nouveaux tribunaux et à limoger les juges. Il était autorisé à faire saisir les armes et les revenus de l'ancienne administration, ce qui ôtait aux rebelles d'éventuelles ressources financières. Il était également habilité à utiliser tous les biens meubles de l'administration espagnole, sans être autorisé à les détruire, ainsi que les moyens de transports et de communication. Enfin, il assurait la protection des lieux de culte, des écoles et des monuments historiques, souvenirs de la présence espagnole que les rebelles voulaient éliminer. Ces derniers se trouvaient par conséquent privés de tout pouvoir politique et économique puisque, en outre, si la propriété privée était maintenue, les impôts et taxes collectés par les anciens colonisateurs devaient dorénavant être versés à la nouvelle autorité militaire.

La signature du traité de paix se déroula à Versailles le 10 décembre 1898. Le traité, ratifié par le Sénat américain le 11 avril suivant, reprend les articles du protocole d'août avec une différence notable concernant les Philippines. Le président McKinley, qui n'était pas à l'origine favorable à l'annexion de cette colonie espagnole, changea d'opinion en octobre sous la pression de l'amiral Dewey et des lobbies d'affaires. Le premier voyait en Manille le port idoine pour la création d'une base militaire dans l'Océan Pacifique qui, avec Pearl Harbor, donnerait à l'escadre du Pacifique les bases logistiques nécessaires à l'expansion militaire de son pays dans la région. De leur côté, les milieux d'affaires voulaient faire des Philippines une base de départ pour la conquête du marché chinois, débouché essentiel pour leurs produits face à la concurrence européenne. McKinley adhéra à la vision annexionniste en septembre et ordonna à ses négociateurs d'obtenir la cession des Philippines. Le gouvernement espagnol accepta de vendre sa dernière colonie pour vingt millions de dollars. Le corps expéditionnaire américain interdit l'entrée de Manille aux nationalistes qui se replièrent dans la localité de Malolos. Aguinaldo prit la tête du gouvernement qui aurait dû diriger le pays conformément à la Constitution promulguée l'année précédente. Il nomma le général Luna commandant en chef d'une armée forte d'environ quatre-vingt mille hommes mais dont l'équipement était inadapté face à son nouvel adversaire.

Le corps expéditionnaire américain, sous les ordres du général Otis, comprenait des éléments de l'armée régulière regroupés dans le VIIIè corps d'armée et appuyés par une puissante artillerie, ainsi que des volontaires et des miliciens de différents États. L'ensemble représentait environ cent mille hommes. Les miliciens ne participèrent pas aux combats.

La première phase de la guerre fut conventionnelle. Les patrouilles échangeaient des coups de feu. En février 1899, une patrouille américaine tua plusieurs sentinelles ennemies. Les incidents dégénérèrent après l'attaque par les nationalistes d'un avant-poste devant Manille. La réaction de Otis fut immédiate. Les assaillants repoussés, il envoya onze mille hommes appuyés par de l'artillerie sur Malolos défendue par seize mille philippins mal armés. La ligne de défense consistait en des tranchées et ouvrages vulnérables dont l'artillerie vint aisément à bout. La bataille tourna rapidement au désastre pour les défenseurs, qui perdirent trois mille hommes. Aguinaldo et les survivants se replièrent dans

les montagnes du nord-est de l'île de Luzon et abandonnèrent la guerre conventionnelle pour mener des actions de guérilla.

La deuxième phase de la guerre fut la plus difficile pour le corps expéditionnaire qui n'était pas rompu aux techniques de la guérilla. L'armée nationaliste dispersée, qui compta jusqu'à quarante mille hommes, se regroupa dans les régions montagneuses et se reforma en de petites unités de guérilleros. Elles agissaient de nuit et se dispersaient le jour dans les forêts ou dans les champs. Elles pratiquaient le corps-à-corps, posaient des embuscades ou attaquaient les avant-postes une fois l'obscurité tombée. Les pertes américaines doublèrent en quelques mois.

Otis, qui écrivait des rapports optimistes, décrivait les nationalistes comme des bandits et non comme des hommes désireux de libérer leur patrie. Il avait été formé à la guerre conventionnelle et menait une telle guerre. Ses troupes sortaient de Manille pour attaquer une région où l'ennemi était censé se cacher. Elles le pourchassaient, détruisaient le maximum d'armes, capturaient des hommes supposés lui appartenir et rentraient à Manille. Les pertes infligées pouvaient être élevées mais, une fois l'armée américaine partie, les nationalistes réoccupaient les villages. Cette tactique se révéla désastreuse même si elle permit des gains territoriaux: les îles de Panay et Cebu furent occupées en février 1899, celles de Jolo et de l'archipel des Sulu en mai. L'armée américaine, qui avait perdu dix-neuf officiers et trois cent quarante-deux hommes, auxquels s'ajoutaient mille quatre cents blessés en 1898, perdit cinq cents hommes en 1899. En outre, on dénombrait deux mille deux cents blessés et plus de mille malades. Le général Mac Arthur remplaça Otis.

Mac Arthur modifia la tactique du corps expéditionnaire qui comptait soixante- dix mille hommes en 1900. Le commandement fut décentralisé grâce à l'instauration de quatre zones d'opérations: le nord de Luzon, le sud de Luzon, Visayas et Mindanao. Chaque commandement local disposait d'une large autonomie qui permettait aux officiers de réagir en fonction de leur connaissance de l'environnement local proche. Il en résulta une flexibilité et une meilleure capacité d'adaptation.

Mac Arthur promut un programme d'amnistie et de mesures destinées à se rallier les populations: construction d'écoles et de routes, développement de projets économiques et sociaux, formation de partis politiques. Il organisa également une sorte de garde rurale, formée de soldats locaux, chargée d'assurer la protection des villages. Enfin, les discours officiels mirent en exergue les réformes et non pas la répression. Celle-ci n'était pourtant pas absente de la vie quotidienne, la loi martiale régnant dans certaines villes. Les terres appartenant aux insurgés furent confisquées, les arrestations et déportations se multiplièrent. La population fut rassemblée dans les zones contrôlées, où elle était nourrie, tandis que toute personne habitant en dehors était présumée être un révolutionnaire et traitée en conséquence.

Cette politique connut un certain succès bien que la guérilla demeurat. Elle installa des gouvernements locaux que la population locale reconnut spontanément ou sous la menace. Fragmentée en unités locales autonomes, elle continua de harceler le corps expéditionnaire qui poursuivit sa tactique de raids suivis de replis dans les régions non contrôlées.

L'arrestation d'Aguinaldo, suite à une dénonciation, par un bataillon d'éclaireurs du colonel Funston en mars 1901 porta un coup fatal à la résistance. Les responsables du gou-

vernement furent arrêtés. La guérilla perdura néanmoins et porta plusieurs coups durs à l'armée américaine: l'embuscade de Balangiga coûta à la compagnie C du 9è régiment d'infanterie quarante-huit tués. Il y eut vingt-six survivants. Le général Smith organisa en représailles une répression vigoureuse qui eut un retentissement négatif aux Etats-Unis. Malgré ces incidents, la résistance nationaliste fut écrasée. La résistance religieuse d'origine musulmane s'y substitua presque immédiatement à partir de l'été 1902. Elle prit un caractère non conventionnel et particulièrement violent. Trois groupes s'opposèrent violemment à la présence étrangère: les Tansugs de Sulu, les Maguindanos de Cotabato et les Maranaos de Lanao.

Les premiers heurts se déroulèrent en 1900. Des bandes organisées se mirent à attaquer les propriétaires terriens. Le lieutenant-colonel Brett mena une expédition punitive contre les opposants avec vingt-cinq soldats et cent guerriers du chef local allié (Datu) Piang. Par la suite l'armée américaine dut affronter une guérilla active. La province maure (the Moro Province) fut instaurée le 3 septembre 1903 et dotée d'une administration militaire. Le général Wood, qui en devint le premier gouverneur, l'organisa de façon à éliminer l'influence des chefs locaux. Il était assisté d'un conseil, devait rendre compte au gouverneur général des Philippines et à la Commission des Philippines (the Philippine Commission) établis à Manille. La province fut divisée en cinq districts. La liberté du commerce y fut instaurée mais elle profita surtout aux commerçants chinois qui s'installèrent. Wood instaura une fiscalité locale dans une région qui ignorait l'impôt: un peso par personne, taxes indirectes. Les citoyens américains en étaient exemptés, ce qui mécontenta les autochtones. En revanche, Wood s'intéressa beaucoup à l'éducation et à la santé publique (éradication du choléra). Le général Bliss succéda à Wood en 1906 avant de laisser son poste au futur général Pershing en 1909. Le pouvoir redevint civil en 1913.

Ces réformes ne rétablirent pas le calme. Les Maranaos tuèrent un soldat américain en 1902 et Wood envoya contre eux une expédition punitive comprenant mille deux cents hommes. Ils affrontèrent les fanatiques religieux (amucks) qui s'attaquaient aux non-musulmans dans la zone du lac Lanao. La forte supériorité matérielle américaine permit de briser la résistance organisée: quatre cents Maranaos périrent à la bataille de Bayan (2 mai 1902). Les pertes américaines s'élevèrent à dix tués et quarante-quatre blessés.

La rébellion des Maguindanaos s'amplifia en 1903. Ils avaient combattu les Espagnols et possédaient une solide expérience militaire. Leur chef Datu Ali s'opposait à Datu Piang, son beau-père, qui avait signé le traité de 1899. Le général Wood chargea le général Baldwin de pacifier la région. Baldwin, qui n'était pas formé à « la petite guerre », utilisa la force et la répression. Sa supériorité matérielle lui permit d'obtenir des succès militaires: cent vingt rebelles périrent le 5 avril 1903 (un tué et quatre blessés américains). Une partie de la province fut pacifiée.

La rébellion était contenue mais se poursuivait. Elle ne menaçait plus l'expansion américaine mais montrait les limites que peut rencontrer l'armée des États-Unis confrontée à la guérilla. Elle maintenait toujours huit cent quarante trois officiers et quatorze mille six cent soixante-sept hommes aux Philippines fin 1903 alors que la loi de février 1901 fixait sa taille à cent mille six cent quinze officiers et soldats. Le coût financier des opérations était élevé et l'opinion publique lassée.

Le remplacement de Baldwin par Pershing permit l'amélioration de la situation. Pershing était un homme courtois et respectueux des coutumes locales. Il adopta une attitude totalement différente de celle de son prédécesseur, interdisant les massacres, encourageant le développement des relations entre ses soldats et les autochtones. Ce comportement humain et diplomatique n'excluait pas le recours à la force: six cents résistants périrent à la bataille de Bud Daju, considérée comme l'affrontement culminant de la campagne (1906). Il reste que la résistance faiblit bien que demeurant active jusqu'en 1913, date à laquelle les historiens fixent la fin de la campagne contre les Musulmans philippins et le retour au calme plus ou moins définitif dans la nouvelle colonie.

En définitive, cette sortie du conflit de 1898 apparaît surtout peu réussie puisque l'après-guerre fut finalement, pour les États-Unis, plus coûteux sur le plan humain et économique que la guerre elle-même. Son étude met en évidence certains facteurs permettant d'éviter un tel échec. Tout d'abord, la nécessité de définir et de respecter les buts de guerre définis à l'origine, ce qui ne fut pas le cas aux Philippines: la promesse d'aider une population à se libérer du joug espagnol se transforma en une nouvelle occupation. La souveraineté ne fut jamais rendue à la population autochtone. Ensuite, la nécessité d'accompagner le désengagement militaire éventuel d'une remise en état d'une administration et d'une force armée locales acceptées par la population autochtone, c'est-à-dire capable de respecter ses aspirations et de ne pas modifier radicalement ses habitudes. La tentative d'imposer un gouvernement plus ou moins calqué sur la forme de gouvernement américain à Cuba se solda par un échec comme en témoignent les révoltes de 1906, 1912 et 1917. Enfin, le désarmement de toutes les factions dont le coût financier peut s'avérer très élevé semble une condition nécessaire, quoique non suffisante, au succès de la conclusion d'un conflit.

RESUMÉ

Jean-David Avenel: Zmena konvenčnej vojny na nekonvenčnú na príklade vojny medzi USA a Španielskom roku 1898

Vojna medzi Španielskom a Spojenými štátmi v roku 1898 bola dokonalým víťazstvom prvej krajiny vo veľmi krátkej konvenčnej vojne: trvala asi šesť mesiacov a vo dvoch námorných víťazstvách dala priestor Spojeným štátom.
Nanešťastie pre Spojené štáty po konvenčnej vojne nasledovala nekonvenčná vojna na Filipínach trvajúca takmer 13 rokov: najskôr proti nacionalistom, ktorí boli po trojročnej vojne porazení; potom proti moslimským rebelom, ktorí boli nakoniec porazení v roku 1913.
Na druhom poli vojny, na Kube, sa cieľ zriadenia demokracie a stabilného politického režimu nepodaril; vlády v krajine nevydržali dlho a Spojené štáty museli vojensky zasiahnuť 3-krát od roku 1902 do roku 1911, potvrdzujúc tak, že je mnohokrát ťažšie dosiahnuť mier ako vyhrať vojnu.

SUMMARY

Jean-David Avenel: The Change of a Conventional War to a Nonconventional One on the Example of War between the USA and Spain 1898

The war between Spain and the United States in 1898 was a perfect victory of the former country in a very and short conventional war: it lasted about six months and gave place at two major naval victories for the the United States.

Unfortunately for the United States,yhe conventional war followed by a non-conventional war in the Philippines during almost thirteen years:first,against nationalits who were defeated after a three-year war; then against Muslim rebels who finally were defeated in 1913.

On the other field of the war,in Cuba,the aim of establishing democracy and a stable political regime did not succeed; governments in the country did not last long and the United States had to intervene militarily three times. between 1902 and 1911,proving that it is often more difficult to win peace than to win war.

Reconstruction après la guerre avant la lettre:
la participation militaire Roumaine en Albanie, 1913–1914

Dr. Sergiu Iosipescu

Parler de reconstruction après la guerre dans le Sud-Est européen et spécialement dans les Balkans c'est presque retracer l'histoire de cette partie du continent depuis un millenaire. Car quand l'Europe blanchit de cathedrales vers l'au mil, d'après la belle formule du chroniqueur Raoul Glaber qu'on peut mettre à la fondation du monde actuel, le Sud/Est du continent connaissait encore les invasions des petchénegues et des coumans et depouventable déluge mongol de 1236–1242. Il est assez difficile à croire que au milieu du XVIIIe siècle, le temps de Lumières et de l'Encyclopédie la moitie sud de la Moldavie et le nord-est de la Valachie out été ravagé par un grand raid des tartars, emportant a leur retour en Crimée, des milliers des esclaves et un riche butin? Et que penser de la decomposition de l'administration ottomane dans la seconde moitié du même XVIIIe siècle suite aux guerres avec l'empire des tsars, et qui provoqua dans les Balkans l'apparition de la féodalité tardive des ayans, dont le plus célèbre fut, sans doute Mustapha pacha Bairaktar. De la même trempe etaient les trops puissants pachas Pasvanoglu de Vidin et Ali de Janina, tous deux en relation avec Napoléon Bonaparte, tous deux ravageant les Balkans autour de leurs résidences.

Depuis le XVIIe siècle on a du donc reconstruire toujours après des guerre devastrices. La première en date de ces reconstructions fût celle des Principautés Roumains de Valachie (Țara Românească) et des Moldavie après le reflux mongol, le retrecissement de la Grande Horde, un empire qui s'étendait autrefois de Carpathes au Pacifique. Resultante des forces multiples – la Croisade catholique, la mise en fonction des echanges économique par le Danube et la „route moldave" grace au rôle de la Mer Noire plaque tournante du grand commerce entre l'Orient et l'Europe du XIVe-XVe siècles – cette reconstruc-

tion très speciale... assez solide pour durer jusqu'à l'époque moderne pour se transformer dans le Royaume de Roumanie.

An sud du Danube, sur les ruines de l'Empire de l'Orient, byzantin, les bulgares et les serbes out essayé, tour à tour, epuisant leurs fores, d'établir leurs propres empires. La pénétration turque dans la presqu'île des Balkans après 1354 et leur main mise sur l'empire byzantin coupa met tout ces véléités imperiales et aussi la vaissance d'un état grec au moyen âge. Contrairement aux assertions des ottomanisants, l'Empire ottoman, un incessant théâtre de guerre, ne reussit pas d'asscoir des structures solides, même à son apogée sous Suleyman le Magnifique, au XVIe siècle. La renaissance militaire ottomane au milieu du XVIIe siècle finit dans le debâcle de Kahlenberg près de Vienne en 1683. De ce moment là commençait la reconstruction, du Royaume d'Hongrie, de la principaute de Transylvanie sous l'égide de la Maison d'Autriche, par les méthodes du mercantilisme, des physocrates et de lumières. Après la paix de Passarovitz (1718). Les Hasbourgs ont essayé aussi de faire une Serbie autrichiènne autour de la grande citadelle danubienne de Belgrade et aussi une province imperiale de la Petite Valachie. Due seulement au génie militaire d'Eugène de Savoie la victoire dans la guerre de 1716–1718 ne s'est pas poursuivi dans la paix et l'Empire ne reussit pas se maintenir au délà du Danube et de Carpathes. La fantôme de l'ancienne monarchie arpadienne d'Hongrie ne put être resurcité faute de moyens et contre une situation géopolitique assez compliquée. Car depuis le commencement du XVIIIe siècle la Question d'Orient et de la Mer Noire d'ailleurs devenaient des questions internationaux. Il faudrait sans doute insister d'avantage sur les causes intrinséques de l'échec des impériaux autrichiens en Petite-Valachio et surtout en Serbie, echec paradigmatique jusqu'à.

Quand par la paix de Belgrade (1739) la Maison d'Autriche perdait la Serbie et la Petite Valachie commancait l'expansion teritoriale de la Russie dans les steppe du nord de la Mer Noire. En marge de cette nouvelle construction impériale les Principautés Roumains, sous la suzerainété de la Porte ottomane ont essayé après la guerre de 1736–1739 une reconstruction moderne présidé par le prince Constantin Mavrocordati di Scarlatti (1730–1769, avec interruptions). La pièce métrise de sa reforme structurelle fût l'aboliton du servage (1746, 1748). Mais à cause des incessants guerres entre la Russie, allié avec les Habsbourgs, avec l'Empire ottoman de 1768–1779, 1786–1792, les reformes n'ont pas abouti. Le bouleversement provoqué par les guerres révolutionnaires et napoléoniennes ont permis à la Russie de patronner une première reconstruction des Principautés Roumains après la paix d'Andrinople de 1829 et, conjointement avec l'Angleterre, la France et la Bavière, du nouveau royaume de Grèce.

En ce qui concerne les Principautés, la reconstruction sous l'occupation russe de 1828 à 1834 a produit un simulacre de régime constituionnel avec tous les tares de l'administration et de coruption russes. En plus on essaya d'introduire me noblesse militaire et civile et une dure exploitation du payssan convocant la future transformation de pays en provinces russes.

L'experience grecque n'est pas moins interessante: un statut international resultant de l'équilibre entre les trois grands – la Russie, l'Angleterre, la France – chacun ayant des intérêts dans la Méditerranée orientale; un roi très jeune... d'une famille romantiq de philhellnes un peu exaltés – les Wittelsbach; un trône soutan quand même par un régiment

bavarois et me equippa allemande et aussi par un grand emprunt garanti par l'Angleterre et la France; et au dessous le peuple et le pays ravagé par dix ans de guerre. Le resultat après un quart de siècle est presenté ironique par le publicite français Edmond About; dix aux encore la faillite et l'echec politique était complet: le roi Othon, fût balayé par un complot militaire en 1865 et la Grèce fit l'experience d'une nouvelle dynastie, qu'elle chassa d'ailleurs au bout d'un siècle. Depuis la guerre et la révolution à la Megali Idea, la ressurection de l'Empire grec d'Orient.

Une grande Bulgarie crée à la paix de San Stefano (février 1878) par une Russie exaspérée de la trop longue résistance ottomane dans la guerre de 1877–1878, avec l'espérance de la transformer en une partie balkanique de som empire, avec un nuveu du tzar Alexandre de Battonberg, comme prince deçu ses créateurs. Diminuée a la Paix de Berlin (juillet 1878) elle changes du camps pour prendre ses distances du grand frère slave en elisant un prince autrichien-hongrois, Ferdinand de Saxe-Coburg (1887–1918). Et, dans le même temps, fixant comme objectif de n'importe quel parti politique la reconstitution de l'empire bulgare de la première moitie du XIIIe siècle.

à la charnière des XIXe/XXe siècle au dessus de ces trois empires de réves partiellement superposés les réalités politiques étaient encore plus compliqués. Après expérience du Tanzimat des années 1839–1876, l'Empire ottoman cherchait sa dernière chance avec les Jeunes Turcs (1908). Mais leur révolution...... rapidement dans un nationalisme turc incompatible avec l'existence de l'empire. Pourtant l'ancien régime ottoman du sultan Abdul Hamid et le gouvernement des Jeunes Turcs trouva parmi les nations de l'empire aponisant l'attachement à l'exception des Turcs euxmémes de deux peuples les Albanais et les Aroumains. Pour comprendre cette situation il faut d'abord refaire un tableau géohistorique, d'après la formule braudelienne. Grâce à Alain Ducellier nous savons aujourd'hui comment le peuple albanais surgit de la nuit de temps pour occuper sa place sur sa façade maritime adriatique. On doit à notre compatriote Nicolae Iorga une *Brève histoire de l'Albanie et du peuple albanais* parue très à propos la Conférence de Paix de 1919, qui continue en français le recit jusqu'à la fin du XIXe siècle. Quand même à ce moment là les pays d'Albanie etaient une des partie la moins connue de l'Europe et c'est un aroumain Nopcea, baron autrichien qui contribua beaucoup à la connaissance géographique de ces contrées. D'après les recherches ethnographiques des savants occidentaux et les explorations roumains dans la partie ouest de l'Empire ottoman vivaient au debut du XXe siècle environs 1.500.000 albanais, repandus depuis la façade maritime entre le lac Santari (Shkoder) et le golphe d'Arta (Prevesa), diminuant vers l'interieur au nord dans les sandjaks Novi Pazar et l'ancienne Serbie, les kazas de Prešova, Kumanovo, Uskul, et a l'est et sud/est dans les Kazas Kičevo, Prilep, Monastir, Castoria. Les albanais avec les aroumains, les bulgares mahomendans et les turcs constituaient la majorité dans les kazas de Rekani, Dibra, Ohrida, Starovo, Korça et Colonja, et les albanais et les aroumains formaient le fond de la population de l'ancien Epyre. D'après la statistique ottomane de 1908 cette région avait une population de presque un démi million d'habitants dont deux cents mille orthodoxes parlant le grec, unt cinquante mille musulmans, quatre-vingt huit mille orthodoxes parlant l'albanais, vingt mille orthodoxes parlant l'arroumain.

Il y avait surement dans cette situation le resultat de siècles d'administration ottomane

avec des exods de population chretiennes, de colonisations et de conversions, mais aussi du grand ascendant exclusiviste de l'eglise et de l'école grecque.

Dans un pays plutôt montagneux les albanais vivaient encore au débat du XXe siècle, au nord de la rivière de Shkumbi, fis, phares, djetas ou clans, occupant des petites régions delimitées par les accidents du rélief ou par des vallées. Les clans étaient dirijé par une assemblée des chefs de famille dans lesquelles le rôle principal revenait aux „bairaktars" – porte-etandards. Parmi les clans de la montagne les plus importants soixante cinq etaient les Malissori, les Micdites et les Matja. Au sud à la campagne les femes, cifliq groupait les paysans sur les terres immenses ds grands proprietaires, beys de la famille Vlorë, Vrioni, Toptani, Verlaci. À pact Shkodër (35 mille habitans), Berat (quinze mille), Tirana (douze mille), Korça (dix mille), Cruja, Durrës, Vlorë, Delvino avaient autour de cinq mille habitans chacun.

Qutre qu'il avait deux grands dialectes albanais – le guegne et le tosque au sud – la population etait catholique au nord avec trois archevêchés à Durazzo, Scutari et..... et deux évêques importants, d'Alessio (Lezhe) et Antivari; orthodoxe dans le sud, avec les evêchés de Durazzo, Berat, Konitsa, Paramitia, ou le clergé etait grec; et musulmane au centre et dans les sud. Les musulmans de sud etaient bektashis, tolérants, mais au centre, les musulmans etaient sunnites plus rigoristes.

On pourrait admetre que les musulmans albanais, turcs et bulgares formaient environs soixante per cent de la population tandis que les catholiques et les orthodoxes se partageaient le quarante per cent restant. Des actives propagandes religieuses grecque pour les orthodoxes, italienne et autrichienne pour les catholique, turque pour les musulmans se disputaient les consciences albannaise.

Quoique le pays avait des ressources minerales et agricoles l'économie etait ruinée par l'administration ottomane et les ravages de la guerre.

Depuis le débût de la guerre balkanique en 1912 et même avait pour les territoires voisines à la Macédoine en crise le commencement du siècle, les contrées albanaises vivaient dans l'effroi et insécurité où le territoire n'a pas été completement devasté par les armées des alliés balcaniques ou ottomanes. Sur ce chapitre on doit faire une entière confiance an rapport de la Commission, de „Carnegie Endowement for International Peace". Là où les armées conquerantes des alliés balkanique s'attendaient à voir surgir les vensable fantômes de l'antiquité grecque ou de l'empire d'Etienne Doushan on decouvrait avec horreur des hunibles villages ou bourgs des albanais, des arroumains, ou même des turcs ou bulgares musulmans. D'après l'enquête de la Fondation Carnegie on procéda systematiquement aux dévastation, aux neutres, à la dislocation de la population, „en vue de transformer totalement le caractère etnique des régions".

Les plans de partage de la Turquie européenne par les alliés balkaniques connus detaillement par l'opinion publique au mois d'octobre 1912 envisageait une zone serbe de la frontière de Montenegro au fluve Devoli et Ochride, avec Uskub, une zone grecque comprenant l'antique Epyre, le lac Prespa et Bitolia-Monastir, et, enfin, une zone bulgare, laisant autour de Berat et de Valona une toute peite Albanie.

Mais en 28 novembre 1912 après un tournée par Bucarest et Vienne et les négociations avec le gouvernement grec, un ancien membre albanais du Parlement Jeune Turc, Ismail Qemal avec le comité national albanais, proclamait à Valona l'indépendance de l'Alba-

nie. C'était le début de la formation de l'état albanais et de la reconstruction. Mais d'abord il fallait attendre l'après guerre car l'occupation grecque et serbe, et monténegrienne de Scutari promettait de durer, les forces albanaises etant insufisantes pour la libération du territoire national.

L'Autriche-Hongrie interessée à contenir la Serbie proposait de 1897 à la Russie et à l'Italie en cas de collapse ottoman la création pur les côtes adriatiques de l'Empire ottoman d'une principauté d'Albanie indépendante de Ianina au lac Scutari et un dévelopement sufisant à l'Est. Avec l'Italie le projet prenait en 1900–1901 la forme d'un accord.

En 1902 l'italie avait insisté pour introduire dans le traité renouvellé de la Triple-Alliance l'accord avec 1901 concernant l'Albanie.

En septembre 1903 à l'occasion de la visite du Kaiser Gouillaume II et du chancellier comte de Bülow à Vienne, dans les discussions avec l'empereur François-Joseph et le comte Goluchowski on envisageait que la meilleure solution pour les Balkans en cas de démembrement de l'Empire ottoman c'etait, premiérément, de créer une Albanie indé-pendante, puis de partager les restes entre la Grèce, la Bulgarie et la Roumanie, mainte-nant le statu-quo de la Serbie et de Montengro.

L'année 1906 manqua un changement dans la politique des Balkans provoqué par les nouveau dirigeants de la diplomatic russe et autrichienne-hongroise: Alexandre Iswolski à Saint-Petersbourg et le baron d'...hrenthal à Ballplatz. Le premier voulait pour la Rus-sie le Detroits le second l'annexion de Bosnie-Hertzegovine et aussi les communications vers Salonique par le chemin de fer de Novi-Pazar.

La diplomatie de la double monarchie reussit a duper le ministre russe et aussi inte-roint en 1911–1912 pour limiter les pretentions de l'Italie victorieusse sur l'Empire otto-man. La guerre fût aussi l'occasion d'une insurection générale des Albanais menacés par les plans de l'alliance balkanique crée sous les auspices de la Russie.

Par la paix de Londres (30 mai 1913) à la fin de la première guerre balkanique les gran-des puissances ont imposé la création d'une principauté d'Albanie dont l'organisation fût confie à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs de la capitale de la Grande Bretagne (17 de-cembre 1912 – juillet 1913). Après la fin de la deuxième guerre balkanique et la paix de Bucarest (10 août 1913) – laquelle fixa tant bien que mal les frontières entre la Bulgarie, la Serbie, la Turquie, et la Grèce pour presque un siècle – la Conférence des Ambassa-deurs elabora le statut international de l'Albanie (29 juillet 1913). Le fragile equilibre en-tre les puissances fût l'œuvre de Sir Edouard Grey, du comte de Mensdorff-Pouilly-Die-trichstei (Autriche-Hongrie), Paul Cambon (France), prince Lichnowski (Allemagne), le marquis Imperiàli, prince de Francavilla (Italie) et le comte Beneckendorff (Russie). Sur le papier la reconstruction de l'Albanie etait terminé. La philosophie de ce traité est très importante pour l'historien mais aussi pour l'annaliste politique actuel. Dans le sta-tut de l'Albanie etait la quintessence de l'expérience politique de la diplomatie XIXe siècle concernant la construction étatique, une synthèse de la constitution du royaume grec et belge en 1830–1831, des Principautés Unis en 1856–1858. L'œuvre de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs a été critiqué de l'intérieur par Paul Cambon et de l'exterieur par le Kai-ser lui même. Le représentant de la République à Londres proposait un régime transitoi-re et progrésif avec un haut commissaire et une Commission Internationale de Controle,

agents du gouvernement et d'étude du pays pour lequel la formule d'organisation la plus apte c'etait une decentralisation de plus poussé. Gouillaume II etait du même avis comparant les tribus des albanais avec les clans écossais. Il prônait un prince mahométan, peut'etre de la dynastie albanaise d'Egypte, en tout pas, un chef à cheval avec une bourse bien garnie pour faire „pleuvoir l'argent qu'on attendait" dans un pays pauvre et si ravagé par la guerre. En s'appuyant sur ces réserves la Russie a accepté dificilement les resolutions de Londres et surtout l'instalation immédiate d'un prince hautement demandé par l'Autriche-Hongrie. Le cabinet de Sankt-Petersbourg, soutint paradoxalement le maintien d'une liaison entre l'Albanie et l'Empire ottoman avec l'esperance cachée de pouvoir en cette qualité le faire diviser pour les alliés balkaniques.

La reconstruction du pays reclamait l'établisèment des frontières, l'évacuation du territoire, occupé par les armées serbe, monténegrine et grecque, et la sécurité de la vie.

La Commission Internationale de Controle, sutenue par les grandes puissances obtent la retraite des armées monténegrine et serbe, prit le gouvernement du pays en janvier 1914 eliminant le cabinet albanais d'Ismail Qemal, accusé de liaison avec la Porte ottomane et les Junes Turcs. Un des commissaires d'allemand Nadolny presentait la grave anarchie du pays et le simulacre d'administration exercée par l'organisme international.

Quel fût le rôle de la Roumanie, de son gouvernement et du facteur militaire roumain dans cet essai de reconstruction après la guerre, plutôt pendant la guerre. Depuis le milieu du XIXe siècle grâce surtout à la renaissance nationale arroumaine les gouvernementes des Principautés Roumains ont souténu les éffort d'emancipation réligieuse et culturelle de ces frère du sud du Danube et spécialement du Pinde, de Macédoine. Après l'entrée du royaume indépendant de Roumanie dans la Triple alliance en 1883, l'Autriche-Hongrie avait encouragé cette politique avec l'ésperence de faire oublier par les roumains teurs aspirations d'union de la Transylvanie. Quoique l'opinion publique roumaine ne tomba jamais dans la piège, le gouvernement de Bucarest avait soutenu le nouvement arroumain, en obténant de la Porte ottomane l'autonomie de l'école roumaine dans les régions peuplées par eux. On fût terriblement deçu à Bucarest pendant la première guerre balkanique des ravages perpétrés par les alliés chretiens dans les territoire des macédo-roumains. On pensa même dans ce conditions a l'importance d'une grande Albanie pour offrir me patrie commune pour au moins un quart de million des arroumains. La reine Elisabeth de Roumanie pensa pour ce „pays de fées" à un prince de sa maison, son neven preféré, Gouillaume de Wied, marié à Sophie de...... roumaine par sa grande-mère.

Si la Roumanie du gouvernement conservateur de Titu Maiorescu réussit a obtenir à Londres l'accord des puissances pour la nomination de son candidat, l'Autriche-Hongrie exclut avec habilité les mailitaires roumains de la gendarmérie d'Albanie. Pour l'organisation de cette gendarmérie, la Conférence de Londres proposa d'abord les officiers suédois et après le réfus de Suède le choix echut aux holandais.

Immédiatement aprèss l'arrivé à Durazzo (Durrës) de la famille régnante, du nouveau „...bret" (empereur) des „shkipetars" (vantours-albanais) Guillaume de Wied – le 7 mars 1914 – en Roumanie fût crée avec l'acord du gouvernement un bataillon de volontaires roumains – la plupart de la colonie albanaise qui se préparait depuis l'été de 1913 – pour participar à la reconstruction du principauté adriatique. Sous la commande du capitaine

Christescu et du lieutenant Burche cet bataillon arriva a Durazzo pour constituer jusqu'à la fin du regne du prince Guillaume l'appui de son gouvernement. Dans ses actions le bataillon roumain avait collaboré avec détachements des Mirdites – catholiques du nord du pays – et des volontaires albanais arrivés ou plutôt réfugiés de Kossovo.

Pendant la crise finale du régime princier causé par l'offensive greque dans l'Epyre et la revolte des sunnites du centre du pays aux mois de mai et juin on discuta à Bucarest e à Sinaïa – la résidence du roi Charles Ier – la possibilité d'engoyer en Albanie deux régiments des volontaires, sufisantes pour rétablir l'odre d'après les estimations assez optimistes. Mais le debut de la Grande Guerre mit fin à ce projet, malgré les dernièrs cris de detresse et les demandes pour un suprême aide envoyés à Bucarest. De Roumanie ou n'avait pas pu qu'acheminer pour l'Albanie les uniformes d'hiver. Le bataillon roumain avec quelques centaines de volontaires de Kosovo ont été les derniers à défendre le siège du gouvernement et la maison du prince Guillaume avant son départ d'Albanie (3 septembre 1914). Immédiatement après les soldats et les officiers roumains ont consigné leurs armes à la Commission Internationale de Controle, comme seule autorité legale du pays.

Cet episode militaire roumain en Albanie a été completement oublié, e.... dans la ruine du prince de Wied. Mais avec justesse un des grands albanais qui connassait aussi le gouvernement du pays, l'évêque orthodoxe Fan Noli disait de prince de Wied qu'on peut lui adresser un grand reproche: „de n'avoir pas pu accomplir des miracles".

L'Albanie de 1912–1914 fût, sand doute l'enjeu de deux alliances des grandes puissances, l'objet de convoitise des pays balkanique voisines, de la revanche des Jeunes Turcs, une de grandes victime de la guerre dans les Balkans.

La Serbie issu de la guerre russo-ottomane de 1806–1812 changea dans un siècle quatre fois la dynastie sous les influences prép-onderantes russe ou autrichienne. Son evolution fût hauté par le rêve de la Grande Serbie d'Etienne Doushan du XIVe siècle, le present etant empoison fût hâuté par la m fût hâutédiocrité d'une petite principauté.

RESUMÉ

Sergiu Iosipescu: Obnova pred 1. svetovou vojnou a účasť Rumunov na obnove Albánska 1913 – 1914

V úvode autor pripomína genézu vývoja juhovýchodnej Európy, postupne pustošenou počas 2. tisícročí nájazdmi Kumánov, Mongolov, Tatárov či Turkov. Koncom 17. storočia prevzalo nadvládu nad krajinami juhovýchodnej Európy Rakúsko-Uhorsko, neskôr sa začalo presadzovať Rusko, vyčerpávané v druhej polovici 18. storočia vojnami s Osmanskou ríšou, ktorá sa nechcela zmieriť so stratou vplyvu v tomto regióne. Územie dnešného Albánska bolo v 19. storočí západnou časťou Osmanskej ríše a žilo na ňom asi 1,5 milióna obyvateľov, ktorí žili v rodových klanoch. Z nich bolo asi štvrť milióna Arumunov. Počas stáročnej nadvlády Osmanskej ríše a moslimského náboženstva dochádzalo k exodu kresťanov, ortodoxných aj katolíkov, takže začiatkom 20. storočia 60% obyvateľov tvorili moslimskí Albánci.
V čase 1. balkánskej vojny roku 1912 vznikli známe plány balkánskych spojencov pod vedením Ruska o rozdelenie európskeho Turecka na srbskú, grécku a bulharskú zónu. 28. novembra 1912 Ismail Kemal s národným albánskym výborom vyhlásil nezávislosť Albánska. To bol začiatok budovania a obnovy al-

bánskeho štátu. Londýnskym mierom 30. mája 1913 rozhodli veľmoci o vytvorení Albánskeho kniežatstva a Bukurešťský mier 10. augusta 1913 ukončil 2. balkánsku vojnu a určil hranice medzi Bulharskom, Srbskom, Tureckom a Gréckom. Konferencia vyslancov 29. júla 1913 vypracovala medzinárodný štatút Albánska. Rok 1914 znamenal stiahnutie srbskej a čiernohorskej armády z Albánska a jeho medzinárodnú správu.

Rumunsko už v 19. storočí podporovalo úsilie arumunskej menšiny o náboženskú a kultúrnu emancipáciu v rámci Albánska. V roku 1913 sa usilovalo o rumunskú vojenskú účasť v žandárstve Albánska a pripravovalo prápor rumunských dobrovoľníkov z albánskej kolónie v Rumunsku. Londýnska konferencia však rozhodla o holandskej účasti. Rumunský prápor podporovaný albánskymi dobrovoľníkmi -utečencami z Kosova prišiel roku 1914 do Albánska, aby podporil vládu kniežaťa de Wieda. Kríza a pád kniežatstva, grécka ofenzíva, povstanie sunitov a začiatok 1. svetovej vojny znemožnili vyslanie ďalších dvoch rumunských práporov do Albánska. Aj preto je dnes rumunská vojenská účasť v Albánsku v rokoch 1913 – 1914 takmer úplne zabudnutá.

SUMMARY

Sergiu Iosipescu: Development before the War and Rumanian's Contribution at Development of Albania, 1913–1914

Author reminds the genesis of evolution in southeastern Europe, which was gradually marauded during two thousand years by the incrusion of Kumans, Mongols, Tartars or Turks.The Empire of Austria-Hungary undertook the predominance over the southeastern Europe's countries at the end of 17th century, however the Russia begun to enforce. Russia had been exhausted in the second half of 18th century by wars against the Ottoman's empire, but did not want to conciliate with loss of influence in this region. The area of contemporary Albania was the western part of Ottoman's Empire in the 19th century and 1,5 million inhabitants lived there in family clans. About 250 thousands of them were Arumuns.

During the centuries-taking the predominance of the Ottoman's empire and the Muslim religion occured an exodus of Christians (orthodox and catholics), so the 60% of the population at the beginning of 20th century were Muslims. During the first Balkan war (in 1912) started up the well-known plans of Balkanian allies under Russian's leadership about splitting the area of European Turkey to Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian zones. Ismail Kemal and the National Albanian Council declared the sovereignty of Albania on November 28th 1912. It was the beginning of building and development of Albanian state. On May 30th 1913 the Great Powers at London Peace Treaty decided about consolidating of Principality of Albania. Second Balkan war was finished on August 10th 1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest, when the boundaries between the Bulgaria, Serbia, Turkey and Greece were determinated. The Conference of Ambassadors confirmed the international status of Albania on July 29th 1913. The Serbian and Montenegro's army left Albania in 1914 and begun the international administration of Albania. As early as in the 19the century Rumania supported the efforts of Aroumanian minority for religious and cultural emancipation in Albania. It was endeavoured to create Rumanian military attendance in Albanian gendermarie and it was prepared to establish the battalion of Rumanian volunteers from Albanian colony in Rumania. But the London Peace Conference decided about the Dutch contribution. Rumanian's battalion supported by Albanian volunteers (refugees from Kosovo) came to Albania to support the governance of Prince de Wied in 1914. The crisis and fall of Principality of Albania, the Greek offence, the Sunit's uprising and the beginning of World War One disabled the delegation of next two Rumanian battalions to Albania. Whereupon the Rumanian military contribution in Albania in 1913–1914 is nowadays almost totally forgotten.

Ambitions territoriales ou comment préserver la paix dans
les années 1920 et 1930: la politique étrangère turque dans les Balkans après la Grande guerre

Lt. Abdil Bicer

La défaite des Ottomans en 1918, amène un partage des territoires par les Alliés. L'Empire ottoman perd la Syrie, l'Irak, le Liban et la Palestine. L'Egypte et Chypre, déjà sous mandat britannique pendant la guerre n'appartiennent plus à la Porte. Par ailleurs, l'Anatolie est partagé en zones d'influence, françaises, anglaises et italiennes.

La révolution kémaliste et la création de la jeune Turquie[1], définissent un nouvel espace géopolitique dans lequel les Turcs essaient, pendant les années 1920 et 1930, de s'inscrire et de jouer un rôle catalyseur.

La devise du Père fondateur: *Paix dans le pays, Paix dans le monde*, est très ambitieuse et généreuse. Encore faut-il avoir les moyens de pouvoir appliquer une politique qui œuvre pour la paix. Quels peuvent être les instruments d'une paix intérieure si, au début des années 1920, la Turquie essaie de régler un contentieux territorial au sujet du vilayet de Mossoul (divisée en trois provinces aujourd'hui: Mossoul, Kirkouk et Erbil) avec la Grande-Bretagne et au sujet du sandjak d'Alexandrette avec la France?

La paix intérieure est étroitement liée aux règlements des questions territoriales ce qui limite d'emblée le champ de la diplomatie. La paix à l'extérieur est réalisée par une série de conventions et traités mais aussi par le Pacte balkanique qui définit la nouvelle orientation de la politique étrangère turque.

Après le règlement, très relatif, des contentieux avec les grandes puissances, la Turquie oeuvre pour une alliance avec les Etats balkaniques qui cherchent à définir leur rôle dans l'échiquier mondial. La tentative amorcée par la diplomatie turque en vue d'établir un es-

---

1   Lire à ce sujet, GAULIS B.G., *La question turque*, Paris, Editions Berger-Levrault, 1931, 373 pages.

pace dans lequel chacun des acteurs peut se définir comme un Etat libre laissant les velléités territoriales du passé de côté est le pari à gagner. Plus qu'une simple devise, Paix dans le pays, Pays dans le monde est la définition de la politique étrangère turque.

Quelle est la réalité militaire et diplomatique de l'élaboration d'un nouveau concept de neutralité ou de défense esquissé par les Turcs durant les vingt années qui suivent la Grande guerre? Peut on déceler le rôle ou l'influence des grandes puissances européennes dans le processus d'alliance qui s'opère dans les Balkans?

FIN DES CONTENTIEUX TERRITORIAUX

La fin de la Grande guerre ne règle pas immédiatement les problèmes territoriaux nés du morcellement de l'Empire ottoman. La guerre de *Libération nationale* turque provoque deux traités ou accords bilatéraux. Le traité de Kars en 1920 qui délimite les frontières orientales avec la Russie bolchevique et les accords d'Angora en octobre 1920 qui met fin au conflit entre Français et Turcs au sujet de la Cilicie.

En 1923, le traité de Lausanne définit les frontières de la jeune Turquie mais laisse en suspens deux grandes questions à régler plus tard: la rétrocession aux Turcs du vilayet de Mossoul par les Anglais, et celle du sandjak d'Alexandrette par les Français. Une revendication supplémentaire mais plus marginale concerne les îles du Dodécanèse occupées par les Italiens.

Si le traité de Lausanne, fixe les frontières de la nouvelle Turquie et permet une pacification des relations entre les Etats balkaniques, le traité de Neuilly en 1919 fixe les frontières de la Bulgarie et prive cet Etat de territoires attribués à la Grèce (la Thrace occidentale), à la Roumanie (la Dobroudja) et à la Yougoslavie (la Macédoine).

Les premières années qui suivent la fin de la guerre sont marquées par des irrédentismes, turcs, au Moyen-Orient, et bulgares, dans les Balkans. Ce sont essentiellement ces questions territoriales qui vont dicter la politique diplomatique des uns et des autres dans la région.

Immédiatement après le traité de Lausanne, les Turcs essaient de régler le différend territorial avec l'Irak. Les négociations se déroulent, dans un premier temps avec la Grande-Bretagne car les Turcs ne veulent pas porter la question devant la S.D.N. Des statistiques sont mises en avant de part et d'autre pour montrer que le vilayet de Mossoul est ou n'est pas arabe. Ensuite, devant la S.D.N., Fethi bey, affirme « (…) *que le vilayet de Mossoul est une partie intégrante de la Turquie*[2] ». De son côté, la Grande-Bretagne estime que cette province doit être intégrée à l'Irak. Or, selon les Turcs, les considérations géographiques sur lesquels repose la thèse britannique sont fausses. Pour eux, « *le nom d'Irak désigne une contrée habitée par des Arabes*[3] ». Se référant essentiellement aux données fournies par l'encyclopédia britannica et la grande Encyclopédie française, il précise les limites territoriales de l'Irak: « *L'Irak arabi correspond maintenant au Vilayet de Bagdad et à*

---

2   SHD/Terre, 7 N 3219, Exposé *in extenso* de la thèse de Fethy bey, au conseil de la S.D.N. sur la question de Mossoul.

3   SHD/Terre, 7 N 3219, Exposé *in extenso* de la thèse de Fethy bey, au conseil de la S.D.N. sur la question de Mossoul.

une partie de celui de Bassorah[4] ». Les estimations et les considérations ethnographiques de part et d'autre ne facilitent pas le règlement de la question. Les Turcs démontrent que le vilayet est en majorité peuplé de Kurdes et de Turcs alors que les Britanniques prétendent que les Arabes sont partout majoritaires.

La S.D.N. donne raison à la Grande-Bretagne le 30 septembre 1924 et déboute les Turcs de leurs revendications. En octobre de la même année, alors que les deux puissances ont accepté l'intégration à l'Irak de la province de Mossoul, une nouvelle friction entre la Turquie et la Grande-Bretagne a lieu au sujet de la région de Hakkari (aujourd'hui en Turquie). Le colonel Catroux, attaché militaire français en Turquie estime que les revendications des Anglais sur cette région sont « *spécieuses en droit*[5] » et ne se fondent que sur « *des considérations d'opportunité qui, en définitive, relève du souci d'obtenir politiquement et militairement la couverture des champs de pétrole de Mossoul*[6] ». Les Turcs portent l'affaire devant la S.D.N. et cette fois ils réussissent à démontrer les ambitions économiques et territoriales de la Grande-Bretagne. La S.D.N. donne raison aux Turcs. Le bras de fer engagé entre les deux puissances depuis 1919 se solde par une victoire des Britanniques fin 1925. La S.D.N. décide d'incorporer Mossoul à l'Irak. Catroux précise dans son rapport de fin d'année 1925 que « (…) *le prestige de la Société des Nations s'est trouvé profondément atteint, non seulement auprès des Turcs, mais on peut dire auprès de l'opinion mondiale qui avait été suffisamment éclairée sur les droits des Turcs dans la question de Mossoul, droits que cette décision a méconnu au bénéfice de l'Angleterre*[7] ».

Les menaces d'occupation militaire de la région par les Turcs et celles de faire éventuellement la guerre pour récupérer Mossoul n'ont pas suffi à enrayer les soulèvements et les insurrections de Nestoriens et de Kurdes menés secrètement par la Grande-Bretagne. La diplomatie turque s'est retrouvée isolée face à la Grande-Bretagne et comme le précise Catroux, les Turcs sont déçus des Français, qui à leurs yeux, sont à la remorque des Anglais[8]. Selon Catroux: « (…) *jamais cette dépendance ne leur a paru plus docile et plus soumise*[9] ».

Déçus de la décision de la S.D.N. mais renforcés par cette défaite diplomatique, les Turcs essaient de construire une politique étrangère visant à consolider la paix à l'extérieur. Pour les dirigeants turcs, et selon Sarrou, le nouvel attaché militaire: « (…) *le meilleur moyen d'avoir la paix à l'intérieur, c'est d'assurer la paix à l'extérieur, c'est-à-dire avec tous les pays voisins*[10] ».

---

4   SHD/Terre, 7 N 3219, Exposé *in extenso* de la thèse de Fethy bey, au conseil de la S.D.N. sur la question de Mossoul.

5   SHD/Terre, 7 N 3219, Rapport du lieutenant-colonel Catroux, L'évolution de l'affaire de Mossoul et la situation du cabinet, Constantinople, 19 octobre 1924.

6   SHD/Terre, 7 N 3219, Rapport du lieutenant-colonel Catroux, L'évolution de l'affaire de Mossoul et la situation du cabinet, Constantinople, 19 octobre 1924.

7   SHD/Terre, 7 N 3220, Service de l'attaché militaire, Rapport de fin d'année (1925), Etat général du Pays, Titre I, p. 135.

8   SHD/Terre, 7 N 3220, Service de l'attaché militaire, Rapport de fin d'année (1925), Etat général du Pays, Titre I, p. 135.

9   SHD/Terre, 7 N 3220, Service de l'attaché militaire, Rapport de fin d'année (1925), Etat général du Pays, Titre I, p. 135.

10 SHD/Terre, 7 N 3221, Service de l'attaché militaire en Turquie, Rapport annuel de 1926, Dossier 1, p. 110.

La paix à l'extérieur est garantie par une série de traités ou conventions conclus avec la France, la Russie, la Perse, la Bulgarie et la Grèce.

VERS LE PACTE BALKANIQUE

Le principal axe de la politique étrangère turque dans les années 1930 est le renforcement des liens avec les Etats balkaniques. La consolidation des frontières et la recherche d'alliances régionales est l'objectif de la Turquie qui cherche à définir une espace neutre en cas de conflit mondial ou plus exactement la construction d'un bloc solide dans les Balkans. Les alliances entre « Etats faibles » à l'instar de la Petite entente, devient la priorité d'Ankara.

Les revendications territoriales héritées de la Grande guerre ne laissent pas penser qu'une entente est possible entre les Etats balkaniques. Pourtant, Ankara semble esquisser une solution. Selon les Turcs, le maintien d'une paix durable dans la région passe par la création d'une entente balkanique pouvant satisfaire tous els Etats d'Europe. A leur initiative, une union est annoncée à partir de 1933. Selon Tevfik Rüþtü Bey, ministre des Affaires Etrangères turc, avec la création d'une Confédération balkanique: « *Il n'est plus de conflit possible dans les Balkans* [11]».

Pour Courson de Villeneuve, attaché militaire français à Ankara, la « *grande pensée politique de la Turquie*[12] » est la mise en place d'une Confédération balkanique regroupant les Etats de la région. Dans cette perspective, l'Albanie est écartée en raison d'une opposition farouche des Italiens considérant cet Etat des Balkans comme étant sous leur influence directe. L'adhésion de la Grèce et de la Roumanie est immédiate, tandis que les Yougoslaves émettent quelques réserves, essentiellement justifiées par leur espoir d'obtenir un accès à la mer Egée. Les Bulgares, quant à eux, refusent de façon catégorique d'entrer dans la Confédération projetée. L'adhésion au pacte, signifierait à leurs yeux l'abandon des revendications territoriales sur la Macédoine et l'accès à la mer Egée.

Le 9 février 1934, le Pacte balkanique est signé par Tevfik Rüştü Bey et ses homologues roumains, yougoslaves et grecs. Selon Courson de Villeneuve, le ministre turc a été un partisan actif de cet accord[13] et seule l'absence de la Bulgarie est à déplorer car elle rend le pacte incomplet. Afin d'élargir l'union et d'augmenter la crédibilité de son action diplomatique, Ankara voudrait étendre l'alliance à la Petite Entente[14], ou tout au moins parvenir à la conclusion de pactes de non agression ou de garanties avec les Etats qui y adhèrent. En réalité, le ministre turc veut favoriser un rapprochement de plus en plus étroit entre l'Union balkanique et la Petite Entente dans le but non avoué de ne laisser aux Bulgares aucun autre choix que l'adhésion.

La préoccupation principale des signataires du pacte est le maintien de la paix et le respect des frontières dans les Balkans. Le pacte doit atténuer les différends opposant la

---

11   SHD/Terre, 7 N 3225 Rapport de l'attaché militaire de France en Turquie, le colonel Courson de Villeneuve, 1er trimestre 1934.

12   SHD/Terre, 7 N 3225, Rapport annuel de l'attaché militaire de France en Turquie, 1934.

13   SHD/Terre, 7 N 3225, Rapport de l'attaché militaire de France en Turquie, 1er trimestre 1934.

14   La Petite Entente, créée en 1920, est une alliance entre la Yougoslavie, la Roumanie et la Tchécoslovaquie. Cette union, sous la bienveillance de la France, est tournée contre la Hongrie.

Yougoslavie et la Grèce, sous réserve bien sûr qu'Athènes facilite le transit des marchandises yougoslaves en direction de la mer Egée par la Macédoine. Une communauté de vue s'organise autour d'une défense commune contre les visées bulgares. La solution recherchée est l'entrée sans condition de la Bulgarie au sein de l'alliance balkanique comme le prévoit d'ailleurs le pacte.

En terme d'alliance, le pacte resserre les liens entre les Etats de la région et donne le ton pour une collaboration plus étroite à l'avenir. Il peut se définir comme un pacte d'intérêts où chacun observe une position qui lui permet d'être en sécurité en deçà des frontières.

Néanmoins, la pérennité du pacte et sa crédibilité international relèvent d'une part de la caution diplomatique accordée par les grandes puissances et d'autre part de l'importance que leur accordent les Etats signataires.

LES BALKANS: ENJEU DES GRANDES PUISSANCES?

Les destinées de la région sont étroitement liées aux prévisions stratégiques et aux ambitions territoriales des Etats voisins ou moins voisins. A quel point les chancelleries balkaniques maîtrisent-elles leur propre politique extérieure? Dans quelle mesure les traités entre Etats balkaniques ne sont-ils pas l'expression de la volonté des puissances européennes? Tous les Etats de la région sont tributaires d'une puissance européenne. On peut distinguer deux groupes d'Etats ayant une influence certaine dans les Balkans, celui des régimes totalitaires, l'Italie puis l'Allemagne, et celui des démocraties occidentales avec la Grande Bretagne et la France. Pour des raisons à la fois économique et militaire, les États balkaniques doivent agir en tenant compte des réalités internationales.

Selon Courson de Villeneuve, Tevfik Rüþtü Bey chercherait à former un bloc autour de l'U.R.S.S. Afin de parer au développement de la puissance allemande, éventuellement accrue de l'Autriche et de la Hongrie, Ankara tente d'unir les Slaves de la Petite Entente et les membres du Pacte balkanique[15] en s'appuyant sur les sympathies de la France et compte sur la bienveillance de l'Italie[16]. Si l'abstention de la Bulgarie invalide la réalisation d'un projet initial, la réserve de l'Italie est remarquable. Malgré l'opposition entre le Duce et le Führer sur le Brenner, les dirigeants italiens admettent difficilement la création d'une union qui se heurte aux prétentions territoriales du régime fasciste.

Déjà, dans la seconde moitié des années vingt Mussolini renforçait la présence italienne en Albanie[17] pouvant de la sorte exercer des pressions depuis le sud contre le gouvernement de Belgrade. Cette « tête de pont » prépare un empire italien dans les Balkans[18]. Soutenant les Oustachis[19] en Yougoslavie, les Italiens encouragent la naissance

---

15 Les Yougoslaves et les Roumains font partis des deux alliances. Cela pourrait faciliter une union des deux blocs dans une perspective de défense commune.

16 SHD/Terre, 7 N 3225, Rapport de l'attaché militaire français en Turquie, 1er trimestre 1934.

17 Voir plus précisément les accords de Tirana en 1927.

18 Cette politique se concrétise en 1939 par l'union personnelle des deux royaumes en la personne du roi Victor Emmanuel.

19 Les Oustachis sont des indépendantistes croates, leur chef Ante Pavelitch se réfugie en Italie au milieu des années 1930 et Rome refuse de l'extrader vers la Yougoslavie.

d'une Croatie indépendante. La question dalmate en particulier caractérise la politique italienne à l'égard de la Yougoslavie.

Dans les années 1930, Mussolini modifie son approche des Balkans. Tout en poursuivant une politique de soutien à l'égard des séparatistes croates, Rome conclut des accords avec Tirana[20]. Cette attitude déstabilise la politique intérieure de la Yougoslavie et la contraint à la prudence. Les actions italiennes pour affaiblir le régime de Belgrade se vérifient aussi avec les militants de l'O.R.I.M[21] qui se battent pour obtenir l'indépendance de la Macédoine yougoslave. L'implication italienne dans les affaires balkaniques gagne à nouveau du terrain et fragilise la situation politique de la région. Les projets italiens accompagnent ceux des Allemands qui jouent sur les différents antagonismes régionaux pour retrouver leur ancienne influence.

Contrairement à Mussolini, Hitler a des objectifs plus pragmatiques dans la région du Danube et des Balkans. Selon le plan *Schacht* mis au point en 1934 par le ministre de l'Economie allemand, les Balkans sont une région d'intérêt stratégique. La richesse en matières premières permettrait au *Reich* de soutenir ses projets de guerre et sa politique hégémonique[22].

La présence étrangère modifie sensiblement les relations entre les Etats et offre aux Bulgares et aux Yougoslaves la possibilité de formuler à nouveau leurs prétentions territoriales. Toutes les actions diplomatiques et militaires de grande importance se trouvent subordonnées aux intérêts des puissances étrangères dans la région. La deuxième moitié des années 1930 voit la montée en puissance de l'Allemagne nazie et face à laquelle une opposition se dessine autour de la Grande-Bretagne. Celle-ci, profitant des hésitations du régime grec propose son soutien à la Grèce. Son objectif principal est de contrôler les accès maritimes pour permettre à la *Royal Navy* de tenir les points stratégiques en Méditerranée orientale et protéger la « voie de Suez ». A Ankara, les Turcs regardent d'un mauvais œil la venue des Britanniques. Ils sont inquiets de l'influence des Britanniques en Grèce et n'hésitent pas à montrer leur mécontentement à leurs alliés grecs[23]. En cas de conflit, la marine britannique promet de soutenir la Grèce qui, convaincue d'une impossible neutralité, préfère le soutien d'une grande puissance, y voyant un moindre risque.

Sous l'influence de la Grande-Bretagne, les Grecs cherchent un accord avec les Bulgares. Ils demandent des garanties de non agression en échanges d'avantages commerciaux, de facilités de transit et de l'établissement d'une zone franche à Dedeagatch ou dans tout autre port de la mer Egée. Se voyant écartée par ses partenaires, la Grèce se rapproche de la Bulgarie transformant ainsi les craintes turques en réalité géopolitique.

FIN DU BLOC BALKANIQUE

Dans la seconde moitié des années 1930, les relations entre Etats balkaniques sont mi-

---

20 Rome accorde à Tirana un prêt sans intérêt en 1932.

21 L'O.R.I.M. (Organisation Révolutionnaire Intérieure de la Macédoine). Cette organisation est née au XIXe siècle.

22 L'Allemagne s'intéresse surtout au pétrole roumain et aux minerais yougoslaves.

23 SHD/Terre, 7 N 3226, Rapport de l'attaché militaire de France en Turquie, 4e trimestre 1935.

ses à l'épreuve. Si le Pacte balkanique favorisait un rapprochement entre les Etats de la région, les facteurs externes tendent à réduire une entente déjà intrinsèquement fragilisée par les revendications territoriales. Les préparatifs militaires turcs en Thrace préoccupent les Bulgares qui estiment être en danger devant la transformation progressive des forces turques en un dispositif offensif[24]. A la rivalité turco-bulgare s'ajoutent les tensions internes en Yougoslavie. Les relations tendues entre Serbes et Croates fragilisent la stabilité du pays. Le contexte international, accentue les antagonismes et oblige le gouvernement de Belgrade à agir. Afin de garantir son intégrité territoriale, la Yougoslavie multiplie et renforce ses relations bilatérales. Pour endiguer la présence allemande dans les Balkans et contenir la pression italienne en Albanie, Belgrade se rapproche de Sofia et s'oppose désormais aux accords balkaniques visant la Bulgarie.

Il ressort une nouvelle fois que des relations apaisées avec les Bulgares simplifieraient l'action diplomatique dans la région. Les craintes qui sous-tendent les relations entre partenaires balkaniques offrent un paysage politique peu convainquant en Europe. Il est impossible aux meilleurs connaisseurs de la région d'affirmer quelles pourraient être les positions adoptées par les uns et les autres dans l'hypothèse d'un conflit généralisé. L'alliance balkanique ne parvient que difficilement à effacer les différences et les antagonismes régionaux. Surtout, elle ne réussit pas à unir les efforts pour limiter les effets de l'influence étrangère.

L'existence et la crédibilité de cette organisation ne pourraient se vérifier qu'avec la mise en place d'une défense commune qui fixerait le nombre de troupes à déployer et le rôle de chacun en cas de conflit. Cette nécessité est encore plus marquée après l'*Anschluss*. Les comptes-rendus de Courson de Villeneuve portent à croire que la défense des Balkans repose en grande partie sur le potentiel militaire[25]. En réalité, les disponibilités militaires turques sont limitées car les Turcs ne peuvent pas affaiblir leur dispositif en Anatolie pour protéger la Thrace.

La Roumanie insiste pour la mise en place d'une défense commune crédible permettant de connaître le nombre exact d'unités à déployer dans les régions concernées. Lors de la conférence des chefs d'états-majors des pays liés par le Pacte balkanique en novembre 1936, les membres de l'alliance parviennent à un accord militaire[26]. Il s'agit essentiellement des dispositions à prendre contre la Bulgarie dans le cas où ses voisins seraient engagés dans un conflit. Les Roumains se sont engagés, avec la majorité de leurs forces, à secourir la Tchécoslovaquie en cas d'attaque par le nord. De ce fait, ils recherchent des garanties pour leur frontière sud. C'est dans cet état d'esprit que l'union balkanique demande à l'état-major turc de renforcer considérablement ses troupes en Thrace. Dans ce cas de figure, la Petite Entente agirait de concert avec les Etats membres du Pacte Balkanique.

Néanmoins, ne parvenant pas à faire taire les revendications bulgares, les gouvernements de la région se décident à composer avec Sofia. La crédibilité de l'action du bloc

---

24 SHD/Terre, 7 N 3226, Rapport de l'attaché militaire de France en Turquie 4e trimestre 1935.

25 Il faut se référer ici au nouveau régime des Détroits qui prend effet à partir de la signature de la Convention de Montreux le 20 juillet 1936. La Turquie ayant obtenu le réarmement de la zone démilitarisée, elle peut adopter une nouvelle position en Thrace orientale et augmenter encore les forces qu'elle a déjà déployée dans la région.

26 SHD/Terre, 7 N 3226, Rapport de l'attaché militaire de France en Turquie, 2ème semestre 1936.

balkanique est fortement remise en cause par le rapprochement en en janvier 1937 entre Belgrade et Sofia qui signent un pacte d'amitié. Ce rapprochement bilatéral mécontente les membres du pacte car l'accord militaire balkanique perd beaucoup de son efficacité et même de son utilité[27]. Loin de renforcer le Pacte balkanique, le traité d'amitié bulgaro-yougoslave redéfinit la situation géopolitique de la région et affaiblit les partenaires balkaniques dans leur alliance.

Selon Courson de Villeneuve: « …*Le Pacte balkanique ne semble plus être le bloc rigide des années précédentes*[28]. Si la Turquie, la Roumanie et la Grèce s'en déclarent toujours fermement partisanes, la Yougoslavie s'en détache progressivement.

A partir de 1938, de nombreuses tentatives pour un rapprochement turco-bulgare échouent. Cette période est marquée par des négociations entre les grandes puissances et les Etats balkaniques, mais la méfiance de chacun empêche tout processus de conciliation avec la Bulgarie qui demeure la clé de voûte d'un véritable bloc balkanique. En maintenant l'existence du Pacte balkanique, Ankara se fait le champion de la défense des frontières communes et du maintien de la paix dans les Balkans.

EN GUISE DE CONCLUSION

Il est difficile de conclure sur un sujet aussi vaste que nous avons fait que survoler en analysant les axes majeurs de la diplomatie dans les Balkans. La grille de lecture utilisée pour comprendre les enjeux nés de la fin de la Grande guerre a été la lecture des rapports des attachés militaires en poste en Turquie. Une étude plus complète, croisant les archives des postes de Belgrade, Sofia, Bucarest et Athènes avec ceux d'Ankara, permettraient de connaître au moins la définition de la politique étrangère de ces Etats, sinon la tentative d'élaboration d'un concept de neutralité active.

La France et la Grande-Bretagne multiplient les démarches à partir de l'automne 1939 en Turquie mais aussi dans les Balkans. La France la rétrocède le sandjak d'Alexandrette afin d'attirer Ankara dans son camp. A aucun moment, les membres du Pacte balkanique ne sont consultés ou convoités comme un ensemble unique. Les démarches à la veille de la Seconde guerre mondiale ne prennent nullement en considération la possibilité de préparer un front balkanique contre une agression allemande

RESUMÉ

Abdil Bicer: Teritoriálne ambície, alebo ako uchovať mier v 20. a 30. rokoch. Turecká zahraničná politika na Balkáne po 1. svetovej vojne

Počas dvoch desaťročí po skončení nadvlády Otomanskej ríše v roku 1918, sa nový turecký režim snažil definovať novú geografickú sféru vplyvu za účelom zabezpečenia mieru zvonka a vo vnútri. Navonok bol mier presadený silnými národmi – Francúzskom a Veľkou Britániou cestou sérií konvencií a zmlúv. Spomedzi všetkých Balkánsky pakt z roku 1934 začal novú orientáciu tureckej zahraničnej politiky pred druhou svetovou vojnou. Obzvlášť Turci presadzovali koncepciu neutrality, ktorá bola v praxi overovaná v ére no-

---

27   SHD/Terre, 7 N 3227, Rapport de l'attaché militaire de France en Turquie, 1er semestre 1937.

28   SHD/Terre, 7 N 3227, Rapport de l'attaché militaire de France en Turquie, 2ème semestre 1937.

vých aliancií. Ankara presadzovala užšie spojenie medzi Balkánskou úniou a Malou dohodou pokusom rozšíriť ju o Bulharov. Pravdou je, že oblasti regiónu boli veľmi závislé od strategických dispozícií a teritoriálnych ambícií okolitých národov. Balkán bol pod vplyvom dvoch skupín. Na jednej strane bol ovplyvnený totalitným režimom v Nemecku a Taliansku a na strane druhej strane tlakom zo strany západných demokratických štátov – Francúzska a Veľkej Británie. V tomto kontexte, keď Bulharsko zostávalo mimo paktu a vnútorné tlaky Juhoslávie spôsobovali vzrast napätia, Francúzska diplomacia uvažovala, že sa Turecko snaží vytvoriť blok so ZSSR na ochranu svojich regionálnych záujmov. Popri antagonizme s Bulharskom, Turecko podozrievalo Grécko z pomoci Veľkej Británie. Čoskoro Turecko muselo čeliť aliancii medzi Gréckom a Bulharskom. Tieto obnovené tlaky, okrem miestnych problémov, boli znakom začiatku konca tohto paktu. V praxi balkánske národy boli svedectvom neschopnosti organizovať spoločnú obranu. V roku 1937 iná aliancia, tento raz medzi Sofiou a Belehradom, potvrdila túto situáciu. Pakt prakticky zanikol, aj keď ho Ankara udržiavala. V predvečer druhej svetovej vojny Francúzsko a Veľká Británia rozširovala kontakty s Tureckom, dúfajúc, že získajú Ankaru do svojho tábora, ale nikdy pakt neformulovali ako spoločnú záujmovú skupinu. Až do posledného momentu, západné demokracie neuvažovali o možnosti spojeného balkánskeho frontu proti nemeckej agresii.

SUMMARY

Abdil Bicer: Territorial ambitions, or how to preserve peace in the 20s and 30s : Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans following WWI

In the two decades following the defeat of the Ottomans in 1918, the new Turkish regime tries to define a renewed geographic area of influence in order to secure peace "inside and outside". Internal peace is linked to territorial issues which limit diplomacy. Peace outside with powerful nations such as France and Great Britain is achieved through a series of conventions and treaties. Among all, the Balkan Pact of 1934 sets up the new orientations of Turkish foreign policy prior to World War Two. More particularly, the Turks establish their concept of neutrality, the reality of which can be questioned in an era of new alliances. In fact, Ankara favors closer links between the Balkan Union and the Little Entente as an attempt to bring the Bulgarians in. Truth is, the destiny of the region depends highly on strategic previsions and the territorial ambitions of the surrounding nations. How independent are local governments? Two distinct groups influence the Balkans. Totalitarian regimes – Germany and Italy – on the one hand, and Western democracies – France and Great Britain – on the other hand. In this context, with the Bulgarians remaining out of the Pact and Yougoslavia's internal tensions causing a growing threat, French diplomacy considers that Turkey is trying to form another block with the USSR to protect its regional interests. Besides its antagonism with Bulgaria, Turkey is also suspicious of Great Britain's assistance to Greece. Soon, Turkey has to face an alliance between Greece and Bulgaria… These renewed tensions, added to other local problems, mark the beginning of the end for the Pact. In fact, the Balkan nations have proven incapable of organizing a common defense. In 1937, another alliance, this time between Sofia and Belgrad, confirms this situation. The Pact is virtually dead, even if Ankara maintains it. On the eve of World War Two, France and Great Britain multiplies contacts with Turkey, hoping to bring Ankara in their camp, but they never address the Pact as a common group. Until the last moment, Western democracies will not consider the possibility of a united Balkan front against a German aggression.

Post-War Security,
the League of Nations Question, and British Foreign Policy, 1917—1922

Prof. Brian J.C. McKercher

As soon as war, threats of war, or the possibility of ruptures are concerned, there must be no question of limited group interests: these must be the concern of the whole of the League.
van Hamel, July 1920[1]

For the British government during the Great War, the political and military expression of exiting that conflict centred on the determination and pursuit of well-defined war aims; in this context, the British desire for an international organization to maintain international security became a central element of the British government's vision of a post-war peace settlement. Admittedly, apart from a determination to prevent German hegemony on the European continent that had animated British leaders since early August 1914, the development and articulation of Britain's war aims did not occur until the Autumn of 1916 when, anticipating that Germany would sue for peace by December, the basis for British requirements at a prospective Peace Conference were needed. Whilst peace proved illusory in late 1916, the development of war aims, including that for a diplomatic mechanism to maintain post-war international security, continued. Ironically, although the American President, Woodrow Wilson, argued for such a mechanism – which he called a League of Nations – both before and after the United States entered the war on the side of Britain and its Allies in April 1917, the British government led by David Lloyd George provided the basis for what became the first international body designed to control war. It was not an easy task. One reason resided in laying down the structure

---

1   van Hamel [League Secretariat, Legal Section] minute to Drummond [League secretary-general], 24 July 1920, LNR [Registered Files, League of Nations Archive, Geneva] 574/5549/5549

of what was a revolutionary departure in international politics and setting its powers in such a way that a balance existed between the international responsibilities of member states and their sovereign rights. This issue preoccupied the British and their allies in the last phase of the war and during the negotiation of the Treaty of Versailles in the first half of 1919; and the League took form largely because of Anglo-American unity of purpose. The second occurred after the victorious Powers agreed on the structure and 'Covenant' – the constitution – of the League. Wilson failed to deliver on his rhetoric when he could not engineer Congressional ratification of the Covenant so that the United States failed to join the new organization. At least from the Peace Conference onwards, Lloyd George's government had looked to a post-war international order bolstered by Anglo-American co-operation within the League. It took two years following Wilson's bungling for London to give final form to its war aim of an international organization to maintain international security.

In the spate of memoranda called for by the Cabinet in the Autumn of 1916 concerning the definition of British war aims, Lord Robert Cecil, the Foreign Office under-secretary and Minister of Blockade, circulated a paper to the Cabinet entitled 'Proposals for Diminishing the Occasion of Future Wars'.[2] Hoping to exploit passions raised by fighting a total war, he summarized the cost of the struggle to all belligerents to that moment: tremendous financial expenditure, considerable losses sustained by military and civilian populations, and the incalculable destruction of property. Not a wild-eyed pacifist calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities,[3] he argued that the prevention of future warfare on that scale – or at least its diminution – could be attained if three basic proposals were realized once peace returned: a five-year guarantee of all territorial arrangements made at the Peace Conference; the conciliation of all future disputes by the signatories to the eventual peace settlement; and to ensure compliance with the conciliation process, the signatory Powers could employ the threat of severe economic and, in the case of extreme crises, military sanctions against transgressor states. In Cecil's view, a reflection of the old Concert of Europe, the Powers would convene only on an *ad hoc* basis to meet crises as they arose.

Cecil's memorandum received critical evaluation from Sir Eyre Crowe, an assistant under-secretary in the Foreign Office and its leading German expert.[4] Crowe told the Cabinet that Cecil's scheme comprised four, not three, areas of concern: a guarantee of the post-war territorial *status quo*; diplomatic machinery designed to permit the peace alteration to that *status quo*; additional machinery for the settlement of other disputes; and, most important, an implied limitation of both armaments and war material production. Moreover, Cecil's ad hoc body would consist only of signatories to the eventual Peace Treaty. But neutral Power territory had also to be protected 'if universal peace is to

---

2   Cecil memorandum [GT484], 'Proposals for Diminishing the Occasion of Future Wars', nd, CAB [Cabinet Archives, National Archive, Kew] 24/10.

3   Cf. Cecil to Coudert [British legal advisor, USA], 16 July 1916, FO 800 [Foreign Office Private MSS, National Archive, Kew] /242; Cecil telegram to Bryce [former British ambassador to the USA], 27 December 1916, FO 800 800/197.

4   Crowe memorandum [GT484A], 'Notes... on Lord R. Cecil's for the Maintenance of Future Peace', 12 October 1916, CAB 24/10.

be assured on the basis of a generally accepted territorial settlement'. Thus, neutral Power co-operation was indispensable. Finally, Crowe argued that the proposed peacekeeping machinery envisaged by Cecil would not flourish unless equipped with both a permanent headquarters and organization, both necessary for speed and convenience. But Crowe posited that permanency would be too radical for traditional diplomatists.

Of course, the immediacy of well-defined war aims evaporated by the end of 1916 when an armistice proved elusive. In this sense, the debate between Cecil and Crowe was an academic one: Cecil represented a growing body of public and official opinion in both Britain and Allied countries that saw a new approach to diplomacy – more public, more open, and subject to agreed rules of conduct amongst all states – as the means to achieve long-term peace once the war ended. Crowe embodied a more traditionalist approach to international politics that denigrated any restraint on the diplomacy of sovereign Britain and which allowed public opinion, unschooled in the intricacies of foreign and defence policy, to involve itself in high policy.[5] But unlike the advent of an early peace, the question of a post-war international organization did not disappear because Wilson continued to promote the idea and, increasingly, vocal public opinion groups in the Allied countries, but especially in Britain and the United States, would not abandon the project.[6] Within the British government, Cecil emerged as a focal point for pro-League sentiment at the highest levels. Thus, throughout 1917, he continued to press the foreign secretary, Sir Arthur Balfour, and the Cabinet about the importance of a post-war security mechanism.[7] By late 1917, as a consequence of not wanting Britain to be caught without a policy for a 'League of Nations' when the eventual peace conference met – and allowing the American government to set the agenda – Cecil convinced Balfour to have the Foreign Office examine the issue carefully.[8] The result was the establishment of an advisory committee headed by Sir Walter Phillimore, an eminent jurist who had recently published a major study of peace plans since the seventeenth century.[9] Three Foreign Office officials joined him: Crowe, Sir William Tyrrell, who in 1916 had co-written the most important analysis of British territorial demands, and Sir Cecil Hurst, a Foreign Office legal advisor.[10] To put crucial legal and strategic issues in context, especially the freedom of the seas, three eminent historians were also asked to serve: Julian Corbett, A.F. Pollard, and J. Holland Rose.

In its deliberations, the Phillimore Committee witnessed the same policy dichotomy that occurred earlier between Cecil and Crowe: balancing a Power's traditional sovereign

---

5 '…the salvation of the world [lay in] paper promises under the league of nations!', in Crowe to his wife, 6 February 1919, Crowe [Crowe Paper, Bodleian Library, Oxford] MS Eng e3022.

6 For example, H.N. Brailsford, A League of Nations, 2nd edition (1917); League of Nations Society, Report of Meeting, May 14th, 1917. Speeches delivered by Viscount Bryce et al. (1917); idem., Report of a conference of the legal profession; A. Williams [League of Nations Society], A League of Nations: how to begin it (1917).

7 Cecil memorandum [GT 2074], 25 August 1917, CAB 24/26.

8 G.W. Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics, and International Organization, 1914–1919 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1978), 65.

9 W.G.F. Phillimore, Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace and Their Teaching (1917).

10 On the territorial question, see Foreign Office memorandum, 'Suggested Basis for a Territorial Settlement in Europe' [CP P5], 29 September 1916, CAB 29/1. For earlier views of Hurst on legal issues and a league, see Hurst memorandum [on proposals of the League to Enforce Peace], July 1917, FO 800/249.

existence with a different approach to diplomacy. But unlike the Autumn of 1916, the issue British League policy a year later was no longer an academic one. As public support for Wilson's 'new diplomacy' was mounting on both sides of the Atlantic and as the expenditure on the war in blood and treasure mounted, some sort of postwar diplomatic body would have to be created. Indeed, because of these considerations, as well as to respond to another 'new diplomacy' suddenly being propagandized by the new Bolshevik regime in Russia, Lloyd George decided to issue a statement of British war aims at a public meeting of the Trades Union Congress on 5 January 1918. Building on ideas promoted by Cecil and General Jan Smuts, the South African foreign minister and a member of the War Cabinet, the prime minister outlined Britain's commitment 'to establish by some international organization an alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes'. More importantly, this organization would provide the means 'to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war, but it would require enough strength to ensure the 'sanctity of treaties' and the post-war 'territorial settlement'.[11] Three days later, Wilson enunciated his government's commitment for a 'League of Nations' when he outlined to Congress his 'Fourteen Points' for a comprehensive peace settlement.

This constituted the political atmosphere in which the Phillimore Committee deliberated. It came into formal existence two days before Lloyd George's war aims speech and it reported In an 'Interim Report' completed on 20 March, and a slightly modified 'Final Report' of 3 July 1918,[12] Phillimore's Committee provided a draft convention for the eventual peace conference, plus an explanation of its recommendations – genuflecting to Wilson, it used occasionally the term 'covenant', which he had been employing when describing the agreement amongst the eventual signatories of a League convention. Importantly, Phillimore and his colleagues supported establishing a body of Powers after the war that could resolve disputes peacefully and, in reserve, have the ability – admittedly, a limited ability – to impose sanctions against states that violated its decisions. By doing so, they repudiated suggestions for a supra-national organization and notions that the wartime alliance should convert into a peacetime structure before or after the fighting ended. Bowing to Wilson's and the growing public demand to end 'old' diplomacy, the Committee endorsed annulling all treaties with commitments inconsistent with the letter of the 'Convention'. Overall, these general recommendations looked to balance between the certain opposition of states, even liberal democratic ones, to surrendering their sovereignty to an untried international body with the increasing public demand for 'new' diplomatic practice.

Ensuring peace and security fell to more specific recommendations. Without deciding whether the League should be an ad hoc body or a permanent organization, the Committee argued that the League should have a fixed seat in a yet-to-be decided state; and that its chair, the head of the host government, would have authority to bring serious

---

11 Smuts, 'War Aims, Draft Statement' [GT 3180], 1 January 1918, Cecil, 'War Aims, Draft Statement' [GT 3181], 3 January 1918, na [but Kerr, Lloyd George's secretary], 'Statement of War Aims: Draft Statement Based on General Smuts' Draft' [GT 3182], 3 January 1918, all CAB 24/37/2. Then see Lloyd George's speech in Lloyd George, War Memoirs, V, 2515–27.

12 Phillimore Committee 'Interim Report', 20 March 1918, Phillimore Committee 'Final Report', 3 July 1918, both Noel-Baker FO 800/249.

matters to the attention of League members. To keep the proposed body under the control of governments, delegates were to be drawn from the League Powers' diplomats accredited to the host country or their appointed representatives. Only over how to resolve issues did the Committee divide. Crowe and Tyrrell argued for unanimous conference votes to permit League action; the others saw a majority vote as more expedient. Thus, in the draft placed before the War Cabinet, both methods were included for decision at a higher level.

But the nub of the Phillimore Committee's findings involved the 'Avoidance of War'. Taking proposals then circulating within the government and the wider public, it suggested that the 'Allied States', signatories to the League treaty, should bind themselves not to go to war with any of their number to settle disputes. The envisaged conciliation process involved: first, submitting the question at hand to arbitration or for separate examining by the main 'Conference of the Allied States'; second, avoiding military action until the resolution procedure had been completed; and finally, having the 'Allied States' forsake action against the Powers involved if they complied with the arbitral decision or ruling of the 'Conference'. Should an 'Allied State' breach this process, it 'will become *ipso facto* at war with all the other Allied States'. In this regard, the other League Powers would 'agree to take and to support each other in taking jointly and severally all such measures – military, naval, financial, and economic – as will best avail for restraining the breach of the covenant'. The Phillimore Committee also dealt with the problem of 'Relations between the Allied States and States not Party to this Convention'. Quarrels between 'Allied States' and non-League Powers were inevitable. Should such disputes arise, however, the 'Conference' would request non-members to place their case before League conciliation machinery, either for arbitration or to the main 'Conference. In doing so, these non-League Powers would be considered temporary members of the 'Conference' and the existing conciliation machinery activated; if non-League Powers rejected the 'Conference' request, the 'Allied States' would still convene to make proposals for settlement. Should the non-League Power persist on an aggressive path, the Phillimore Committee recommended that any League Power 'may come to its assistance'.

The Phillimore 'Report' possessed strengths and deficiencies. A strength in terms of practical policy came with the recognition that to be effective, any League would require Powers willing to band together to settle disputes; this willingness would come only if their individual national interests were perceived not to be imperilled. Crowe's hand can be seen here. Each 'Allied State' could decide how best to respond – 'jointly and severally' – in their own interest in an intra-League dispute; outside, they would not be compelled to enforce an arbitral award or a 'Conference' decision. Along similar lines, the Committee as a whole understood that delegates to the League had to be government agents not private citizens. The 'Report''s deficiencies were two-fold. The Phillimore Committee proved unable to clarify the issue of membership. An assumption existed that the 'Allied Powers' in the post-war League would be the Allies then fighting the Central Powers; but whilst the possible membership of the Central Powers was conspicuous by its absence, that of the wartime neutrals supportive of a post-war organization remained cloudy. The second deficiency centred on the scope of League functions. Wilson and his supporters on both sides of the Atlantic – and Cecil, for that matter – were championing a 'new' di-

plomacy at the centre of which would be a powerful League to enforce peace. The Phillimore Committee saw only a renewed and expanded Concert of Europe system with a limited ability to enforce an arbitral award or a decision about culpability in an international dispute because its sanctions would be, at best, discretionary or, at worst, optional. Politicians would have to make difficult decisions about the shape of the League.

Endeavouring to push the decision-making process, even before the final Phillimore 'Report' was completed, Cecil encountered resistance. Part of the problem derived from the pressures of the war. In March 1918, just as Phillimore and his colleagues submitted their 'Initial Report', the Germans had embarked on a massive offensive in France. Transferring troops to the West had begun during the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations and seeking a knock-out blow against the British and French before American forces could reach France, this offensive began to drive the Allied armies back across France. Finally, in July, just after Phillimore's 'Final Report' was completed, a decisive Allied counter-attack east of Paris on the Marne River broke the German assault. Over-stretched, it reserves dwindling, and facing fierce opposition, the German Army began a fighting retreat back towards the German frontier. Lloyd George's government had to concentrate on the war effort. Such concerns not only emanated from the Cabinet Room. In mid-May, for instance, a House of Lords debate on the League was postponed temporarily, not by a government peer, but by Lord Parmoor, a staunch League supporter and pacifist, who argued that 'it was not appropriate to discuss the matter while the German offensive was proceeding'.[13] When the Lords finally discussed the question six weeks later, Lord Curzon, a former Indian viceroy and a Cabinet minister, provided only tepid support. His public stance brought immediate castigation from Lord Craigmyle, at that moment the president of the League of Nations Society, who pointedly asserted that Lloyd George's government lagged far behind British public opinion and its American ally in supporting the League.[14] Craigmyle's comments were partly correct and partly wrong. Truth lay in the assertion that domestic opinion had progressed further than the government – or, at least publicly, as the labours of the Phillimore Committee remained secret. However, the American government had yet to formulate specific proposals for a League 'Covenant' – Wilson's rhetoric and his 'Fourteen Points' speech suggested something else. Here lay Cecil's dilemma. On 15 May, he garnered War Cabinet approval for sending Phillimore's 'Initial Report' to Wilson.[15] Colonel Edward House, Wilson's foreign policy advisor, responded only with general remarks about the need for compulsory arbitration and a post-war territorial guarantee suffused by international 'moral' precepts.[16] As public interest groups in Britain stepped up their campaign to force the government to act and disturbed by House's inability to go beyond mouthing platitudes, Cecil finally asked the War Cabinet to publish the Phillimore 'Final Report'.[17] This was the meeting in which he disclosed fear about 'faddist schemes' drowning efforts to produce practi-

---

13 CC 7(412), 15 May 1918, CAB 23/6.
14 T. Shaw, first Baron Craigmyle [League of Nations Society], The League of Nations: speech... House of Lords, June 26th, 1918 (1918).
15 CC 7(412), 15 May 1918, CAB 23/6.
16 House to Cecil, 24 June 1918, CAB 24/59.
17 The rest of this paragraph is based on CC 8(457), 13 August 1918, CAB 23/7.

cal policy. Wilson proved the stumbling block. Lord Reading, the new British ambassador at Washington who had just returned from Washington, also attended this Cabinet. He stressed that the president 'was very anxious that nothing should be published here which might commit the Government until he had submitted his own views to them'. Lloyd George then settled the issue for the moment: publication would not occur. Accepting Wilson's concerns, he added that the Imperial War Cabinet needed to consider the matter – this body had been set up in 1917 to allow dominion leaders to advice on war policy. He also stressed that 'the end of the war was a long way off and Germany was nowhere near accepting tolerable terms.'

For Cecil and League advocates within the government, frustration with the impasse was clear. Yet politics, and foreign policy, in particular, is the mastery of the likely. Far from abating, League advocacy by public interest groups was rising. With Wilson's public stance and the commitments made by him and Lloyd George the preceding January, a post-war League had become a matter of policy. Translating public support by the politicians into practical politics, and ensuring that the League could function effectively, had become an issue of *when* it would happen, not *if*. But ensuring that the eventual League could function effectively in preserving peace – its final shape and powers, especially the ability to enforce its decisions – seemed to await the eventual peace conference. The war had spawned the League ideal; the return to peace would give it tangible form.

Indeed, in December 1918, following a general election that sustained the Lloyd George government in power and in which voter support for the League ideal proved important, Smuts wrote what he called a '*practical suggestion*' to show both the new government and the British and Imperial public that the League could provide the basis of sustained peace. Carefully and compellingly, he followed Wilson – and Cecil – in arguing that continuing the wartime alliance in the guise of the League would not sustain peace. Going beyond the still unpublished Phillimore Report, Smuts proposed a bicameral permanent organization with a permanent Secretariat. A council of heads of government and foreign ministers could serve as the guiding force for ensuring security, fostering disarmament, and developing international jurisprudence; a general conference of all League members would convene to discuss issues deriving from council deliberations. Significantly, he argued for permitting medium and small Powers into the League, and a few at a time on a rotating basis on advisory panels to the council, the locus of League authority. Although the Great Powers would have permanent council seats, thereby, dominating its decisions, lesser Powers would not be excluded from important decisions. On the vexing matter of voting procedure, Smuts rejected unanimity: a bloc of three votes could preclude Council action. On the most crucial point, he conformed to Phillimore proposals. Economic and political sanctions would be indispensable in implementing Council decisions against transgressors of peace. Sanctions vis-a-vis League members running afoul of the Council would be automatic; those against non-League members would be more flexible. Nevertheless, for Smuts, an effective League remained the sine qua non for post-war peace and security. The Powers needed to translate the rhetoric of their leaders and the demands of their public opinions into constructive policy.[18]

---

18   By this time, British pro-League public interest groups were trying to build ties to their American counterparts;

The Imperial War Cabinet discussed the 'Cecil plan' and Smut's *practical suggestion* on Christmas Eve, just days before Wilson's scheduled arrival in London.[19] In these deliberations, despite criticism that devolved from some ministers that looked to an alliance with France to maintain post-war security and others that reckoned that Britain should isolate itself within the Empire to protect better its interests, Lloyd George and his colleagues accepted as British policy the League of Nations as a permanent bi-cameral organization with powers to confront ay transgressor of peace with the combined economic and military resources of its membership. In meetings with Lloyd George and other British leaders after his arrival in London, Wilson accepted the vision of the post-war organisation visualised by Phillimore and Smuts – the moreso as Wilson had not formulated any specific American policies.

Thus, the League of Nations was created by the Allied victors of the Great War at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919; in the League Commission, the Conference sub-committee that devised the Covenant, the League constitution, the problems of the shape of the organization and its powers were finally resolved. League advocates like Cecil were happy to allow Wilson to take credit for the creation of the League,[20] the better to get general Allied support for their labours outside the Commission. This strategy proved difficult. A Democrat, Wilson failed to include any Republican politicians in the American Delegation to the Peace Conference, with the result that partisan politics in the United States jeopardised American membership in the organization. His negotiation style revealed a trying and stubborn colleague, something that disaffected even his supposed ally, Cecil, in the League Commission. Lastly, the Allies decided to handle the German settlement first. In the over-all negotiations at Paris – negotiations amongst the former Allies as the Germans were kept away until being presented with the Treaty of Versailles – a range of issues touching territorial transfers, reparations, and disarmament affirmed Crowe's 1916 observations about 'the fundamental problem' of the balance of power.[21] Wilson found his ideals confronting the realpolitik of the Great and lesser Powers, including Britain, to protect and extend their narrow national interests. In this twisted diplomacy, Wilson's cachet as the apostle of 'new' diplomacy began to dissipate amongst his supporters in the victorious and defeated Powers. Hard bargaining is the essence of conference diplomacy; at Paris, such bargaining produced a series of compromises and political agreements that often reflected more 'old' diplomacy's concentration on narrow national interests than Wilson's broad internationalism. Hence, the League was created

see the H.G. Wells (Chairman), H. Wickham Steed, Viscount Grey, Gilbert Murray, Lionel Curtis, J.A. Spender, W. Archer (Secretary), A.E. Zimmern, Viscount Bryce [for the League of Free Nations Association] to the Editor, Atlantic Monthly, Volume 123, No. 1(January 1919), 106–115. Cf. Bennett, Independence and Sovereignty; P.H. Gibbs [League of Free Nations Association], A League of Nations or Anarchy: The aspiration born on the battlefields that looks to statesmen for something better than war (Boston, MA, 1919) League of Free Nations Association, The Problems of a League of Nations (1918?).

19 Except where noted, the next two paragraphs are based on Imperial War Cabinet (46), 24 December 1918, CAB 23/42.

20 As early as October 1917, Cecil referred to 'Wilson's League of Nations'; see Cecil to Spring Rice, 29 October 1917, FO 800/242.

21 XX On the Peace Conference, see M.L. Dockrill and J.D. Goold, Peace Without Promise; Sharp, Berkeley book, new Dockrill, and some in French and German.

within the clash of these competing national interests, becoming enmeshed in Versailles and the other peace treaties as the means to preserve the newly-fashioned post-war order. It amounted to a struggle between idealism and realism.

Nonetheless, within the League Commission, dominated politically by Wilson and Cecil and following the blueprint drafted by Phillimore and Smuts, the shape and function of the League came into being. Because of the demands of public opinion in Britain, the English-speaking British dominions, the United States, and continental Europe, its Covenant was the first piece of diplomatic business concluded by the delegations – by mid-February – and through Wilson's lobbying, it was to be included as the preamble to Treaty of Versailles. Once each victorious Power signed the treaty, it would automatically become a member of the international organization. Such a ploy by Wilson was both a strength and a weakness for the new organization. On one hand, every ratified treaty would widen League membership; on the other, any failure to ratify would diminish its potential effectiveness. It came to pass that because of domestic Republican opposition in the United States to the Covenant, the Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles and American membership in the League. But it was not just isolationist Senators who disapproved a United States role in this new international body, Wilson's supporters joined them. Fostered by the British, a compromise was proposed in March 1920 allowing for American reservations towards the Covenant when enforcing the Monroe doctrine. Stubborn to the end, Wilson ordered his supporters in the Senate to vote against a modified Covenant. Despite the United States government having long advocated a post-war diplomatic mechanism to maintain peace and security, the new League of Nations that held its first sessions in the Autumn of 1920 lacked American membership.

The failure of the Wilson Administration to secure ratification of Versailles set in train a debate within the British government over whether Britain should withdraw from the League. Quickly, however, because of the support for the League amongst the public and via massive pro-League public opinion groups, it proved impossible for the Cabinet to countenance secession. Along with emerging academic critiques that the Great War had been caused by secret diplomacy, militarism, and entrenched elites in all belligerent Powers, general opinion in Britain demanded adherence to the precepts of Wilson's 'new diplomacy'. Publicly, Lloyd George and his ministers continued to express British support for the League and its work; within the confines of government, however, the Cabinet and its chief foreign policy advisors, primarily Crowe, who was now permanent under-secretary of the Foreign Office, began to formulate particular policies that whilst they genuflected to the Covenant, were more concerned with protecting and extending British national interests. For instance, at the Washington naval conference of 1921–1922, Lloyd George's government made much about disarmament – a League goal; but at Washington, the British gave up nothing substantial and, in fact, saw the Royal Navy strengthened in the most important warship – cruisers – over its American and Japanese adversaries. It was the same in areas where the League involved itself after 1919 in meeting crises caused by border quarrels and other territorial adjustments in post-war Europe like the Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden. If British interests were not affected, Britain would support League efforts at resolution. But should those interests be imperilled in any way, Britain would pursue diplomatic strategies in isolation of

the organization. By October 1922, when the Lloyd George government fell from power, British government attitudes towards the League of Nations were set: the League had become a tool of British foreign policy not its diplomatic panacea.

The course of British League policy from 1917 to 1922 says much about the origins, development, and execution of war aims – the military and political expression of exiting conflict. First, it is axiomatic that war aims tend to evolve during the course of a war and are subject to a range of political and other pressures that change their shape. British League policy is a case in point – Cecil and Crowe talked about an ad hoc mechanism that would meet only in moments of crisis; this notion was confirmed by the Phillimore Committee; but then, powerful political impetus – from Smuts and the Cabinet – under pressure from public opinion saw the development of the concept of a permanent organization, with a permanent headquarters and administration, always in session. Another issue, especially in western Europe and North America in the aftermath of the Great War, has been the power of public opinion in shaping war aims and, just as important, the tangible expression of those aims in the aftermath of war. No doubt the advent of influential public opinion organizations in Britain and the United States endorsed Wilson's concept of the League; and in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, it saw the inclusion of the League as a defined war aim in both Lloyd George's and Wilson's January 1918 speeches. Moreover, the growing support for a post-war diplomatic mechanism to promote peace and security led to the Smuts Plan for a permanent organization, and it also forced the Lloyd George government to continue British membership in the organization after the American failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. In an age of mass democracy – a democracy the bloodletting between 1914 and 1918 unleashed – war aims cannot be pursued without public support – and to try to neglect what the majority of that opinion beholds as important is impossible. Governments might later seek ways to minimise the political and strategic impact of such aims, but they cannot obviate them without running afoul of those who put them in office. Existing war militarily is, of course, a difficult and dangerous enterprise; but ensuring why a Power fights and for what ends it is doing so is equally difficult. And as British League policy after 1917 demonstrates, the political dimension of exiting war can stretch well into the post-war period.

RESUMÉ

Brian McKercher: Povojnová bezpečnosť, Liga národov a britská zahraničná politika 1917 – 1922

Britská zahraničná politika v rokoch 1917 – 1922 vychádzala z príčin, rozvoja a realizácie, ako aj naplnenia vojnových cieľov – vojenských a politických požiadaviek na konci prvej svetovej vojny. Vojnové ciele sa v jej v priebehu Veľkej vojny modifilovali a boli predmetom rozsiahlych politických a iných tlakov. Ligu, ktorá je témou príspevku, považovali tvorcovia jej koncepcie (lord Robert Cecil – štátny podsekretár na mimisterstve zahraničných vecí a Eyre Crowe) za dočasný mechanizmus fungujúci v čase krízy (vojnového konfliktu). Tento pohľad potvrdil Phillimorský výbor. Neskôr vplyvom politického impulzu zo strany generála Jana Smutsa (vtedajší juhoafrický minister zahraničných vecí), ktorý bol členom britského vojnového Kabinetu, ako aj pod tlakom verejnej mienky, sa koncepcia Ligy črtala v podobe stálej organizácie so stálym vedením a administratívou s pevným programom. Nezanedbateľný vplyv mala, osobit-

ne v západnej Európe a severnej Amerike, sila verejnej mienky v pohľade na vojnové ciele ako dôsledok Veľkej vojny. Bezpochyby mienka politických a spoločenských organizácií vo Veľkej Británii a Spojených štátoch poznamenala koncepciu Ligy, ktorú predostrel americký prezident T. Wodroow Wilson. V dôsledku ruskej revolúcie roku 1917 bola spracovaná definícia vojnového cieľa na základe vystúpenia predsedu britskej vlády Davida Lloyda Georgea a Wilsona v januári 1918. Okrem toho, vzrast podpory povojnového diplomatického mechanizmu napomáhať mieru a bezpečnosti v Európe a vo svete viedol generála Smutsa k myšlienke vytvoriť stálu bezpečnostnú organizáciu národov. Taktiež vyvinul tlak na vládu Lloyda Georgea, aby Briti naďalej ostali členmi organizácie po americkom neúspechu ratifikovať Versailleskú mierovú zmluvu. V rokoch „ľudovej demokracie" (v 20. rokoch 20. storočia) sa názor na vojnové ciele nemohol zaobísť bez rešpektovania, resp. podpory verejnej mienky. Koniec vojny je, z hľadiska vojenského, pravdaže ťažký. Politické dimenzie konca vojny sa premietli pri mierových rokovaniach a následnom povojnovom usporiadaní Európy a sveta.

Структура и основные направления деятельности Советской военной администрации в Германии после Второй мировой войны, 1945–1949 гг.

**Полковник Михаил Лёшин
(Col. Mikhail Lyoshin)**

Вскоре после победоносного завершения Второй мировой войны, 5 июня 1945 г. ведущие державы антигитлеровской коалиции – СССР, Великобритания, США и Франция – в Декларации о поражении Германии провозгласили, что в условиях отсутствия в Германии центрального правительства или власти, способной взять на себя ответственность за сохранение порядка, управление страной и за выполнение требований вышеуказанных четырех держав-победительниц, правительства последних берут на себя верховую власть в Германии, включая всю власть, которой располагают германское правительство, верховное командование и любое областное, муниципальное или местное правительство или власть.

В этом же документе объявлялось, что Германии вскоре будут предъявлены дополнительные политические, административные, экономические, финансовые, военные и другие требования, оформленные в виде прокламаций, приказов, распоряжений и инструкций должным образом назначенных лиц или органов.

Руководствуясь вышеуказанной декларацией, Совет народных комиссаров (СНК) СССР уже на следующий день утвердил Положение о Советской военной администрации в Германии (СВАГ). В качестве ее главных задач были названы осуществление контроля за выполнением Германией условий безоговорочной капитуляции, управление советской зоной оккупации в Германии и проведение в

жизнь согласованных решений Контрольного совета по главным военным, политическим, экономическим и другим вопросам, общим для всей Германии.

Возглавил СВАГ в качестве главноначальствующего главнокомандующий Группой советских оккупационных войск в Германии (ГСОВГ) маршал Советского Союза Г.К.Жуков. После его отзыва в Москву в марте 1946 г. главноначальствующим стал его первый заместитель генерал армии В.Д.Соколовский, которого в марте 1949 г. сменил генерал армии В.И.Чуйков. Местом пребывания СВАГ был определен город Берлин. Советская зона оккупации охватывала площадь в 107,5 тыс. квадратных километров с населением около 18,5 млн человек. Советский сектор Берлина включал в себя 8 из 20 районов города (45,3 % площади города), где проживало около 1,2 млн человек.

В своем приказе № 1 от 9 июня 1945 г. Г.К.Жуков объявил об образовании СВАГ и назначении своих ближайших помощников. В руководство администрации, помимо главноначальствующего, вошли заместители, политический советник, помощники по военно-морским, военно-воздушным делам и экономическим вопросам, начальник штаба.

Первый заместитель главноначальствующего замещал его по всем вопросам и отвечал за разоружение и роспуск всех германских вооруженных сил, ликвидацию германского генерального штаба, военных школ, изъятие военного имущества и архивов, а также другие вопросы, касающиеся полной демилитаризации Германии. Он руководил работой следующих отделов: военного отдела, военно-морского отдела, военно-воздушного отдела, отдела по репатриации.

Заместитель главноначальствующего по делам гражданской администрации осуществлял руководство и контроль за деятельностью органов немецкой администрации в советской зоне оккупации. Он руководил работой управления комендантской службы, отдела внутренних дел, отдела связи, отдела здравоохранения.

Помощник главноначальствующего по экономическим вопросам ведал вопросами экономического разоружения Германии и использования германской экономики для возмещения ущерба, нанесенного Германией Советскому Союзу. Он осуществлял ликвидацию или контроль за германской промышленностью, которая использовалась для военного производства, а также руководство и контроль за работой германской промышленности и сельского хозяйства для удовлетворения нужд немецкого населения и занимался вопросами внутренней и внешней торговли, продовольствия, финансов, транспорта, топлива, рабочей силы. Он руководил работой следующих отделов: промышленного отдела, сельскохозяйственного отдела, отдела торговли и снабжения, транспортного отдела, топливного отдела, финансового отдела, отдела по репарациям и поставкам и отдела рабочей силы.

При главноначальствующем в качестве политического советника состоял политический советник при главнокомандующем ГСОВГ. На него возлагалась обязанность представления главноначальствующему предложений и заключений по всем вопросам политического характера, в том числе по всем внешнеполитическим вопросам, а также представление по согласованию с главнокомандующим

советскому правительству информации о положении в Германии и своих предложений по всем вопросам, относящимся к компетенции СВАГ. Политический советник осуществлял общее руководство работой политического отдела, отдела народного образования и правового отдела.

Начальники отделов СВАГ назначались СНК СССР. Они осуществляли руководство и контроль за деятельностью соответствующих германских административных органов и учреждений.

Приказом главноначальствующего № 5 от 9 июля 1945 г. были созданы Советские военные администрации (СВА) земель Мекленбург, Саксония, Тюрингия и провинций Бранденбург и Саксония (с 1946 г. – Саксония-Ангальт).

Связь с германскими центральными учреждениями и должностными лицами советской зоны оккупации осуществлялась главноначальствующим, его заместителями, политическим советником или другими представителями главноначальствующего по его уполномочию, а в провинциях и районах – уполномоченными главноначальствующего. Для урегулирования вопросов, касающихся Германии в целом, на основании Соглашения о контрольном механизме в Германии от 14 ноября 1944 г. и дополнения к нему от 1 мая 1945 г. был создан Союзный контрольный совет (СКС), состоявший из главнокомандующих оккупационными войсками четырех держав в Германии, и союзническая военная комендатура Большого Берлина.

Одной из главных целей правительств четырех держав в Германии была ее демилитаризация. В 1945–1948 гг. СКС подготовил и одобрил около двадцати законов, приказов и директив по тем или иным вопросам, связанным с демилитаризацией Германии. В декабре 1945 г. был утвержден календарный план выполнения решений Потсдамского соглашения по ее разоружению и демилитаризации. В рамках выполнения этого плана СВАГ провела большую работу, в результате которой в советской зоне оккупации у немцев были изъяты самолеты всех типов, все военно-морские суда, все оружие, боеприпасы, взрывчатые вещества, военное оборудование, другие орудия войны и все остальные военные материалы; преданы суду нацистские военные преступники; установлен контроль за потенциально опасными лицами из числа бывших военнослужащих вермахта и ограничена их деятельность; закрыты все военно-учебные заведения; распущены все полувоенные организации и организации ветеранов войны; ликвидированы немецкие военные памятники и музеи; введен запрет для немцев на производство, экспорт, импорт, перевозки и хранение военных материалов, ношение военной формы, знаков различия, употребление военных приветствий, выдачу военных наград; проведено разминирование и уничтожение фортификаций, подземных сооружений и военных построек.

Важнейшим условием выполнения задач советской оккупационной политики в Германии было оживление деятельности немецких политических партий и общественных объединений. Поэтому уже на следующий день после создания СВАГ приказом № 2 главноначальствующий разрешил в советской зоне деятельность всех партий и организаций, „ставящих своей целью окончательное искоренение остатков фашизма и укрепление начал демократизма и гражданских свобод в Гер-

мании". На первом этапе это разрешение коснулось Коммунистической партии Германии (КПГ), Социал-демократической партии Германии (СДПГ), Христианско-демократического союза (ХДС) и Либерально-демократической партии Германии (ЛДПГ). В 1948 г. были также созданы Национально-демократическая партия (НДП) и Демократическая крестьянская партия (ДКП). Среди общественных организаций наиболее активную роль в экономической сфере играли Союз свободных немецких профсоюзов (ССНП) и Объединение крестьянской взаимопомощи, в политической – молодежная и женская организации и Культурбунд.

Параллельно в городах и селах Восточной Германии возникали новые органы самоуправления, которые все активнее брали в свои руки дело экономического восстановления и нормализации жизни страны. По мере того как они все более успешно справлялись с возложенными на них обязанностями, советские оккупационные органы передавали им все больше полномочий. Еще в июле 1945 г. СВАГ утвердила президиумы земельных и провинциальных управлений в Саксонии, Тюрингии, Мекленбурге, Саксонии-Ангальт и Бранденбурге, в состав которых вошли представители всех политических партий. Как верховные органы самоуправления немецкого народа, управления земель и провинций уже вскоре, 22 октября 1945 г., получили от Советской военной администрации право издавать законы, а также распоряжения, имеющие силу закона (приказ № 110 главноначальствующего СВАГ).

Осенью 1946 г. в Восточной Германии состоялись выборы в земельные (ландтаги), районные (крайстаги) и общинные представительства. После выборов были разработаны и приняты конституции земель, а также созданы правительства земель. В этот период СВАГ со своей стороны координировала деятельность правительств земель и принимала меры, необходимые в связи с выполнением постановлений Контрольного совета.

По инициативе президиумов управлений земель и провинций, поддержанной советской администрацией, с осени 1945 г. в Восточной Германии стала проводиться земельная реформа, которая предусматривала конфискацию земель всех крупных землевладельцев, имевших более 100 га земли, а также военных преступников, и активных сторонников нацистского режима. Конфискованная земля, составлявшая около одной трети всей полезной сельскохозяйственной площади Восточной Германии, была распределена преимущественно среди батраков, малоземельных крестьян и переселенцев. В результате земельной реформы более 330 тыс. батраков, малоземельных крестьян и переселенцев получили свыше 2 млн. га земли. От земельной реформы выиграли также и средние слои деревни, получившие дополнительные лесные наделы и освободившиеся от долговых обязательств. Советская военная администрация также содействовала развитию новых крестьянских хозяйств, предоставляя им семена, удобрения, строительные материалы и т.п.

В июле и августе 1946 г. по итогам состоявшегося в Саксонии референдума органы самоуправления земель и провинций Восточной Германии издали законы об экспроприации и передаче в руки государства предприятий, являвшихся ранее собственностью нацистской партии, военных преступников и нацистов, запре-

щенных обществ и организаций. В результате этих преобразований ключевые позиции в промышленности занял государственный сектор. В январе 1947 г. СВАГ приняла ряд важных мер, нацеленных на стабилизацию ситуации в экономике, среди них были сокращение демонтажа и репарационных поставок, передача немцам 74 предприятий советских акционерных обществ, отмена продовольственных карточек шестой нормы и другие. К середине 1947 г. в советской зоне уже были созданы условия для организации центрального управления экономикой. Эти задачи были возложены на Немецкую экономическую комиссию (НЭК). Согласно приказу № 32 главноначальствующего СВАГ от 12 февраля 1948 г., комиссия наделялась законодательными полномочиями (до того времени осуществляемыми только советской администрацией), которые были обязательны для всех немецких органов советской зоны. Вместе с тем, ряд вопросов экономического характера, например, в области финансов, централизованного снабжения населения, установления единых цен и т.д., продолжал оставаться исключительно в компетенции СВАГ.

Важную роль в процессе устранения остатков нацизма в Германии играла денацификация. К январю 1947 г. в советской зоне оккупации действовали 262 комиссии по денацификации, в которых было занято 1512 человек. Всего с 1945 по апрель 1948 г. из различных органов власти, учреждений и предприятий было уволено 520 тыс. бывших нацистов. На 1 января 1947 г. было интернировано 65 138 бывших служащих СС, гестапо, службы безопасности СС, лиц руководящего состава нацистской партии, из них 17 866 человек привлечено к уголовной ответственности и 17 175 – осуждены на различные сроки тюремного заключения. С августа 1947 г. дела по денацификации стали рассматриваться не советскими военными трибуналами, а немецкими судами. В марте 1948 г. комиссии по денацификации были распущены (приказ главноначальствующего № 35 от 26 февраля 1948 г.), а ведение дел на бывших нацистов и военных преступников передано немецкой уголовной полиции и немецким судам.

Несмотря на то, что СВАГ в течение четырех лет выполняла свои задачи в чрезвычайно сложных и многоплановых условиях: не имея опыта подобной деятельности; на территории, разоренной войной, с населением, недоверчиво относящимся к советским войскам, ей удалось воплотить в жизнь многое из совместной программы держав-победительниц в отношении капитулировавшей Германии, демилитаризовать и денацифицировать советскую зону оккупации, организовать и осуществить подъем из руин ее городов и предприятий, восстановить сельское хозяйство, провести демократические преобразования жизни местного населения, судебную, школьную и другие реформы. 10 октября 1949 г., через три дня после образования Германской Демократической Республики, главноначальствующий СВАГ генерал армии В.И.Чуйков по поручению правительства СССР передал временному правительству ГДР функции управления, которые были до этого момента в ведении СВАГ. Вместо последней постановлением Совета Министров СССР от 5 ноября 1949 г. была создана Советская контрольная комиссия, которая должна была обеспечить контроль за выполнением Потсдамских и других совместных решений четырех держав в отношении Германии. Ее председательству-

ющим стал бывший главноначальствующий СВАГ. Окончательно оккупационные функции советских войск в Германии были упразднены в 1954 г. В августе 1954 г. советское правительство заявило, что оно считает утратившим силу все принятые СВАГ и СКК в период с 1945 по 1953 г. приказы и директивы.

RESUMÉ

Mikhail G. Lyoshin: Štruktúra a základné smery pôsobenia Sovietskej vojenskej správy v Nemecku po druhej svetovej vojne 1945 – 1949

Po ukončení druhej svetovej vojny v Európe – ZSSR, Veľká Británia, USA a Francúzsko, vodcovské štáty protihitlerovskej koalície – v Deklarácii k porážke Nemecka vyhlásili, že ich vlády preberajú zvrchovanú moc v Nemecku. Na základe deklarácie Rada ľudových komisárov ZSSR 6. júna 1945 ratifikovala Pravidlá sovietskej vojenskej správy v Nemecku. Medzi hlavné úlohy patrila kontrola plnenia podmienok bezpodmienečnej kapitulácie Nemecka, riadenie sovietskej okupačnej zóny v Nemecku a uskutočňovanie rozhodnutí kontrolnej rady ohľadom hlavných vojenských, politických, hospodárskych a iných otázok, spoločných pre celé Nemecko.

Hlavný veliteľ skupiny sovietskych okupačných vojsk v Nemecku maršal Sovietskeho zväzu G. K. Žukov bol na čele sovietskej vojenskej správy v Nemecku. V rozkaze č. 1 z 9. júna 1945 G. K. Žukov vyhlásil zriadenie sovietskej vojenskej správy v Nemecku a povinnosti svojich bezprostredných zástupcov. Štáb správy okrem hlavného veliteľa a jeho zástupcov tvoril politický poradca, asistenti pre vojenské, námorné a letecké záležitosti a hospodárske otázky a náčelník štábu.

Hlavnou podmienkou realizácie úloh sovietskej okupačnej politiky v Nemecku bolo oživenie pôsobenia nemeckých politických strán a verejných asociácií. Preto na druhý deň po vytvorení správy rozkazom č. 2 hlavný veliteľ rozhodol o pôsobení všetkých strán a organizácií v sovietskej zóne, „zameraných na konečné vyhubenie zvyškov nacizmu a posilnenie začiatkov demokratizmu a občianskych slobôd v Nemecku". Súčasne sa v mestách a dedinách Východného Nemecka zakladali nové inštitúcie samosprávy, ktoré aktívnejšie zobrali do svojich rúk všetky problémy hospodárskej obnovy a normalizácie života v krajine. Pretože všetky inštitúcie úspešne zvládali uložené povinnosti, sovietske okupačné orgány na ne presúvali stále viac právomocí. Na jeseň roku 1946 sa vo Východnom Nemecku konali voľby do všetkých zastupiteľských orgánov samosprávy. Po voľbách sa pracovalo na základných ústavných zákonoch a formovali sa základné vlády. Počas tohto obdobia vojenská správa koordinovala pôsobenie základných vlád a prijímala potrebné opatrenia v súvislosti s realizáciou rozhodnutí kontrolnej rady.

Počas 4 rokov vojenská správa plnila úlohy v mimoriadne zložitých a mnohostranných podmienkach: nemajúc skúsenosti s podobným pôsobením na území zničenom vojnou, s obyvateľstvom podozrievavým voči sovietskym vojskám. Napriek tomu sa podarilo uskutočniť veľa zo spoločného programu víťazných mocností vo vzťahu ku kapitulujúcemu Nemecku, demilitarizovať a denacifikovať sovietsku okupačnú zónu, zorganizovať a dosiahnuť oživenie v zničených mestách a podnikoch, obnoviť poľnohospodárstvo, uskutočniť demokratickú transformáciu života miestneho obyvateľstva, zaviesť súdne, školské a iné reformy.

10. októbra 1949, tri dni po vytvorení Nemeckej demokratickej republiky, hlavný veliteľ sovietskej vojenskej správy generál V. I. Chujkov v mene vlády ZSSR presunul na dočasnú vládu NDR funkcie vlády, ktoré dovtedy vykonávala sovietska správa. Namiesto toho bola rozhodnutím Rady ministrov ZSSR z 5. novembra 1949 vytvorená sovietska kontrolná komisia, ktorá mala zabezpečovať kontrolu nad uplatňovaním Postupimskej dohody a iných spoločných rozhodnutí 4 mocností ohľadom Nemecka. Jej predsedom sa stal bývalý hlavný veliteľ sovietskej vojenskej správy. Nakoniec v roku 1954 boli okupačné funkcie soviet-

skych vojsk v Nemecku zrušené. V auguste 1954 sovietska vláda vyhlásila všetky rozkazy a pokyny prijaté vojenskou správou a sovietskou kontrolnou komisiou počas obdobia rokov 1945 až 1953 za zrušené.

SUMMARY

Mikhail G. Lyoshin: Structure and the Basic Directions of Activity of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany after the Second World War, 1945–1949

After the end of the Second World War in Europe – the USSR, Great Britain, the USA and France, leaders of the Antihitlerite coalition, – in the Declaration on defeat of Germany proclaimed, that their governments would take the Supreme authority in Germany. Being guided by the Declaration, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on June 6, 1945 ratified the Regulations of the Soviet military administration in Germany. As its main tasks were named the control of fulfillment by Germany the terms of unconditional surrender, the management of the soviet zone of occupation in Germany and the execution of the decisions of the Control council on main military, political, economic and other questions, the common for all Germany.

The commander-in-chief Group of the Soviet occupational troops in Germany marshal of the Soviet Union G.K.Zhukov headed the Soviet military administration in Germany. In the order № 1 of June 9, 1945 G.K.Zhukov has declared formation of the Soviet military administration in Germany and duties of his nearest deputies. The staff of the administration, besides commander-in-chief and his deputies included political adviser, assistants on military, naval and air affairs and economic questions, the chief of staff. The major condition of realization of the tasks of the Soviet occupational policy in Germany was revival of activity of German political parties and public associations. Therefore the next day after creation of the administration by the order № 2 the commander-in-chief has resolved in the Soviet zone the activity of all parties and organizations, „aimed at the final eradication of the rests of nazism and strengthening the beginnings of democratism and civil freedom in Germany".

At the same time in towns and villages of the East Germany there were organized new institutions of self-government, which took all problems of economic restoration and normalization of life of the country in their hands more actively. As all of them coped more successfully with the duties assigned to them, the Soviet occupation organs transferred them more and more powers. In the autumn of 1946 the elections took place in the East Germany in all representatives bodies of self-government. After the elections the constitutions of the grounds were worked out, and also the governments of the grounds were created. During this period the military administration coordinated the activity of the governments of the grounds and also took the measures necessary in connection with realization of decisions of the Control council.

Within four years the military administration was carrying out the tasks in extremely complicated and multiplanned conditions: not having the experience of similar activity, in the territory ruined by war, with the population mistrustfully regarding the Soviet troops. Despite of that, it managed to realize much of the joint program of the victorious powers in relation to the capitulating Germany, to demilitarize and denazify the Soviet zone of occupation, to organize and carry out a rise from ruins of its cities and enterprises, to bring about a rise in agriculture, to carry out democratic transformations of life of local population, to conduct judicial, school and other reforms.

On October 10, 1949, in three days after formation of the German Democratic Republic, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet military administration general V.I.Chujkov on behalf of the government of the USSR transferred to the provisional government of GDR the functions of government which were till that moment conducted by the Soviet administration. Instead of it by the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of November 5, 1949 the Soviet Control commission was created, which had to provide the control over implementation of the Potsdam and other joint decisions of the four Powers concerning Ger-

many. The former commander-in-chief of the Soviet military administration became its chairmen. Finally the occupational functions of the Soviet troops in Germany were abolished in 1954. In August 1954 the Soviet government declared all taken by the military administration and the Soviet Control commission orders and instructions during the period from 1945 to 1953 be abolished.

panel 7:

Post Conflict Issues of the Cold War

Chair:
Lieutenant-colonel László Veszprémy, Hungary

The First Conversion Project of the Cold War.
The Hungarian Defence Industry in 1953–1955[1]

Dr. Pál Germuska

The Secretariat of the Hungarian Worker's Party (MDP) was busy working on the national economic plan for 1954 when the party leadership was rather unexpectedly summoned to Moscow in mid-June 1953. The delegation included, among others, Mátyás Rákosi (Chief Secretary of the party and Prime Minister), Ernő Gerő, Imre Nagy and István Hidas; all members of the Politburo and vice-Prime Ministers at the same time. At the negotiations, on 13–16 June, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), besides appointing Imre Nagy as the new Prime Minister, also demarcated the new direction of economic policy. The major elements of the new program consisted of the reduction of industrial and military investments, the dynamic development of agriculture and the prioritisation of the production of consumer goods.[2]

In Budapest, on the second working day of the new Parliament – which had been convened after the May 1953 general elections – Imre Nagy, the newly-appointed Prime Minister, presented the planned reform measurements of his government, which were in accordance with Moscow's intentions.

2   See in detail in Rainer (1996) 509–520. p.

THE PARTIAL CONVERSION OF THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY

Imre Nagy had the task of implementing considerable political and economic change. This was probably the first time that the leaders started to estimate how much the extensive military development of the Hungarian People's Army, which numbered 200,000 soldiers at the time, as well as its equipment and maintenance, cost Hungary. As one report among the files of the Chief Secretary, Mátyás Rákosi, shows, the expenses of the defence industry (i.e. the army, military industry, state security, the police, the building of a system of pillboxes at the southern border) had substantially increased between 1949 and 1953.[3] Of all expenditures, the Ministry of Defence's (HM) total expenditure in 1949 had been "only" 2 milliard Ft. It increased to 2.2 milliard in 1950, 4.4 milliard in 1951, 7.4 milliard in 1952, and almost 9 milliard in 1953; altogether a sum total of 25 milliard Ft. (In 1953 1 USD was valued at 11.74 Ft: 1 milliard Ft therefore, equalled 85.2 million USD.) In 1951–1953 the State Defence Authority has almost doubled its expenses and consumed at least 3.2 milliard Fts. A summary of the data shows that the overall expenses of the defence industry, including military investments and investments made with "military interests" in mind (such as transport and telecommunication), were close to reaching, or had actually reached, 25% of the annual national income between 1950 and 1952. The investments of the military industry between 1949 and 1951 rose 2.8 times from 393 million to 937 million Ft, and then stabilized at that level. They came to make up 5.6% of all investments of the national economy. It was only at the time of the New Course, that – as part of the modification of the economic plan for 1953 – military investments were reduced to 3.7% of total national investments.[4]

One of the first measurements of Imre Nagy and the new parliament was to pass Act No. 6 of 1953. This came into effect on 7 July and disbanded the major authority in the field of military industry: the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (KÖM), which had been founded barely a year and a half before.[5] The military industry was formally integrated into civil branches of the economy: labelled as section "B". It became incorporated into the Ministry of Metallurgy and Machine Industry (KGM), though its former structure was maintained within the new institutional framework. (This meant that section "A" and section "B" of the KGM both continued to have separate planning departments, personnel departments, and so on). On 27 July 1953, the new Prime Minister took over the presidency of the National Defence Council; the institution of key importance in military affairs. This council was made up of vice-Prime Ministers, the Minister for Home Affairs, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Metallurgy and Machine Industry and the chief of the general staff. On 10 August the National Defence Council de-

---

3   Magyar Országos Levéltár [Hungarian National Archive] (MOL) M-KS 276. f. 65. cs. 195. ő. e. 530. p.

4   MOL M-KS 276. f. 65. cs. 195. ő. e. 531. p.

5   The name is clearly the calque of the Russian Medzimashinoje Miniszterstvo (Minsredmash, MSM). It is strange, however, that in the Soviet Union the authority only managed the nuclear industry, and the production of atomic bombs (see details: http://www.iss.niiit.ru/book/iamhawk.htm), whereas in Hungary the entire military industry was called medium machine industry until the 1960s.

cided on the first major staff reduction in the Hungarian People's Army: the aim was to discharge almost 40.000 soldiers.[6]

The elaboration of the guidelines of the new economic policy, also known as the New Course, went slowly, however. Prime Minister Imre Nagy, who also directed the post-war land-distribution process as Minister of Agriculture, concentrated mainly on agricultural matters. In the second half of 1953 almost 50 governmental decrees were issued to alleviate the burdens on individual farmers and to revitalise the agricultural sector, but the problems of the costly heavy industry was rarely dealt with by the Cabinet. It was only in November 1953 that the National Defence Council set up a so-called Coordination Committee, which was supposed to facilitate the conversion of military industry into civil production. The committee's activity, however, was rather insignificant.[7]

Hesitation had grave consequences. Although the HM cancelled several orders after July 1953, production at the enterprises of the KGM/B remained almost uninterrupted until the end of the year. This is also testified to by the proportions of financial expenditure. According to a report prepared by the Corporate (Military) Department of the National Planning Bureau (OT) in February 1954,[8] the defence sector consumed 11.6 milliard out of the 13.9 milliard Ft that was allocated to it in 1953 (this was more than 18% of the country's annual budget, which was around 60 milliard Ft at the time).

It became apparent to the party leadership at the meeting of the MDP's Politburo on 17 February 1954[9] that, with regards to the conversion of military industry, not much had actually happened. Although the enterprises of the KGM that had been manufacturing military wares before, produced twice as many pots for the household in the second half of 1953, and 1.5 times more hoes and cogs than in the first half of the same year, they still failed to meet the planned targets for consumer commodities and for the generally neglected agricultural machine construction. The Politburo still remained vague, however, and all it did was to prescribe the development of a premium-system that was supposed to make factories more interested in constructing agricultural machines. The Politburo, moreover, insisted on complying with the planned estimates for metallurgical industry, even though the deepening crisis in the Hungarian economy was already being indicated by disruptions in the supply of energy, raw materials, and goods.

Months passed without any genuine step being taken to solve the problem. The OT sabotaged the conversion in its own way, through failing to designate clear-cut goals for economic policy. Furthermore, it also failed to specify the direction and the extent of the development of certain product-groups, such as pots or radios. For this reason, the defence plants started the production of a substantially lower amount of military articles at the beginning of 1954 and in order to absorb their production capacities for the second half of the year, they tried to develop a second – more civil – profile.[10] In this regard the companies were left almost completely alone, since the Central Planning Department

---

6   Thürmer (1981) 26. p.
7   MOL M-KS 276. f. 95. cs. 224. ő. e. 211–215. p.
8   MOL M-KS 276. f. 65. cs. 242. ő. e. 28. p.
9   MOL M-KS 276. f. 53. cs. 161. ő. e.
10   MOL M-KS 276. f. 95. cs. 224. ő. e. 101–103. p.

of the KGM/B[11] only attempted to come up with proposals on this matter in June 1954. Even those proposals contained nothing more than a list of the suggested individual profiles for each company.

In the meantime, there was immense disorder in the military factories, which had been triggered by the confusing effects of the often contradictory central directives. The defence plants that had a straightforward disposition to mass production before had to change their profile overnight and they started manufacturing various products, ranging from herbicides to locks and from ammunition to toys. The artificially controlled price system, which did not reflect the actual market conditions, also backfired and, in the case of certain merchandise, the producers' price even failed to cover the material costs. Complicating things even further, in 1954 the military industry was supposed to commence the construction of new, more up-to-date war equipment.[12] These factors were all responsible for the emergence of a situation that had been unknown in planned economy up to that point: frying-pans were produced by 10 companies, walking ploughs by 4, while window-fittings were manufactured in at least two dozen factories.[13] Apart from that, the problem of acquiring parts and raw materials for the production of those commodities that were suddenly being promoted had to be tackled as well. This was the case with the assembly of motorbikes, for example: instead of the 14.000 pieces that were made in 1954, more material was needed to construct the 45.000 that eventually came out of the factories in 1955. It should not come as a surprise that the enterprises under the authority of the KGM/B attempted to delay the beginning of the conversion and only wanted to execute "the old HM assignments". The change in the profile of war plants was also impeded by everyday difficulties, provoked by the abruptness of the transformation process. The Lamp Factory in Budapest, for example, that had mostly been producing small arms before 1953, never received the sample-piece of the sewing machine that was supposed to manufacture after the change.[14]

Besides all that, the sector suffered its first major loss when the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, at its meeting of 20 July 1954, reduced the annual investment budget by 20%.[15] The Politburo of the MDP, however, did not get further than appointing a separate committee on 21 July to work out the details of the conversion of military industry. It took 3 months for that committee, headed by KGM Minister János Csergő, to prepare its summary report[16], which suggested modifications in the economic plan of the KGM for 1955 and proposed that only 7% of the entire production should be military related as opposed to the 13% in 1954. More radically, the KGM aspired in 1955 to double the value of those civil products that were meant to be manufactured for domestic trade (from 1.9 milliard to 3.8 milliard Ft). This proposal, however, threatened to create serious problems, as it would have provoked an acute scarcity of raw materials, which the Ministry hoped to solve through the importation of goods.

---

11 MOL M-KS 276. f. 95. cs. 224. ő. e. 147–164. p.
12 MOL M-KS 276. f. 95. cs. 224. ő. e. 193–205. p.
13 MOL M-KS 276. f. 95. cs. 224. ő. e. 170–176. p.
14 MOL M-KS 276. f. 95. cs. 224. ő. e. 80–82. p.
15 Rainer (1999) 76. p.
16 MOL M-KS 276. f. 53. cs. 199. ő. e.

The balance of foreign trade was already problematic. Due to the decrease of Soviet raw material transports, Hungarian industry had to rely more on imports from the West: in 1955 all of Hungary's rubber and leather, 92% of her copper, 72% of her coke, 66% of her tin and 41% of her cotton came from capitalist states. Yet the shortage of special drills and measuring instruments – so crucial for the military industry – remained acute.[17]

In the autumn of 1954 it seemed for a short time that Imre Nagy, besides his success in high politics, would be able to achieve a major breakthrough with regard to the conversion of military industry. At the meeting of the Politburo on 15 September the Prime Minister announced that the old economic policy "should be struck to death" and that, in line with the program of June 1953, the industrial sector should be transformed and that this should accompany the maximisation of agricultural development.[18] After that, the Politburo at its meeting of 20 October[19] – besides dismissing several opponents of the New Course in the spirit of the October session of the Central Committee that marked Imre Nagy's momentary victory – discussed the Csergő-report and expressed its discontent with the slow pace of the conversion of military plants. Therefore, as a punishment, the Politburo recommended that the KGM's enterprises should achieve a 100% increase in the consumer goods production, instead of the 89% rise that had been prescribed earlier.

At the level of slogans and propaganda, the switch to the construction of consumer goods was a simple and praiseworthy matter. In practice, however, the process was hindered by numerous difficulties. The introduction of a compulsory civil profile was often not tailored to the individual companies' characteristics. Some of the factories, moreover, were compelled to produce goods that were rejected by other enterprises due to their lack of capacity or the potential for loss that the construction of such articles entailed. For example, the Precision Mechanics Company in Budapest was obliged to make aluminium spoons, though it specialised in the manufacturing of microwave precision instruments and radiolocators that were widely sought for on foreign markets. The Danuvia Machine-tool Factory that had been producing automatic machine-guns, light machine-guns and their spare parts before, started to construct toys, mouse- and rattraps, and was later refashioned to produce motorbikes. In the case of some factories, the specialised manufacturing equipment made it impossible to manufacture consumer goods. Thus, the capacity utilisation at such places usually oscillated between 35 and 60% (at the Copper Rolling Mills, in the Industrial Instruments Factory and so on). The situation was further complicated by the fact that the companies had to look for products and customers on their own to make up 30–40% of their capacity. Up to that point such a procedure had been unknown in planned economy, especially in the field of military industry.[20] The changes were not especially popular with factory-workers either. The Metal Processing Works in Veszprém, for example, had to dismiss 1500 employees. Whole in-

17   Borhi (2004) 286. p.
18   Rainer (1999) 83. p.
19   MOL M-KS 276. f. 53. cs. 199. ő. e.
20   MOL M-KS 276. f. 95. cs. 230. ő. e. 141–143. p.

dustrial units were left without work and even those who could keep their jobs had to endure a 50% reduction in their salaries (from 1200–1300 Ft to 600–700).[21]

The difficulties were increased by the fact that too much off-time, the replacement of equipment, the change of profile, the production of unmarketable articles, the high manufacturing costs (which were often more than the retail price), caused deficits for the factories at a time when "efficiency", "profitability", and "productivity" were the major categories in judging economic performance. No wonder, that in one quarter of a year, in 1954, the Lamp Factory accumulated a 1.6 million Ft debt, whereas the Aluminium Factory ended up with a 4 million Ft deficit.[22] Almost all consumer goods of the Danuvia Machine-tool Factory[23] (already mentioned above) showed a deficit: in the case of toy-rifles, due to the utilisation of reserved walnut gun-stocks there was a 17 Ft/piece deficit, whereas in the case of mousetraps, due to employment of first class quality springs, the debit was 0,25 Ft/piece. It might seem comic, but the only profitable products at what had previously been a war plant were dustpans.

ABOUT-TURN: THE MILITARY INDUSTRY FACING NEW TASKS

Shortly after Nagy's October victory new winds started to blow from Moscow. On 29 November Mátyás Rákosi returned from his lengthy holiday in the Soviet Union, where news about Imre Nagy's likely dismissal had already reached his ears. Being aware of that, Rákosi, at the meeting of the Politburo in early December 1954, outlined the new political guidelines to be adopted. In the first week of January 1955 the Soviet Presidium also expressed its irrevocable will in this matter.

At the meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU's Central Committee on 8 January 1955, First Secretary N. S. Khrushchev withdrew his support for Imre Nagy's pro-population and pro-standard of living policies after 18 months, probably because by late autumn 1954 the direction and dynamics of change in Hungary had surpassed the Soviet leadership's ideas of de-Stalinisation. The politics of the New Course through restraining the development of military forces and dismantling the oversized military industry decreased the military potential of the Hungarian People's Army and – indirectly – that of the allied socialist forces. This happened at the time when the Soviet Union, because of the acceptance of West Germany into NATO, started to lay new emphasis on the necessity of strengthening socialist unity and attempted to replace military cooperation treaties based on bilateral agreements with an overarching defensive alliance involving the entire Eastern Bloc (the Warsaw Pact). Several historians argue that the reasons behind Imre Nagy's removal in early 1955 were Khrushchev's worries that the reformist Prime Minister would neglect the necessary military investments to modernise the Hungarian army.[24]

To remove all doubt, one only has to read Khrushchev's announcement – uttered in his

---

21   MOL M-KS 276. f. 89. cs. 614. ő. e. 291–292. p.
22   MOL M-KS 276. f. 95. cs. 230. ő. e. 141–143. p.
23   MOL M-KS 276. f. 95. cs. 230. ő. e. 320–321. p.
24   See for example Borhi (2004) 237–238. p.

usual unsophisticated manner – at the briefing of 8 January: "If there is no industrialisation, […] we can't compete with the enemy. No matter if there is going to be a war or not, we have to develop our industry. We may have enough bacon, but if there is no aircraft, there is going to be trouble."

After the Moscow session, the Politburo in Budapest issued a decree that was drafted by Rákosi himself, who had managed to restore his previous authority by that time. The resolution returned to the prevailing dogma of the period before June 1953 and declared industrialisation as the basis of economic policy.[25] Furthermore, at the meeting of the MDP's Central Committee on 2 March 1955, Mátyás Rákosi included the rejection of the primacy of industrialisation and heavy industry among Imre Nagy's major sins.[26]

Following the change, the Secretariat of the National Defence Council was engaged in feverish activity in order to assess the effect of the New Course on military industry.[27] According to the summary report that was prepared for Mihály Farkas, Secretary of the Central Committee (and previous Minister of Defence), in 1953 15% of the total production of the KGM/B was dedicated to consumer goods. The proportion increased in 1954 to 35% and by 1955 it was supposed to reach 65%. Although the conversion kept the sector alive, 8500 employees still had to be sacked. At the same time, the central directives to preserve and conserve the instruments and equipments of war plants were treated with the usual carelessness and neglect that characterised the working morale of the period. For example, the huge punching-machines of the Light Machine Factory in Miskolc, that produced fragmentation shells and armour-piercing grenades, were left to rust in the open air. In the Mechanical Works nearby Budaörs, the workshop for constructing mortar bombs was irreversibly rebuilt and in the Smithery and Press-material Factory of Törökbálint, which had produced fragmentation shells and mortar bombs before 1953, parts for the servicing of active machines were taken out of the equipment that had been stopped. This put 40% of the machines suitable for producing articles of war out of order. For similar reasons, a number of defence plants failed to meet the expectations and requirements of military preparedness. This meant that in the event of war, the KGM/B could have reached adequate production levels in 6 months at best, instead of within the prescribed 3 month time limit. Even then, the department would not have been able to provide the necessary supplies for the army. Therefore, the writers of the report advocated the taking of urgent measures for the restoration of previous military capacities.

The stabilisation of Hungarian war industry was not to be postponed any further, as the establishment of the Warsaw Pact had reached the stage in February 1955 when the decree was already being negotiated. At the same time, the individual demands of the countries of the Soviet Bloc for war equipment were also being discussed with the aim to prepare mutual transports. It also became obvious that the Hungarian People's Army would have to play its part in the upgrading process of the armies of the satellite countries. In this spirit, István Bata, Minister of Defence summarised in February 1955 the development plans of the Hungarian People's Army for 1956–1959, and their conse-

---

25   See in detail Rainer (1999) 107–113. p. For the quotation see 112. p.
26   Rainer (1999) 118. p.
27   MOL M-KS 276. f. 67. cs. 164. ő. e. 76–79. p.

quences on domestic military industry.[28] The army required domestic industry to manufacture military products worth 8.8 milliard Fts in the next four years. The preparations for production were supposed to start in 1956 and it was hoped that from 1957 on mass production would proceed at a gradually accelerating pace, escalating in 1959. On the basis of initial demands, the HM also estimated that there would be war equipment orders from the allied countries worth 2.8 milliard Fts (Goriunov machine-guns, 57mm and 85 mm anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, fire control equipments and radars).

On the basis of the army's demands, Richárd Kolos, vice-Minister and head of the KGM/B department, in his proposal of April 1955,[29] set a target of increasing the military industry production by 2.8 times by 1959 (if compared to 1953 this would have meant the doubling of production). As a consequence of this, the manufacturing of consumer goods, constructed in defence plants in the Nagy-era, had to be taken over by other sections of the KGM. Besides that, the sector was supposed to produce 75 new types of war goods (Goriunov machine-guns, 152 mm howitzers, copper cartridge-cases, anti-aircraft ammunition, etc.). In order to execute the upgrading, the Ministry requested a 1.4 milliard Ft budget for new investment.

The re-intensification of production failed, however, partly due to the frequently changing demands of partner countries and partly due to the miserable state of the Hungarian budget. During the autumn of 1955 the HM practically reduced its domestic orders for 1956 to zero and it remained incapable of outlining any concrete plans for the subsequent years as well. The production plan of the KGM/B was thus decreased by one third (from 2750 million to 2050 million Ft). For this reason almost every war plant had to face capacity utilisation problems. More precisely, such problems actually re-emerged, because since the summer of 1953 there had been a radical drop in the number of military orders anyway.[30]

During the debates on the various different versions of the Second Five Year Plan, which was being prepared during the spring of 1956, the KGM/B reduced its long-term production quotas by 900 million Ft. Therefore, the total production of the military industry would have only been increased by 2.4 times between 1956 and 1960.[31] Even these calculations were thwarted by the outbreak of the October Revolution. Not only was the launching of the new, middle-term plan cancelled, but after the suppression of the revolution, the government of János Kádár also had to concentrate its resources on the improvement of the standard of living, rather than on the development of the armed forces and the military industry. Thus, in 1959, more than 80% of the goods manufactured by the companies of the KGM/B were still consumer goods and the new development program only started in that year.

It can be concluded that the conversion program of Imre Nagy constituted an exceptional case not only in the Socialist Bloc, but also in the early period of the Cold War generally. The Hungarian war industry was reintegrated into the civil economy – formal-

---

28   MOL XIX-F-6-aa 7. box
29   MOL M-KS 276. f. 95. cs. 229. ő. e. 333–342. p.
30   MOL M-KS 276. f. 95. cs. 230. ő. e. 81–82. p.
31   MOL M-KS 276. f. 95. cs. 289. ő. e. 109–114. p.

ly at least – and it could not thus become a powerful military-industrial conglomerate with a certain level of independence, unlike what had happened in other socialist countries. In the period 1953–55 the process was only characterised by difficulties and severe losses. Nevertheless, due to the pressure from the centre, the war plants developed a dual production structure, which helped them stand the storms of the lengthy transitional period. Companies with a double profile could maintain their staff of specialists and their factory equipment to some extent, while also retaining their military production capacities, ready to be re-activated in case of need. Besides that, by the late 1950s most of the factories realised what consumer goods suited their production facilities and, in doing so, they generally secured profitable management for themselves. Consequently, the conversion program proved to be a success that, in the long run, enforced the requirements of profitability and efficiency in an economic sector that had been indifferent towards material costs before.

REFERENCES

Borhi, László: *Hungary in the Cold War 1945–1956. Between the United States and the Soviet Union.* Budapest–New York, 2004, CEU Press

Rainer M., János: *Nagy Imre. Politikai életrajz. II. kötet.* [Imre Nagy. Political biography. 2nd vol.] Budapest, 1999, 1956-os Intézet

Thürmer, Gyula alezredes: *A Magyar Néphadsereg Vezérkara Anyagtervezési és Közgazdasági Csoportfőnökségének története.* [The history of the Economy and Planning Divisions of the General Staff of the Hungarian People's Army] Budapest, 1981. Kézirat. [manuscript] in Hadtörténelmi Levéltár [War History Archives], Magyar Néphadsereg Különgyűjtemény. [Special collection of Hungarian People's Army].

RESUMÉ

Pál Germuska: Prvý konverzný projekt studenej vojny. Maďarský obranný priemysel v rokoch 1953 – 1955

Konverzný program Imre Nagya znamenal výnimočný prípad nielen v socialistickom bloku, ale v ranom období studenej vojny aj širšie. Maďarský vojenský priemysel sa znovu integroval do civilnej ekonomiky – aspoň formálne – a nemohol sa teda stať silným vojensko-priemyselným konglomerátom s určitou úrovňou nezávislosti, na rozdiel od ostatných socialistických krajín. V období rokov 1953 – 1955 tento proces charakterizovali iba ťažkosti a vážne straty. A jednako z dôvodu tlaku z centra vyvinuli vojnové závody dvojitú štruktúru výroby, ktorá im pomohla vydržať búrky dlhého prechodného obdobia. Spoločnosti s dvojitým profilom si mohli do určitej miery udržať svojich odborníkov a strojové vybavenie, pričom si udržali aj svoje kapacity vojenskej výroby pripravené na opätovné spreväzdkovanie v prípade potreby. Okrem toho si koncom 50. rokov 20. storočia väčšina závodov uvedomila, aký spotrebný tovar vyhovuje ich výrobným zariadeniam, a tým si vo všeobecnosti zabezpečili výnosné vedenie. Konverzný program následne dokázal, že je úspešný, pretože dlhodobo presadzoval požiadavky výnosnosti a účinnosti v hospodárskom sektore, ktorý mal predtým laxný prístup k materiálovým nákladom.

The Intervention that Never Happened:
Yugoslavia under the Threat of Soviet Intervention, 1948–1953

Dr. Vladimir Prebilič[1] – Dr. Damijan Guštin[2]

I. INTRODUCTION

In Yugoslavia, the end of the Second World War brought a victory to one of the strongest resistance movements in Europe, which had fought the occupying forces of Axis for four years, offering constant military and political resistance at a very high human toll. In a simultaneous civil war, the resistance movement, thanks to the successful policy of its leadership, a favourable international geostrategic constellation and the support of Great Britain and, especially, the Soviet Union, reached an agreement with the emigrant Yugoslav government, which had resided in Cairo and London throughout the occupation and over which it eventually prevailed politically. Its supremacy was confirmed at the elections in November 1945, in which the opposition refused to participate. The new Yugoslav government, headed by Tito, proclaimed Yugoslavia a state of people's democracy, similar to the regimes set up by the Soviet Union in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. This implied a prevailing influence of communists in politics and state affairs, with the cooperation of some other docile political forces. In foreign politics, Yugoslavia tied itself strongly to the Soviet Union with which it concluded a substantial friendship treaty. From it, Yugoslavia received military aid and the political support for its dispute with Italy over the Julian March. Yugoslav relations with the Western allies, on the other hand, had cooled down and were all but broken, as a result of its meddling in the Greek civil

1   Ph D, Lecturer, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department for Defence Studies, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.
2   Ph D, Lecturer, Institute for Contemporary History, Ljubljana, Slovenia; Faculty of Social Sciences, Department for Defence Studies, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.

war. The relations became strained to breaking point in Summer 1946 with the shooting down of two American planes in the Yugoslav air space.[3]

Yugoslavia in the Soviet camp

Wherever, in its area of influence, the Soviet Union succeeded in establishing the rule of people's democracy, it then sought to secure its gains by asserting direct control, through a military presence and the support of national communist parties. These became the key elements in the political spectrum of the "people's democracy". Yugoslavia also belonged to this area, although by its own ideological determination. In 1946, Stalin had the idea of forming a new, inter-party body which would deal with the coordination, cooperation and, above all, the exchange of information and views between individual communist parties. Its founding convention was held in September 1947 in Warsaw, where the leaders of nine communist parties (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, Italy and the Soviet union – the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks) met. Consultations resulted in the adoption of a declaration on political views and a resolution on the organisation and operation of the newly founded Information Bureau of the Communist Parties (the Cominform). The primary task of this organisation was the exchange of experience and, only when such a need arose, coordination of activities between individual communist parties on a mutual consent basis. The Cominform whose headquarters were in Belgrade also undertook to publish a weekly bulletin.[4]

Stalin's policy towards Yugoslavia resembled that in other Eastern European countries, in which pro-Soviet governments had been installed through a military occupation. He praised the politically naïve Yugoslav communists as a raw model for others, while trying to subdue Yugoslavia in a similar way as other Eastern bloc countries, by controlling their economy (through joint venture companies, for example), as well as their foreign and interior politics. Occasionally, he would become infuriated with the over zealous and autonomous politics of the Yugoslav government. In Winter 1947/48, Stalin tried to put an end to this by resurrecting the idea from 1944, of a federation of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (the Balkan Federation), whereby the submissive Bulgarian CP would undo the influence of the Yugoslav leadership. The latter rejected his initiative. On 18 March, the Soviet Union decided to withdraw its military and civilian advisers from Yugoslavia, quoting as a reason the hostility of the Yugoslav authorities. Ten days later Stalin added to the pressure by sending a letter to Tito. In it, he accused the CPY leadership of being perfidious, double-faced and unfoundedly critical of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). At the same time, Stalin warned Tito that his behaviour was only ac-

---

3   Jože Pirjevec: *Jugoslavija 1918–1992: nastanek, razvoj ter razpad Karadjordjevićeve in Titove Jugoslavije*. Koper, Lipa, 1995, pp. 155–170; Jerca Vodušek Starič: *Prevzem oblasti 1944–1946. Ljubljana, Cankarjeva založba, 1992, pp. 308–426*; Lorraine M. Lees: *Keeping Tito Afloat: the United States, Yugoslavia and the Cold W*ar. University Park Pensylvania, The Pensylvania State University Press, 1997, pp. 13–18.

4   Leonid Gibianskii: The Soviet-Yugoslav Clash. Historiographic Versions and new Archival Sources. In: *Jugoslavija v hladni vojni / Yugoslavia in the Cold War*. Ljubljana, Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, Toronto, University of Toronto, 2000, pp. 49–70; Pirjevec, *Jugoslavija 1918–1992*, pp. 171–180; Mateja Režek: *Med resničnostjo in iluzijo: slovenska in jugoslovanska politika v desetletju po sporu z informbirojem: 1948–1958*. Ljubljana, Modrijan, 2005, pp 9–20.

cepted by a narrow circle of the communist elite and that his people would disapprove of it. He was deeply convinced that Tito was on his own and that the Yugoslavs considered the CPSU more important than him or the CPY. Stalin also relied on the support of a large number of the CPY officials who had been indoctrinated by the Soviet Union and for whom he was an idol and model.

His assessment proved mistaken. Immediately after receiving Stalin's letter, Tito called a meeting of the CPY Central Committee at which he succeeded in securing total support and eliminating those committee members on whom Stalin relied (Sreten Žujović and Andrija Hebrang). At the same time, central committees in all republics were convened, as were other communist organisations in Yugoslavia, all of which equally condemned Stalin's actions and the accusations by the CPSU. An extensive letter to Stalin, in which Tito sharply refuted all the charges against the CPY, was also confirmed by the CPY Central Committee. Failing to realise that Tito and the CPY were not like other communist leaders and their parties, Stalin decided to increase pressure even more. In another letter of May 1948, Stalin and his Communist Party accused Tito and the CPY leadership of being illegal and illegitimate, of departing from the Marxist model of organising and directing the Party, and approaching the ideas of Trotsky, a personification of everything forbidden. Stalin forwarded these condemnations to all the Cominform members as the official Soviet position. This act became some kind of a precedent, given that an internal conflict between two ruling parties and confidential correspondence had suddenly turned public. Other Cominform members backed up the Soviet position. One after another, they sent letters to Belgrade, condemning the CPY and defending the absolute authority of Stalin and the Soviet CP. The CPY was not even given an opportunity to present its own position and counterarguments.[5]

On 20 June 1948, the Second Session of the Cominform began in Bucharest, with the debate on the situation in the CPY on its agenda. At the end of the seven-day session, the eight parties adopted a comprehensive resolution on the situation in the CP of Yugoslavia. In it, the CPY stood condemned of departing from Marxism and Leninism in its interior politics, conducting policies hostile to the Soviet Union and its Party, rapprochement with the capitalist West, discrediting the Soviet civilian and military advisers, as well as a Trockyst attitude towards its own party colleagues. The Cominform unanimously denounced such behaviour by the CPY leadership, calling upon the „healthy forces" within the CPY to use the support of the fraternal parties and the Soviet CP and force its leaders to change policy or, if necessary, remove them and elect new ones. By calling upon the *coup d'état* against a lawful and legitimate government, the Cominform totally abused its purpose. This rude interference with Yugoslav internal affairs was an indicator of its future steps and the course of events in other socialist states.

Although Stalin was firmly convinced that the CPY leadership would be disciplined or forced to resign, this never materialised. Tito enjoyed the firm support of the entire CPY as which became clear at the Fifth Congress of the CPY on 21 June 1948, where the main

---

5 Pirjevec, *Jugoslavija 1918–1992*, pp. 181–186; Vladimir Dedijer: *Dokumenti 1948, 1*. Beograd 1979, pp. 299–306; Dušan Biber: Titov izziv Informbiroju v analizi CIA: (prvi večji razkol v satelitskem imperiju Sovjetske zveze). In: *Zgodovinski časopis*, 52, 1998, 4, pp. 597–604.

item on the agenda was the Cominform resolution. The widest and the highest body of the Party was behind the actions of Tito and the CPY leadership. The Congress concluded that equality, mutual respect and consideration of each communist party were the basis for any cooperation. Any interference with a country's sovereignty or its communist party was defined as intolerable and the principle on the freedom of choosing their own road to socialism adopted.[6]

As the tension grew, the Cominform continued its political campaign. In November 1949, it adopted a resolution entitled *The Yugoslav Communist Party in the Hands of Murderers and Spies*, claiming that Tito and his inner circle had betrayed the Yugoslav interests by abandoning democracy and socialism and openly approaching the Western imperialist and capitalist principles. Consequently, Tito and his inner circle were branded as a group of spies for the West, secretly infiltrating imperialist ideas and deceiving the Yugoslav peoples.[7] The Cominform considered it an international obligation for other communist parties to help restore democracy in the CPY. Therefore, it called upon all the communists in Yugoslavia to openly challenge Tito's reactionist camp, by appealing to their loyalty to Marxism and Leninism and openly offering help in this matter.

II. THE DANGER OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

The ruling Yugoslav communists interpreted the Soviet ideological assault as a military threat against Yugoslavia and, as such, an international relations affair. Having just prevented an internal conflict, the ruling party was soon pervaded by the fear that the Soviet Union might use military force to remove the defiant Tito's team, had the Yugoslav communists loyal to Stalin failed to do so through a putsch. There were quite a few arguments confirming this, such as the psychological war, clandestine operations of the Soviet intelligence service, an economic blockade against Yugoslavia, incidents on its borders with Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania. The first border incidents were recorded as early as 1948, only to intensify by the end of that year. Usually, these entailed shallow incursions and firing at soldiers guarding the border. According to a Yugoslav statistics, there were 896 border incidents in two years, resulting in several dozens of military fatalities. Inundated by notes from the neighbouring states, the Yugoslav government launched a diplomatic counter-offensive. Thirty notes were sent to Albania, twenty-five to Bulgaria, twenty-seven to Hungary and thirteen to Rumania.[8] In general, each side rejected any responsibility for the existing situation, blaming the other side.[9]

Ensuring internal security
Fearing that the Soviet Union might become too influential in the Yugoslav ruling par-

---

6   *Peti kongres Komunistične partije Jugoslavije*. Ljubljana, Cankarjeva založba, 1948.

7   »Jugoslovenska Kompartija u rukama ubica i špijuna«, 29. 11. 1949; In Mihailo Vojvodić (ed.) *Dokumenti o spolnjoj politici Socialističke federativne republike Jugoslavije. God 1949*. Beograd, Jugoslovenski pregled, 1989, pp. 493–496.

8   *Bela knjiga o agresivnim postupcima vlada SSSR, Poljske, Čehoslovačke, Mađarske, Romunije, Bugarske I Albanije prema Jugoslaviji*. Beograd, Ministarstvo inostranih poslova FNRJ, 1951 (The White Book), p. 371.

9   *Bela knjiga,* pp. 373–374, 375.

ty, causing a division in the country, Tito's inner circle, after ensuring its own unity, took steps in the following directions:

Contrary to the established practice of the CPY, which operated secretly, it thoroughly explained the new situation to the citizens of Yugoslavia. The leading newspapers printed extensive excerpts from the documents by both parties. Mass gatherings, also of non-CPY members, were held, expressing support for its leadership and rejecting the Soviet behaviour. With this they successfully counteracted a very intensive propaganda campaign launched by the Soviet Union and its satellites (which, according to Yugoslav records, broadcast around 6,000 programmes, mostly on the radio). None of the means used by the Cominform members succeeded in dividing the CPY or forming within it a faction which would ask the Soviet CP for protection and thus make a military intervention justifiable, feasible and successful.

Each party meeting had yet another purpose – to detect sources of opposition. Due to an intense propaganda, the CPY members were compelled to declare their allegiance. Those failing to show an open support for the CPY were considered opponents of the regime. The state security services and the police arrested some 55,000 people. Around 16,200 were interned in purpose-built concentration camps on the Northern Adriatic islands of Goli and Sveti Grgur and in Bileća in Herzegovina. Two thirds were imprisoned only on the basis of a police order, while the rest had been judicially sentenced to several year terms. A similar differentiation was made also in the armed forces, among officers and even ordinary soldiers. The Cominform resolution found greater support among the officers of Serbian and Montenegrin nationality. Many officers who had trained at the Soviet military schools after the war were among the first to be suspected.[10]

At the same time the Yugoslav government strove to prove its Stalinist orthodoxy in domestic politics. In agriculture, it started introducing total collectivisation as a replacement for private production and, in interior politics, strengthening the role of the CPY rather than that of the Liberation Front as a political organisation.[11]

The defence plan

Yugoslavia's security situation seriously deteriorated as a result of the threat from the East. After a period of being close and open towards the countries with people's democracy, all of its eastern border, from the Austrian occupation zone to the Greek border and as far as the Skadar Lake, turned into a potential battlefield. Anticipating an intervention by the Soviet and other Eastern European forces, the Yugoslav army was hastily preparing for defence. The main attack was expected from the direction of the vast Panonian plain. Albania, where the Soviet Union had accumulated great quantities of military material, was also considered a very dangerous launching point.[12]

The Yugoslav defence forces, in their turn, inspired respect for their sheer number, if

10   Marko Kalođera: *Vojni pravosudni organi i organi pravne službe JNA*. Beograd, Vojnoizdavački I novinski centar JNA, 1986, pp. 230–233, Ivan Matović: *Vojskovođa s oreolom mučenika: povest o generalu Arsu Jovanoviću načelniku Vrhovnog štaba NOVJ i njegovoj tragičnoj sudbini*. Beograd, Vojska, Vojnoistorijski institut, 2001.

11   Pirjevec, *Jugoslavija 1918–1992*, pp. 203–205; Neven Borak et al: *Slovenska novejša zgodovina, 2*. Ljubljana, Mladinska knjiga, Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2005, pp. 937–939.

12   Darko Bekić: *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu: odnos s velikim silama 1949–1955*. Zagreb, Globus, 1988, p. 23–27.

nothing else. An army with a victorious tradition of resistance during the Second World War was in the middle of a first peace-time reorganisation (the second one was implemented in 1947). Given the tense situation to its west, even after the conclusion of the peace treaty with Italy (the Trieste problem), and to its south (the civil war in Greece, in which Yugoslavia was also involved), only a small portion of the Yugoslav army had been demobilised, making it one of the largest armed forces in Europe. Its thirty-two divisions represented a force capable of halting a first onslaught. However, the army was weakened by insufficient heavy weaponry and technical equipment due to the delays in the Soviet supplies and the fact that its domestic military industry was almost nonexistent. Furthermore, the new government channelled a large percentage of an already low national income into the post-war reconstruction of infrastructure and huge investments in heavy industry. Nevertheless, around twelve percent of the national income was earmarked for defence and, during the crisis, almost twenty-three percent of the national income.[13]

Yugoslavia first reinforced its border units, which secured the border areas and, in the years to come, intercepted most provocations and incidents. The border incidents in which firearms were used amounted to 1,450. The government extended the compulsory military service to three years, thus increasing the number of soldiers to 390,000. Due to a change in defence requirements, another reorganisation was carried out in the army, reinforcing the units that defended areas in Serbia, Vojvodina and Slavonia.[14]

Since the Yugoslav army expected the main onslaught from the Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian territory, its military plan envisaged a withdrawal to the strategically important central parts of the country, south of the Sava and west of the Morava rivers. There, production capacities were built, including those that had been transferred from the most endangered areas in Serbia, Vojvodina and Slavonia. Evacuation plans for people, livestock and grain were drawn.[15] There were also radical plans of mining the Đerdap Gorge, which would cause the Danube river to flood vast areas of Vojvodina and thereby stop the advance of the Soviet divisions.

The Yugoslav army made greatest changes in its defence doctrine, returning to the popular partisan warfare tactics which had proved so successful in the Second World War. In mid–1949 it started organising territorial units for the defence of smaller areas and the operation on occupied areas. A large number of partisan units was formed so that in 1953, there were 195 detachments in 30 groups, with a total of 80,000 soldiers. A High Command of the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia was founded with headquarters in each of the republics. Personal liaison between commanders was established at the republics' level through the coordination committees for national defence.[16]

It seems that the Soviet Union expected Tito's regime to collapse under its multilateral pressure within a year. It was prepared to attack Yugoslavia, but only after its election

13 Gojko Miljanić: *Kopnena vojska. 1*. Beograd, Vojnoizdavački I novinski centar, 1988, pp. 57–67.

14 Ibidem, pp 57–67; *Bela knjiga*, pp. 40–45, 423–435.

15 Svetozar Vukmanović – Tempo: *Revolucija koja teče: memoari*. Beograd, Komunist, 1971, pp. 104–105; Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu*, p. 37.

16 Vukmanović, *Revolucija koja teče*, pp. 105–109; Miljenko Živković: *Teritorijalna odbrana*. Beograd, Vojnoizdavački I novinski centar, 1986, pp. 21–79.

as a member of the UN Security Council. At the time, Yugoslavia only had from seven to nine divisions, when at least fifteen were needed. Large movements of the Soviet units began, and the armies of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria were greatly reinforced.[17] According to some western analysts the Soviet Union could have launched a military intervention in Spring 1950. Several options were foreseen: from the attack by the Soviet Union itself to an independent attack by its satellites, the launching of a guerrilla war or the continuation of psychological war with the intention to assassinate Tito. A guerrilla war was considered as the most probable option.[18] In any event, the Korean crisis which broke out in Spring 1950, most probably influenced the Soviet decision to maintain pressure on Yugoslavia only at the level of psychological and economic war for that year. Even so, the plan of military intervention in Yugoslavia was very much alive in 1951. A testimony by General Bela Kiraly, the Commander-in-chief of the Infantry of the Hungarian army, supports the existence of a plan which was allegedly tried out at the military exercises (the map wargame) in January 1951. It represented the Hungarian part of the general attack on Yugoslavia, in which the Bulgarian, Rumanian and Albanian armies were to participate alongside the Soviet, together with some Polish and Czechoslovak contingents.[19] According to this plan, the Hungarian forces were to form a first echelon which would break through the Yugoslav defence line between the Danube and the Tisa rivers and, parallely, advance across the Drava river into Slavonia towards Zagreb. The Rumanian forces would do the same in the Banat, east of the Tisa river. A second echelon would be composed of the Soviet armoured divisions which would advance to Belgrade on the heels of the Hungarian and Rumanian forces. It seems that a large scale parachute drop on the Bosnian plateau was also envisaged, in order to create a military base in the centre of the Yugoslav defences. The roles of the Albanian army and the Soviet navy remain unclear.[20]

17 Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu*, pp. 86–88.

18 Ibidem, p. 98.

19 Bela Kiraly: The Aborted Soviet Military Plans against Tito's Yugoslavia. In: *At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historical Perspective*. New York, Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1982, pp 277, 284–285, 288. Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu*, p. 238.

The question remains as to how much this plan was connected with the presumed Soviet planning of a general attack on Western Europe in 1954 or 1955. See Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu*, p. 238.

20 Bela Kiraly: The Hugarian Army under Soviet Control. In: *20th Century Hungaria and the Great Powers*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 290–293, 366; Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu*, pp. 238–239.

Former Yugoslavia

The economic war

Stalin expected that the economic blockade and other forms of economic pressure would politically destabilise Yugoslavia. Following the Soviet Union, all the Cominform members gradually cut economic,[21] cultural and diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. More than fifty treaties and agreements with Yugoslavia were cancelled, causing huge economic damage. The Yugoslav trade with Eastern European countries in 1947 and 1948 amounted to more than fifty-two percent of its total foreign trade. Within a year after the Cominform resolution, trade between Yugoslavia and Eastern European countries dropped by fourteen percent, and by 1950 died away altogether. This caused enormous economic damage in the area of 430 million. All this, coupled with extremely poor harvests in 1950 and 1952, caused great problems in Yugoslavia's balance of payment with other countries. The country was threatened with famine.[22]

It was the economic blockade that compelled Yugoslavia to seek economic relations with the West. Nevertheless, the western forces observed the crisis between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the possibility of an intervention with reservation.[23] It took several months for them to become aware of the gravity of the conflict. When they did realise how serious the situation was, they saw in it an opportunity to discredit the Soviet Union and thus deepen the conflict in the opposite camp. To the Yugoslav pleas for aid, the three western countries (Great Britain, France and the US) responded with a re-

---

21 On 1 October 1949, the Bulgarian government unilaterally cancelled the Treaty on Frendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, signed by the two countries on 27 November 1947 for the period of twenty years (See the Note by the Government of the FNRY to the Government of the NR of Bulgaria concerning the unilateral cancellation of the Treaty on Frendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance by the Government of the NR of Bulgaria, Belgrade, 13 October 1949; cf. *Dokumenti o spolnjoj politici Socialističke federativne republike Jugoslavije, God. 1949*, pp. 234–240). Rumania followed suit on the same day, while Czechoslovakia had already done so on 12 June 1949.

22 Savo Kržavac, Dragan Marković: *Informbiro, kaj je to?: Jugoslavija je rekla ne*. Ljubljana, 1976, p. 186.

23 As the news of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict split surfaced, Moscow's Cold War antagonists saw significant opportunities. The Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade described the situation as "brilliantly fluid". For example, the National Security Council in Washington began speculating about the potential benefits of encouraging the spread of what it called the "Tito virus" (Leonid Gibianskii: The Soviet-Yugoslav Clash. Historiographic Versions and new Archival Sources. In: *Jugoslavija v hladni vojni / Yugoslavia in the Cold War*. Ljubljana, Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, Toronto, University of Toronto, 2000, p. 49).

served policy of "keeping Tito afloat", i.e. a support just sufficient to allow Tito to stay on. Initially, they were also prepared to help with weapons, but only after the outbreak of armed conflict.

Among the first to actively intervene in this political and ideological conflict were the United States of America. The relations between the US and Yugoslavia had already visibly improved by the second half of 1949. America decided to grant economic aid which decisively alleviated the consequences of the aforementioned droughts. Brushing aside any second thoughts about awarding a communist country such as Yugoslavia[24], aid was, at least initially, granted without attaching any major political conditions to it.

Seeking aid and support, Yugoslavia found "allies" in the US, France and Great Britain. The negotiations peaked in April 1951, when Conference of Experts on Economic Issues from the US, France and Great Britain was held. It was agreed that these countries should provide aid to Yugoslavia, not on an individual but on a tripartite basis. From 1 July 1951 to 1 July 1952, Yugoslavia received a total of US$ 120 million.[25] of this aid was to help alleviate and remove Yugoslavia's economic difficulties and increase its combat ability. However, the diplomatic pressure on Tito and the whole of Yugoslavia became increasingly apparent. The main goal of the provided aid was to bring Yugoslavia into the "Western embrace". Despite some disputes, the financial aid kept coming. By August 1953, when a great deterioration between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was expected, almost all aid had been delivered. In 1954, new negotiations started between the US and Yugoslavia for special aid after a disastrous harvest caused by a drought. The US agreed to deliver 1,300,000 tons of grain, and the economic aid continued also into 1950, when Yugoslavia was granted additional 920,000 tons of grain, 477,000 tons of corn and 18,000 tons of cotton. Furthermore, in 1955, a new Tripartite Aid agreement was signed and Yugoslavia received US$ 151 million. The total Tripartite Aid between 1951 and 1955 amounted to approximately US$ 600 million, not counting extra grain shipments worth around US$ 150 million. By adding also US$ 1.2 billion in various types of military aid, the Western aid reached a total of at least US$ 3.5 billion.[26]

To join or not to join Western defence structures?
As the rift between Yugoslavia and the Soviet camp deepened, the Western countries

---

24 At that time the Assistant to the US Secretary of State made a very important statement. In front of the Foreign Policy Committee of the US Congress, he affirmed that economic, diplomatic and financial aid to Yugoslavia did not mean approval of its state policy and the communist regime. Savo Kržavac, Dragan Marković: *Informbiro, kaj je to?: Jugoslavija je rekla ne*, p. 186.

25 The US share in the aid was 65%, Britain's 23% and France's 12%. Presented in figures, the US agreed to give Yugoslavia a grant of US$ 78 million, Great Britain US$ 27.6 million, and France US$ 14.4 million. Dragan Bogetić: Western Economic and Military Aid to Yugoslavia during the Conflict with the Cominform. In: *Jugoslavija v hladni vojni / Yugoslavia in the Cold War*, p. 296.

26 How huge this aid was, can be determined through the comparison with the Marshall plan in the period 1948–1951. Under this plan, Great Britain received US$ 2.8 billion, France US$ 2.4, and Italy and Germany US $ 1.3 billion each. Other Western countries (Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Austria, and Greece) together received the remaining US$ 3 billion. No Western country, therefore, received a greater aid than Yugoslavia under the Tripartite Agreement, and the seven countries mentioned last received in total an amount approximately equal to what was given to Yugoslavia alone. Bogetić, Western Economic and Military Aid to Yugoslavia during the Conflict with the Cominform, p. 318.

saw an opportunity for applying additional pressure on Yugoslavia to abolish the communist regime. Even more so they hoped that Yugoslavia's successful rebellion would serve as an example for other satellites, leading to the weakening of the communist bloc. Nevertheless, the US did partially denounce the Soviet Union's interference with the Yugoslav internal affairs as rude and intolerable. This became apparent in the US support of Yugoslavia's UN membership, in the second round of the fourth regular session of the UN General Assembly on 20 October 1949, when Yugoslavia was elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, although this was opposed by all Eastern European countries which supported the candidacy of Czechoslovakia.[27] Yugoslavia's non-permanent membership in the Security Council, after informing the General Assembly about its conflict with the Soviet Union and its satellites, represented a significant political victory in its struggle against total isolation.[28]

In the absence of other alternatives and after a long hesitation, the Yugoslav government decided to request arms from the Western powers. Although secretly at first, they informed the US about their willingness to accept arms. After considerable discussions in the American administration – with opposing views regarding aid for Yugoslavia – the decision prevailed to grant the military aid, however, subject to the foundation of a tripartite committee (US, UK and France) in order to avoid political problems and coordinate the supplies.[29]

Under the shadow of a possible armed intervention in Yugoslavia, the Western powers attached great importance to this issue. In October 1950, after being officially briefed on the security situation from the Yugoslav perspective, the Western powers were ready to offer Yugoslavia military support. This action was based on a peripheral defence strategy created by NATO, which visualized Europe as "an elongated bottleneck". The broad part of the bottle represented the Soviet Union, with Western Europe as the neck, and ending with Spain. The seas on both sides were envisaged as dominated by the Allied forces. In the event of the Soviet penetration through Europe, the Allies would have an ideal position for launching an attack from the flank. The East Mediterranean and the Balkans were particularly important in this concept. All negotiations between the Western powers and Yugoslavia were highly classified.[30] On these grounds, the Tripartite Military Committee for aid to Yugoslavia was formed in October 1950. It consisted of gen-

---

27 Izjava A. J. Višinskog, ministra vanjskih poslova SSSR i šefa delegacije SSSR na IV. Redovnom zasedanju Generalne skupštine Ujedinjenih nacija, na konferenciji za štampu protiv kandidature FNRJ za nestalnog člana Saveta bezbednosti UN, 18. 10. 1949; In: *Dokumenti o spolnjoj politici Socialističke federativne republike Jugoslavije, God. 1949*, pp. 477–478.

28 Govor dr. Aleša Beblerja, člana delegacije FNRJ, na 308. zasedanju Prvog komiteta (za politična pitanja) IV. Redovnog zasedanja Generalne skupštine Ujedinjenih nacija o antijugoslavenskoj kampanji albanske vlade, povodom razmatranja grčkog pitanja, Njujork, 2. 11. 1949, In: *Dokumenti o spolnjoj politici Socialističke federativne republike Jugoslavije, God. 1949*, pp. 477–478.

29 Bogetić, Western Economic and Military Aid to Yugoslavia during the Conflict with the Cominform. In: *Jugoslavija v hladni vojni / Yugoslavia in the Cold War*, p. 302; Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu*, pp. 278–280.

30 This was because of two main reasons: the first was the fear of the possible reaction among the Party's ranks and among their general following to a military alliance with bourgeois countries, especially an alliance opposed to their former ideological partners. In case of public announcement of this alignment, the military intervention of the USSR might be provoked. Secondly, Western governments were not keen to publicise this kind of cooperation with Yugoslavia, since it was still just another communist country and a possible enemy in the eyes of Western citizens.

eral staff officers from the American, British, and French armies. The Committee soon drafted a paper allowing for the exercise of military cooperation and the delivery of the first shipment of arms. However, this military cooperation soon became a cause of "misperception" for further diplomatic cooperation. The US saw the military aid solely as a means of binding Yugoslavia to NATO's defence strategy. Consequently, it considered it very important to start military and strategic negotiations on Yugoslavia's participation in the Western defence preparations. The Yugoslav leaders, in their turn, sought to get more in return for their military cooperation. They wanted to be given the firmest possible guarantees of support in the event of Soviet aggression against Yugoslavia. Notwithstanding the disputes, considerable quantities of military material started arriving in Yugoslavia in the course of the following few years. In November 1952, additional military negotiations between Yugoslavia and US, France and Britain commenced. Their main purpose was to convince the Yugoslav leaders for a greater commitment in the NATO structures. With the two sides failing to find a mutually satisfactory compromise, Yugoslavia began forming a military alignment with two Balkan states: Greece and Turkey. In this way, Yugoslavia successfully overcame the announced cutbacks of military aid from the West.[31]

The problem of joining NATO

Although having lost its former political and strategic support, Yugoslavia's alliance with the opposite bloc was hindered by the Western countries' hard-line, anti-communist ideology, which prevailed among both its leaders and at the political grassroots, as well as the consideration of not provoking the Soviet Union. With the Bled Agreement the Yugoslav side only undertook to respect western economic standards in using the received aid and not to use it for the investment cycle of its heavy industry. The main objective of the US and the other two members of the Tripartite Committee was Yugoslavia's close alliance with NATO and, possibly, its integration in the organisation's defence plans, whereas Yugoslavia wanted to secure defence in the event of being attacked.[32]

In this way the US used military aid as a carrot which also happened to be a stick. The Yugoslav army was increasingly dependent on the military material it had been receiving from the three Western powers. In 1952, the three NATO members assessed that the moment for convincing the Yugoslav leadership to join NATO had arrived. Their request for military cooperation was accompanied by the information that a large shipment of strategically important weaponry (200 armoured vehicles, heavy artillery and, in the future, supersonic fighter jets) was on its way. On 19 July 1952, Tito himself expressed his willingness to enter negotiations on the use of this vast military aid. Koča Popović, the Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff, and his American counterpart, Omar Bradley, had already been discussing the possibility of establishing a defence alliance in May and June 1951. The talks began in November 1952, initially without success. But afterwards, side-

---

31   Bogetić, Western Economic and Military Aid to Yugoslavia during the Conflict with the Cominform. In: *Jugoslavija v hladni vojni / Yugoslavia in the Cold War*, pp. 304–305.

32   Darko Bekić: The Balkan Pact: the Still-born of the Cold War. In: *Jugoslavija v hladni vojni / Yugoslavia in the Cold War*, pp. 129–136; Bogetić: Western Economic and Military Aid to Yugoslavia during the Conflict with the Cominform. In: *Jugoslavija v hladni vojni / Yugoslavia in the Cold War*, p. 303–304

stepping Western expectations, Yugoslavia undertook the obligation to enter a military alliance with two NATO members, Turkey and Greece (The Friendship and Cooperation Treaty between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, also known as the Balkan Pact, was concluded on 28 February 1953.)[33] Indirectly incorporated in NATO like this, Yugoslavia could have become an important pillar of the western defence constellation on the southern wing, That would, however, open new problems, especially in the relations with Italy, which, until then, had played the most important role there. Great Britain accepted the Yugoslav argument that there could be no local war (limited to Yugoslavia) without the outbreak of a general war in Europe. This gave a firmer reassurance to Yugoslavia that the NATO countries would participate in its defence had it been attacked.[34]

Stalin's death was a turning point, above all psychologically. Two years later, the Soviet Union was prepared to present its conflict with Yugoslavia as a Stalinist deviation which had been publicly rejected. This gave rise to the western fears that their own military aid might turn against them if Yugoslavia concluded agreements with the Soviet Union.[35] The Yugoslav foreign politics, having resolved the Trieste question with an agreement on the division of the disputed territory, refused to be militarily and economically bound neither to the Soviet nor to the Western bloc. At the same time, it was not prepared to relinquish the American economic and military aid which was subject to a strategic association with the western defence structures. A gradual cooling of the military aspect of the Balkan Pact was within this context. This was not hard to achieve due to the ever growing rifts in the strategic orientations of its members, notably Turkey, which sought the association of the Middle East countries in the context of a pact between Iraq and Turkey. As a result of all this, by 1955 the Balkan Pact existed only on paper.[36] Yugoslavia adopted the strategy of equidistance from both blocs and started seeking another path in the alignment with the new third-world countries.

CONCLUSION

The international conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, disguised as an ideological strife between two communist parties, had long-reaching consequences on the strategic situation in Europe, although failing to foreshadow the confrontation of the two blocs in Central Europe. The conflict was much more important for Yugoslavia. Anticipation of a Soviet intervention triggered many administrative and doctrinal changes, not only in the civilian but also in the military life. Through them the Yugoslav Army sought to respond to the strategic shifts in the country's military and political situation. In 1954, it started a process of considerable reduction in its armed forces. Demobilisation and the shortening of the military service term brought the numbers down to around 280,000 soldiers. The most important consequence of the crisis was Yugoslavia's

33 Bogetić, Western Economic and Military Aid to Yugoslavia during the Conflict with the Cominform. In: *Jugoslavija v hladni vojni / Yugoslavia in the Cold War*, p. 304–305.
34 Dragan Bogetić: *Jugoslavija I zapad 1952–1955: jugoslovensko približavanje NATO-u*. Beograd, Službeni list SRJ, 2000, p. 112.
35 Pirjevec, *Jugoslavija 1918–1992*, pp. 220–222.
36 Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952–1955*, pp. 235–236.

political independence and a slightly greater openness towards the West. Yugoslavia thus became a country from which new (nowadays irrelevant) ideas on socialism started to emerge. More importantly, it established itself as an extra-bloc country, eventually becoming a co-founder of the Non-Alignment Movement.

The key question is therefore: Did the clash between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia actually cause any considerable damage to the latter? Although there is no simple answer to this question, it cannot be answered affirmatively on the basis of these analyses. The aid received, the diplomatic positioning and the acquired political capital, among both the Western and Eastern European countries, secured Yugoslavia a special status and recognition also in the future. The strengthened economy, a selective implementation of socialist reforms and a continued reception of various kinds of the development aid, made Yugoslavia economically more developed than other Eastern European countries. Furthermore, Tito succeeded in interiorly unifying Yugoslavia, temporarily overcoming vast ethnic and economic differences between the individual republics and, with his authority, providing a safe convenience of different cultures in one state.

RESUMÉ

Vladimír Prebilič – Damijan Guštin: Intervencia, ktorá sa nikdy neuskutočnila: Juhoslávia pod hrozbou sovietskej intervencie 1948 – 1953

V Juhoslávii koniec druhej svetovej vojny priniesol víťazstvo jedného z najmohutnejších hnutí odporu v Európe a následne aj novú juhoslovanskú vládu vedenú Titom. Naznačovalo to prevládajúci vplyv komunistov v politike a štátnych záležitostiach spolupracujúcich s niektorými inými poslušnými politickými silami. V zahraničnej politike sa Juhoslávia silno primkla k Sovietskemu zväzu, s ktorým uzavrela dôležitú dohodu o priateľstve. V roku 1946 Stalin uvažoval o vytvorení nového straníckeho orgánu, ktorý by sa zaoberal koordináciou, spoluprácou a predovšetkým výmenou informácií a názorov medzi jednotlivými komunistickými stranami. Jeho zakladajúce zasadanie sa konalo v septembri 1947 vo Varšave, kde sa stretli vodcovia deviatich komunistických strán (Juhoslávie, Bulharska, Rumunska, Maďarska, Poľska, Francúzska, Československa, Talianska a Sovietskeho zväzu – Všezväzovej komunistickej strany boľševikov). Rozhovory boli zakončené prijatím deklarácie o politických názoroch a rezolúcie o organizácii a pôsobení novo založeného informačného byra komunistických strán (Kominform). Primárnou úlohou tejto organizácie bola výmena skúseností a, iba ak by to bolo potrebné, koordinácia činností medzi jednotlivými komunistickými stranami na základe vzájomnej zhody. Stalina však rozzúrila príliš horlivá a nezávislá politika juhoslovanskej vlády. V zime 1947/48 sa Stalin pokúsil o jej ukončenie obnovením myšlienky z roku 1944, o federácii Juhoslávie a Bulharska (Balkánskej federácie), čím by poslušná bulharská KS narušila vplyv juhoslovanského vedenia. Juhoslovanské vedenie však túto iniciatívu odmietlo. 18. marca Sovietsky zväz rozhodol o stiahnutí svojich vojenských a civilných poradcov z Juhoslávie, pričom ako dôvod uviedol nepriateľstvo juhoslovanských úradov. O desať dní Stalin zosilnil tlak napísaním listu Titovi. V liste obvinil vedenie KSJ zo zrady, dvojtvárnosti a bezdôvodne kritického vzťahu ku Komunistickej strane Sovietskeho zväzu (KSSZ). Stalin sa spoliehal aj na podporu veľkého počtu úradníkov KSJ, ktorí boli naočkovaní Sovietskym zväzom a pre ktorých bol idolom a vzorom. Hoci bol Stalin pevne presvedčený, že vedenie KSJ by malo byť potrestané alebo donútené odstúpiť, nikdy k tomu nedošlo. Tito sa tešil pevnej podpore celej KSJ, ako sa ukázalo na 5. kongrese KSJ 21. júna 1948, kde hlavným bodom programu bola rezolúcia Kominformu. Za Titovým konaním a za vedením KSJ stál hlavný a najvyšší orgán strany. Po zabránení vnútornému konfliktu sa vo vládnucej strane čoskoro rozšíril strach, že Sovietsky zväz by mo-

hol použiť vojenskú silu na odstránenie vzdorného Titovho tímu, keď sa to juhoslovanským komunistom lojálnym voči Stalinovi nepodarilo prostredníctvom puču. Bolo iba niekoľko argumentov, ktoré to potvrdzovali ako psychologická vojna, tajné operácie sovietskej spravodajskej služby, ekonomická blokáda Juhoslávie, incidenty na jej hraniciach s Maďarskom, Bulharskom a Albánskom. Prvé pohraničné incidenty boli zaznamenané už v roku 1948 a do konca tohto roka sa ešte zintenzívnili. Obyčajne išlo o povrchné vpády a streľbu do vojakov strážiacich hranice. Podľa juhoslovanskej štatistiky za dva roky došlo k 896 pohraničným incidentom s niekoľkými tuctami mŕtvych vojakov. Juhoslovanská bezpečnostná situácia sa vážne zhoršila v dôsledku hrozby z východu. Po období uzatvárania a otvárania sa ľudovodemokratickým krajinám sa celá jej východná hranica, od rakúskej okupačnej zóny po grécku hranicu a až po Skadarské jazero, zmenila na potenciálne bojisko. V očakávaní intervencie zo strany sovietskych a iných východoeurópskych síl sa juhoslovanská armáda náhlivo pripravovala na obranu. Hlavný útok sa očakával zo smeru šírej Panónskej panvy. Aj Albánsko, kde Sovietsky zväz nahromadil veľké množstvo vojenského materiálu, sa považovalo za veľmi nebezpečné miesto na začatie útoku. Jeho 32 divízií predstavovalo silu schopnú zastaviť prvý prudký nápor. Avšak armáda bola oslabená pre nedostatok ťažkých zbraní a technickej výzbroje, čo spôsobilo zdržanie sovietskych dodávok a fakt, že domáci vojenský priemysel takmer neexistoval. Okrem toho nová vláda presmerovala veľké percento už aj tak nízkeho národného dôchodku na povojnovú rekonštrukciu infraštruktúry a rozsiahle investície do ťažkého priemyslu. No i tak, asi 12% národného dôchodku bolo vyhradených na obranu a počas krízy to bolo takmer 23% národného dôchodku. Juhoslávia najskôr posilnila svoje pohraničné jednotky, ktoré zabezpečovali pohraničné oblasti a v nasledujúcich rokoch zachytili najviac provokácií a incidentov. Pohraničných incidentov, v ktorých boli použité strelné zbrane, bolo až do 1 450. Vláda predĺžila povinnú vojenskú službu na 3 roky, čím sa počet vojakov zvýšil na 390 000. Vzhľadom na zmeny v obranných požiadavkách v armáde prebehla ďalšia reorganizácia, čo posilnilo jednotky, ktoré bránili oblasti v Srbsku, Vojvodine a Slavónsku. Pretože juhoslovanská armáda očakávala hlavný útok z maďarského, rumunského a bulharského územia, jej vojenský plán predpokladal odsun do strategicky dôležitých centrálnych častí krajiny, južne od rieky Sávy a západne od rieky Moravy. Tam sa stavali výrobné zariadenia, vrátane tých, ktoré boli presunuté z najohrozenejších oblastí v Srbsku, Vojvodine a Slavónsku. Boli vypracované evakuačné plány pre ľudí, dobytok a obilie.[37] Existovali aj radikálne plány na podmínovanie Ðerdap Gorge, čo by spôsobilo rozliatie rieky Dunaj do rozsiahlej oblasti Vojvodiny, a tým aj zastavenie postupu sovietskych divízií. Juhoslovanská armáda urobila najväčšie zmeny vo svojej obrannej doktríne, vrátila sa k populárnej taktike partizánskej vojny, ktorá bola taká úspešná v druhej svetovej vojne. V polovici roka 1949 sa začalo s organizovaním teritoriálnych jednotiek na obranu menších oblastí a pre operácie na okupovaných územiach. Vytvoril sa veľký počet partizánskych jednotiek, takže v roku 1953 bolo 195 odlúčených jednotiek v 30 skupinách s celkovým počtom 80 000 vojakov. V každej republike bolo založené hlavné velenie partizánskych odlúčených jednotiek Juhoslávie. Osobný styk medzi veliteľmi bol zriadený na úrovni republík prostredníctvom koordinačných výborov pre národnú obranu. Medzinárodný konflikt medzi Juhosláviou a Sovietskym zväzom, zamaskovaný ako ideologický spor medzi dvoma komunistickými stranami, mal ďalekosiahle dôsledky na strategickú situáciu v Európe, hoci sa nepodarilo predpovedať konfrontáciu týchto dvoch blokov v strednej Európe. Konflikt bol oveľa dôležitejší pre Juhosláviu. Očakávanie sovietskej intervencie spustilo mnohé administratívne a doktrinálne zmeny, nielen v civilnom, ale aj vo vojenskom živote. Hospodárska a vojenská pomoc, ktorú Juhoslávia dostala, diplomatické postavenie a nadobudnutý politický kapitál, zabezpečil Juhoslávii zvláštne postavenie a uznanie medzi západo- a východoeurópskymi krajinami aj pre budúcnosť. Posilnené hospodárstvo, selektívne uplatňovanie socialistických reforiem a nepretržité dodávky rôznych druhov rozvojovej pomoci spôsobili, že Juhoslávia bola hospodársky rozvinutejšia ako ostatné východoeurópske krajiny. Okrem toho sa Titovi podarilo vo vnútorne zjednote-

---

37

nej Juhoslávii dočasne prekonať rozsiahle etnické a hospodárske rozdiely medzi jednotlivými republikami a vďaka svojej právomoci zabezpečil bezpečné spolužitie rôznych kultúr v jednom štáte.

Hungary Exiting the Revolution and War of Independence in 1956
Casualties, Retaliations and Propaganda

Dr. Éva Tulipán

On 22nd November 1956 three Soviet communist party leaders sent the following account from Hungary to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow: *"the general situation in the country is gradually normalizing, although very slowly. Since 12th November, our troops have not been engaged in any military operations; only isolated units follow small bands of rebels into the countryside in order to eliminate them."*[1]

By the time the report was written, the Soviet army had fulfilled two interventions against Hungary.

THE SOVIET INTERVENTIONS OF 23RD OCTOBER AND 4TH NOVEMBER, 1956

As we know from the works of Hungarian military historian Miklós Horváth, all decisive personalities of the communist party leadership in Hungary agreed to the first Soviet intervention of 23rd October. When they felt that events of the streets threatened their power, they turned automatically to Moscow to help defending it. The first intervention was executed according to the operations plan "Wave" developed in July 1956 by Colonel Malashenko, having studied the similar plans of the Hungarian army, police and political

---

1   "Situational Report from Georgii Malenkov, Mikhail Suslov and Averki Aristov". In *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A history in documents*, edited by Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne and János M. Rainer, pp. 449–455. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2002.

police. In the course of the intervention, the Soviet troops applied the method of intimidating the enemy by demonstrating superior strength, used successfully in Berlin[2].

Which the Soviet and Hungarian leaders were not prepared for was that this lead to the contrary effect and that tanks, which were to be used for demonstrating power, were totally unsuitable for fighting among houses without infantry. And although the first units were reinforced with additional ones from the territory of Ukraine and Rumania between 24–28th October, Soviet troops suffered great losses in the streets of Budapest[3].

By the end of October, the decision was made in Moscow to begin a new operation called "Whirlwind" in order to restore socialist order in Hungary. According to the plan, the Soviet Special Corps had to rout the insurgent groups and disarm any resisting regular army units. On the eve of the attack – for securing the success of the operation – KGB chief Serov arrested the minister of defence and other high ranking Hungarian officers, who went to Tököl for the negotiations concerning the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. At the same time, Imre Nagy and several other political leaders were persuaded to seek asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy[4].

Prior to the attack, Marshal Koniev, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, issued his order no.1, in which he described the situation as the following: "*It must not be forgotten that in the previous war, Horthyist Hungary fought against our motherland as an ally of Hitler's Germany*"[5]. This must have been a general opinion as Colonel Malashenko, acting chief of staff of the Special Army Corps, also wrote the same in his memoir in 1995: "*Officers and soldiers in the ranks executed their military duties. They did not consider whether their actions were justified; they did not question their orders. In those years many remembered that Hungary had fought as an ally of Fascist Germany against our country in the last war… they considered their actions as a continuation of their earlier fighting*"[6]. In the light of these texts, Béla Király's definition, when he speaks about "the first war between socialist countries"[7], proves to be completely accurate.

Operation Whirlwind started at 4 a.m. Budapest time, 4th November, when the password "Thunder" was given. The main forces of the divisions of the Special Corps invaded Budapest from several directions, while the attack also began in the countryside, with units of seventeen Soviet divisions involving about 60 000 soldiers. The Soviets could

---

2   Miklós Horváth, "Soviet Aggression against Hungary in 1956: Operations "Wave" and "Whirlwind" In *A Millennium of Hungarian Military History,* edited by László Veszprémy and Béla K. Király, pp. 557–582. Highland Lakes, N. J.: Atlantic Research and Publications Inc., 2002.

3   Horváth Miklós, *1956 hadikrónikája (Military Chronicle of 1956),* pp. 107–108. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2003.

4   Miklós Horváth, „Introduction to Part IV" In *1956: The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence,* edited by Béla K. Király, Kenneth Murphy and László Veszprémy. pp. 432–464. Highland Lakes, N. J.: Atlantic Research and Publications Inc., 2006.

5   Miklós Horváth, "Soviet Aggression against Hungary in 1956: Operations "Wave" and "Whirlwind" In *A Millennium of Hungarian Military History,* edited by László Veszprémy and Béla K. Király, p. 578. Highland Lakes, N. J.: Atlantic Research and Publications Inc., 2002.

6   Yevgeny Ivanovich Malashenko, "The Special Corps under Fire in Budapest: Memoirs of an Eyewitness" In: *Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary 1956*, edited by Jenő Györkei and Miklós Horváth, p. 279. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 1999.

7   Béla K. Király, "An Abortive and the First Real War between Socialist Countries" In *A Millennium of Hungarian Military History,* edited by László Veszprémy and Béla K. Király, pp. 535–556. Highland Lakes, N. J.: Atlantic Research and Publications Inc., 2002.

break organized armed resistance of the Hungarian insurgent groups only as late as 11th November, when struggle of the forces of the revolution was suppressed both in Budapest and in the countryside. Operation Whirlwind was over but Soviet forces still remained in the country and the Hungarian people had to wait for long decades to their full withdrawal from Hungary and for gaining the independence that they hoped in the days of the revolution[8].

CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTIONS: DESTRUCTION AND CASUALTIES

Eleven years after the Second World War, Budapest lay in ruins once again. Around 5 200 houses and buildings had suffered serious damage, more than 2 000 flats were inhabitable. Almost 100 buildings with 700 flats in them were completely devastated. Close to 20 000 people were injured[9] and almost 200 000 people emigrated[10].

Inner districts of Budapest had received the greatest destruction. There were some industrial suburbs, however, where fighting was especially violent: the number of totally perished houses and buildings was the highest in Csepel, where on 9th November Soviet tanks fired along several streets causing death of whole families[11].

Casualties of Soviet Troops

Soviet historian Alexandr Kirov estimated that the total Soviet casualties were *circa* 1 900 persons. Of this number roughly 650 died, 50 were missing and 1200 persons were wounded.

In Budapest, Soviet troops suffered the greatest losses (80% of their casualties) in fighting in the 8th and 9th districts. Lieutenant General Malashenko also confirms that "*more than half of the casualties were incurred in October by units of the Special Corps. The 33rd Mechanized Division under General Obaturov also suffered heavy casualties. They faced the most complex situation, since they were active in the central districts, where several armed groups were stationed, and initially they were not always successful in organising their operations*"[12].

Hungarian Casualties during the Soviet Interventions

In the course of battles in Budapest around 2000 persons died. Total casualties of Hun-

---

8   Miklós Horváth, "Soviet Aggression against Hungary in 1956: Operations "Wave" and "Whirlwind" In *A Millennium of Hungarian Military History,* edited by László Veszprémy and Béla K. Király, p. 577. Highland Lakes, N. J.: Atlantic Research and Publications Inc., 2002.

9   "Az október 23-i és az azt követő eseményekkel kapcsolatos sérülések és halálozások" ("Injuries and Death Cases Connected to the Events on an following 23rd October"). A Központi Statisztikai Hivatal 1957. május 15-i jelentésének kiadása (Publication of the report of the Central Statistical Office on 15th May, 1957). *Statisztikai Szemle*, 1990/10. pp. 797–816.

10   "Az illegálisan külfödre távozott személyek adatai (1956. október 23 – 1957. április 30.)" ("Personal data of illegally emigrated persons (23rd October,1956 – 30th April, 1957"). *Regio – Kisebbségtudományi Szemle*, 1991/4.

11   *Budapest Statisztikai Zsebkönyve (Statistical Pocket Book of Budapest).* pp. 230–231. Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1957.

12   Miklós Horváth, "Losses of Life in the War and during the Reprisals" In *1956: The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence,* edited by Béla K. Király, Kenneth Murphy and László Veszprémy. pp. 478–479. Highland Lakes, N. J.: Atlantic Research and Publications Inc., 2006.

garian people reach as high as 2700–3000 persons[13]. The two peaks of the death diagram correlate with the two Soviet interventions, of which the second claimed more lives. Between the two the only violent action was the siege of the Budapest Communist Party Headquarter in Köztársaság Square (30th October). Three quarters of casualties were suffered in Budapest, 46% in the inner districts of Pest.

Regarding the gender distribution we can find that 14% of the victims were women and 86% were men. 78% of the female losses of the country happened in Budapest and the remaining 22% in the countryside. In the case of Budapest, female and male losses diagrams come closer to each other on those days, when the capital suffered great civilian casualties (the majority of women did not participate actively in the war of independence). If we consider the generational specialties, as well, this finding is confirmed: losses of the oldest and youngest generations increase on the same days and territories, when and where women death rate is high. Generally considering the age distribution, we can derive that almost tree quarters (72%) of the dead were under 40 years. Among them 44% was younger than 25 years. More than half of the dead belonged to the working class.

Hungarian Military Casualties[14]

The Hungarian Peoples' Army lost 250–300 persons during the revolution. Nearly 40% of the casualties occurred in two days: 24th October and 4th November. The army suffered 30% of its total losses on one single day, 4th November, when 70 soldiers died, 64 (91.43%) of whom were killed by Soviet weapons. About three quarters of total military casualties were made up of deaths of soldiers aged 20–24. Less than half of the losses occurred in the course of armed combat, and only 8% died during the fights against rebels. At least 10% of the casualties were caused by disorganisation of the government forces, which resulted in their firing at each other. 16% of the victims were killed in action against Soviet troops, and as high as 46% of the total casualties fell as a consequence of one-sided Soviet attacks. Thus, 62% of the Hungarian military losses were inflicted by the occupying Soviet troops. Nevertheless, 46% of the soldiers that were shot by Soviets were registered after the revolution as having been "killed in action" (literally "heroic dead") or "killed on duty".

KÁDÁR'S ATTEMPTS TO GAIN POWER: RETALIATIONS AND PROPAGANDA

The power of János Kádár's puppet government, appointed by the Soviets in Moscow, was solely guaranteed by Soviet military presence and at the outset Kádár was the most hated man in the country. He was completely isolated and although armed resistance had finished by the middle of November, it was replaced by a most peculiar type of rev-

---

13 Éva Tulipán, "Az 1956-os forradalom és szabadságharc során elszenvedett veszteségek vizsgálata" ("A Study of Casualties Suffered during the 1956 Revolution and War of Independence") In *In memoriam 1956*. Miklós Horváth – Éva Tulipán, pp. 55–71. Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2006.

14 For further details see Miklós Horváth – Éva Tulipán, Keresztutak: *Magyar Néphadsereg 1956 (Crossroads: Hungarian Peoples' Army 1956)*. Budapest: H&T Kiadó, 2006.

olution that was fought without guns but that mobilized masses in peaceful demonstrations in the streets and great strikes in the factories. At the beginning of its political existence, the new and illegitimate government had to face the unfavourable circumstances and to take measures towards handling the situation.

Kádár was – from the very beginning – busy in organising special police squads for the purposes of retaliation and securing his authority. Former members of the hated political police were transferred *en mass* into the reorganised police. The reconstruction of which was accomplished with Soviet assistance, as the November situational report informs us: *"Currently comrade Münnich* [deputy premier of the Kádár government] *is implementing measures for strengthening the organs of the political police. Comrade Serov and his officials are actively helping comrade Münnich"*[15]. Only by February 1957 was the regime able to set up its special para-military force, the so called "Workers' Guard", that was directly under the command of the party's Central Committee.

By as early as 22nd November the first steps of the reprisals had been taken, not surprisingly with Soviet support, too: *"In order to find and eliminate underground rebel centres, our security officials, together with the Hungarian police, worked on arresting and detaining persons who participated most actively in the armed riots. Altogether 1,473 people were arrested in addition to 5,820 persons who detained and remain under investigation. Leaders and organizers of the riots, persons who supplied the rebels with weapons and ammunition, and also members of the so-called revolutionary committees active during the riots are subject to arrest"* – can we read in the situational report already cited[16]. This happened in spite of the fact that Kádár first promised impunity to participants of the revolution[17].

Quite to the contrary, authorities shot at defenceless, unarmed civilians (as proved by Hungarian historians Sándor M. Kiss and Frigyes Kahler[18]) during and after the revolution, martial law procedures were introduced together with arrests of civilians, immediate executions and destructive attacks without rational justification. As Frigyes Kahler has pointed out, between 1st January, 1957 and 31st December, 1960, almost 17000 persons were convicted on charges of crimes against the state. Another Hungarian scholar, Tibor Zinner estimates the total number of convictions as high as 26621 counting the entire period of reprisals[19].

Furthermore, authorities – just like prior to the revolution – gave first priority to the identification and punishment of "class-enemy elements" who were supposed to had at-

---

15   "Situational Report from Georgii Malenkov, Mikhail Suslov and Averki Aristov" In *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A history in documents*, edited by Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne and János M. Rainer, pp. 449–455. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2002.

16   "Situational Report from Georgii Malenkov, Mikhail Suslov and Averki Aristov" In *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A history in documents*, edited by Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne and János M. Rainer, pp. 449–455. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2002.

17   Miklós Horváth, „Losses of Life in the War and during the Reprisals" In: *1956: The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence,* edited by Béla K. Király, Kenneth Murphy and László Veszprémy. p. 480. Highland Lakes, N. J.: Atlantic Research and Publications Inc., 2006.

18   Kahler Frigyes – M. Kiss Sándor, *„Mától kezdve lövünk": Tíz év után a sortüzekről („We Are Shooting from This Day on": About Salvo Fires Ten Years after.* Budapest: Kairosz Kiadó, 2003.

19   Miklós Horváth, „Losses of Life in the War and during the Reprisals" In *1956: The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence,* edited by Béla K. Király, Kenneth Murphy and László Veszprémy. p. 480. Highland Lakes, N. J.: Atlantic Research and Publications Inc., 2006.

tempted restoring their power during the Revolution: aristocrats, landowners, capitalists, factory owners, bankers, Fascist and bourgeois Party leaders, political and military leaders of the Horthy system etc. At the court the fact that a military officer was trained in the pre-war military academy and served in the pre-1945 "Horthy army" could led to more severe sentence, as in the case of Major Antal Pálinkás (Pallavicini), who first was sentenced to life imprisonment, but the appeals court changed it to capital punishment. The decision was made in part because of his aristocratic origins, and his training in the pre-war military academy further worsened his position.

Miklós Horváth found that the case of Antal Pálinkás (Pallavicini) was an exemption, however, as the dominant majority of those convicted was of working-class origin. Of the 229 persons executed he could only classify 16 as "class enemies," including 6 of wealthy peasant origin. Among the rest were 10 middle peasants, 19 poor peasants, 28 landless impoverished agrarian workers, 23 civil servants or intellectuals, 28 employees of small-scale industries, 8 service workers, 9 railway workers, 54 industrial workers and 9 unskilled or temporary workers[20].

"MARTYRS"

The Kádár government very soon after its establishment started to publish brochures and books about so-called "counter-revolutionary" victims. Propagandists of the regime aimed to gain sympathy and support from the masses by way of recollecting the cruel deeds of rebels and telling stories about the life and horrible death of "good communists" several of whom in reality died among yet unclarified circumstances.

Among them the most famous is Sándor Sziklai, who was commander of the Military History Institute in 1956, and the falsification of his story is the most extreme example of creating "martyrs" after the revolution. Until the fall of the Kádár regime, Sziklai was said to have died by the weapons of "counter-revolutionists". In the 1990s, however, Jenő Györkei and Miklós Horváth published another explanation to his death: Sziklai, after causing fatal injury to his own father-in-law and another person (an insurgent) committed suicide[21]. New findings confirmed the latter version, as lately it was revealed that the death records in the parish registry of both Sándor Sziklai and his fater-in-law were falsified three years after the revolution[22]. It is a shocking fact that during the reprisals six persons, who were accused of participating in "murdering" Sándor Sziklai, were sentenced to capital punishment, two persons were in reality executed (four of them were convicted *in absentia*, they emigrated after the revolution). Four other defendants were

20 Miklós Horváth, „Losses of Life in the War and during the Reprisals" In *1956: The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence,* edited by Béla K. Király, Kenneth Murphy and László Veszprémy. pp. 481–483. Highland Lakes, N. J.: Atlantic Research and Publications Inc., 2006.

21 Jenő Györkei – Miklós Horváth, "Additional Data on the History of the Soviet Military Occupation" In *Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary 1956*, edited by Jenő Györkei and Miklós Horváth, pp. 84–85. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 1999.

22 Miklós Horváth – Éva Tulipán: *In memoriam 1956.* p. 231. Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2006.

sentenced to life imprisonment, additional seven persons were convicted to sixty years altogether[23].

It was not rare that rebels were blamed for the deaths of the Hungarian soldiers, police, and civilians who were either killed in the fights against Soviets or by Soviet soldiers. In the archive, the transformation from Soviet victim to "counter-revolutionary martyr" can be traced, as in many cases both versions can be found in the same file.

According to the official version, János Bogár was on his way home, when on 5th November was shot in the head by a band of "counter-revolutionaries". In the archives, however, with Miklós Horváth we have found another description of his death: he was on his way home, when Soviet soldiers made the bus he was travelling with stop and started to frisk his fellow soldiers. "When it was his turn he stood in front of a Soviet soldier who drew his pistol and it fired at the same instant. The bullet went through on his left, under the chest. János Bogár …wanted to take off the bus. When he was on the steps the Soviet soldier shot him in the head from behind. He fell off the steps and died immediately".

The sad story is gradually transforming when reading the documents: the first new motive is that the bus was stopped by "soldiers dressed in Soviet uniform". Then they become "persons dressed in Soviet uniform" and it is only one step forward to find out that these "persons" were "counter-revolutionists". One document also adds the quite weird explanation that "counter-revolutionaries dressed in Soviet uniform so as to increase the hysteria against Soviet soldiers"[24].

Researches concerning the circumstances of the deaths of "martyrs" are in progress, but it is clear even so far that at least 30% of soldiers and border guards and 10% of state security personnel were not killed in battles against the insurgents, but in fighting between Soviet and Hungarian government forces and between Hungarian army and security forces partly as a result of organizational confusion[25].

Miklós Horváth have found a close relationship between the number of those executed for participation in the revolution (229) and the number of those whom the Kádár regime declared to have died as martyrs (224). He drew the conclusion that "one of the main objectives of the reprisal was vengeance for "those who died in defense of the regime," which meant that for each "martyr" at least one execution was to be carried out". Thus "enlargement of the number of "martyrs" was motivated, in addition to the intent to mislead the public, by efforts to increase the number of those executed and thereby justify the reprisals". He found that this practice accorded with what János Kádár said concerning the reprisal and the number of those executed in a conversation with Soviet First Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on 25th September, 1985 in Moscow: *"when the number of*

23 László Böőr – Tibor Takács, "Pest megye" ("Pest County") In *A vidék forradalma (The Revolution of the Countryside)* II. p. 277. Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 2006.

24 Éva Tulipán: "A harcok magyar katonai veszteségei" ("Hungarian Military Losses of the Fighting")p. 95. *Keresztutak*: *Magyar Néphadsereg 1956 (Crossroads: Hungarian Peoples' Army 1956)*. Miklós Horváth – Éva Tulipán, Budapest: H&T Kiadó, 2006.

25 Miklós Horváth, „Losses of Life in the War and during the Reprisals" In *1956: The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence,* edited by Béla K. Király, Kenneth Murphy and László Veszprémy. p. 488. Highland Lakes, N. J.: Atlantic Research and Publications Inc., 2006.

death sentences reached the number of those who had died as innocent victims in the counter-revolutionary events, I requested the comrades to stop"[26].

Retaliation continued until 1963 when the regime felt safe enough to announce "great amnesty" and set free the majority of those having been imprisoned after the revolution. Not every participants of the revolution was released, however, as the amnesty only applied to those having sentenced for political crimes[27].

The remaining of Soviet Army in Hungary was never questioned until the fall of the regime.

RESUMÉ

Éva Tulipán: Koniec revolúcie a vojny za nezávislosť v Maďarsku v roku 1956. Obete, odveta a propaganda

Príspevok sa zaoberá postkonfliktnou situáciou v Maďarsku po revolúcii v roku 1956. Prvá časť je stručným zhrnutím samotného konfliktu, dvoch sovietskych intervencií, ktoré zadusili vojnu za nezávislosť a urobili z Jánosa Kádára prvého muža nového režimu. Druhá časť sumarizuje situáciu, ktorej museli čeliť Maďari a Kádárove úrady. Prvou úlohou bolo spočítať obete a škody spôsobené konfliktom. Počty obetí na životoch v príspevku vychádzajú z nového výskumu. Sovietska armáda stratila 650 vojakov, 50 bolo nezvestných a 1 200 osôb bolo zranených. Maďarských obetí bolo asi 2 700 – 3 000, z ktorých asi 2 000 zomrelo v Budapešti. 14% obetí boli ženy, 86% boli muži a takmer tri štvrtiny mŕtvych ešte nemali 40 rokov.

Maďarská ľudová armáda stratila počas revolúcie 250 – 300 osôb. Takmer 40% obetí zahynulo v prvých dňoch dvoch sovietskych intervencií (24. októbra a 4. novembra). Asi tri štvrtiny mŕtvych vojakov boli vo veku 20 – 24 rokov. Takmer dve tretiny strát v maďarskej armáde spôsobili okupačné sovietske vojská, 16% z nich bolo zabitých v akcii proti sovietskym vojskám, 46% padlo v dôsledku jednostranných sovietskych útokov.

Mnohí vojaci, ktorých zastrelili Sovieti alebo náhodne maďarské vládne sily, boli po revolúcii zaregistrovaní ako "hrdinsky padlí". V príspevku sú špecifické príklady, ako kádárovská propaganda falzifikovala okolnosti a vinila povstalcov z toho, že spôsobili ich smrť. Maďarský vojenský historik Miklós Horváth zistil, že Kádárova vláda potrebovala takto zvýšiť počet " mučeníkov", aby mohla "zvýšiť počet popravených, a tým zdôvodniť represálie". Tento názor potvrdzuje aj citovanie slov Jánosa Kádára, ktoré povedal Gorbačovovi 25. septembra 1985 v Moskve.

---

26   Miklós Horváth, „Losses of Life in the War and during the Reprisals" In *1956: The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence,* edited by Béla K. Király, Kenneth Murphy and László Veszprémy. pp. 487–488. Highland Lakes, N. J.: Atlantic Research and Publications Inc., 2006.

27   Insurgents were often accused of murder, theft etc. – many of them innocently – and were judged consequently. The amnesty did not concern these sentences.

The Danube Operation in 1968

Dr. Michal Štefanský

A military intervention of five countries of the Warsaw Treaty in Czecho-Slovakia at night from 20 to 21 August 1968 was conducted under the title „the Danube" operation. The military intervention had political and military goals. The Soviet Politburo in August 1968 came to conclusion that the Czecho-Slovak leadership with A. Dubček is under anti-Soviet forces. In consequence the communist regime in Czecho-Slovakia was threatened. According to this Soviet idea, results of the Second World War may be annulled if Czecho-Slovakia gives up its membership in the Warsaw Treaty and the Mutual Economic Aid Council. Military goals consisted in Soviet efforts aimed at deployment of its divisions in the territory of Czecho-Slovakia. The Soviet leadership struggled for it already in 1967 and during discussions with the Czecho-Slovak delegation in Moscow in May 1968. An essence of the Soviet proposals consisted in deployment of the Soviet divisions on the boarder with the Federal Republic of Germany /FRG/ in the first line. Direct adversaries on the FRG side were the 2nd Bundeswehr Army Corps and the 7th American Army. A main goal of the military operation was to strengthen the unity and discipline inside the bloc, to force Czecho-Slovakia to be an obedient and reliable state in accordance with Soviet ideas. Deterrent effects of the intervention were addressed to Rumania that formally remained the Warsaw Treaty member, but in the foreign and political spheres it had totally different views on main political and military events, e. g. on the Arabic-Israeli war in 1967, the Vietnamese war, the relation to China and others. Since the end of the Second World War the military intervention in Czecho-Slovakia was the third one in sequence within the Soviet bloc. Different from the military interventions in the German Democratic Republic /GDR/ in 1953 and Hungary in 1956, in the military intervention in Czecho-Slovakia there were four more States in addition to the Soviet Union. The supreme commander of the intervention troops was Soviet General I. Pavlovskij – commander of the Ground Forces of the Soviet Army. The operation was led by Soviet Minister of Defence Marshal A. Grečko from Moscow. Five states of the Warsaw Treaty were involved in „the Danube" operation, but authorities of this military grouping did not discuss preparation and realisation of this operation.

The Soviet preparation for the military operation against Czecho-Slovakia started at the beginning of April 1968 when Czecho-Slovak communist leadership was criticised by the Warsaw Treaty states in the meeting in Dresden. The essence of the Soviet criticism taken over by other four states of the Warsaw Treaty was based on statements that Czecho-Slovak communist leadership under A. Dubček is not firm, but weak and it succumbed to hostile forces labelled as anti-socialist and anti-Soviet ones. In addition to that the Soviet side justified the weakness of Czecho-Slovak communist leadership by a loss of combat ability of the Czecho-Slovak Army that should have been shown in insufficient guarding of the western boarder with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Austria and that consequently threatened also the whole Warsaw Treaty security. Naturally, Soviet arguments were an ideological preparation and justification of the military intervention and did not have real grounds. Czecho-Slovakia through its official representatives has never challenged the membership in the Warsaw Treaty and Comecon. Statements on the loss of combat ability of the CS Army and lack of protection of the western boarder were based on ideological grounds too. In spite of the fact that official representatives of the Warsaw Treaty had an opportunity to see the protection of the western boarder of Czecho-Slovakia in person, the argumentation on the insufficient protection was given to the Treaty on the Soviet troops' deployment in the territory of Czecho-Slovakia. The Treaty stipulated that the Soviet troops in the territory of Czecho-Slovakia had to ensure security of socialist countries against West German revanchists and militarists.[1]

Since half of June 1968 there were also other four states of the Warsaw Treaty involved in military preparations for the intervention, particularly: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and GDR. These states together with the USSR participated in the military exercise in the territory of Czecho-Slovakia called „Šumava" and in exercises along CS boarders called „Nemen" and „Celestial Shield". Military preparations for the intervention took place paralelly with elaboration of the political plan for change of the CS state leadership. Soviet political plans aimed at elimination of Dubček and supporters of reforms. They were directed at ending the social reform of the political system with liberalisation of relations, elimination of censorship, reconstruction of legal state and remedy of great faults of 1950's. The reforms were expressed by the motto „socialism with a human face".

The Soviet side was confused by development in Czecho-Slovakia and did not have ready a scenario of how to stop reform changes. States of the Warsaw Treaty exerted political, military and ideological pressure on the CS leadership. Stationing of the Soviet troops in the territory of Czecho-Slovakia after ending of the „Šumava" exercise should have encouraged opposition and conservative forces against Dubček. However, the exercise did not fulfil these tasks. From military aspect it was a reconnaissance of terrain and training of the military intervention, because „the Danube"operation was participated by the same units, which staffs had been present in „Šumava" exercise. In August 1968 the Soviet side came to conclusion that reversing the development in Czecho-Slo-

---

1 Treaty between the CSSR Government and the USSR Government on Conditions of Temporary Stay of Soviet Troops in the Territory of Czecho-Slovakia In: Vojenské otázky československé reformy 1967 – 1970, 6/2. Praha – Brno, 1999, p. 75.

vakia is possible only through the military intervention in connection with an internal coup. The coup should have been carried out by conservative forces through establishing of the government of workers and farmers as in Hungary in 1956. After the intervention troops' entry, the attempt with the government of workers and farmers went bankrupt and the Soviet leadership got in a difficult situation. Czecho-Slovakia was occupied militarily, but it was not politically dominated by the intervention troops. Inhabitants of the whole country were loyal to legal representatives of the CS State and only except for small exceptions they refused to cooperate with the intervention troops.

Available resources of Russian provenience show that the Soviet leadership of the communist party delayed realisation of „the Danube" operation and expected that the change in Czecho-Slovakia will be done through political means. At the end of July and at the beginning of August the Soviet leadership asked Dubček to conduct personal changes in the leadership of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia (CPCS), to forbid any activity of social democrats and various civil associations that required not to stop the reforms of the political system, but on the contrary to continue in it even speeder. The Soviet decision to solve the situation by the military intervention was accelerated also by the fact that at the beginning of September 1968 the CPCS congress should have taken place, in which conservative representatives of CPCS and pro-Soviet policy supporters should not have been elected to the leadership. At the beginning of August 1968 the Soviet Army command confronted the Politburo with a dilemma: either to return the Soviet troops concentrated along the CS boarders to their original garrisons for several months under pretences of military exercises or to use the concentration of the troops for the military intervention. Definitive decision on „the Danube" operation was made in the Soviet Politburo meeting on 16 –17 August 1968. On 18 August leaders of four States of the Warsaw Treaty approved the military operation in the meeting in Moscow. The military readiness for the operation was verified by the meeting in the USSR Ministry of Defence with presence of the supreme commander of the Warsaw Treaty Marshal I. Jakubovskij, the USSR Minister of Defence Marshal A. Grečko, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army Marshal M. Zacharov, commanders of all services, southern and northern groups of the Soviet Army, the commander of the Soviet troops in GDR and commanders of intervention units assigned for „the Danube"operation. According to memories of the Soviet commander of the 38th Army, General A. Majorov, who took part in the mentioned meeting, the commanders of intervention units reported on readiness for „the Danube" operation and the whole meeting took 43 minutes.[2] Through the intervention the troops of boarder military circles in the USSR in strength of 80 – 100 divisions and strategic troops in the territory of the USSR with nuclear weapons were put on alert.

On 20th August 1968 at 23.00 p.m. CET, the vast „Danube" operation was launched with participation of half a million of soldiers and lots of military equipment. Prior to the intervention the commanders of troops opened one of five envelopes with five orders of advance on the territory of Czecho-Slovakia. The other four envelopes contained the orders for „the Danube – channel" and „the Danube – channel – Globus" operations[3].

---

2   MAJOROV A,: Vtorženie Čechoslovakia 1968. Svideteľstva komandarma. Moskva, 1998, s. 226.

3   Rossia /SSSR/ v vojnach vtoroj poloviny XX veka. Moskva: Triada firm, 2002,

The content of these operation plans is not known. Obviously, the Soviet side was not quite sure „what reactions will be caused by „the Danube"operation if the combat activity will not be extended also out of the territory of Czecho-Slovakia. There were 26 divisions, including 18 Soviet ones, assigned for „the Danube" operation. This number did not include the air armies. First intervention troops crossed the Czecho-Slovak land boarder on 20th August after 23:00 p.m. in four directions on 21 points.

The first military reaction on the entry of five states of the Warsaw Treaty to the territory of Czecho-Slovakia was issuing of two orders by the Minister of Defence destined for the CS Army. It occurred after the Soviet pressure on the Minister General M. Dzúr by the Soviet Minister of Defence Marshal A. Grečko and the representative of the Warsaw Treaty in Czecho-Slovakia General Jamščikov. Prior to the beginning of the intervention they both expressly asked the CS Minister of Defence to issue orders to the CS Army not to offer an armed resistance to the intervention troops. The first order of the Minister of Defence General M. Dzúr commanded to the CS. Army to remain in barracks, not to offer the armed resistance and to provide aid to the Soviet troops. The second order issued shortly after the midnight on 20th August forbade the CS aircraft to take off and commanded to provide aid to Soviet aircraft when landing in Prague and Brno.[4] The orders of the Minister of Defence eliminated the armed resistance of the CS Army. The Minister of Defence and the President of the Republic L. Svoboda developed great efforts in first hours and days of the military intervention to prevent armed conflicts. Conflicts were imminent there where the intervention troops wanted to occupy the CS Army barracks and to disarm the Army. In spite of great pressure and various demonstrative protests, firstly through publishing of various declarations in newspapers with anti-intervention contents, no armed conflict occurred in the whole State territory. The Czecho-Slovak Army as a whole was pacified by legal CS representatives. However, there were quite a lot of dramatic situations with tensions, because many commanders only very unwillingly subordinated to the orders of the Minister of Defence and the President of the Republic. They referred to the Declaration of the CC CPCS Chairmanship addressed to the CS people that condemned the military intervention and labelled the invasion of the troops as the breach of international law and friendly relations among the countries of the Warsaw Treaty. Anti-occupation declarations and protests of the CS Army commanders were misused for political persecutions in 1969 and served as a reason for dismissing the officers from the Army.

In 36 hours the intervention troops occupied all important positions and objects in Czecho-Slovakia. „The Danube" operation was finished. The whole territory was militarily occupied. Slovakia was occupied by troops of the 38th Army commanded by the Soviet Army General A. Majorov, later the commander of the Central Group of the Soviet troops in Czecho-Slovakia. The Bulgarian motoshooting regiment was included into this army. Soviet division groups „South"with the 8th Hungarian motoshooting division

---

http: www.militra.lib.rn/h/20c2/index htm

4 Orders of the Minister of Defence M. Dzúr, issued after his night meeting with the USSR Ambassador to CSSR S. Červonenko, Deputy Commander of the Warsaw Treaty in CSSR A. Jamščikov, the Minister of Defence A. Grečko and L. Brežnev In: Vojenské otázky československé reformy 1967 – 1970, 6/1. Praha – Brno,1966, p. 268.

with the support of the 36th Soviet Air Army and Hungarian air regiments advanced on Slovakia from north-western Hungary. There were conflicts with Hungarian Army arisen in connection with disarmament of the CS police members and officers of the Army in southern Slovakia.

The entry of troops of the Warsaw Treaty was a shock for Dubček and his supporters. Surprised people did not understand why there were convoys of tanks, armoured carriers and other combat equipment deployed on main squares and streets of big towns in the morning on 21st August. The military equipment not only disturbed normal life and caused material damages and human losses, but also incited and by its presence provoked the people to unexpected actions, for example stopping tanks with human bodies. However, the passive resistance may have finished also by bloody massacres in case of provoked attacks against tanks by means of combustibles or home made bombs. Events of first hours and days of the military intervention inspired to considerations that heavy equipment should have endangered the people while neither street fights were excluded on the side of troops. Presence of a large amount of heavy combat equipment in towns was risky for both sides – for intervention troops and for civilian population too.

Political failure of the military intervention was reported to Moscow by CC CPSU K. Mazurov, who acted in Czecho-Slovakia under a code name General Trofimov. In a difficult situation when six highest CS constitutional actors were interned to the territory of the USSR, President of the Republic L. Svoboda decided to discuss with the Soviet side their releasing from internment and looking for political ways from the emerged situation. Talks in Moscow on 23 – 26 August between Czecho-Slovak representatives and the Soviet leadership were lengthy and marked with harsh pressure on the CS delegation to sign the agreement on legalization of the military intervention as an action to protect socialism. Besides that the Soviet leadership asked the CS Government to withdraw the Czecho-Slovak complaint from the UN Security Council and to declare the extraordinary congress CPCS in Prague null and void. These requirements were contained in the Moscow Protocol that was under pressure signed by CS representatives. The Protocol contained a consent with deployment of the Soviet troops in the territory of Czecho-Slovakia and with the justification that the Soviet troops would withdraw from Czecho-Slovakia when threatening of socialism in Czecho-Slovakia and threatening of security of the socialist countries would blow away.[5] The presence of troops of the Warsaw Treaty was joined with breaking of the public order, committing of criminal activity and interfering in internal affairs. From 21 August to 3 October 1968, weapons of the Warsaw Treaty troops killed 72 and injured 902 Czecho-Slovak citizens. Most casualties were in the first days of the intervention. Killing occurred in direct shooting and in shooting against objects. Deaths and injuries were caused by vehicles of the troops too. There were also vast material damages on roads, buildings, transport and elsewhere. Soviet casualties before 20 September were 98 dead and 87 injured. An analysis of casualties according to Soviet resources shows that most cases of dead and injured were caused by accidents of helicopters and vehicles. Neither one case of using weapons against soldiers of the Warsaw Treaty from the Czecho-Slovak side is known. Weapons impounded by the

---

5   The Moscow Protocol, August 26, 1968 In: The Prague spring 1968. Budapest: CEU Press, pp.477–480.

Soviet Army belonged to CS armed bodies – the people's militia controlled by the communist party. After the entry of troops the weapons of the people's militia were closely guarded in order not to be misused. In spite of that, they were confiscated and used for propagandistic purposes as a proof of armed „counterrevolution".

The period from „the Danube" operation to deployment of the Soviet troops in barracks of Czecho-Slovak Army at the beginning of November 1968 was filled with dramatic Czecho-Slovak – Soviet political and military discussions. The first discussion of military delegations took place in Ukrainian town Mukačevo on 16 – 17 September 1968 and was led by Ministers of Defence Marshal A. Grečko and General M. Dzúr. The Soviet delegation refused to negotiate the Soviet troops' withdrawal stages and asked for areas to deploy its troops. Finally, the delegations agreed to assign five areas for the ground troops, four airfields with barracks, storage capacities and joint using of five training areas.

The situation in Czecho-Slovakia and deployment of the Soviet troops was a topic of the last negotiation of five States of the Warsaw Treaty without Czecho-Slovakia on 27 September in Moscow. Leaders of five States agreed on deployment of the Soviet troops in the territory of Czecho-Slovakia on the same conditions as in Poland and Hungary and on not mentioning the date of the troops' departure in the agreement with the Czecho-Slovak Government. Besides that in the meeting they agreed on the strategy of breaking the reforms in Czecho-Slovakia by gradual shunting of head representatives from power. After the Soviet – Czecho-Slovak meeting in Moscow at the beginning of October, *the Agreement between the CSSR Government and the USSR Government on Conditions of Temporary Stay of the Soviet Troops in the Territory of CSSR* was ready. The Agreement was presented by the Committee of the Czecho-Slovak Parliament and on 18 October approved by the Parliament. 228 deputies of 242 present in the Parliament voted for the approval. Only five deputies voted against the Agreement. In Article 1, the Agreement stated that "part of the Soviet troops being in CSSR temporarily, shall stay in its territory in order to ensure security of socialist countries against strengthening revanchist attempts of West German militarists". After signing the Agreement on Temporary Stay of the Soviet Troops, troops of four states of the Warsaw Treaty abandoned the territory of Czecho-Slovakia. Part of the Agreement was a secret protocol to the Agreement stating that 75 000 Soviet troops will be temporarily deployed in the territory of Czecho-Slovakia. The troops will consist of infantry, artillery, tank troops and other services. In the airfields there will be deployed 200 aircraft and helicopters. The Soviet troops in strength of 73 500 troops were dislocated in 33 garrisons and in four airfields. The Headquarters of the Central Group of the Soviet troops was situated in Milovice close to Prague. After dislocation of 73 500 Soviet troops in the territory of Czecho-Slovakia, the Warsaw Treaty troops had 46 divisions in Central Europe in comparison with 29 divisions of NATO.

Deployment of the Soviet troops enforced redislocation of the Czecho-Slovak Army. Redislocation and organisational changes touched 100 formations of the CS Army and 32 garrisons. The Army moved 1 200 tanks, 100 guns, 700 armoured carriers and other combat equipment. Changes touched 29 000 troops of the Czecho-Slovak Army. In Slovakia there was dislocated the 30th Guard Motoshooting Irkutsk–Pinsk Division with HQ in Zvolen and garrisons in southern and central Slovakia. In addition to that the So-

viet Army had available one airbase with helicopter regiment in the airfield Sliač. The 13th tank division and other tank and motoshooting units were moved from Bohemia to Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak Army redislocation. Movement of tank and motoshooting units from Bohemia have even more increased the importance of Slovakia as a rear area and logistic base for the Czecho-Slovak Army, which main forces were dislocated on the boarder with FRG and Austria.

By the scope of deployed troops and equipment „The Danube"operation was the largest military operation since the end of the Second World War. It caused concerns about the military intervention in Austria, Rumania and Yugoslavia. In long-term horizon the consequences of the military intervention appeared in restoration of neo-Stalin regime in Czecho-Slovakia accompanied by political persecutions of supporters of reforms. The regime formed in 1970's was marked as a real socialism and was characterised by stiffness and resistance to any changes.

The military intervention installed new issues of security of small states. Development in bipolar divided world was marked with alternation of international tension and its moderation due to détente policy. The Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the one hand moderated an emergence of conflicts through guaranteeing of boarders established after the Second World War, on the other hand it raised questions of human rights respecting in States of the Soviet bloc. Joining of families sensitively touched also Czecho-Slovakia, because after the military intervention several tens of thousand people emigrated to western countries.

The intervention set in motion also changes in the North-Atlantic Alliance. They were judged in the meeting of the NATO Defence Ministers in half November 1968 in Brussels. The Ministers of Defence agreed on the fact that the military intervention was not any threat to any NATO country. They considered it to be an internal bloc affair. Simultaneously, they declared determination not to permit any other Soviet expansion against states as Austria, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Finland. The intervention served for revitalisation of NATO because due to the détente policy some member states have been loosing interest in the membership and wanted to terminate it. The intervention served also as a tool for NATO member states to agree with proposals to increase financial cost for joint defence.

RESUMÉ

Michal Štefanský: Operácia Dunaj v roku 1968

Pod názvom operácia „Dunaj" sa uskutočnila vojenská intervencia piatich štátov Varšavskej zmluvy do Československa v noci z 20. na 21. augusta 1968. Intervenčným vojskám velil veliteľ pozemných vojsk Sovietskej armády generál I. Pavlovskij. Operáciu z Moskvy riadil sovietsky minister obrany A. Grečko. Okrem Sovietskej armády sa na intervencii zúčastnili vojská Bulharska, Poľska, Maďarska a NDR. Operácia sa pripravovala od apríla 1968 a sprevádzala ju kritika československého vedenia komunistickej strany a štátu. Kritika Alexandra Dubčeka a protagonistov reforiem sa zakladala na názoroch, že vedenie štátu je nespoľahlivé a podlieha protisocialistickým a protisovietskym silám. Ochrana západnej hranice Československa, ktorú pokladali aj za hranicu Varšavskej zmluvy, nebola podľa kritikov zabezpečená. Od júna 1968 sa príprav na intervenciu zúčastnili aj štyri štáty Varšavskej zmluvy. Pozdĺž čs. hraníc sa konali

vojenské cvičenia Varšavskej zmluvy, ktoré mali zastrašiť čs. politické vedenie. Vojenské cvičenie pod názvom „Šumava" koncom júna 1968 na území Československa bolo rekognoskáciou terénu a nácvikom na intervenciu, pretože sa ich zúčastnili jednotky, ktoré sa zúčastnili aj vojenskej intervencie.

Prvý sled intervenčných jednotiek vstúpil na územie Československa 20. augusta o 23.oo hod. Vojská prekročili hranice zo štyroch smerov a na 21 miestach. Intervencie v prvých dňoch sa zúčastnilo 26 divízií, mimo leteckých armád. Československá armáda nekládla žiadny odpor intervenčným vojskám. Dva rozkazy ministra obrany Martina Dzúra vydané pod sovietskym nátlakom zabránili vojenskému odporu. Proti intervencii sa postavili obyvatelia celého štátu, ktorí kládli pasívny odpor.

Rozmiestnenie sovietskych vojsk v počte 73 500 vojakov na území Československa sa uskutočnilo podľa sovietsko-československej zmluvy z 18. októbra 1968. Vojská ostatných štyroch štátov boli stiahnuté z územia Československa. Počtom nasadených vojakov a bojovej techniky operácia „Dunaj" bola od skončenia druhej svetovej vojny najväčšou v strednej Európe. Mala za cieľ obnoviť neostalinský režim, podobný, aký existoval v ostatných krajinách Varšavskej zmluvy. Intervencia vyvolala obavy v Rakúsku, Rumunsku a Juhoslávii. Rozmiestnením sovietskych vojsk v Československu získala Varšavská zmluva v počte divízií v strednej Európe prevahu nad NATO. Dôsledky intervencie pre štáty NATO posúdili ministri obrany na schôdzi v novembri 1968 v Bruseli. Dohodli sa na posilnení vplyvu USA v Európe a celkovej revitalizácii NATO.

Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Czechoslovakia, 26. 2. 1990–27. 6. 1991

Major-General (ret.) Svetozár Naďovič

INTRODUCTION

The 26th June of the year 1991 was written when the last soldier of the Soviet army left Czechoslovakia. That army, which – in cooperation with armies of four countries of the Warsaw Treaty – in the force of about 500 000 soldiers invaded Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968 and stopped the revival process of the society and reforms, directed towards democracy and cooperation with Europe.

The Czech and Slovak spring and its symbol, Alexander Dubček, represented a new hope for the change of relations on the old continent which – at that time – seemed to be hopelessly conserved. The entry of the troops of the five countries of the WT frustrated this hope.

It lasted seventeen years before the question of the possibility to reform socialism came on the agenda of the day in the USSR. It was under the name "perestrojka" after Gorbatchev took up the function of Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It is necessary to keep in mind that the changes were an objective necessity, they were demanded by the domestic and economic situation not only in the Soviet Union, but also in other socialist countries.

The solving of economic stagnation which influenced negatively the living standard of citizens and called out their displeasure with the regime could no longer be delayed. The "perestrojka" opened unambiguously the road to democratic process in all European socialist countries. And even when this process did not start synchronously, after a certain time it flowed into one stream and the result became not the reform of socialism but its doom. A new era of the development opened for the pertinent countries of the former socialist community, including the USSR which – at the end – dissolved itself. It can be said without exaggeration that it was the beginning of a new era of the global development.

The turning moment in Czechoslovakia started in November 1989. The process, designed as the "velvet revolution", led to basic changes in the power structure and the overall orientation of Czechoslovakia in domestic and external politics. Qualitative changes took place in the political, social and economic conditions of the development of the state.

The new state power had to solve very quickly many strategic tasks with the aim to secure for the process to become irreversible. One of the strategic tasks with a high priority was to secure the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.

But let us return to the year 1968 in order to understand under which conditions the Soviet occupational forces stayed in Czechoslovakia.

I. LEGALIZATION OF THE INTRUSION INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968 AND SIGNING THE TREATY ABOUT THE TEMPORARY STATIONING OF SOVIET TROOPS ON THE TERRITORY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

After the crash of the plan for the immediate taking over by the collaborator's government, the leadership of the USSR summoned a meeting of the highest representatives of the ČSSR and the USSR to Moscow, whereto it usurped the right to influence also the composition of the Czechoslovak delegation, where Moscow intended to have loyal allies.

During demanding and complicated negotiations on August 23rd to 26th in Kremlin, the Soviet leadership forced the representatives of the ČSSR, including Dubček, to sign a – with foreign hand written – Moscow protocol. It consisted of 15 articles which grossly interfered into domestic issues of a sovereign state, meant the capitulation and legalized the intrusion.

On the basis of Article 5, the leadership of the state together with the Ministry of Defence had to solve a complex of problems connected with the deployment of the temporary contingent of the Soviet troops on the territory of the ČSSR. After complicated negotiations in Mukačevo on September 16th to 17th 1968, it was agreed that the force of Soviet occupational troops would be one all-arms Army with five land divisions, one mixed air division and an army complete, about in the force of 80 000 Soviet soldiers. The formally legal act which concluded the discussions of the military delegations of the defence resorts of the ČSSR and the USSR was the Treaty among the Governments of the ČSSR and the USSR about some questions connected with the temporary presence of Soviet troops on the territory of the ČSSR. The treaty was signed by the Chairman of the Government of the ČSSR O. Černík and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. Kosygin.

This treaty was considered to be a part of the "normalization", its content was worked up under a heavy pressure of Soviets and the ČSSR was literally pressed into the final form of the treaty. Under the term "temporary" the Soviets understood the deployment of their troops forever.

II. POLITICAL DELIBERATIONS ABOUT THE DEPARTURE OF SOVIET TROOPS AFTER NOVEMBER 1989. CONCLUDING THE "TREATY ABOUT THE DEPARTURE OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA"

The negotiation about the departure of Soviet troops was the first important task on the international forum for the external politics of the ČSSR after November 1989. Certain foreplay to this were the political declarations of the states which participated in the intervention in 1968 and now re-evaluated the questions of the "entry" of troops.

On December 3, 1989, the government of L. Adamec declared August 1968 as a violation of the international law and proposed negotiations in December 4, 1989 in Moscow about the temporary sojourn of Soviet troops and about their departure in connection with the all-European disarmament process. The premiers Adamec and Gorbatchev issued a common declaration that the August intervention represented "interfering into the internal affairs of the ČSSR". At the same time, on December 4th in Moscow, the representatives of Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the USSR declared that "from the viewpoint of the now known facts, the entry of troops of their states represented interfering into the internal affairs of a sovereign state and must be condemned".

However, it was the Citizen's Forum, led by Václav Havel, which took up the standpoint to the stay of Soviet troops, reacted on the declaration of the Government and basically rejected the connection between the departure of Soviet troops and the all-European disarmament process. The accepted standpoint was based on the concept of unlawful entry of Soviet troops to the Czechoslovak territory and, therefore, nullity of the Treaty about their temporary stay. "The only result of this fact must be the immediate withdrawal of these troops as soon as the Soviet side declares the unlawfulness of the entry of the troops to the territory of the ČSSR in 1968…", they said.

The deliberations with the Soviet side could be successful only after solving some basic questions. Which were they?

The Soviet side wished to solve the withdrawal of its troops as a part of the process of limitation of conventional military forces in Europe, which was also the standpoint of the Government of L. Adamec. An important shift in this question took place after the creation of the so-called Government of national agreement with M. Čalfa as Premier Minister and J. Dienstbier as Minister of defence. According to its standpoint, the departure of Soviet troops was exclusively a bilateral affair, independent of the disarmament process and the Vienna negotiations. At the end, we succeeded to push this standpoint through.

A second region of questions were the ideas about the timetable of the departure of the troops. The Soviets proposed "within five years", our diplomacy "by the end of one year". When we could not come to an agreement, V. Havel expressed his willingness for a compromise, provided that the highest representative of the USSR would ask for it. On the basis of a personal letter of M. Gorbatchev, V. Havel and the Czechoslovak side agreed with the limitation of 18 months.

The third question was the compensation for damages and the financial settlement and was one of the most sensitives. If we would insist on solving it together with the with-

drawal, it would lead to lengthy delays in the departure of troops. The compensation was, therefore, solved by a separate agreement.

During the deliberations, the Czechoslovak side concentrated on a speediest departure of troops and to that aim oriented all its actions.

There were together three rounds of negotiations between the ČSSR and the USSR. The expert delegations worked as organs of the executive power in two groups: the legal-political and the technical-military group. The deliberations were led by the deputy ministers of foreign affairs E. Vacek and I. Aboimov. The discussions started on January 16, 1990 and February 22, 1990 in Prague, where the leaders of the delegations initialized the prepared text of the Agreement, which was later in Moscow signed by the Ministers of foreign affairs J. Dienstbier and E. Schewardnadze during the visit of the delegation of the ČSSR. led by President V. Havel on February 20, 1990,

The Agreement was brief, it consisted of only six Articles. These six articles, however, guaranteed the speediest departure of Soviet troops and fulfilling of the first strategic task of Czechoslovak foreign politics.

III. ORGANIZATION OF SECURING THE WITHDRAWAL

The accepted agreement became the starting point for the organization of the withdrawal. Both parties denominated their plenipotentiaries for matters concerning the departure of Soviet troops. It was Lieutenant-General R. Ducháček for the Czechoslovak side and Colonel-General E. Vorobiov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of troops for the Soviet side.

On February 22, 1990, the Ministry of Defence established the Executive for Securing the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Czechoslovakia, the task of which was the practical securing of the withdrawal in the overall complex of the task. It was me, Major-General S. Naďovič, who was nominated as the Chief of this Executive.

The Executive for Securing the withdrawal (ESW) consisted – apart from the secretariat and the registry – of
- ► Department of the Government sections,
- ► Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Government of the ČSSR,
- ► Organizational-planning department,
- ► Outfit-technical department,
- ► Rear department,
- ► Building-Accommodation department,
- ► Financial department.

According to the plan, it should have 75 persons altogether, but we managed with 63 persons. Very important was the Department of the resorts of the Government where we had our workers of civil resorts of federal and republic ministries and central financial institutions.

The Federal National Assembly established on March 28, 1990 the Mixed Parliamentary Commission, the task of which was to control the fulfilling of the tasks of the accepted Agreement, to follow the course, conditions and realization of the departure of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and also to initiate the solving of property-legal, humanitar-

ian and ecological questions historically connected with the withdrawal. It was Michael Kocáb, a great friend of President Václav Havel and – at that time – the man number two in the politics, who became famous in the role of the Chairman of the Commission,

Up to 30 persons worked in the Parliamentary Commission. The Commission executed its work in cooperation with the ESW and was dependent on it.

On the regional level, district and local commissions were established for solving the consequences of the stay of Soviet troops. They helped also with the tasking-over of the property from the departing Soviet troops, cooperated closely with the ESW, the Parliamentary Commission and – before all – with the Regional Military Building and Accommodation Executives.

The taking-over of the movable and immovable military property from the Soviet Army was executed by the Regional Military Building and Accommodation Executives.

IV. THE PROGRESS OF THE WITHDRAWAL

On the day of signing the Agreement about the Departure, the 26th February 1990, the Central Group of Troops was deployed on the territory of Czechoslovakia in 76 garrisons. It consisted of these parts:

- ► The High Command of the Group,
- ► The 26th Army corps,
- ► The 31st Armoured division,
- ► The 15th Guard armoured division,
- ► The 18th Guard motorized rifle division,
- ► The 36th Guard motorized rifle division,
- ► The 48th Motorized rifle division,
- ► The 131st Mixed air division,
- ► The 442nd Rocket missiles brigade,
- ► The 185th Rocket missiles brigade,
- ► The 5th Anti-air rocket missiles brigade,
- ► The 211th Artillery brigade,
- ► plus a set of various groups and types of troops of technical and rear provision.

The complete numbers represented:

- ► Persons   73 500
- ► Families   16 911
- ► Family members   36 921
- ► Launching devices (tact. and operational.-tactical)   30
- ► Equipment of anti-air defence   151
- ► Tanks   1 220
- ► Infantry combat vehicles + armoured carriers   2 505
- ► Guns and mine-throwers   1 218
- ► Cars   18 594
- ► Helicopters   173
- ► Aircrafts   103

The state of reserves:
- ► Technical materiel   178 330 tons
- ► Rear materiel   98 696 tons.

The withdrawal took its course according to the timetable of the departure of forces and equipment which was a part of the Agreement. It had been planned in three stages.

The first stage: From 26th February to 31st May 1990, 26 000 persons, 30 launching devices, 540 tanks, 480 ICV + AC, 350 guns and mine-throwers, 19 aircrafts, 48 helicopters and 8 unmanned equipments had to leave Czechoslovakia. It started by the withdrawal of two divisions, the 31st Armoured and the 48th Motorized rifle division, both rocket divisions and a part of the 131 Mixed air division. Also the Commandment of the 28th Corps was withdrawn.

The second stage: It was planned to withdraw, from 1st June to 31st December 1990, 18 300 soldiers together with the pertinent technique. The 15th Guard armoured division, the 30th Guard motorized rifle division, the 211th Artillery division and the 5th Anti-air rocket missiles brigade departed. 28 260 soldiers and 540 tanks were withdrawn. After the end of this stage, it represented about 75 to 85 % of all planned items.

The third stage: From 1st January to 30th June 1991, all other persons, military technique and material had to be withdrawn.

The timetable of the withdrawal has been observed, in some cases even fulfilled before the time. All in all, one can declare that the withdrawal was ended before the agreed deadline.

During the withdrawal, two tragic events occurred. 21 Soviet soldiers died at the explosion of the ammunition in a tank and at the crash of a helicopter. There were no wounded or killed Czechoslovak citizens during the whole withdrawal.

825 trains, 31 353 wagons and 18 153 containers were used for the withdrawal. On one's own axles, 1 709 cars in 21 columns were transferred. The air transport took place in 15 overflights.

The official concluding act was executed by the signature of the "Protocol of the Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the ČSFR and the USSR about ending the departure of Soviet troops from the territory of the ČSFR" on 25th June 1991.On that day, the Plenipotentiaries and I were personally received by the Chairman of the Federal National Assembly A. Dubček and by the President of the republic V. Havel. In all the country the bells began to chime.

CONCLUSION

One of the sad chapters of the history of Czechoslovakia has found its end. All reasonable people gave a breath of relief because by the departure of Soviet troops the Brezhnev doctrine ceased to exist and nothing hampered the free development of Czechoslovakia.

As a compliment from the organizers of this conference, you have obtained a copy of the book "The Great Withdrawal", written by four authors, who secured the departure of

Soviet troops from the ČSFR, Germany, Hungary and Poland. The book was published by the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic in English on November 16, 2005. As a co-author of this book, I describe in the first part of this book in a much more detail this unrepeatable era. I am proud that the introductory word to my part of the book was written by President V. Havel. With a great modesty and respect to you all, dear colleagues, I recommend these remembrances to your attention.

RESUMÉ

Svetozár Naďovič: Odsun sovietskych vojsk z Československa 26. február 1990 – 27. jún 1991

Stiahnutie sovietskych vojsk sa realizovalo podľa harmonogramu odsunu jednotiek a zariadení a vychádzalo z medzivládnej Dohody, ktorú 26. februára 1990 v Moskve podpísali ministri zahraničných vecí Eduard Ševarnadze a Jiří Diensbier. Odsun bol plánovaný v troch etapách.

Prvá etapa trvala od 26. februára do 31. mája 1990. Počas nej bolo odsunutých z Československa 26-tisíc osôb, 30 zariadení, 540 tankov, 48 bojových vozidiel pechoty a obrnených transportérov, 350 pušiek a mínometov, 19 lietadiel, 48 vrtuľníkov a 8 bezpilotných prostriedkov. Stiahnutie začalo odsunutím dvoch divízií, 31. tankovej a 48. motostreleckej divízie, dvoch raketových brigád a časti 131. zmiešanej leteckej divízie. Tiež bolo odsunuté veliteľstvo 28. armádneho zboru.

Druhá etapa bola naplánovaná na obdobie 1. jún – 31. december 1990, keď územie Československa malo opustiť ďalších 18 300 vojakov spolu s prislúchajúcou technikou. V tomto období boli stiahnuté 15. a 30. gardová motostrelecká divízia, 211. delostrelecká brigáda a 5. protilietadlová raketová brigáda, ako aj 28 260 vojakov a 540 tankov. Po skončení tejto etapy bolo odsunutých okolo 75–85 percent všetkých sovietskych jednotiek.

V tretej etape bol od 1. januára do 31. júna 1991 bol odsunutý všetok zostavajúci personál, vojenská technika a materiál.

Časový plán odsunu sovietskych vojsk z Československa sa plnil podľa stanoveného harmonogramu a v niektorých prípadoch bol dokonca splnený predčasne. Celkovo možno konštatovať, že odsun bol ukončený pred dohodnutým časovým termínom.

V priebehu odsunu sa stali dve mimoriadne tragické udalosti. Pri výbuchu munície v tanku a po páde vrtuľníka zahynulo dovedna 21 sovietskych vojakov. Žiadni československí občania neboli v priebehu odsunu zranení, alebo zabití.

Na odsun bolo použitých 825 železničných transportov, 31 353 vagónov a 18 153 kontajnerov.

Oficiálny záverečný akt bol podpísaný na základe „Protokolu splnomocnených zástupcov vlád ČSFR a ZSSR o ukončení odsunu sovietskych jednotiek z územia ČSFR" z 25. júna 1991. V tento deň splnomocnenci oboch zúčastnených strán ako aj autor tohto príspevku boli prijatí predsedom Federálneho zhromaždenia ČSFR Alexandrom Dubčekom a prezidentom republiky Václavom Havlom.

CONCLUSION

Peut-on Penser la *Sortie de Guerre*?

Col. Frédéric Guelton

La *sortie de guerre* est un phénomène historique aussi ancien que l'entrée en guerre, c'est-à-dire que la guerre elle-même. Pourtant si les entrées en guerre furent toujours imaginées par des Etats et plus particulièrement les états-majors dont le métier premier est de planifier la « guerre future », les sorties de guerre ne le furent presque jamais. Elles furent encore moins étudiées. La sortie de guerre est pourtant un moment fondamental dans la marche de la guerre vers la paix comme le déclara allégoriquement Clemenceau lorsqu'il écrivit en référence à la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale, que « *la guerre était gagnée, restait à gagner la paix* », c'est-à-dire à « bien sortir de la guerre »! La sortie de guerre est un moment fondamental mais aussi par essence complexe et surprenant. Surprenant par la soudaineté qui caractérise son déclenchement. Complexe par le changement total d'attitude qu'il impose à ses acteurs. Il est même plus complexe que ne le sont la guerre et l'entrée en guerre. L'entrée en guerre est toujours préparée, même si la guerre imaginée est toujours, ensuite, différente de la guerre réelle et si son déroulement demeure, au-delà des souffrances qu'elle engendre, un « *art simple et tout d'exécution* »…

Au fil des millénaires, les belligérants, frappés par une cécité aussi remarquable que constante, furent politiquement incapables d'envisager que l'issue d'une guerre puisse ne pas être, pour chacun d'eux et jamais pour « l'autre », victorieuse. Ce faisant ils n'éprouvèrent jamais la nécessité, jusqu'à une période récente, d'envisager un processus de sortie des guerres dans lesquelles ils s'étaient préparés à… entrer. Après tout, la victoire n'y pourvoirait-elle pas spontanément et naturellement!

Comment expliquer ce décalage historique entre un phénomène ancien et permanent et la prise de conscience récente de son existence, de son historicité et de la nécessité de l'étudier?

Il semblerait, à première vue, que l'idée même de la sortie de guerre fut, au moins au cours du XXe siècle, emportée et balayée par les deux guerres mondiales et leur caractère exceptionnel autant qu'apocalyptique. Si une telle hypothèse venait à être confirmée, il serait possible d'établir que les deux guerres mondiales ne se seraient pas terminées par des sorties de guerres considérées comme des processus normaux et normés dans la transition du temps de guerre vers le temps de paix. Il serait alors possible d'avancer que les deux guerres mondiales auraient davantage donné naissance, brutalement, à travers

une violence extrême, qualifiée par des auteurs comme Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau de « *brutalisation de la guerre* » à un monde nouveau, en rupture avec le passé, largement révolutionnaire, et qui n'aurait été en paix que parce que les hostilités avaient, *de jure,* pris fin. En la matière, et en se limitant à l'approche juridique qui est un des aspects les mieux circonscrits de la sortie de guerre, l'observation à rebours de la période 1870–1945 est édifiante. La Seconde guerre mondiale se termina par des capitulations sans conditions, et les traités de paix qui y ont mis fin n'étaient toujours pas tous signés au début du XXIe siècle. La Première Guerre mondiale se termina par des armistices et la signature de traités de paix imposés aux vaincus sans négociation ni discussion. La guerre franco prussienne de 1870–1871, guerre d'un autre temps déjà, avait donné lieu, après la cessation des hostilités à la signature de préliminaires puis d'un traité de paix à Francfort discuté et rédigé en bonne et due forme par les représentants allemands et français. La même démarche étendue aux siècles précédents et ouvertes à tous les champs constitutifs de la sortie de guerre verrait certainement le phénomène évoqué ci-dessus s'accentuer jusqu'à remonter à l'Amphictyonie de la Grèce ancienne.

La prise de conscience de l'intérêt, de la nécessité ou de l'obligation de penser les sorties de guerre est récente. Elle correspond, pour l'essentiel, à la période de la fin de la guerre froide et au passage de la bipolarité à la multipolarité. Ce passage, cette transition, furent caractérisés, non par la naissance d'un ordre nouveau espéré après la première guerre du Golfe de 1990–1991 et le rôle central occupé dans le règlement de ce conflit par l'Organisation des Nations Unies, mais par l'irruption d'un désordre nouveau, d'un chaos inattendu, lourds de conflits rarement qualifiés de guerre bien qu'ils en furent. Ces conflits et ces guerres imposèrent de penser, de repenser, les processus de sortie de guerre dans leur complexité apparente. Les médias, c'est-à-dire ici la capacité à montrer, vite et partout, la guerre et ses horreurs grâce aux progrès techniques, jouèrent un rôle majeur. Ce rôle déjà important à la fin de la Deuxième guerre mondiale (découverte des camps d'extermination puis procès de Nuremberg filmés) fut amplifié avec l'apparition du transistor (période de la guerre d'Algérie) avant de devenir central avec la télévision (guerre américaine au Vietnam). La fin de la guerre froide coïncida, peu ou prou, avec la diffusion d'informations en « temps réel » par des sociétés privés comme CNN puis par des particuliers ou des groupes informels via Internet. Cette évolution, essentiellement technique, nous a conduit à la situation actuelle qui impose de considérer les sorties de guerre, rebaptisées pour l'occasion sorties de crise, comme un sujet central de l'action politique et militaire.

Cette irruption de la sortie de guerre dans les perceptions, voire les préoccupations quotidiennes de tous, lui confère une position originale, celle de l'omnipotence du temps présent qui bride la réflexion. Le contexte immédiat l'emporte sur toute autre considération dont la mise en perspective historique considérée comme une gesticulation intellectuelle négligeable et inutilement dévoreuse de temps. Les Etats et ceux qui les gouvernent, obnubilés par la « nouveauté » voire l'étrangeté des « guerres nouvelles » (civiles, ethniques, religieuses, mafieuses…) et des sorties qu'elles induisent, ne perçoivent pas que cette complexité n'est qu'une incapacité à inscrire leur étude dans la longue durée historique en les dépouillant de l'écume des vagues afin de discerner, de faire appa-

raître et de mettre en évidence les courants de fond qui les orientent depuis toujours. La Grèce ancienne nous propose, à elle seule, une typologie synthétique dont l'étude, prolongeant celle que lui consacra Raymond Aron dans son *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire*, permettrait de s'intéresser aux grandes formes de guerres et de sorties de guerre. Le modèle initial de l'amphictyonie peut, dans une telle perspective, être étudié, hors de tout anachronisme, comme la volonté de gérer les crises afin d'éviter les guerres grâce à la création d'un tribunal ou d'une cour d'arbitrage. Elle préfigure les conférences de La Haye, la Société des Nations puis l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Les guerres Médiques présentent quant à elles tous les traits la guerre classique opposant des formes d'Etat et des armées clairement identifiées. A l'issue de la guerre, l'un est nettement vainqueur et l'autre nettement vaincu. La sortie de guerre propose alors un modèle qui peut aussi être qualifié de classique et normé. Enfin la guerre du Péloponnèse permet d'aborder la question de la guerre civile avec ses particularités autant dans son déroulement que dans sa sortie. C'est dire à quel point la réflexion historique, par l'ouverture intellectuelle qu'elle impose et parce qu'aucun tabou, aucune censure, aucune autocensure ne la brident, permet d'aborder la complexité du phénomène sortie de guerre en lui conférant la profondeur de champ nécessaire et en lui restituant son historicité oubliée.

Les évolutions techniques conjoncturelles qui voilent la réalité du phénomène disparaissent alors peu à peu pour en laisser apparaître les constantes, dont la principale demeure, à l'échelle historique, inchangée: la guerre étant d'abord un affrontement violent entre groupes humains organisés, toute sortie de guerre est avant tout une aventure humaine, douloureuse et improvisée dans laquelle les sentiment et la raison s'affrontent. Paradoxalement la sortie de guerre n'est donc pas, et ne peut pas être un espace de paix. Elle est le champ clos d'un affrontement nouveau et imperceptible, avéré, avouable ou inavouable, entre des êtres humains qui souhaitent naturellement vivre en paix et des Etats qui cherchent aussi, lors de la sortie de guerre, et au-delà de la quête de la paix juridique, à défendre des intérêts nationaux considérés comme légitimes en terme de sécurité ou de puissance. Ou simplement parce qu'ils sont persuadés que la victoire leur donne métaphoriquement « tous les droits », *Vae Victis*! Ses acteurs viennent le plus souvent de connaître, de vivre intimement la guerre dont il faut sortir. Ce qui veut dire que ceux qui viennent de combattre doivent devenir les acteurs de la paix en gestation. C'est ce qui explique que les Etats se soient, depuis longtemps, efforcés de constituer une typologie technique des acteurs de la sortie de guerre, qui soit la moins militaire possible. Aux militaires qui viennent de combattre et qui sont chronologiquement et physiquement les premiers acteurs de la sortie de guerre, les Etats ont adjoint des forces de nature intermédiaire (gendarmerie, carabiniers…), des unités de police civile et plus récemment les ONG (quelles agissent ou non dans un cadre étatique). Ces acteurs doivent mettre en œuvre une transition dans laquelle l'affrontement entre les différentes parties demeure central.

La sortie de guerre voit aussi souvent la mise en œuvre de modifications territoriales imposées et « justifiées » par le « bon droit » du vainqueur contre le vaincu. Le démantèlement ou les amputations infligées au territoire du vaincu se font au nom de « la liberté des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes » ou au nom du « respect des nationalités » (*les 14 Points de W. Wilson*). Dans le même temps, l'extension du territoire des vainqueurs

est justifiée par leur droit, naturel ou historique, et par leur besoin de sécurité (création d'une zone de contact entre la Pologne, la Tchécoslovaquie et la Roumanie après 1918 par exemple). Il est à noter que le même argumentaire aurait pu être tenu en inversant les rôles si les armes en avaient décidé autrement.

Le processus de sortie de guerre va également s'inscrire dans un retour de la négociation diplomatique dont l'objet sera d'asseoir la politique étrangère du vainqueur au détriment du vaincu, si nécessaire en utilisant le poids ou la menace des armes. Enfin il n'est pas rare que la sortie de guerre, comme la guerre, ait d'abord servi, sous couvert de justifications diplomatiques, des intérêts de politique intérieure. Il en fut ainsi lorsque Charles X envoya un corps expéditionnaire punitif à Sidi Ferruch en juin 1830 afin de répondre à un « affront diplomatique ». Mais dans ce cas, le résultat n'est pas toujours à la hauteur des attentes comme le montrèrent les *Trois Glorieuses* et l'arrivée au pouvoir de Louis-Philippe en juillet 1830.

Pour les individus enfin, civils ou militaires démobilisés, acteurs souvent passifs de la sortie de guerre, cette dernière est le plus souvent marquées par une douleur initiale qui parfois se prolonge avant que la paix ne règne… *définitivement*. Si cela est d'emblée compréhensible pour le vaincu, cela le devient presque aussi rapidement pour le vainqueur souvent empêtré dans sa victoire et dans le prix global payé pour l'obtenir. Et ce d'autant plus que, pour le vainqueur comme pour le vaincu, la sortie de guerre est faite d'imprévu, de hasard, et de bricolage alors que les peuples, portant un regard nouveau et étonné sur ce qu'ils viennent de vivre se tournent vers et le deuil et le recueillement, en appellent à la justice, à la miséricorde ou à la vengeance.

En définitive, la sortie de guerre, phénomène à l'historicité indéniable est un objet d'étude récent. Dotée d'une logique propre elle ne peut pas être abordée et encore moins définie hors de son environnement, dans sa double dimension conjoncturelle et historique.

Elle représente un domaine de recherche nouveau qui mérite d'être analysé, étudié en profondeur, et soumis à la raison critique afin de déterminer si, à travers toutes les sorties de guerre que connut, au fil des millénaires, l'humanité, il peut exister des constantes, potentiellement utiles à l'action des contemporains, bien qu'ignorées ou négligées jusqu'à présent. Ce domaine de recherche doit être abordé avec précaution car la distorsion qui existe entre la réalité historique de la sortie de guerre et sa perception actuelle brouille l'observation. Le vocabulaire actuel accentue le phénomène dans la mesure où il contribue à décrire un phénomène ancien, la guerre, avec des mots nouveaux en nombre plus limités qu'hier (souvent en raison d'une autocensure aussi compréhensible que nocive). La guerre peut dans cette perspective, être niée dans sa réalité juridique alors qu'elle est vécue dans sa réalité physique. Ce fut le cas entre la France et l'Algérie entre 1954 et 1962. Lorsque les combats cessent, il ne peut en conséquence pas y avoir de sortie de guerre jusqu'à ce que la loi en décide autrement…, plusieurs décennies plus tard. La guerre peut enfin, au sens lexical du terme, être niée dans sa réalité historique au profit du conflit, de la crise, du « maintien de la paix »… ce qui rend en théorie la sortie de guerre impossible et son étude encore plus indispensable.

Can War Exit or Can Post Conflict Operations Be Planned?

Col. Frédéric Guelton

Exiting war is a historical phenomenon as old as entering war, as is war itself. However if entering war is always imagined by states and more particularly by their military staff, whose first trade consists in planning „future wars", post conflict operations are generally never planned. They were even less studied. Exiting war and post conflict operations are however a fundamental moment in the peace process as Clemenceau said when he wrote, in reference to the end of the First World War, that „the war was won, peace was still to be won", that is to say exiting war in the best possible way! The end of war operations is an essential though complex and surprising moment. Surprising due to its suddenness. Complex by the total change of attitude it imposes to those involved. It is even more complex to leave war than it is to get into it. A war is always prepared, even if war as it is imagined differs from real war which remains, beyond the sufferings it generates, a „simple art, all in execution"...

With the passing millenia, the belligerents, struck by a constant blindness, were politically unable to consider that the exit of a war could be victorious for each one of them and never for „the other". By doing this they never felt the need, up to a recent period, to consider a process for war exits, for which they only had prepared with... entering. After all, victory would provide for it spontaneously and naturally!

How to explain this historical shift between an old and permanent phenomenon and the recent awareness of its existence, its historicity and need for studying it? At first sight, it seems that the very idea of war exit was, at least during the 20th century, carried and swept away by the two World Wars as well in their exceptional as in their apocalyptic character. If such an assumption was to be confirmed, we could establish the fact that the two World Wars would not have ended up with post conflict operations, considered as normal and normalized process in the transition from war time to peace. It would be then possible to claim that the two World Wars had rather given birth to a new world in a brutal and extreme violent way, termed by authors like Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau as „brutalisation of war". All this in an abrupt change with a largely revolutionary past, and which had been in peace only because *de jure* hostilities had ended.

If the legal approach is solely being used — one of the best known aspects of war exits — the backward observation of the 1870–1945 period is edifying. The Second World War ended with unconditional surrenders and the peace treaties which put an end to it were still not signed at the beginning of 21st century. The First World War ended with armistices and the signing of peace treaties imposed on the defeated without neither nego-

tiation nor discussion. The French Prussian war of 1870–1871, already a war of the old days, had given way to the signature of preliminaries, after the suspending of hostilities, then of a peace treaty in Frankfurt discussed and written in due form by the German and French representatives. The same step extended to previous centuries and opened to all component fields of war exit would certainly embrace this aforesaid phenomenon to be accentuated back until Amphictyonia in ancient Greece.

Only very recently it became a necessity but also an obligation to think post conflict operations or war exits. For most of it, it basically corresponds to the end of the Cold War and also to the transition from a bipolar world to a multipolar one. This change was not characterized by the birth of a new order hoped for after the first Gulf War in 1990–1991 and by the United Nations central role in the ruling of this conflict, but rather by the irruption of a new disorder, an unexpected chaos, burdened with conflicts — not termed as wars as it should have been. These wars and conflicts made us think about and re-think war exiting process in their obvious complexity. The media, i.e. the capacity of showing quickly and everywhere war and its horrors thanks to technological advancement, played a major role. This role was already prominent at the end of World War II (discovery of concentration camps and Nuremberg trial both filmed) and was amplified with transistors (war in Algeria) before becoming central with television (American war in Vietnam). The end of the Cold War more or less coincided with the live broadcasting of news by private companies such as CNN then by individuals or unofficial groups via the internet. This was essentially a technical evolution. However, it led us to the present situation which imposes on us to regard war exits, sometimes called crises exits, as a central matter in political and military action.

War exits burst out in perceptions even in daily concerns and it endows it with an original position, the one of present time omnipotence which restrains reflection. The immediate context prevails over any other consideration including a historical viewpoint regarded as trivial intellectual gesticulating and unnecessarily time draining. The States and those who govern them are obsessed with the „novelty" and indeed the oddness of the „new wars" (civil, ethnic, religious, mafia…) as well as with the post period they involve. They do not see the complexity is no other than an incapacity to make their studies come within long historical periods, depriving them from useless appearances and highlight the mainstreams which have always directed them. Ancient Greece gave us a synthetic typology which study would enable us to read about great forms of war and war exits. This would continue what Raymond Aron carried out in his *Introduction ŕ la philosophie de l'histoire*. In such a perspective, the original model of the amphictyonia can be studied out of any anachronism as the will to manage crises in order to avoid wars thanks to the creation of a tribunal or arbitration court. It foreshadows the conferences in The Hague and the League of Nations then United Nations Organisation. Medic wars or Greco-Persian wars, introduce all the war classical features opposing forms of States to clearly identified armies. At the end of the war, one is distinctly the victorious and the other one distinctly the defeated. War exits offer then a model which can also be standardized and classical. Finally, the Peloponnesian war can bring us to the civil war issue with its peculiarities as well in its unfolding as in its exit. This shows how high histori-

cal reflection can get when intellects are open-minded and that no taboos or censorship or self-censorship can restrain it. We can then study the complexity of the war exit phenomenon giving it a necessary depth as well as restoring its forgotten historicity.

Fluctuations arising out of certain economic situations and their evolution which shield the reality of the phenomenon slowly vanish so as to let permanent features appear, which main one lies unchanged on a historical scale. War is first of all a violent event between organised human groups. Any war exit is a human adventure, painful and improvised, in which reason and feelings struggle. Paradoxically, the war exit is not and cannot be a peace space. It is an enclosed sphere where a new conflict takes place, imperceptible, known, respectable or not to be mentioned, between human beings whose unique wish is to live in harmony and States who beyond legal peace in war exits seek the defence of national interests regarded as legitimate in terms of security or power. Or simply because they are persuaded that victory metaphorically gives them „all rights", *Vae Victis*! Most of the time, the protagonists just intimately lived that war they want to get out from. That means that these people have to be actors for the peace process too. This is the reason why States have long endeavoured to list a technical typology of protagonists in war exits, which has to be the less military possible. For the military who were chronologically and physically the first protagonists in war exits, States have added intermediary forces (gendarmes, carabineers…), civil police units and more recently Non Governmental Organisations (be they within the state framework or not). These protagonists have to implement a transition within which the conflict between different parties is of a central matter.

War exits often implement territorial modifications imposed on and justified by the „right" of the victorious over the defeated. Dismantling and drastic cut inflicted to the defeated territory are led for the sake of „the right of peoples to self-determination" or for the sake of „respect of nationalities" (*W. Wilson's Fourteen Points*). Meanwhile, the territory extension of the victorious is justified by their right, be it natural or historical, and by their need of security (creation of a contact zone between Poland, Tchecoslovaquia and Rumania after 1918 for instance). It is worth noticing that the same arguments could have been used with inverted roles and if arms had decided otherwise.

War exits process also stresses the return of diplomatic negotiations which aim at basing a foreign policy to the detriment of the defeated and if needed by using the threat of weapons. Eventually it is common that a war exit like war itself is primarily used for the interest of domestic policies under the guise of diplomatic justifications. In the same way did Charles X send a punitive expeditionary force to Sidi Ferruch in June 1830 in order to answer back to a „diplomatic affront". Nonetheless, in that case, the result did not really meet expectations as the Three Glorious Days showed and as when Louis-Philippe came into power in July 1830.

For individuals, at last, civilians or demobilized military, often passive protagonists in war exits, this period is scarred with an initial pain which sometimes lingers before peace rules…definitely. If this is right away understandable for the defeated, it nearly also does for the victorious who have got themselves tangled up in their victory and in the global price they had to pay for it. It is all the more true that for both opponents, war exits

are unpredictable, full of coincidence and of makeshift repair whereas peoples are trying to have a new look on what they have just experienced, mourn and meditate but at the same time they call to justice, mercy or vengeance.

On the whole, war exits are a recent study subject with an indisputably historicity. It has its own logic which can only be studied and even less defined out of context, in its double circumstantial and historical dimension.

It embodies a new research field which deserves to be analysed, thoroughly studied and reasonably criticised in order to determine if throughout all the war exits humanity happened to experience centuries after centuries, some constants would exist. It could potentially help contemporaries even though they have been ignored or neglected so far. This research field has to be tackled cautiously because the distortion between historic reality of war exits and its present perception can confuse observation. Present vocabulary underlines the phenomenon in a way that contributes to describe an old phenomenon, war, with a more limited number of new words than before (often because of self-censorship, understandable in a way but harmful too). Through that perspective war can be denied, in its legal reality whereas it is strongly experienced in its physical reality. That was the case between France and Algeria in 1954–1962. When fights end, there can be no war exits until the law decides otherwise… many decades later. Finally, war can, in its terminology, be denied in its historic reality to the advantage of conflict, crisis, „peace and order" … which makes the theory of war exits impossible and its study even more essential.

Možno premýšľať o *ukončení vojny?*

Plk. Frédéric Guelton

Ukončenie vojny je takým starým historickým javom ako vstup do vojny, teda ako vojna sama. Avšak, ak si začiatky vojen štáty a najmä ich štáby, ktorých prvoradou úlohou je plánovať, „budúcu vojnu" vždy plánovali, ukončenia vojny si nepredstavovali skoro nikdy. A ešte menej ich skúmali. Ukončenie vojny je však základným momentom v postupe vojny k mieru, ako to alegoricky vyhlásil Clemenceau, keď napísal po skončení 1. svetovej vojny, že *„vojna je vyhraná, stačí vyhrať mier"*, to znamená „dobre ukončiť vojnu"! Ukončenie vojny je základným momentom, ale v podstate aj komplexným a prekvapujúcim. Prekvapujúcim náhlosťou, ktorá charakterizuje jeho začiatok. Komplexným úplnou zmenou postoja, ktorý vnucuje jeho aktérom. Je dokonca komplexnejší ako je vojna a začiatok vojny. Začiatok vojny je vždy pripravovaný, aj keď predstavovaná vojna je potom vždy iná ako vojna skutočná.

Za tisícky rokov boli bojujúce strany postihnuté pozoruhodnou a trvalou slepotou, politicky neschopné predpokladať, že koniec vojny by mohol nebyť pre ich stranu víťazný. Takto nepociťovali nikdy potrebu, až do posledného obdobia, plánovať proces ukončenia vojen, v ktorých sa pripravovali na... začiatok. Veď napokon by sa víťazstvo nezaistilo spontánne a prirodzene!

Ako si vysvetliť tento historický posun medzi starým a stálym javom a súčasným uvedomovaním si jeho existencie, jeho historickosti a potreby skúmať ho?

Na prvý pohľad by sa zdalo, že samotnú ideu ukončenia vojny, aspoň v priebehu 20. storočia, odviali a zmietli dve svetové vojny a ich výnimočný až apokalyptický charakter. Keby sa táto hypotéza potvrdila, bolo by možné dokázať, že obidve svetové vojny by sa neboli skončili ukončením vojny považovaným za prirodzený a normovaný proces pri prechode z vojny k mieru. Bolo by teda možné povedať, že obe svetové vojny by umožnili zrod brutálneho, prostredníctvom extrémneho násilia, ktoré niektorí autori nazvali, ako napr. Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau « *brutalizáciou vojny»*, nového sveta v úplnom rozpore s minulosťou, značne revolučnej, a ktorá by bola nechaná na pokoji iba preto, že nepriateľstvo sa, *de jure,* skončilo. V tejto oblasti a obmedziac sa na právny prístup, ktorý je jedným z najlepšie vymedzených aspektov ukončenia vojny, je pozorovanie obdobia 1870 – 1945 z opačného konca poučné. Druhá svetová vojna sa skončila bezpodmienečnými kapituláciami a mierové dohody, ktoré ju ukončili, ešte stále neboli všetky na začiatku XXI. storočia podpísané. Prvá svetová vojna sa ukončila prímeriami a podpísaním mierových dohôd, ktoré boli vnútené porazeným bez rokovania, či diskusie. Francúzsko-pruská vojna z rokov 1870–1871, vojna už z iného obdobia, dala po ukončení vojenských operácií podnet k podpísaniu predbežných mierových dohôd a potom miero-

vej dohody vo Frankfurte, ktorú riadne prediskutovali a zostavili nemeckí a francúzski zástupcovia. Ten istý postup, rozšírený na predchádzajúce storočia a otvorený pre všetky podstatné oblasti ukončenia vojny, by určite našiel už spomínaný jav a bol by čoraz silnejší, keby sme sa vracali až k Amfiktiónu v starom Grécku.

Len nedávno si ľudstvo, v podstate od obdobia konca studenej vojny a prechodu od bipolárnosti k multipolárnosti, uvedomilo záujem, nevyhnutnosť alebo povinnosť myslieť na ukončenia vojen. Tento prechod bol charakterizovaný nie zrodom nového očakávaného poriadku po prvej vojne v Perzskom zálive roku 1990 – 1991 a ústrednou úlohou, ktorú zohrávala v tomto konflikte Organizácia spojených národov, ale zachvátením nového neporiadku, neočakávaného chaosu plných konfliktov zriedkavo označených ako vojna, hoci ňou v skutočnosti boli. Tieto konflikty a tieto vojny nútili myslieť a zamýšľať sa nad procesmi ukončenia vojen v ich zjavnej komplexnosti. Médiá, teda schopnosť ukázať rýchlo a všade vojnu a jej hrôzy vďaka technickému pokroku, zohrali hlavnú úlohu. Táto úloha bola dôležitá koncom 2. svetovej vojny (sfilmované objavenie koncentračných táborov a potom Norimberský proces) a rozšírila sa s objavením sa tranzistora (obdobie vojny v Alžírsku), až kým sa nestala ústrednou s nástupom televízie (americká vojna vo Vietname). Koniec studenej vojny sa viac-menej časovo zhodoval so šírením informácií súkromnými spoločnosťami, ako CNN, potom jednotlivcami alebo neformálnymi skupinami prostredníctvom Internetu „v reálnom čase ". Tento vývoj, predovšetkým technický, nás viedol k súčasnej situácii, ktorá núti zvažovať ukončenia vojny, premenované niekedy na ukončenia kríz, ako ústredná téma politickej a vojenskej činnosti.

Tento nástup ukončenia vojen do vnímania, či dokonca do každodenného centra záujmu všetkých, mu dáva originálne postavenie, ktoré je postavením všemocnosti súčasného času, ktorý drží na uzde uvažovanie. Momentálny kontext víťazí nad akoukoľvek úvahou, ktorej historická perspektívnosť je považovaná za bezvýznamnú intelektuálnu gestikuláciu zbytočne oberajúcu o čas. Štáty a tí, ktorí ich riadia, zaslepení „novosťou", či dokonca zvláštnosťou „nových vojen" (občianskych, etnických, náboženských, mafiánskych…) a ukončení, ktoré prinášajú, nevnímajú, že táto komplexnosť je iba neschopnosť zaradiť ich štúdium do dlhého historického trvania očistiac ich od peny vĺn, aby sa dali rozlíšiť, ukázať a zvýrazniť spodné prúdy, ktoré ich odjakživa smerujú. Staré Grécko nám ponúka syntetickú typológiu, štúdium ktorej dopĺňa typológiu uvádzanú Raymondom Aronom vo svojom *Úvode do filozofie dejín,* a ktoré nám umožňuje zaujímať sa o veľké formy vojen a ukončenia vojen. Počiatočný model amfiktyónie sa môže v tejto perspektíve skúmať mimo akéhokoľvek anachronizmu, ako vôľa riešenia kríz s cieľom vyhnúť sa vojnám vďaka vytvoreniu súdu alebo arbitrážneho súdneho dvora. Ohlasuje konferencie v Haagu, Spoločnosť národov a potom Organizáciu spojených národov. Médske vojny predstavujú všetky znaky klasickej vojny stavajúc proti sebe formy štátu a jasne identifikované armády. Po skončení vojny je jeden jasný víťaz a druhý jasne porazený. Ukončenie vojny ponúka teda model, ktorý môžeme označiť za klasický a normovaný. Napokon peloponézska vojna umožní riešiť otázku občianskej vojny so svojimi zvláštnosťami v jej priebehu, ako aj pri jej ukončení. Teda, do akej miery historické uvažovanie umožňuje intelektuálnou otvorenosťou, ktorú presadzuje a nepozná žiadne tabu, žiadnu cenzúru,

žiadnu autocenzúru, ktoré by ju brzdili, riešiť komplexnosť javu ukončenia vojny udeliac mu nevyhnutnú hĺbku poľa a prinavrátiac mu jeho zabudnutú historickosť.

Konjunkturálny technický vývoj, ktorý zahaľuje realitu javu, teda pomaly zaniká a necháva objavovať sa konštanty, z ktorých tá hlavná zostáva z historického hľadiska nezmenená: vojna je najprv prudkou zrážkou medzi organizovanými ľudskými skupinami a každé ukončenie vojny je predovšetkým jedným bolestným a improvizovaným ľudským osudom, v ktorom stojí proti sebe cit a rozum. Paradoxne teda ukončenie vojny nie je a nemôže byť priestorom mieru. Je uzavretým poľom novej nepostihnuteľnej konfrontácie, preukázateľnej, prípustnej alebo neprípustnej, medzi ľuďmi, ktorí si prirodzene želajú žiť v mieri a štátmi, ktoré sa tiež usilujú počas ukončenia vojny a popri hľadaní právneho mieru brániť národné záujmy, považované za legitímne z hľadiska bezpečnosti alebo sily. Alebo jednoducho preto, že sú presvedčení, že víťazstvo im dáva metaforicky „všetky práva", *Vae Victis!* (Beda porazeným!). Aktéri ukončenia vojny najčastejšie poznali a hlboko prežili vojnu, ktorú treba ukončiť. To znamená, že tí, ktorí práve bojovali, sa musia stať strojcami rodiaceho sa mieru. To vysvetľuje, že štáty sa už dávno usilovali vytvoriť technickú typológiu aktérov ukončenia vojny, ktorá by bola čo najmenej vojenská. K vojakom, ktorí práve dobojovali a ktorí sú chronologicky a fyzicky prvými aktérmi ukončenia vojny, štáty pričlenili sily prechodného charakteru (žandárstvo, karabinierov…), jednotky civilnej polície a v poslednom čase nevládne organizácie (ktoré pôsobia alebo nepôsobia v štátnom rámci). Títo aktéri musia realizovať prechod, v ktorom konfrontácia medzi rôznymi stranami zostáva v centre pozornosti.

Ukončenie vojny tiež často zaznamenáva presadzovanie vnútených a „oprávnených" teritoriálnych zmien „právom" víťaza proti porazenému. Rozklad a nútené odoberanie územia porazeného sa robia v mene „slobody národov rozhodovať o sebe" alebo v mene „rešpektovania národností" (*14 bodov W. Wilsona*). V tom istom čase je rozširovanie územia víťazov zdôvodňované ich prirodzeným alebo historickým právom a ich potrebou bezpečnosti (napr. vytvorenie kontaktnej zóny medzi Poľskom, Československom a Rumunskom po roku 1918). Treba poznamenať, že taká istá argumentácia by mohla byť pri obrátených úlohách, keby o tom boli rozhodli zbrane inak.

Proces ukončenia vojny bude zároveň súčasťou návratu diplomatických rokovaní, úlohou ktorých bude posilniť zahraničnú politiku víťaza na úkor porazeného, ak to bude potrebné s využitím váhy alebo hrozby zbraní. A napokon nie je zriedkavé, že ukončenie vojny, podobne ako vojna, najprv slúžilo, pod pláštikom diplomatických zdôvodnení, záujmom vnútornej politiky. Bolo tomu tak, keď Karol X. v júni 1830 poslal trestný expedičný zbor Sidi Ferruchovi, aby odpovedal na „diplomatickú urážku". Avšak v takomto prípade výsledok vždy nezodpovedá očakávaniam, ako to ukázali *tri slávne dni* a prevzatie moci Ľudovíta Filipa v júli 1830.

A napokon pre jednotlivcov, civilistov alebo demilitarizovaných vojakov, často pasívnych aktérov ukončenia vojny, je toto ukončenie najčastejšie poznamenané počiatočnou bolesťou, ktorá sa často predlžuje, až kým definitívne nezavládne mier. Ak je to ihneď zrozumiteľné pre porazeného, stáva sa to rýchlo zrozumiteľné aj pre víťaza, ktorý je často zamotaný do svojho víťazstva a do celkovej ceny, ktorú zaplatil, aby ho získal. O to viac, že pre víťaza aj pre porazeného je ukončenie vojny urobené z neočakávaného, z náhody a z improvizácie, zatiaľ čo národy sa pozerajú po novom a udivene na to, čo práve pre-

žili a utiekajú sa k smútku a rozjímaniu, pripomínajúc spravodlivosť, milosrdenstvo alebo pomstu.

Ukončenie vojny, jav s nepopierateľnou historickosťou, je predmetom najnovšieho štúdia. Má svoju vlastnú logiku, nemôže sa však posudzovať a už vôbec nie definovať mimo svojho kontextu, vo svojom dvojitom rozmere: konjunkturálnom a historickom.

Predstavuje oblasť nového výskumu, ktorá si zaslúži byť analyzovaná, skúmaná do hĺbky a predkladaná kritickému rozumu s cieľom určiť, či pri všetkých ukončeniach vojen, ktoré za tisícročia ľudstvo poznalo, môžu existovať konštanty, potenciálne užitočné pre činnosť súčasníkov, hoci až doteraz ignorované alebo zanedbávané. K tejto oblasti výskumu treba pristupovať opatrne, pretože disproporcia, ktorá existuje medzi historickou skutočnosťou ukončenia vojny a jej súčasným vnímaním, narúša pozorovanie. Súčasný slovník zdôrazňuje tento jav do tej miery, nakoľko prispieva k opísaniu starého javu, vojny, novými slovami v obmedzenejšom počte ako v minulosti (často z dôvodu autocenzúry, tak pochopiteľnej, ako škodlivej). Z tohto pohľadu môže byť vojna popieraná v právnej realite a prežívaná v realite fyzickej. To bol prípad medzi Francúzskom a Alžírskom v rokoch 1954 – 1962. Keď boje prestávajú, nemôže následne nastať ukončenie vojny, kým zákon o tom nerozhodne inak..., o niekoľko desaťročí neskôr. Vojna môže byť napokon, v lexikálnom zmysle slova, popretá vo svojej historickej skutočnosti v prospech konfliktu, krízy, „udržania mieru“..., čo v teórii ukončenie vojny znemožňuje a jeho skúmanie robí nevyhnutnejším.

PARTICIPANTS' RESPONSE

„André and Miloslav,

Thank you very much for doing the hard work and co-chairing a very successful, and if I may say, the most successuful MHWG conference to date. 18 countries, over 60 participants, and 31 papers-by any measure, this was a great success. Having been present at the conception of the MHWG in 2000 and participated in the first MHWG conference in Bucharest in 2001, I can definitely say that this group has come a long way and achieved even more than was expected in the beginning.

Miloslav, I congratulate you and your Institute of Military History on orchestrating and hosting the highly successful conference. Bratislava is a beautiful city and Slovakia can be very proud of your efforts; you represented your country and your office very well. Please extend and convey my and COL Dalessandro's sincere thanks to your superiors..."

[„André a Miloslav,

Ďakujem za úsilie a organizáciu, ak môžem povedať doteraz najúspešnejšej konferencie Pracovnej skupiny pre vojenskú históriu /MHWG/, na ktorej sa zúčastnilo 18 krajín, vyše 60 účastníkov s 31 príspevkami, čo považujem za veľký úspech. Ako jeden zo spolutvorcov koncepcie MHWG v roku 2000 a účastník prvej konferencie v roku 2001 v Bukurešti môžem s určitosťou povedať, že skupina prešla dlhou cestou a dokonca dosiahla, viac ako sa pôvodne očakávalo.

Miloslav, gratulujem Tebe a Vášmu Vojenskému historickému ústavu za zorganizovanie a hosťovanie vysoko úspešnej konferencie. Bratislava je krásne mesto a Slovensko môže byť hrdé na Vaše výsledky; veľmi dobre reprezentujete svoju krajinu a svoj úrad. Odovzdajte moju a plk. Dalessandrovu úprimnú vďaku Vašim nadriadeným orgánom..."]

<div align="right">

Dr. William W. EPLEY
Chief, Field & International Branch
U.S. Army Center of Military History
Washington

</div>

"Miloslav and André,

Just a short note to say thank you for a splendid conference. The hospitality and the organization were second to none! I know how much work goes into one of these things and you both deserve much credit. I would like to write a personal note to whomever in

each of your countries about the splendid job that you did... I would be delighted to drop them a letter about how valuable the meeting was, and how much the Canadian delegation enjoyed the experience..."

[„Miloslav a André,
Iba v krátkosti sa Vám chcem poďakovať za skvelú konferenciu. Pohostinnosť a organizácia bola prvotriedna! Viem, čo táto práca obnáša a vy obaja si zaslúžite veľký kredit. Rád by som napísal osobné poďakovanie Vašim nadriadeným orgánom, akú skvelú prácu ste odviedli... Budem potešený napísať im list, aká cenná bola konferencia a ako sa kanadská delegácia teší z týchto skúsenosti..."]

> Dr. Ronald G. HAYCOCK
> History Department
> Royal Military College of Canada
> Kingston, Ontario

Wednesday, April 12, 2006

"Dear Miloslav and André,
Thank you so much for all the work and effort you put in to organise the conference last week. It was a great success. I very much enjoyed meeting you and the rest of the participants..."

[„Miloslav a André,
Ďakujem za všetku prácu a úsilie, ktoré bolo vložené do organizácie konferencie minulý týždeň. Bol to obrovský úspech. Veľmi som sa tešila so stretnutia s Vami a ostatnými účastníkmi konferencie..."]

> Ms Tabitha SWANN
> Corporate Memory
> (Analysis Branch)
> Ministry of Defence
> London

Thursday, April 20, 2006

„Dear friends,
... I would like to take the time and thank you all for a wonderful conference – but especially, of course, our organizers, who did a really splendid job and made it possible to have such an excellent experience in Bratislava. They really deserve our gratitude for a job well done!

The conference showed not only how big a family the MHWG network has become, but demonstrated a new what we had already discussed in Budapest two years ago: that this "family" would indeed be able to survive even alone, without an institutional link. I hasten to add, though, that I much prefer to have an organisational link of some sort..."

["Drahí priatelia,

... rád by som Vám všetkým poďakoval za skvelú konferenciu, ale hlavne, pravdaže našim organizátorom, ktorí odviedli skvelú prácu a umožnili usporiadanie takej skvelej konferencie v Bratislave. Zaslúžite si skutočný obdiv za dobre vykonanú prácu.

Konferencia ukázala nielen to, akou veľkou rodinou založenou na spoločnej práci sa MHWG stala, ale nanovo demonštrovala to, čo sme už konštatovali pred dvoma rokmi v Budapešti, že táto „rodina" by skutočne bola schopná prežiť dokonca sama, bez inštitucionálnej bázy. Iniciatívne dodávam, že ja viac uprednostňujem určitú organizačnú bázu..."]

Dr. Erwin A. SCHMIDL
Institute for Strategy and Security Policy
Austrian National Defence Academy
Vienna

PICTORIAL SUPPLEMENT

Monday, April 3, 2006 – „Welcome drink" at the Hotel Tatra under the patronage and presence of Martin Fedor - Minister of Defense of Slovak Republic

Tuesday, April 4, 2006 – from the first meeting day of the conference

Tuesday, April 4, 2006 – from the first meeting day of the conference

Wednesday, April 5, 2006 – guided visit of the Slovak National Uprising, Museum in Banská Bystrica (group photography of participants)

Wednesday, April 5, 2006 – Guided visit of the Slovak National Uprising in Banská Bystrica and the Military Historical Museum in Piešťany

Thursday, April 6, 2006 – from the second meeting day of the conference

Thursday, April 6, 2006 – from the second meeting day of the conference

Thursday, April 6, 2006 – „Farewell Coctail" at the Club of the Ministry of Defence with presence LTG Ľubomír Bulík, of Chief of Joint Chiefs of Staff of Slovak Armed Forces

ON AUTHORS

Prof. JEAN-DAVID AVENEL, *Professeur des universités,*
president de la Commission française d'Histoire militaire, nowadays in mission in Casablanca
Université de Paris XII-Val de Marne
France
E-mail: jeanavenel@yahoo.fr

Col. Dr. OLEG ANATOLIEVICH BELOSLUDTSEV, *Deputy chief*
Military Encyclopedia
Institute of Military History,
MoD of the Russian Federation
Universitetskij prospect 14
119330 Moscow
Russia
Phone: +7-495-147-2013
E-mail: obelos@yandex.ru

Lt. ABDIL BICER, *Researcher*
Army Studies Department
Service Historique de la Défense
Château de Vincennes BP 166
00468 Armées
France
E-mail: ab_bicer@yahoo.fr

He has written many articles and contributed to several books dedicated to the First World War. He is currently a PhD candidate with Professor Fremeaux at Sorbonne University. His thesis is dedicated to French Intelligence in Eastern Europe Greece and the Ottoman Empire, from 1915 to 1924.

Maj. Dr. FLAVIO CARBONE, Ph.D., *Junior teacher to*
the chair of Military Arts and Peace-keeping Operations
Carabinieri Officers School,
Via Aurelia n. 511
00165 Roma
Italy
E-mail: flpapcrb@hotmail.com; flaviocarbone@tele2.it

He served as Platoon and Company Mobile Battalion Commander, as Special Investigation Unit and

Company Commander in the territorial branch of Carabinieri. Abroad, he served for 8 months in the MSU Regiment in Bosnia – Herzegovina during the Nato-SFOR "Joint Forge" mission.

After a period in the Staff of the Carabinieri Officers College as International Relations and Foreign Languages Section Chief, he is in charge of the activities linked to the Military Arts and Peacekeeping Operations Chair as junior officer in the same Carabinieri Officers College. He attended various military national and international courses.

He had been also assistant of the University Chair of Military Institutions history in Milano and Military history in Rome.

He published four monographic works (two in Italian military history and one of these together with Professor Ilari), about ten articles and issues and other nine are going to be published or evalued. He wrote about 100 reviews of books primarily in the "Rassegna dell'Arma dei Carabinieri".

He participated with three papers to national and international congresses and he spoke at the "commission sur l'histoire du renseignement" of the French CEHD in 2005 about Carabinieri Corps.

RICHARD CARRIER, Ph.D., *Senior Lecturer in International History and History of War*
Royal Military College of Canada
Saint-Jean Campus
(450) 358–6777, poste 5641
Canada
E-mail: r.carrier@st-jean.rmc.ca

He is employed at RMC of Canada since 1996. In former time had been awarded for several times (*Overseas Research Student Awards Scheme* / Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom, 1992–1993/, *Senate Studentship Award*/Lancaster University, United Kingdom, 1992–1993/, *Italian Republic, Embassy of Italy in Canada*/Culture and Language Award, 1993.

He has contributed by many papers not only to Canadian's as well as to international conferences. Important Publications and his papers are*: Le Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean: 10 ans après; L'éducation et les militaires canadiens*; *Le Canada dans la Seconde Guerre mondiale: à propos de l'utilisation astucieuse des hommes et des moyens*; *Entre la guerre et la paix: Réflexions sur les attitudes et comportements militaires dans les opérations de maintien de paix*; *Guerres limitées et paix perpétuelleh: Étude des rapports entre les caractéristiques de la guerre au XVIIIe siècle et les conceptions de la paix de l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Jeremy Bentham et Emmanuel Kant*.

Dr. ARTHUR ten CATE, *Senior researcher*
Netherlands Institute of Military History
Netherlands Defense Academy
Alexander Barracks, Building 203
Van Alkemadelaan 357
2597 BA The Hague
Netherlands
E-mail: a.t.cate@mindef.nl

Dr. PÁL GERMUSKA, Ph.D., *Researcher*
Institute for the History of the 1956
Hungarian Revolution Public
Endowment Foundation (Institute of 1956)
Pf. 218
1410 Budapest
Hungary
Phone: +36 (1) 322 5228
Fax: +36 (1) 322 3084
E-mail: germuska.pal@ella.hu

Since 1995 works as a researcher at the Institute of 1956, and since 1999 he is a secretary of the institute as well as. He is involved in the history of the Hungarian socialist era. His main publications are: *1956 Handbook. Vol. I–III,* edited by A. Hegedüs (in Hungarian, editorial assistant with Tibor Beck); Revolution in the Arts Faculty (in Hungarian, with Tibor Beck), *1956 Encyklopaedia* (in Hungarian, multimedia CD-ROM, edited with A.B. Hegedüs and Z. Lux); *Under the Spell of Industria. Development Policy and the Socialist Cities* (in Hungarian); *The Defence Industry and the New Economic system.* In: Sixties in Hungary (in Hungarian); *Defence Industrial Cooperation inside the Frames of the COMECON, 1956–1965* (in Hungarian*).* In: Hadtörténeti Közlemények, 2006/1.; Začiatky maďarského exportu vojenskej techniky. In: Vojenská história 2006/3.

Col. FRÉDÉRIC GUELTON, Chef du *Département de l' armée de Terre*
Service Historique de la Défense
Château de Vincennes BP 166
00468 Armées
France

DAMIJAN GUŠTIN, Ph.D., *Scientific Collaborator*
Lecturer at University of Ljubljana,
Faculty of Social Sciences, Department for Defence Studies
Institute for Contemporary History
Kongresni trg 1
SI- 1000 Ljubljana
Slovenia
E-mail: damijan.gustin@inz.si

He researches mostly in the field of Slovene history in 20th century, with special emphasis on the Second World War in former Yugoslavia 1991–1995. He is co-author of Slovene contemporary history 1848–1992.

RONALD G. HAYCOCK, **Ph.D.**, *Professor of Military History and War Studies*
History Department
Royal Military College of Canada
Kingston, Ontario K7K 7B4
(613)541–6000, ext. 6243
Canada
E-mail: haycok-r@rmc.ca

He specializes in Canadian Military History, Strategic Studies and War and Technology. He is the author or editor of several books and numerous articles, and in his 31 years at RMC, he has served as Chairman of War Studies, Head of the History Department and Dean of Arts.

Col. Dr. WINFRIED HEINEMANN, Ph.D., *Director, East German and Warsaw Pact*
Military History Branch
Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt
Zeppelinstraße 127/128
Postfach 60 11 22
14411 Potsdam/BR
Germany
phone: 331–9714577; E-mail: winfriedheinemann@bundeswehr.org

He has published many articles and co-edited some important works, e.g.:
Roon, die Heeresreform und das Kaiserreich. Militärgeschichtliches Beiheft zur Europäischen Wehrkunde/Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, Heft 4/1987; The Development of German Armoured Forces 1919–40, in: Armoured Warfare, ed. by J. Paul Harris and F. H. Toase, London 1990;
Eduard Dietl. Lieblingsgeneral des „Führers", in: Die Militärelite des Dritten Reiches. 27 biographische Skizzen, hg. von Ronald Smelser und Enrico Syring, Berlin 1995; Außenpolitische Illusionen des nationalkonservativen Widerstands in den Monaten vor dem Attentat, in: Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler, hg. von Jürgen Schmädeke und Peter Steinbach, München 1985; Der Widerstand gegen das NS-Regime und der Krieg an der Ostfront, in: Militärgeschichte 8 (1998); Der militärische Widerstand und der Krieg, in: Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 9: Krieg und Gesellschaft 1939–1945, hg. vom Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt, München 2004; Vom Zusammenwachsen des Bündnisses. Die Funktionsweise der NATO in ausgewählten Krisenfällen 1951–1956, München 1998 (=Entstehung und Probleme des Atlantischen Bündnisses bis 1956, 1); Halvard Lange, Tyskland og NATO. Halvard Lange, Deutschland und die NATO, in: Tysklandsbrigaden. Fra okkupasjon til samarbeid. Die norwegische Deutschlandbrigade. Von der Okkupation zur Kooperation, hg. von Tom Kristiansen, Oslo 1998; Politische Zusammenarbeit im Bündnis, in: Von Truman bis Harmel. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Spannungsfeld von NATO und europäischer Integration, hg. von Hans-Joachim Harder, München 2000.
He edited: Das Internationale Krisenjahr 1956. Vorgänge – Perzeptionen – Auswirkungen, hg. von Winfried Heinemann und Norbert Wiggershaus, München 1999 (=Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte, 48); Nationale Außen- und Bündnispolitik der NATO-Mitgliedstaaten, hg. von Norbert Wiggershaus und Winfried Heinemann, München 2000 (=Entstehung und Probleme des Atlantischen Bündnisses bis 1956, 2).

Dr. SERGIU IOSIPESCU, PhD., *Chair of Department of Military History*
of Defence Political Studies and Military History
Institute for Political Studies
of Defense and Military History,
Ministry of National Defense
6 Constantin Mille St., sector 1,
010142 Bucharest
Rumania
E-mail: sergiu_iosipescu_arheo@yahoo.com

The former director of Magazine of *Les Carpates de sud-est dans l'histoire militaires de ĺ Europe (XI-II*ᵉ *siècles)*. He is the author of many studies and books about rumunian military history in Middle ages and ancient time, at present time he is a Chair of Department of Military History of Defence Political Studies and Military History. He is preparing the book with cooperation of French Service Historique de la Defense about Napoleon and Rumunian.

Lt.Col. Dr. JÁNOS JAKUS, Ph.D., *Researcher*
Institute and Museum of Military History
Kapisztrán Square 2–4
H-1014 Budapest, Pf. 7.
Hungary

His first role as a military officer was with a rifles regiment until 1982, when he enrolled in the Miklós Zrínyi Military Academy. Finishing in 1985, he served as an instructor of combat operations and organization, military strategy and leadership at both institutions until 1992. He then served on the Hungarian Armed Forces General Staff, and in 1998 he began his duty with the Ministry of Defence, where, since 2003 he has worked at the Military History Institute and Museum. He graduated on his Ph.D. in military history in 1998, and regularly publishes articles in Hungarian and English.

Capt. Dr. MIGUEL LÓPEZ CORRAL, *Analyst leader at Analysis and Prospecting Center,*
International relationship History lecturer Carlos III University in Madrid
Analysis and Prospecting Center
Guardia Civil General Direction
Madrid
Spain
E-mail: miguellc@guardiacivil.es

Dr. BRIAN McKERCHER
History Department
Royal Military College of Canada
Kingston, Ontario K7K 7B4
(613)541–6000, ext. 6243
Canada
E-mail: mckercher_b@rmc.ca

Col. Dr. MIKHAIL G. LYOSHIN, *Deputy Chief*, *Senior Research Fellow, Extraordinary Professor,*
the *Russian Academy of Natural Sciences (Section of Military History, Culture and Law),*
Foreign Military History Department
Institute of Military History,
MoD of the Russian Federation
Universitetskij prospect 14
119330 Moscow
Russia
Phone: +7-495-147-2013
E-mail: mlyoshin@yandex.ru

Lt.Col. LES'MELNYK, Ph.D., *Chief, Command Information Division*
National Guard
Bureau Office of Public Afffairs
and Strategic Communications
USA
Phone: (703)607–2636
E-mail: Les.Melnyk@ngb.ang.af.mil

Books and Reports: Phelps, Ruth and Beatrice Farr. *Reserve Component Soldiers as Peacekeepers.* Arlington, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioural and Social Sciences, September 1996; Rader, Steve et al. *Mobilizing an Infantry Company: The Experience of Calling Up C/3–116th Infantry (Virginia Army National Guard) for Operation JOINT GUARD.* Science Applications International Corp., August 25, 1998; Minuteman Inst. for National Defense Studies. *Citizen Soldiers as Peacekeepers: The Army National Guard in the Balkans*. (MINDS Study Paper #1), Washington, DC, June 2000; Doubler, Michael. *I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636–2000*. Washington DC: Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 130–1, 2001; U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned, *After-Action Report (AAR) SFOR 7 – Citizen-Soldiers in Bosnia*. (CALL Special Edition No. 02–12, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, October 2002), 1; Congressional Research Service. "Bosnia and Kosovo: U.S. Military Operations." CRS Report for Congress, February 16, 2004; Government Accountability Office. *Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges: Statement of Janet A. St. Laurent, Director Defense Capabilities and Management*. (Testimony Before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives) Washington DC, April 29, 2004; Government Accountability Office. *Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions*. (Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, and Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, House of Representatives) Washington DC, November 2004; Multinational Force & Observers. "Annual Report of the Director General – February 2004." Office of Publications, Multinational Force & Observers, Rome, Italy, 2004; Congressional Research Service. "Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations:Issueas of U.S. Military Involvement." CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Updated January 30, 2006; National Guard Bureau. *National Guard 2007 Posture Statement*. Washington DC, February 2006.

MG. (ret.) Ing. SVETOZÁR NAĎOVIČ,
General of the Czechoslovak Army and of the Slovak Army

His military carrier started in 60'. Since February 1990 he was appointed Chief of the Executive for Securing the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Czechoslovakia. Even during his activity in this function he was appointed Chief of the Main Executive of the Land Forces of Czechoslovak Army at the end of May. There he stayed until the separation of the ČSFR. At the Army of the Slovak Republic, he worked in the functions of the Deputy Commander of Land Forces until his retirement at the end of 1997.

He is the coauthor of book: *The great withdrawal,* by Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic in English version

Col. Ing. ONDŘEJ NOVOSAD, *Commander of Operations,*
Commander of Joint Operations Centre
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic
MoD of the Slovak Republic
Kutuzovova 8
832 28 Bratislava
Slovakia
E-mail: novosado@mod.gov.sk

Until 1996 he performed basic commanding and staff positions at company, battalion and regiment levels. He served one year as the Deputy Commander of the Engineer Battalion in UN Peacekeeping mission UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia. Between 1999 and 2000 he served in NATO's KFOR mission as NCC, and from July 2003 he served as NCC in Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq for six months. In 2000 he was appointed a senior officer in the Headquarters of the Land Forces and in 2004 he was appointed the Chief of the Joint Operations Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. In 2001 he completed the Senior Staff Officers' Course. In 2005 he participated in an English language course at St John College of the University of Leeds, York, England.

Aspirant LOUIS N. PANEL
Département Gendarmerie
nationale
Service Historique de la Défense
Château de Vincennes BP 166
00468 Armées
France
E-mail: loisnpanel@yahoo.fr

Prof. MARIA GABRIELA PASQUALINI, *Professor of University of Palermo,*
Carabinieri Officer's School in Rome
Vice Presidente Consultative Committee
to General Chief of Staff Military Feminine Service
VIA COLA DI RIENZO 212
00192 Roma
Italy
E-mail: mg.pasqualini@tiscalinet.it

VLADIMIR PREBILIČ, Ph.D., *Assistant Professor at the Defence Study Department*
for military history and military geography
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Ljubljana
Kardeljeva pl. 5
SI – 1000 Ljubljana
Slovenia
Phone: + 386 1 58 05 331
E-mail: vladimir.prebilic@fdv.uni-lj.si

Since 1999 he is employed at the Defence Studies Department at the Faculty of Social Sciences. In 2001 he finished his masters programme and received M. Sc. His thesis was based on thorough analysis of three conversion models of former military sites and other installations (USA, UK and Germany) were compared. In 2004 he defended his doctoral thesis: The Military Logistics of German Armed Forces During the II. World War and was promoted on the rank of assistant professor in 2005. His bibliography consisted of two books and more than 30 articles. Most important foreign articles are: *Theoretical Aspects of Military Logistics, Defence System and Ecology – NATO's Role, Intervention That Never Happened: Informbiro Crisis, Crisis Management in Slovenia, New Challenges and Possible Reorganization of Slovene Mountain Rescue Service, Die Rechtslage der deutschen Minderheit in Jugoslawien 1944 bis 1946, Between Old Ties and New Challenges: Slovenian Policy Towards Crisis Situation in South Eastern Europe.*

Dr. ROBERT STERLING RUSH, Ph.D., *Command sergeant major (ret.) US army,*
Coordinator Military History Working Group
U.S. Army Center of Military History
103 Third Avenue
Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319–5058
USA
E-mail: Robert.S.Rush@tac01.usace.army.mil
        robert.rush@hqda.army.mil

During a career that spanned thirty years, served in leadership positions from squad leader through continental army command sergeant major, and includes assignments in ranger, light, and mechanized infantry units. Upon retirement, he attended The Ohio State University and earned a Doctor of Philosophy in military history in 2000. He has just completed a six month assignment in Iraq

as historian for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division. While in Iraq, Dr. Rush collected documents and interviews of those persons and organizations participating in the Iraq reconstruction; from which comprehensive manuscripts on reconstruction as a whole, and the USACE Gulf Region/Project and Contracting Office in particular will be written. At the Center of Military History, he serves as program officer for international military history activities. He is responsible for both the academic content and logistical implementation of current exchange programs with foreign military history offices. He serves as coordinator of the Military History Working Group, which includes members from 18 Eastern and Central European nations. Besides his work in Europe, Dr. Rush has initiated contact and built support for both Pacific Rim and Mahgreb Military History Initiatives. He has written several papers on different historical aspects of Army reconstruction activities. He also vetted the Smithsonian Institute's World War II portion of The Price of Freedom: Americans at War. He is author of books: GI: The US Infantryman in World War II (2004); US Infantryman of WW2 (1) Pacific Theater of Operations 1942–1945(2002); US Infantryman of WW2 (2) Mediterranean Theater of Operations 1943–1945 (2002); US Infantryman OF WW2 (3) European Theater of Operations 1944–1945(2003);Hell in Hürtgen Forest: Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment (2001); The Soldier's Guide 7th Edition (2006); The NCO Guide 8th Edition (2006). He has also had articles published in Armed Forces and Society, Military Review, Army History, On Point, Army Trainer, the NCO Journal; Revue international d'histoire militaire. No 80; and Historie a Vojenství 3–4/2003.

Dr. TAMARA SCHEER, *Researcher Institute for Str*ategy *and Security Policy*
Austrian National Defence Academy
AG Stiftgasse 2A
A-1060 Vienna
Austria
E-mail: scheer.tamara@gmx.at

In former period she has dedicated to Austro-Hungarian history until the end of World War I, especially military history as well as Balkans, since 2005 to 2006 worked for National Defence Academy Vienna/Institute for Strategy and Security Policy about "Austro-Hungarian Experience with military governments during First World War in Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Poland and Italy", at the moment finishing doctoral thesis about "Management and monitoring of state of emergency during the First World War – emergency regulations and war supervision office".

Ms. CARMEN SORINA RÎJNOVEANU, *Scientific Researcher*
Institute for Political Studies
of Defense and Military History,
Ministry of National Defense
6 Constantin Mille St., sector 1, 010142 Bucharest
Rumania
Phone: 004-021-315.17.00
E-mail: carmen_sorina@yahoo.com

As a co-editor she has issued titles: Future of NATO. Readings and Documents Collection, as well as

Combating Terrorism: NATO and Transatlantic Dimension, US Realignment and NATO Transformation: Implications for Southeast Europe and Greater Black Sea Region.

The important papers had been written by her: The attacks of September 11. Consequences on North-Atlantic Alliance's Development, The redefinition of NATO-Russia Relations. The establishment of a new cooperation mechanism, Rumania's Stand on the Czechoslovak Crisis in 1968, Evolution of NATO-Russia Relations in the Perspective of Prague Summit, Rumania's Policy of Autonomy in the Context of Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1960–1968, A perspective on the evolution of EU – Russia Relations, NATO Training Mission in Iraq, as a co-author wrote: *Rumania-NATO. Chronology: 1989–2004*.

MAJ. WILLIAM SHANE STORY, Ph.D., *Historian*
U.S. Army Center of Military History
103 Third Avenue
Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319–5058
USA
E-mail: william.story@hqda.army.mil

In his professional carrer he was working in many position, e.g. as a platoon leader in frame of Aviation Brigade, 2nd Armored Division, Ft. Hood, Texas. For several years has been acting as officer in Germany as well as there were acting as a commander of troops (Bravo Troop, 2nd Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment. Later he was acting as a historian in frame of U.S. Peacekeeping Force, Kosovo as well as Colaition Forces Land Component Command, Kuwait and Iraq. Nowadays he works at U.S. Army Center of Military History.

His Presentation:"Turn the Recorder Off": Oral History in the Iraq War Zone' Oral History Association, Portland, Oregon. 1 October 2004.

In Periodical magazine he contributed by paper :'Transformation or Troop Strength? Early Accounts of the Invasion of Iraq'. Also reviews on proffesional monographies were written by him.

Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Critical History (monograph, U.S. Army Center of Military History) is important work in progress.

Ms. TABITHA SWANN, *Research Team Leader*
Corporate Memory
(Analysis Branch)
Ministry of Defence
London
United Kingdom
E-mail: tabitha.swann112@mod.uk

Dr. MICHAL ŠTEFANSKÝ, CSC., *Scientific Researcher*
Institute of Millitary History
Krajná 27
821 04 Bratislava
Slovak Republic
E-mail: vhu@centrum.sk

He is dedicated to new period of Slovak history after 1945 year in international context. He is the author of book, scientific studies, co-author of encyclopedias and editor of miscellanies as well as documents. The particular tasks of his research activity are 1968 events in Czechoslovakia.

Commodore ANDREAS TOUSSAS, *Officer of Helenic Navy*
Hellenic Commission on Military History
Athens
Greece
E-mail: eesi@otenet.gr

In his professional carreer has served in various posts in the Hellenic Navy General Staff and the Hellenic National Defense General Staff, as Assistant Greek Naval Attaché at the Greek Embassy in Washington D.C. as well as in various naval and fleet units as staff officer.

ÉVA TULIPÁN, M.A. Ph.D., *Researcher historian IMMH and Lecturer (20th Century Hungarian History)*
Péter Pázmany Catholic University Centre of European Studies
Institute and Museum of Military History
H-1014, Budapest
Kapisztrán Square 2–4
Hungary
Phone: +36 20 4608524
E-mail: e.tulipan@chello.hu

She is attending the National Scholarship for PhD Candidates.
As a co-author issued monography: with Miklós Horváth (In memoriam 1956. Budapest: Zrínyi Ki-adó, 2006.(with Miklós Horváth) Keresztutak: Magyar Néphadsereg 1956 (Crossroads: Hungarian Peoples' Army 1956). Budapest: H&T Kiadó, 2006.
She is author of studies:„Köztársaság tér: szimbólum és történelmi esemény" („Köztársaság Square: Symbol and Historical Event"), „Köztársaság tér, 1956. október 30." („Köztársaság Square, 30th October, 1956").

Prof. Dr. KENT ZETTERBERG, *Professor in Modern Political His*tory *and security Politics*
National Defence College
Stockholm
Sweden
E-mail: Kent.Zetterberg@fhs.se

Professor is a member of the research project Sweden during the Second World War (SUAV) 1969 – 1978, and founder and leader of the research project Sweden's defence during the Cold War (FOKK), a cooperation between the National Defence College, the Royal Academy of Military Sciences and the Royal Academy of Naval Science since 2000. He has written a lot of books and articles about Sweden's Defence and security Politics in a Nordic context covering mainly the period 1800–2006, with emphasis on the period 1920–1990. Other research topics include Swedish Domestic politics

1905–2005, Media History, research politics and biographical essays on Swedish politicians, civil servants, chief-editors and journalists, dilplomats and military leaders.

Lt.Col. JANUSZ ZUZIAK, Ph.D., *Specialist in The Military Bureau for Historical Research and professor in Jan Kochanowski Accademy in Kielce*
Wojskowe Biuro Badań Historycznych
Stefana Banacha Street 2
00–909 Warszawa
Poland.
E-mail: januszzuziak@op.pl

LIST OF 6TH MHWG INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

#	COUNTRY (ORG)	NAME
1	Austria (ISSP NDA)	Dr. Felix **Schneider**
2	Austria (ISSP NDA)	Dr. Tamara **Scheer**
3	Austria (ISSP NDA)	Dr. Erwin A. **Schmidl**
4	Canada (RMC- St. Jean)	Dr. Richard **Carrier**
5	Canada (RMC- Kingston)	Dr. Ronald G. **Haycock**
6	Canada (RMC- Kingston)	Dr. Brian **McKercher**
7	Czech Republic (IMH)	LtC. Aleš **Knížek**
8	Czech Republic (IMH)	LtC. Eduard **Stehlík**
9	France (SHD)	VA Louis **De Contenson**
10	France (SHD)	Col. Frédéric **Guelton**
11	France (SHD)	Lt. Abdil **Bicer**
12	France (SHD)	Asp. Louis N. **Panel**
13	France (CFHM)	Prof. Jean-David **Avenel**
14	France (SHD)	M.A. André **Rakoto**
15	France (SHD)	Officer Interpretor – Mr. Yaroslav **Boukine**
16	France (SHD)	Officer Interpretor – Mr. Camille **Calmy**
17	Germany (MGFA)	Col. Winfried **Heinemann**
18	Greece (HNH)	RA Mavroidis **Giannoukakos**
19	Greece (EESI)	LTG Nicholas **Mastrandonis**
20	Greece (EESI)	MG Dimitrios **Kristalis**
21	Greece (EESI)	CDR Andreas **Toussas**
22	Hungary (MHIM)	LtC. István **Czigány**
23	Hungary (MHIM)	LtC. János **Jakus**
24	Hungary (MHIM)	Dr. Éva **Tulipán**
25	Hungary (1956 Inst. History)	Dr. Pál **Germuska**
26	Hungary (MHIM)	LtC. László **Veszprémy**
27	Italy (COS)	Maj. Flavio **Carbone**
28	Italy (UNIPA, COS)	Prof. Maria Gabriella **Pasqualini**
29	Netherlands (NIMH)	Dr. Arthur **Ten Cate**
30	Poland (WBBH)	Col. Janusz **Zuziak**
31	Poland (WBBH)	LtC. Wojciech **Hajnus**
32	Poland (CAW)	CDR Waldemar **Wójcik**
33	Poland (CAW)	Mr. Andrzej Czeslaw **Zak**
34	Rumania (IPSDMH)	Dr. Sergiu **Iosipescu**
35	Rumania (IPSDMH)	Ms. Carmen Sorina **Rîjnoveanu**

36	Russia (IMH)	Col. Oleg A. **Belosludtsev**
37	Russia (IMH)	Col. Mikhail G. **Lyoshin**
38	Slovakia (IMH)	Col. ret. Jozef **Bystrický**
39	Slovakia (IMH)	LtC. Peter **Šumichrast**
40	Slovakia (IMH)	Maj. Miloslav **Čaplovič**
41	Slovakia (IMH)	Dr. Michal **Štefanský**
42	Slovakia (IMH)	Dr. Imrich **Purdek**
43	Slovakia (IMH)	Dr. František **Cséfalvay**
44	Slovakia (IMH)	Dr. Jan **Štaigl**
45	Slovakia (IMH)	Dr. Vladimír **Segeš**
46	Slovakia (IMH)	Dr. Igor **Baka**
47	Slovakia (IMH)	M. A. Mária **Stanová**
48	Slovakia (IMH)	M. A. Božena **Šeďová**
49	Slovakia	MG ret. Svetozár **Naďovič**
50	Slovakia (GS AF SR)	Col. Ondřej **Novosad**
51	Slovakia	Officer Interpretor – M.A. Dušan **Institoris**
52	Slovakia (MoD)	Officer Interpretor – Dr. Eva **Pijáková**
53	Slovenia (AFMM)	LtC. Tomaz **Kladnik**
54	Slovenia (AFMM)	Cpt. Zvezdan **Markovič**
55	Slovenia (ICH-LJ)	Dr. Damijan **Guštin**
56	Slovenia (UNI-LJ)	Dr. Vladimir **Prebilič**
57	Spain (Guardia-CGD)	Capt. Miguel López **Corral**
58	Spain (CEHISMI)	Capt.(N) José María Blanco **Núnēz**
59	Sweden (NDC)	Dr. Kent **Zetterberg**
60	United Kingdom (CM MoD)	OBE Alex **Ward**
61	United Kingdom (CM MoD)	Ms. Tabitha **Swann**
62	United States (NG US)	LtC. Les' **Melnyk**
63	United States (US ACMH)	Dr. William W. **Epley**
64	United States (US ACMH)	Maj. William Shane **Story**
65	United States (AHECC)	Col. Robert **Dalessandro**
66	United States (US ACMH)	ComSgMaj Scott **Garrett**
67	United States (EUCOM)	Dr. James **McNaughton**

Editors:
    Maj. Miloslav Čaplovič, M. A., Ph.D.
    Mária Stanová, M. A.
    André Rakoto, M. A.

Pictorial Supplement:
    Ing. Miroslav Mihálik

Translation:
   Maj. Dr. Rudolf Kapitáň
    Dr. Eva Pijáková
    Ing. Ladislav Koudelka, DrSc.

EXITING WAR

Bratislava 3 - 7 April 2006

WAR

POST CONFLICT MILITARY OPERATIONS

6th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

Military History Working Group

Editors

Miloslav Čaplovič
Mária Stanová
André Rakoto