

PAST THROUGH PRESENT:
THOUGHTS ON MILITARY HISTORY AT THE STRATEGIC,
OPERATIONAL, AND TACTICAL LEVELS OF WAR

Past through Present: Thoughts on Military History at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels of War

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Conference Welcome

by

MR. LAJOS FODOR
Secretary of State of Hungary

Ladies and Gentlemen, Distinguished Guests:

It is a pleasure to open this conference. We highly appreciate that the Hungarian Institute and Museum of War History could organize the 12th Conference of the Euro-Atlantic Conflict Studies Working Group together with our Austrian colleagues.

This annual meeting has proven to be an appropriate occasion for countries to work together so that, as a result of their collaboration, an ever closer intellectual community can be formed year by year.

It is of great importance that last year the table of organization of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense was fundamentally changed. I am convinced that this significant restructuring – cutting bureaucracy and redundancy – shall result in a more efficient way of operation. Several supporting institutes, offices, and agencies of the Ministry ceased to exist, were restructured, or took on a more efficient operational structure.

Still, from among these organizations, the staff number of the Institute and Museum of War History was hardly affected: it was only reduced from 127 to 123.

The above suggests that your work, which will continue to have to meet a constant future demand both in domestic and international terms, has been effective and efficient.

The last twelve years, ladies and gentlemen, saw the development of this conference series into a pan-European forum that originally focused on Central European issues and was intended to promote Central European cooperation. Each region of the continent is represented in the series, supplemented by American and Canadian military historians. This conference may well be considered one of the most successful annual meetings for military historians, next to those other annual international war historian conventions that attract large audiences.

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We are proud of the fact that the conference has always had Hungarian lecturer participants, and we hope that the economic situation is not going to have negative effects on this tradition in the future either.

The organizers intended to find a topic that provided most participants with the opportunity to join. The significant number of paper presenters definitely confirms that the choice (“Past through Present: Thoughts on Military History at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels of War”) was more than simply a matter of selection, providing a really interesting theme. By focusing on contemporary conflicts, it could be ensured that the results of these lectures could get incorporated into the curriculum of defence educational institutions as soon as possible, with the aim to serve as supplementary material for Army decision makers.

This jointly-conducted Austrian and Hungarian conference, ladies and gentlemen, is an excellent example to demonstrate our close cooperation in the field of professions and science.

From among the achievements of this collaboration, I feel obliged to highlight the Budapest Archives Representation, which is still operating in the Military Archives in Vienna. The Representation provides access to the Hungarian military records specialists to process the two countries’ common archival heritage dating from 1526.

Another joint military institute that one cannot forget about is the Hungarian Nobility Guard. This organization, which initially constituted a body of 120 people, was founded by Maria Theresa in 1760. Its members were appointed by the counties, which even bore the costs of maintenance. The Guards were constantly present at the residence, accompanied the monarch on the various journeys, and the equestrian squad added charm to the official ceremonies and festivals.

This common military history can further be confirmed by the Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt, one of the oldest officer training institutes in the world, which was founded in 1751 by Empress Maria Theresa, in addition to the staff course operating in Vienna since 1852. The latter also served as the most important educational institution for Hungarian officers. The independent Royal Hungarian Army and the Hungarian staff course could find their leaders or founders among the officers graduating from those respected institutions.

During the last decades several joint exhibitions and conferences have been organized and held in the framework of the Austrian–Hungarian military historian collaboration, in Vienna and Budapest alike. This can be well supported by the “Iron Curtain” (Vasfüggöny) joint exhibition in 2001, which aimed at reviewing the two countries’ relationship between 1945 and 1989. In 2006, the anniversary of the 1956 Revolution was commemorated in the form of a conference in both capitals.

Ladies and gentlemen, let me say “thank you” to our Austrian partner, Dr. Christian Ortner, the Director of the Heeresgeschichtliches Museum in Vienna for his devoted organizational work and the provision of the conference venue.

At the same time I would like to wish you a pleasant visit to the Esterházy Palace in Fertőd. I believe that visiting the Austrian and Hungarian Esterházy monuments is an outstanding opportunity to learn more about – and get a better understanding of – the eventful history of Central Europe.

Let me conclude by the words of one of our famous writers: “What is common in Central Europe is that history is sensibly around us.”

I wish you a successful and enjoyable conference – thank you for your attention!

Anthology Preface

by

DR. CHRISTIAN ORTNER
Director, Austrian Military History Museum

After many years of absence, the 2012 Conflict Studies Working Group conference is once again being held in Vienna, hosted by the *Heeresgeschichtliches Museum/Militärhistorisches Institut* (Austrian Military History Museum). When the question was posed, without any hesitation Hungary was chosen as Austria's and Vienna's favorite joint host, and it is represented here by the Institute for Military History of the Museum of Military History. The planned cooperation was never influenced by any nostalgic considerations or a review of hundreds of years of concerted history, but by a long lasting and fruitful cooperation in military history and research between Austria and Hungary. So Vienna was very pleased by the Hungarian commitment to work together under the tradition of *Viribus unitis*.

The conference theme, "Past through Present: Thoughts on Military History at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels of War," was chosen to show the military-historical character of the symposium and to allow a vast possibility of topics for lecturers and presentations. Therefore, it was not surprising that the organizers received many papers but were only able to accept a restricted number of presentations. As confirmed by different sources, the high academic and scholarly value of all the presentations fortunately ensured was the success of the conference.

For the staff ride portion of this conference, an excursion jointly organized by Austrian and Hungarian military historians will be conducted to "hot spots" of the history not only of the so-called Cold War, but also for those wars ending in 1989. The excursion will be a highlight and an excellent example of the joint cooperation between Hungary and Austria in hosting this conference. Therefore, I want to give my grateful thanks to the Hungarian Ministry of Defense and the members of the Institute for Military History/Museum of Military History for their outstanding support and assistance in helping make this conference a success.

Past through Present: Thoughts on Military History at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels of War

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War Strategies and Diplomatic Tactics: The End of World War II in Yugoslavia

by

MILJAN MILKIĆ

ABSTRACT In this article, we will analyze, through the example of the ending of Second World War in Yugoslavia, the attitude of the Western Allies towards Yugoslavia, their interests in Yugoslavia, and their influence on the forming of a new Yugoslav government. The question of territorial status of Venezia Giulia is an important issue within the context of the Western Allies' political interest. During the Second World War, the Yugoslav region was perceived by the Allies fighting against the anti-Hitler coalition in terms of their general plans in Mediterranean, and in Central and Eastern Europe. In this context, the northwestern part of Yugoslavia, especially Venezia Giulia and the port of Trieste, had particular importance. The United States and British Governments sought to ensure their presence in the northern Adriatic area and to control the Trieste port as a logistical base for an advance towards Austria. The importance of the Anglo-American presence in this region was confirmed in negotiations at the highest level were held, at the Allied conferences, and at the level of combined Allied army headquarter chiefs in this region. The entry of the Yugoslav forces in Trieste on 1 May 1945 provoked a crisis that threatened to lead to an armed conflict between the Yugoslav and Allied forces. The diplomatic moves of all actors of the May crisis in 1945, unambiguously confirmed the strategic importance of Trieste and the interests of great powers in Venezia Giulia. The position of the post-war Yugoslavia was an essential issue for creation of the further Allies' attitudes against Yugoslavia, but it was also important for mutual relations between Western Allies and the Soviet Union. The British government justified its policy with the fact that the Soviet Government wanted to have Trieste as an exit to the Mediterranean. The War coalition of major powers showed its inflexibility on the future constitutional status of Venezia Giulia.

The aim of this article is to point out at the importance of diplomacy and diplomatic history in the study of military history. As we all know, military

history is not only about battles, war strategy, and tactics. The foreign policy decisions are also significant for the study of military history. In this article, we will try to analyze, through the example of the ending of the Second World War in Yugoslavia, the attitude of the Western Allies towards Yugoslavia, their interests in Yugoslavia, and their influence on forming a new Yugoslav government. The defining of the Yugoslav-Italian and Yugoslav-Austrian border as well as the question of territorial status of Venezia Giulia are important issues within the context of the Western Allies' political interest.¹

From the end of November 1943 until early March 1945, in the occupied Kingdom of Yugoslavia there was no single "Yugoslav" government and "Yugoslav" policy. In this area, a few Yugoslav subjects acted and those were the Royal Yugoslav Government, the National Liberation Movement and the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland, which were important participants in all of the events during this period. It also led to the creation of new political structures (Committee of National Liberation of Yugoslavia and the Provisional Government of the Democratic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), as well as of military formations (Yugoslav Army). The period is characterized by the existence of two Yugoslav governments, the Royal Government and the Committee of National Liberation of Yugoslavia, the latter controlled by the Communist Party. Both governments were equally representing the Yugoslav state in international relations. Mutual political antagonisms of these two governments significantly impacted the international position of Yugoslavia. This situation lasted until the formation of a unified Yugoslav government on 7 March 1945.

Given the fact that it was recognized by the Allies, the Royal Yugoslav Government continued the international continuity of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and had the potential for political activities through direct contact with representatives of the anti-fascist coalition. Since the beginning of the war, the Royal Yugoslav Government was significantly engaged in the anti-fascist coalition. In June 1941, the government representatives attended a conference of allied representatives in St. James Palace. In September of the same year, the Yugoslav government accepted the Declaration that United States President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had proposed in London, and in January 1942, the Yugoslav government was among the founders of United Nations. After the second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia, from 29 November-30 November 1943, and the formation of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia

¹ For information on the population in Venezia Giulia, see Olinto Marinelli, "The Regions of Mixed Populations in Northern Italy," *Geographical Review* 7, no. 3 (March 1919): 133-138.

began sending its military and political missions for negotiations with the Allies. By sending the first military mission to Alexandria, Egypt, for talks with the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean, British General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, in December 1943, recognition of the National Liberation Army by the Allies was achieved.²

During the Second World War, the Yugoslav region was perceived by the Allies gathered around the anti-Hitler coalition in terms of their general plans in Mediterranean, and in Central and Eastern Europe. At the Casablanca Conference, from 14-24 January 1943, the third allied conference which was attended by both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, military operations in the Balkans were discussed.³ The strategic importance of the Yugoslav area increased after amphibious and air assaults by the allied Fifth and Eighth Armies on Sicily on 10 July 1943. The signing of the armistice in Syracuse on 3 September 1943, between Italy and the Allies and the command of Marshal Pietro Badoglio, and the surrender of Italian Armed Forces on 8 September 1943, brought German armed forces to parts of Adriatic coast which were formerly under Italian control.⁴ In this context the north-western part of Yugoslavia had particular importance, especially Venezia Giulia and the port of Trieste. The American and British governments, through the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean (first General Wilson, then Field Marshal Harold Alexander), sought to ensure their presence in the northern Adriatic area and to control the Trieste port as a logistical base for operations towards Austria. The importance of the Anglo-American presence in this region confirms the fact that the conversations at the highest level were held, at the Allied conferences, as well as at the level of combined Allied army headquarter chiefs in this region.

At the Quebec Conference, held from 14-24 August 1943, British and American headquarter chiefs discussed the possible use of allied forces in the Balkans, in the region of Trieste-Vienna, and came to a conclusion on the need to supply "Balkan guerrillas" from sea and air.⁵ The differences between the American, British, and Soviet governments regarding the status

² Vladimir Velebit, *Sećanja* (Zagreb: Globus, 1983), 176. [Vladimir Velebit, *Memoirs* (Zagreb: Globus, 1983), 176.]

³ William M. Franklin, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conferences at Washington 1941-1942, and Casablanca 1943* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1968).

⁴ About Italy under Allied occupation, see René Albrecht-Carrié, "The Italian Treaty," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 257, Peace Settlements of World War II (May 1948): 76-86.

⁵ William M. Franklin, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conference at Washington and Quebec 1943* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1970), 479.

of Venezia Giulia derived from the fundamental understandings of how to design the post-war world. The British government aimed to protect its sphere of influence in the Mediterranean from the Soviet influence and to maintain the balance of powers in Europe. Most of American diplomacy and President Roosevelt were not overly concerned with the relations of the spheres of influence, but had already attempted to establish a multilateral, neo-Wilsonian world order.

The Yugoslav question at the Allied Conference at Tehran (28 November-1 December 1943) was significant because both Great Britain and the Soviet Union had claims to secure their influence in the Balkans.⁶ President Roosevelt proposed that the Anglo-American troops, together with the Yugoslav Partisans, undertake operations in the northern Adriatic, while Churchill was trying to ensure that part of the Mediterranean Allied Forces remained for operations in the Adriatic Sea area. The National Liberation Movement received support at the conference and it was decided to rebuild Yugoslavia “in complete independence and territorial integrity.”⁷

The conclusions from the Tehran Conference as well as the support to the partisan movement in Yugoslavia once again raised the issue of the status of Venezia Giulia and the position of the region on a geopolitical map of post-war Europe. In summer 1944, the British government was keen on the idea to occupy with troops the whole area of the northern Adriatic, but there was some controversy among the Allies about the offensive line. While the British General Wilson was proposing to continue the advance towards Istria at the cost of delay of the Operation Anvil in Provence, the American generals were against it and informed the Roosevelt of their opposition.⁸ Churchill thought the Americans and British should, at the end of the war, have a strong force north of Trieste, and warned that “for the reasons of high politics, we have in central and southern Europe our stake and do not let all fall into Soviet hands, with unforeseeable consequences that it could bring.” On 21 September 1944, in his message to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Antony Eden, Churchill indicated that Yugoslav partisans leader Josip Broz Tito did not need any special reason “to defer

⁶ Bernard Noble, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), 493-496.

⁷ Miljan Milkić, *Tršćanska kriza u vojno-političkim odnosima Jugoslavije sa velikim silama 1943-1947* (Beograd, INIS, 2012), 32. [Miljan Milkić, *Trieste Crisis in the Context of Military and Political Relations between Yugoslavia and Great Powers, 1943-1947* (Belgrade, INIS, 2012), 32.]

⁸ Thomas M. Barker, “The Ljubljana Gap Strategy: Alternative to Anvil/Dragoon or Fantasy?” *Journal of Military History* 56, no. 1 (January 1992): 61.

to the Russians completely,⁹ and this was sent twenty days before Tito's meeting with Churchill in Naples. Bearing in mind the importance of the Yugoslav area for future allied military operations, on 12 and 13 August 1944, Churchill led direct talks with Tito and sought to examine the possibility of using the port of Trieste during the Allied landings on the Adriatic coast.¹⁰ Also, he informed Tito that the cooperation with the local Yugoslav forces represented an operational issue that would require careful examination and consultation with the president of the United States.

The meetings Tito had during his stay in Italy denote the beginning of the strengthening of the Yugoslav communists' diplomatic leadership efforts to improve the international position of the Committee of National Liberation of Yugoslavia. On 6 August 1944, Tito had his first official military meeting with the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean, Wilson, and members of his staff at Caserta.¹¹ The next day at Bolzano Lake, Tito met Alexander, the Allied ground force commander in Italy, and raised the issue of Trieste in regard to further Allied operations.¹²

The next meeting between Tito and Wilson was held on 10 August 1944. Tito requested that in any operation in Istria, Allied forces cooperate with the local partisan units but remained without "definitive and obligatory response."¹³ During his conversation with the Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander in Mediterranean, General Sir James A. H. Gammell, on 13 August, Tito was handed a memorandum about the Allied plans in Istria and in neighboring areas.¹⁴ The memorandum stated that in case allied forces occupied northern Italy, Austria, or Hungary, the Allied High Command would establish an Allied military administration in the area which would be under Italian administration. This area would remain under the direct allied administration until a decision was made on it in negotiations between the interested governments. In response to the Allied memorandum, Tito told Gammell that he believed the local civil and military administration must be

⁹ *Tito-Churchill strogo tajno* (urednik Dušan Biber), Arhiv Jugoslavije (Beograd: Globus, 1981), 323. [Dušan Biber, ed., *Tito-Churchill top secret*, Arhiv Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Globus, 1981), 323.], and Edwin P. Hoyt, *Backwater War. The Allied Campaign in Italy 1943-1945* (London: Praeger, 2002), 175-185.

¹⁰ Vladimir Velebit, *Sećanja* (Zagreb: Globus, 1983), 278. [Vladimir Velebit, *Memoirs* (Zagreb: Globus, 1983), 278.]

¹¹ Biber, 258.

¹² Field-Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis, *The Alexander Memoirs, 1940-1945* (London: Cassel, 1962), 132.

¹³ Milkić, 53.

¹⁴ Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije 1941-1945, II (Beograd: Jugoslovenski pregled, 1989), 2: 226-227. [Documents about Foreign Policy of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1941-1945, II (Belgrade: 1989), 2: 226-227.]

lead by civil and military authorities of the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia. Churchill first explained the efforts of the British government to form a unified Yugoslav government with all Yugoslavs fighting against the enemy in a memorandum addressed to Tito on 12 August, and then he repeated it the next day at a meeting also attended by the President of the Yugoslav Royal government, Ivan Šubašić.

By the autumn of 1944, over 70 percent of Yugoslav territory had been liberated. On 28 September, the military-political agreement on a joint action of the National Liberation Army and the Red Army was made in Moscow.¹⁵ Talks between Tito and Šubašić about forming a joint Yugoslav government continued on 21 October 1944 and were completed finished in liberated Belgrade, on November the first by signing of the Second agreement of Tito-Šubašić envisaging the creation of governorship by king's constitutional act. The agreement represents an international recognition of the new government and explicitly confirms the legal continuity of Yugoslavia and its continued existence in the old form.

The position of post-war Yugoslavia was an essential issue for creation of the further Allies' attitudes against Yugoslavia, but it was also important for mutual relations between Western Allies and the Soviet Union. The crucial event in relations among the Allies was a "percentages agreement," an agreement made during a meeting between Churchill and Joseph Stalin in Moscow from 9-17 October 1944.¹⁶ The agreement on the Balkans included the division into spheres of influence in Yugoslavia, and it was suggested they should have 50 percent each. Aware of the fact that such an agreement primarily affects the actual situation on the ground, during a meeting with the members of Imperial General Staff, on 30 October 1944, British Prime Minister expressed concern that the ports of Rijeka and Trieste might fall into Yugoslav Partisans hands by February.¹⁷ On the same day, in his telegram to General Hastings Ismay, Churchill warned of the inefficiency of the plans presented by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers.¹⁸

The Anglo-American military commanders considered the northern Adriatic area in the context of further military operations. At the beginning of January 1945, Field Marshal Alexander, for purely military reasons, responded to the British General Staff that it was acceptable for the Allied forces to control the communication from Trieste to Austria without forming

¹⁵ *Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije 1941-1945*, 2: 285-286.

¹⁶ Leo Mates, *Međunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Nolit, 1976), 30. [Leo Mates, *International Relations of Socialist Yugoslavia* (Belgrade: Nolit, 1976), 30.]

¹⁷ Biber, 361.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 362.

an Allied military government.¹⁹ Recognizing the political sensitivity of the issue, on 27 January 1945, Alexander explained his views in one of his reports for the conference in Malta.²⁰ He proposed the division of Venezia Giulia on the basis of Yugoslav-Italian border and reaching of the agreement with the Yugoslav Partisans while ensuring full control and operating of the port of Trieste.

The question of Yugoslavia was discussed from military and political aspects at the Yalta Conference, held 4-12 February 1945.²¹ At this meeting of Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt, allied military operations in Italy were considered and the withdrawal of German forces from the northern Adriatic territory was expected. The expected claims of Yugoslav Communists in Venezia Giulia, particularly Trieste, and parts of Austria, were also considered. Continuing the British policy of spheres of influence, Eden explained the reasons for which the British government considered it necessary to divide Venezia Giulia between Anglo-American and Yugoslav forces and handed over to the ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and the United States two memoranda regarding the Yugoslav-Austrian and Yugoslav-Italian border.²² The memoranda were accepted with the consent that they should be considered by „the usual diplomatic channels“ after the conference.²³ The formation of the Yugoslav government received joint support at the meeting of Yalta; a recommendation about Yugoslavia that had the character of conditional recognition of Tito-Šubašić agreement was adopted.

Given that the conference at Yalta did not give a direct answer regarding the British initiative on the issue of determining the northwestern border and the military administration in the territory of Venezia Giulia, on 15 February 1945, in the Embassy of Great Britain in Athens, a meeting was held that included Eden and Alexander, then the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean. Conclusions from the meeting in Athens and then from an 18 February meeting with the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Forces in the Mediterranean in Caserta, and from a meeting held two days later in Rome, presented the basic guidelines for the distribution of Venezia Giulia, which

¹⁹ Alice Hills, *Britain and Occupation of Austria, 1943-1945* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 121.

²⁰ Uroš Kostić, *Oslobođenje Istre, Slovenačkog primorja i Trsta 1945* (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1978), 25. [Uroš Kostić, *Liberation of Istria, Slovenian littoral and Trieste* (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1978), 25.] See also *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1955).

²¹ Biber, 442.

²² "British Proposal Regarding Venezia Giulia, Yalta, February 10, 1945," *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, 888-889.

²³ Kostić, 27.

Alexander had agreed with Tito in talks held from 21-24 February 1945 in Belgrade.²⁴

The arrival of the Yugoslav forces in Trieste on 1 May 1945 provoked a crisis that threatened to lead to an armed conflict between the Yugoslav and Allied forces.²⁵ The diplomatic moves of all actors of the May 1945 crisis, unambiguously confirmed the strategic importance of Trieste and the interests of the great powers in Venezia Giulia.²⁶ Both British and American governments confronted a territorial expansion of Yugoslavia but in choosing foreign policy resources they had to take into consideration the support that the Yugoslav government was receiving from the Soviet government at that time.²⁷ Although declarative, the Soviet support could easily turn into a direct and open military support.

The British government justified its policy with the fact that the Soviet government wanted to have Trieste for access to the Mediterranean.²⁸ Therefore, the refusal to surrender the part of Venezia Giulia to Tito might induce him to seize all of it. As a direct consequence of the Belgrade agreement, after the military operations of Anglo-American forces and the Yugoslav army in late April and early May 1945, Venezia Giulia was divided.²⁹ This created the possibility that the Yugoslav army units, as the Allied forces, with the occupation of Venezia Giulia could attempt to achieve a long-term foreign policy goal of the Yugoslav government – the annexation of Trieste and Venezia Giulia to Yugoslavia.

On 18 April 1945, in his message to Stalin in connection with the progress of Yugoslav Army units towards Trieste, Churchill expressed his dissatisfaction with the fact that “Marshal Tito completely took over the dominance.”³⁰ The diplomatic consequences of military operations resulted in serious deterioration of relations between the Yugoslav government and the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. Further food

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 40, and Hills, 122.

²⁵ “The Crisis in Trieste and Venezia Giulia,” *Current Intelligence Study* 22 (1 June 1945), http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp (accessed 15 May 2010).

²⁶ Cox Geoffrey, *The Road to Trieste* (London: William Heinemann, 1947); John C. Campbell, ed., *Successful Negotiation. Trieste 1954. An Appraisal by the Five Participants* (Princeton, N. J.: 1976); and “Military Occupation of Trieste: Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and the Judicial System,” *Stanford Law Review* 4, no. 1 (December 1951): 112-124.

²⁷ N. S. Timasheff, “The Soviet Union and World Peace,” *Review of Politics* 8, no. 4 (October 1946): 461. About territorial claims, see Andrew F. Burghardt, “The Bases of Territorial Claims,” *Geographical Review* 63, no. 2 (April 1973): 225-245.

²⁸ Edvard Kardelj, *Sećanja*, NIRO Radnička štampa, Državna založba Slovenije (Beograd: 1980), 54. [Edvard Kardelj, *Memoirs* (Belgrade: 1980), 54.]

²⁹ Mates, 72.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 30.

and war materiel delivery to the Yugoslav army by the Allies was brought into question, as was the possibility of an armed attack on the Yugoslav units. The crisis was temporarily resolved with the signing of the "Agreement for the Provisional Administration of Venezia Giulia" in the form proposed by the British and American governments, between Yugoslavia on one side and Britain and the United States on the other side, on 9 June 1945 in Belgrade. Venezia Giulia was divided into two parts, and Yugoslav government promised to withdraw their units west of the demarcation line by 12 June. In the Duino Agreement, which was signed on 20 June 1945, the demarcation line between the Allies and Yugoslav zones was specified, a place to house the Yugoslav unit of 2.000 men was determined, the modalities of the Allied occupation of Pula were established, and a free transfer from one zone to another was provided as well as the organization of a railway and maritime transport between the two zones.

The wartime coalition of major powers showed its dissatisfaction with the future constitutional status of Venezia Giulia. The first hints of conflict could be noted in Stalin's letter of 21 June 1945 to United States President Harry S. Truman and to Churchill. Stalin „draws attention“ to the Trieste situation expressing his belief “that in respect of Trieste-Istria the Yugoslav interests shall be met, particularly bearing in mind that the South Slavs came halfway in the main issue to the Allies.”³¹ Churchill's 23 June 1945 response pointed out to serious disagreements regarding the division of spheres of influence and the beginning of conflicts between the wartime Allies. Churchill shows disrespect to the British-Soviet agreement from October 1944 about the areas of influence. According to Churchill, it led to a situation in which the British and American governments had to put in motion hundreds of thousands of troops to prevent these being attacked by Tito. Churchill pointed to the unsustainability of one “russified” border which would go from Lübeck through Eisenach to Trieste and then through Albania, and warns that it is “a question that requires a lot of negotiations between good friends.”

In May-June 1945, the viability of the coalition between the Soviet Union and Western countries was seriously threatened. During June 1945, the American and British governments were faced with communication problems with the Soviet government, which brought into question their earlier agreements. Letters were exchanged that hinted the beginning of the Cold War. With the Belgrade and Devin agreement the territorial dispute was not permanently solved, and the territorial status of Trieste and Venezia Giulia still remained a problem between the major powers.³²

³¹ Milkić, 80.

³² Jonathan Knight, “Russia's Search for Peace: The London Council of Foreign Ministers, 1945,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 13, no. 1 (January 1978): 140.

After World War I, through the action of the people's society, an attempt is made to reject the concept of the balance of powers in international relationships and implement the concept of collective security. Even though this concept turned out to be unsustainable with the outbreak of the World War II, at the end of the war the balance of powers had once again become a dominant concept between major powers. There were substantial differences between the American, British and Soviet governments about the organization of the post-war world. During the war, the British government, led by Churchill, aimed to protect its influence in the Mediterranean from the Soviet influence and to maintain the balance of powers in Europe. During the war years, most of American diplomacy and President Roosevelt was concerned more with attempting to establish a multi-lateral world than with national spheres of influence. At the time, the outcome of the Second World War was quite certain, and on 12 April 1945, Roosevelt died. In July 1945, the Labour Party won the elections in UK and was more focused on social issues and internal development of the state. Unlike Churchill, it was not preoccupied with the matters of high politics and British domination. There was a change in the balance of power and the United States under Truman took the lead among Western nations. This was the period when Soviet leader Stalin began distancing the Soviet Union from his Western Allies. Stalin, who had already started imposing Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, expressed at the Potsdam Conference his wider ambitions and intention to dominate other parts of the world. After the Second World War period, President Truman's dominant influence on decision-making and problem-solving was notable within the antifascist coalition. The American administration solely influenced on the solution of various issues related to the post-war development of Europe and the world. The changes that have occurred in relations between the most powerful states affected the post-war arrangement of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Communist leadership position within the anti-fascist coalition after World War II.

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